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HISTORY  
OF THE  
PENINSULAR WAR.

---

“Unto thee  
“Let thine own times as an old story be.”  
DONNE.

---

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POET LAUREATE,

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MDCCCXXXVII.

Ἱστορίας γὰρ ἔαν ἀφέληται το διὰ τί, καὶ πῶς, καὶ τίνος χάριν  
ἐπράχθη, καὶ το πραχθέν ποτερα ἔυλογον ἔσχε το τέλος, το κατα-  
λειπόμενον αὐτῆς ἀγώνισμα μὲν, μάθημα δὲ οὐ γίγνεται· καὶ  
παραυτικά μὲν τερπει, πρὸς δὲ τὸ μέλλον οὐδὲν ὠφελεῖ τὸ παρά-  
παν.

POLYBIUS, lib. iii. sect. 31.



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# HISTORY

## OF THE

### PENINSULAR WAR.

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#### CHAPTER XLI.

(CONTINUED.)

GUERRILLAS, AND THEIR EXPLOITS. SIR ROWLAND HILL'S SUCCESS AT  
ALMARAZ. BATTLE OF SALAMANCA.

AT this time, when nothing could be expected from the Spanish armies, the Guerrillas acted in larger *May, 1812.* bodies than before, and engaged in more difficult *Duran enters Soria.* enterprises than they had yet undertaken. Duran having obtained a plan of the fortifications of Soria from an architect who resided there, resolved upon attacking that city as an important post, from whence the French commanded a considerable extent of country. Soria, which stands on the Douro, near the supposed site of Numantia, and contained about 1,100 families in the middle of the last century, is surrounded by an old wall eighteen feet in height and six in thickness, to which some works adapted to a more modern art of war had been added; the suburb also had been fortified, and the castle strengthened. He approached the city by a circuitous route (during a most tempestuous night of wind and snow, which froze as it fell,) and reaching *March 18.* it at daybreak scaled the walls, forced the

suburb, and obtained possession of the city. The enemy retired into the castle, and Duran prepared to besiege it, setting fire to four convents to clear the way for his operations.

The adventurers had arrived in fortunate time, for the morrow was St. Joseph's day, when a ball and supper were to have been given in honour of the Intruder for his name's sake, and the delicacies which had been prepared for this occasion served to regale these unexpected and unwelcome visitors. Battering-rams were employed with great effect against the old walls, that the city might no longer afford protection to the French; the public money was seized, great quantities of grain and biscuit dispatched by all the means of transport which could be found, and a contribution levied upon the inhabitants, for hitherto they had contributed nothing to the national troops, being under the yoke of the French, and thinking it evil enough to pay what the invaders exacted; but the Guerrillas admitted of no such excuse: they supposed the people to be rich because it was a trading city, and many who had formerly been rich proprietors dwelt there; the contribution, therefore, was not likely to be lightly imposed. Duran enrolled also such men as he thought fit for service, ordered others who might have been serviceable to the enemy to leave the city, and retreated himself without loss, when a detachment arrived from Aranda to the succour of the garrison.

This enterprise led to a tragedy characteristic of the spirit in which the war was carried on on both sides. The French, who had come in time to save the castle of Soria, obtained intelligence that the Junta of Burgos were in a village called Grado; and there, under the guidance of a Spanish traitor, Moreno by name, a party of 450 horse, making a march of fourteen leagues in less than four-

*Members of  
the Junta  
of Burgos  
seized by  
the French  
and put to  
death.*

*March 21.*

and-twenty hours, surprised them early in the morning. Some twenty soldiers with their commander were found fast asleep, and made prisoners, as were three members of the Junta and the secretary of the Intendency : but more persons escaped than were taken, though the enemy set every house on fire, with the intention of burning those who might have hidden themselves. As soon as the news was known, Duran and the Junta of Soria sent to the French commander in that city, reminding him that the prisoners taken there had been treated with humanity, and threatening reprisals if the persons who had now been captured should be put to death. This was of no avail. The vice-president of the Junta, D. Pedro Gordo, who was the parochial priest of Santibañez, was inhumanly scourged by Moreno, . . perhaps from some impulse of private enmity : the prisoners were then conducted to Aranda, from whence the soldiers contrived to effect their escape. Navas, the secretary of Gordo, and the two other members of the Junta, D. Jose Ortiz de Covarrubios, and D. Eulogio Jose de Muro, with a young lad, son of the former, were sent in irons to Soria, there to be tried by the criminal Junta of that city. The trial, which took place during the night, occupied five hours, all the formalities of *April 2.* justice being observed ; and the boy, whom because of his youth it would have been monstrous to condemn, was acquitted : the other four were sentenced to death, and four priests were ordered immediately to attend them ; but no more time was allowed than was necessary for bringing together and forming the soldiers who were to conduct them to the place of execution.

The different behaviour of the sufferers was such as deeply to affect the spectators. Ortiz was greatly moved at the thought of leaving his son fatherless and destitute ;

but overcoming that emotion with a Spaniard's feeling, he commended the boy to God as the orphan's Father, and called upon the Lord to receive his soul as a victim for his religion and his country. The priest held a crucifix in one hand as he went to execution, and beat his breast incessantly with the other; and while tears of ardent devotion streamed down his cheeks, implored with a loud voice forgiveness for his own sins and for those of the people. Muro, who was a much younger man than either, was of a weak constitution, still further weakened by the fatigues he had undergone in the performance of his duties; so that what with ill treatment, and what he had suffered during twelve days' imprisonment, there seemed to be an entire prostration of his strength; faintings and cold sweats succeeded each other, and it was thought he would expire before he could reach the place where he was to be put to death. He had asked earnestly for a crucifix; the priest who attended him not knowing for what service he had been summoned had improvidently left his house without one; he gave him therefore in its stead a rosary, with a medal attached to it, on which was the image of Our Lady of the Pillar. Muro had studied in the university of Zaragoza, where it is said he had never omitted, for a single day, to visit and adore the tutelary idol of that city; and this trifling circumstance, which at any other time would have appeared to him light as air, acted upon him now in a manner that might seem miraculous or incredible to those who cannot comprehend the force of imagination and the strength of a believing mind; for no sooner had he seen what image the medal bore, than, as if by an influx of divine support, he put off all weakness and proceeded to the place of death with a firm step and a cheerful countenance, and

*Circum-  
stances  
of the exe-  
cution.*



ejaculations of jubilant devotion. When they came to the foot of the hill on the top of which they were to suffer, "Up, brothers!" he exclaimed, "up! let us ascend this our Mount Calvary, where it is vouchsafed to us that we should imitate our Redeemer! I pray and trust that this hour our offences shall be blotted out by virtue of the blood which on his holy Calvary he shed for our sins." In this spirit he knelt down upon the fatal spot, raised his eyes to heaven, and presented his breast to the soldiers. The Spaniards compared the circumstances of this man's death with what the French themselves had related of Marshal Lasnes, how after he had received his mortal wound, a visit from Buonaparte comforted and for a while revived him: "Let patron," said they, "be compared with patron, client with client, and cause with cause!"

The bodies of these victims were suspended from the gallows till the following day, when the French gave orders that they should be taken down and buried. But the execution had been an act of impolitic severity: after Duran's recent visit the national cause would not have been popular in Soria, unless the national feeling had been thus provoked; and that feeling was now manifested in a manner which the invaders had not looked for. The clergy, the nobles, the different brotherhoods of the city, and the people assembled: the bodies were carried to the church of St. Salvador in procession, with a long line of tapers, and a most numerous attendance; they were then dressed in grave clothes with becoming decency, that of the priest in his sacerdotal habits. So public and ostentatious a funeral was considered by the French an insult to their authority; soldiers, therefore, were sent to interrupt it, and some of the attendants were compelled to carry the bodies back to

*Treatment  
of their  
bodies.*

the gallows and hang them there again, the priest in his alb, the others in their shrouds; there they remained many days, and what the birds and the dogs had left was then buried at the foot of the gallows.

When D. Jose O'Donell, who commanded what was called the 2nd and 3rd army then in Murcia, *Retaliatory executions.* received official intelligence of these executions, he wrote to Duran, as acting commander in Aragon and Soria, and instructed him to put to death ten prisoners, without distinction of rank, for each of the four victims, first apprising the nearest French commandant that he had received these orders, and should act upon them unless such reparation were made as might be deemed proportionate to the offence. Without waiting for such instructions, the Merino had exacted vengeance upon a larger scale. Having defeated a considerable body of the French who had marched from Aranda, to collect requisitions, killed and wounded some 150 and taken about 500 prisoners, he put 110 of them to death, twenty of these being in reprisals for each member of the Junta of Burgos; the others, at the rate of ten for each of his own people whom the French had executed. The other prisoners were marched into Asturias where opportunity might be found for embarking them; but all the officers, twelve in number, including the lieutenant-colonel, their commander, were reserved to be shot unless General Rey, who commanded at Burgos, would rescue them from that fate by delivering the traitor Moreno into the Merino's hands. The unhappy prisoners are said to have addressed a letter to Rey, entreating him to save their lives by complying with this proposal, for they well knew that in these cases the Spaniards never failed to execute what they threatened. The issue has not been related, but may easily be guessed, as it was scarcely possible that

the French commander should so far break his faith with a Spaniard in the Intruder's service as to deliver him to certain death.

There were no persons whom the Spaniards regarded with such hatred as those who had forsaken the national cause, and entered into the Intruder's *El Manco.* service. Albuir, known as a Guerrilla chief by the name of El Manco, had taken this course, and became therefore a special object of vengeance to his countrymen: it is the only instance of any man who had acquired celebrity as a Guerrillero becoming a traitor, while in the officers of the army such cases were not unfrequent: this was because the regular officers were men, who, having entered the service either as a matter of course or of compulsion, felt severely the poverty of the government, and often had little else to do than to talk of its errors, complain of its abuses, and speculate upon its hopeless condition; whereas the Guerrilla leaders led a life of incessant activity and animating hope, and most of them were impelled to that course by a strong feeling either of their country's injuries or of their own.

At this time Lord Wellington's successes had animated the Spaniards with a hope of deliverance, and made the French more intent upon extirpating *Mutual retaliation.* those persons who, by keeping up the national spirit in what they deemed the subjected provinces, occupied a large part of the invading force. They attempted to surprise the Junta of Aragon, as they had that of Burgos, and a detachment from Palombini's troops nearly effected this at Mochales, in the lordship of Molina: the Junta escaped, but the enemy sacked the village, stripped the women in the market-place, and hung the alcalde and two other persons; in reprisals for whom, Jabarelli, the late commandant at Calatayud, and ten other prisoners, were shot by the Spaniards. Vicente Bonmati, the



leader of a Guerrilla-party, had been put to death at Petrel, in Valencia, with circumstances of peculiar cruelty; the French having tied his hands, transfixed them with a bayonet, and then parading him through the streets, pricked him with their bayonets till he died. Upon this the Camp Marshal Copons, provincial commandant-general in that kingdom, gave orders to shoot the first prisoner who should be taken, and informed the nearest French commandant, that for every other such execution twenty prisoners should be put to death. Such reprisals were but too characteristic of a vindictive people, capable of inflicting as well as enduring anything; but they were evidences also of that high-mindedness which the Spaniards retained in their lowest fortune; never abasing themselves, never submitting to the insolent assumption of authority, nor for a moment consenting that might should be allowed to sanction injustice. Their parties, meantime, acquired a confidence from their own experience, and from the success of their allies.

*May 5.* Mendizabal appeared before Burgos, and drove the enemy from the monastery of Las Huelgas and the hospital del Rey. Duran entered Tudela by escalade, and destroyed a battering train of artillery which had been brought thither from Zaragoza, with the intent, he supposed, of laying siege to

*May 28.* Ciudad Rodrigo. The Empecinado attacked the French in Cuenca; they withdrew from it in the night, and he destroyed their fortifications there, and set fire to the Inquisition. Mina received information that a strong convoy was about to set forth from Vittoria for France, escorting some prisoners taken from Ballasteros. He determined to intercept them upon the plains of Arlaban, which had been the scene of one of his most successful exploits in the preceding year; and in order to deceive the enemy, he wrote letters which were thrown

*May 30.*



into their hands, declaring his intention of marching upon the river Arga, to form a junction at the foot of the Pyrenees with two of his battalions. The enemy, supposing that this dreaded commander was far distant, began their march: his orders were, after one discharge to attack with the bayonet, and that no soldier should touch the convoy on pain of death till the action was ended. It was of no long duration; the vanguard were presently slaughtered; the centre and the rear, consisting of Poles and of Imperial Guards, made a brave but unavailing resistance: from 600 to 700 were slain, 500 wounded, and 150 taken, with the whole convoy, and about 400 prisoners set at liberty. M. Deslandes, the Intruder's private secretary, was in the convoy; he got out of his carriage, and endeavoured to escape in a peasant's dress, with which it seems he had provided himself, in anticipation of some such danger; but this disguise cost him his life, which would have been saved had it been known in time who he was. His wife, an Andalusian lady, with two of her countrywomen, who were married to officers in the enemy's service, fell into Mina's hands. Very few would have escaped if the French had not erected a fort at Arlaban, in consequence of their last year's loss, and this served as a protection for the fugitives.

Some letters from the Intruder were found upon his secretary. One was to Buonaparte, reminding him how, when he returned to Spain at his desire twelve months before, his Imperial Majesty had told him, that at the worst he could quit that country in case their hopes should not be realised, and that then he should have an asylum in the south of the empire. "Sire," said he, "events have deceived my hopes; I have done no good, and I have no hopes of doing any. I entreat your Majesty, therefore, to let me resign into

*April 9.*

*Intercepted  
letters from  
the In-  
truder.*

your hands the right to the crown of Spain, which four years ago you deigned to transfer to me. I had no other object in accepting the crown than the happiness of this vast monarchy, and it is not in my power to effect that. I entreat your Majesty to receive me into the number of your subjects, and to believe that you will never have a more faithful servant than the friend whom nature has given you." There were other letters of the same date to his wife, whom he had left in Paris, and who was to deliver that which he had written to the Emperor only in case the decree for uniting to France the provinces beyond the Ebro should have been published ; otherwise she was to await his farther directions. In another letter to her he said, that if the Emperor made war against Russia, and thought his presence in Spain could be useful, he would remain there, provided that both the military and civil authority were vested in him ; otherwise his desire was to return to France. Should there be no Russian war, he would remain with or without the command, provided nothing were exacted from him which could make it believed that he consented to a dismemberment of the monarchy : provided also that troops enough and territory enough were left him, and that the monthly loan of a million, which had been promised, were paid. In that case he would remain as long as he could, thinking himself as much bound in honour not to quit Spain lightly, as he should be to quit it, if, during the war with England, sacrifices were required from him which he neither could nor ought to make, except at a general peace, for the good of Spain, of France, and of Europe. A decree for uniting to France the provinces beyond the Ebro, if it arrived unexpectedly, he said, would make him depart the next day ; and if the Emperor should adjourn his projects till a time of peace, he must supply him with means of subsistence during the

war. But if he inclined either to his removal, or to any of those measures which must cause him to remove, it was then of great consequence that he should return to France on kindly terms with the Emperor, and with his sincere and full consent; and this was what reason dictated to him, and what was more conformable to the situation of the miserable country over which he had been made king, and to his own domestic relations. In that case, he asked from the Emperor a domain in Tuscany, or in the south, some three hundred leagues from Paris. The course of events, and the false position in which he found himself, so contrary, he said, to the rectitude and loyalty of his character, had greatly injured his health: he was growing old; nothing but honour and duty could detain him where he was, and his inclination would drive him away, unless the Emperor explained himself in a different manner from what he had hitherto done. There was also a letter to his brother Louis, expressing a hope to see him one day in good health, and with the happiness which arises from a good conscience. . . That happiness the intrusive king Joseph might well envy! It is little excuse for him that he was more weak than wicked, and in mere weakness had consented to be made the instrument of his brother's insatiable ambition. Even in these letters, where he manifested a full sense of his humiliating situation, no consciousness is expressed of its guilt. For the sake of his own credit, and no doubt of his own personal safety, he protested against any immediate dismemberment of Spain; but he would have been contented to serve his brother's purpose, by nominally retaining the kingdom, till a pretext could be found for dismembering it at a general peace.

But how long he should retain it depended upon something more than the will and pleasure of Napoleon



Buonaparte, and this he was soon made to apprehend.

*Sir Row-  
land Hill's  
expedition  
to the  
bridge of  
Almaraz.*

Lord Wellington was not about to remain idle with his victorious army ; he prepared for offensive operations, and the first step was to interrupt the communication between the armies of Soult and Marmont. All the permanent bridges on the Tagus below that of Arzobispo had been destroyed ; and the only way which was practicable for a large army was by a bridge of boats at Almaraz, in the line of the high road, where the noble bridge erected in Charles the Fifth's time, at the city of Plasencia's cost, had been demolished. For the protection of this important post, the French had thrown up strong works on both sides of the river : they had formed a flanked *tête-du-pont* on the left bank, riveted with masonry and strongly intrenched ; and on the high ground above it they had constructed a large and strong redoubt, called Fort Napoleon, with an interior intrenchment, and a loop-holed tower in its centre ; here they had mounted nine pieces of cannon, and had garrisoned it with between 400 and 500 men. On the right bank, there was a redoubt called Fort Ragusa, in honour of Marshal Marmont, of the same strength and construction, except that the tower had a double tier of loopholes ; this flanked the bridge, and between the redoubt and the bridge there was a *flèche*. For farther security, the invaders had fortified an old castle commanding the Puerto de Miravete, about a league distant, being the only pass for carriages of any kind by which the bridge could be approached. A marked alteration of climate is perceptible upon crossing the narrow mountain ridge over which the road here passes. Coming from Castille, the traveller descends from this ridge into a country, where, for the first time, the gum-cistus appears as lord of the waste, . . the most beautiful of all shrubs in the Peninsula for the profusion



of its delicate flowers, and one of the most delightful for the rich balsamic odour which its leaves exude under a southern sun; but which overspreads such extensive tracts, where it suffers nothing else to grow, that in many parts both of Portugal and Spain it becomes the very emblem of desolation. The old castle stood at little distance from the road, on the summit of the sierra: the French had surrounded it by a lower *enceinte*, twelve feet high; they had fortified a large *venta*, or travellers' inn, upon the road, and had constructed two small works between the inn and the castle, forming altogether a strong line of defence.

Sir Rowland Hill, to whom this important service had been intrusted, broke up from Almandralejo on the 12th of May, with part of the 2nd division of infantry, and six of the 24-pounder iron howitzers which had been used against Badajoz. The Marquis de Almeida, who was a member of the Junta of Extremadura, accompanied them, and from him and from the people, Sir Rowland received the most ready and effectual assistance which it was in their power to bestow. On the morning of the 16th they reached Jaraicejo, an old and decayed town, about eight miles from the summit of the pass; and on the same evening they advanced in three columns . . the left, under Lieutenant-General Chowne, toward the castle of Miravete; Sir Rowland himself, with the right under Major-General Howard, toward a pass through which a most difficult and circuitous footpath leads by the village of Romangordo to the bridge; and the centre, under Major-General Long, along the high road, to the Puerto. The artillery was with the centre: both the flank columns were provided with ladders, and it was intended that both should escalate the forts against which they were directed; but the difficulties of the way were such, that it was found impossible for them to

reach their respective points before daybreak : as the enemy, therefore, could not be taken by surprise, Sir Rowland judged it best to defer the attack till they should be better acquainted with the position and nature of the works ; and the troops bivouacked on the sierra. It was found that the castle, because of its peculiar situation, could not be carried without a long operation : a false attack therefore was directed to be made upon it by Lieutenant-General Chowne, and Sir Rowland, with the right, and the 6th Portuguese caçadores (about 2,000 men in all), on the evening of the 18th began to descend by the mountain path which he had originally proposed to take. They were provided with twelve scaling-ladders of sixteen feet in length ; and he relied, as in this case he well might do, upon the valour of the troops, to supply the want of artillery. Although the distance was little more than six miles, the way was so difficult, that notwithstanding all the exertions of officers and men the head of the column did not arrive near the fort till it was break of day, and it was two or three hours later before the rear came up ; but during this time the troops were completely concealed by the hill, and the feint against the castle had induced the enemy to believe that the bridge forts would not be attacked till the pass should have been forced, and a way made for the guns.

Could the attack have been made before day, it was intended that the *tête-du-pont* should have been escalated, and the bridge destroyed at the same time *May 19.* that Fort Napoleon was assaulted ; but well knowing how much depended upon celerity, Sir Rowland did not wait till the troops who were appointed to this part of the operations could come up ; with the first battalion of the 50th and one wing of the 71st, he escalated the fort in three places nearly at the same time. At first a determined resistance was made, but the enemy soon slack-

ened their destructive fire: they took to flight as soon as the assailants were on the top of the parapet; they abandoned the tower, and were driven at the point of the bayonet through their entrenchment, and through the *tête-du-pont*, and across the bridge. The commander of Fort Ragusa on the opposite bank, with a cowardice rarely shown among French officers, but with a selfish disregard for the soldiers which was too common among them, cut the bridge, in consequence of which many leaped into the river and perished, and 259 were made prisoners, including the governor and sixteen officers; and acting with further folly in his fear, he evacuated his own fort, which was perfectly safe from any attack, and retired with his garrison to Naval Moral, three leagues off, for which he was brought to summary trial at Talavera and shot. . . Both forts were entirely destroyed by the conquerors, and the whole apparatus of the bridge, and the stores, which were in such abundance as to prove that this point had justly been considered a most important station by the enemy. The loss in this signal enterprise was, two officers and 31 men killed, 13 and 131 wounded.

The garrison ought to have been prepared for such an attack; for Marmont had apprehended it, and in that apprehension had marched a detachment to the Puerto del Pico, with the view of reinforcing Talavera in case the bridge should be lost. Sir Rowland retired by Truxillo to his former position in front of Badajos; and on the second day after his success, a division of the central army, under General d'Armagnac, crossed the Tagus by the Puente del Arzobispo, to relieve the isolated garrison at Miravete. Both Soult and Marmont had put their forces in motion as soon as they were informed of Sir Rowland's march: the latter arrived upon the Tagus too late to prevent the evil, and without the means of



repairing it; the former, when he found that the allies had passed Truxillo on their return, gave up the hope of intercepting them. He returned to Seville, and, regarding with uneasy apprehension the enterprising spirit of an enemy whom he had once affected to despise, gave directions for strengthening the line of the Guadalete, lest a force should be landed at St. Roque's or at Algezirás, and endanger his communication with the besieging army before Cadiz. Bornos, as the most important point upon

*Ballasteros  
defeated at  
Bornos.*

the line, was fortified with great care. Ballasteros thought to interrupt the progress of the works, and accordingly brought all the force he could muster, consisting of about 6,000, to attack the French division there of 4,500 under General Corroux. Collecting his troops at La Majada de Ruiz, and marching from thence early in the afternoon of one day, he succeeded in fording the Guadalete unperceived at dawn on the next. The attack was made bravely, but, with the usual ill fortune and ill discipline of a Spanish army, some mistake led to confusion, and confusion was followed by panic: the French were not strong enough to pursue them beyond the river, and Ballasteros retired with the loss of about 1,000 killed and wounded, and half as many prisoners, . . a fourth of his whole force.

*June 1.*

Meantime Badajoz had been fully supplied; the means of transport which had been used for that service were then employed in storing Ciudad Rodrigo; a month's consumption for the whole army was deposited there; the bridge at Alcantara was repaired for a readier communication with Sir Rowland's corps; and on the 13th of June the army broke up from its cantonments on the Agueda. On the 16th they came up with the enemy, about six miles from Salamanca, on the Valmusa, and there was a skirmish with their cavalry;

*Lord Wel-  
ington ad-  
vances into  
Spain.*



in the evening the French withdrew across the Tormes, and the army bivouacked within a league of Salamanca.

When the earliest accounts of Spain begin, Salamanca was already a considerable place, and known by *Salamanca*. a name little different from what it bears at present.

It fell to decay after the Moorish conquest, but was re-peopled at the same time with certain other towns upon the Tormes, by the Leonese in the 10th century, after the great battle of Simancas: in the 13th King St. Ferdinand removed thither the university from Palencia. It soon became one of the most flourishing seats of learning in Christendom, and continued to be so till Spain rejected the light of the reformation. In its best days it is said to have contained no fewer than 8,000 native students, and 7,000 from foreign countries: when the present war began, the number little exceeded 3,000, among whom a few Irish were the only foreigners. The population consisted of some 3,400 families: it had once been much greater. But Salamanca was still an important and a famous place: popular fiction had made its name familiar to those who are unacquainted with its history; while to the antiquary, the historian, and the philosopher, it is a city of no ordinary interest. The Roman road, which extended from thence to Merida, and so to Seville, may still be traced in its vicinity: its bridge of twenty-seven arches, over the Tormes, is said to be in part a Roman work. The Mozarabic liturgy is retained in one of its churches. Its cathedral, though far inferior to some of the older edifices, whether of Moorish or Gothic architecture, in Spain, is a large and imposing structure. Twenty-five parish churches are enclosed within its walls, twenty convents of monks or friars, eleven of nuns: these, with its numerous colleges, give it an imposing appearance from without, and a melancholy solemnity within. Nowhere, indeed, were there more munificent

endowments for education, and for literature, and for religion; and nowhere could be less of that happy effect which the benefactors in their piety had contemplated: the philosophy which was taught there was that of the schoolmen, the morality that of the casuists, the religion that of the Inquisition. It is a popular belief in Spain, that the Devil also has his college at Salamanca, where students of the black art take their degrees in certain caverns, every seventh being left with him, in earnest of the after-payment to which they all are bound.

The city stands in a commanding situation on the right bank of the Tormes, a river of considerable magnitude there, which rises near the Sierra de Tablada in Old Castille, and falls into the Douro on the Portuguese frontier, opposite Bemposta. The country round is open, without trees, and with a few villages interspersed, in which the houses are constructed of clay. On the left of the river there are extensive pastures, on the right a wide and unenclosed corn country. The pastures are common, and the arable land occupied after a manner not usual in other parts of Spain: it is cultivated in annual allotments, and reverts to the commonalty after the harvest.

Marmont had apprehended this advance of the allies, and had applied for reinforcements without effect. He showed some cavalry and a small body of infantry in front of the town, and manifested an intention of holding the heights on the south side of the Tormes; but in the evening of the 16th the enemy withdrew over the river, and the allies bivouacked within a league of Salamanca. The French retired from that city during the night, leaving some 800 men in the fortifications which they had constructed there. These works commanded the bridge; the left column of the allied army therefore crossed at the ford of El Campo, a

league below the city, the centre and the right at the ford of Santa Martha. The utmost joy was expressed by the inhabitants when the English entered, and women crowded to thank Lord Wellington and bless him for their deliverance. Some aching hearts there were among those who had connected themselves by marriage, or by looser ties, with the enemies of their country, but the general feeling was that of perfect and grateful joy ; for though this city had suffered none of the immediate evils of war, its consequences had been severely felt there. During the three years of its captivity the French had demolished thirteen of its convents and twenty-two of its twenty-five colleges ; the people had been compelled to labour upon works erected for their own subjugation ; and the last act of the enemy before they left the city, was to set fire to such houses as obstructed the defence of their works, . . . consisting of a fort and two redoubts. For the same reason they had previously demolished the Convent of St. Augustine, the colleges of Cuenca and Oviedo, and the magnificent King's College. The *Siege of the fort was formed out of the Convent of St. Vicente, forts there.* a large building in the centre of the angle of the old wall, on a perpendicular cliff over the Tormes. The windows had been built up and loopholed ; on both sides it was connected by lines of works with the old wall. There was a fascine battery in a re-entering angle of the convent, not enclosed by these lines, and this was protected by a loopholed wall, with a palisade in front. *Col. Jones's sieges. 158-9.* The demolition of so many substantial edifices supplied timber of the best quality, and in abundance, for gates, drawbridges, palisades, and splinter proofs ; and the whole was well flanked in every part. The ground to the south, which was toward the bridge, fell by a steep descent : at the bottom was a small stream flowing to the Tormes ; and on the opposite bank the



convents of San Cayetano and La Merced had been converted with great skill into two redoubts, with well-covered perpendicular escarpes, deep ditches, and casemated counterscarps ; they were also full of bomb-proofs, made by supporting a roof horizontally and vertically with strong beams, and covering it with six feet of earth. These works were seen at once to be far more respectable than Lord Wellington had expected to find, his information amounting to little more than that some convents had been fortified. It was necessary to reduce them before the army could advance, but the means of attack had been provided on this inadequate knowledge : they consisted of only four iron eighteen-pounders and four 24-pounder iron howitzers, with an hundred rounds for each. The engineers had only 400 intrenching tools, without any stores ; there were present three engineer officers, with nine men of the corps of royal military artificers ; and the works were soon found to be even more formidable than they appeared.

The sixth division broke ground before the fort. The left wing of the army moved to Villares de la *June 17.* Reyna, a league in advance of Salamanca ; the right and centre bivouacked on the Tormes, near Santa Martha, on the right bank. Lieutenant-Colonel Ponsonby's brigade followed the retiring enemy, and skirmished with them for two leagues. A battery was erected for breaching the main wall of the fort. It was nearly full moon ; little could be done therefore during the first night. An attempt to blow in part of the counterscarp opposite to the intended breach, was frustrated by the vigilance of a dog ; and an attempt at mining it failed also, the party being ordered to withdraw in consequence of the loss sustained by a plunging fire from the top of the convent. On the second night two batteries were completed : they opened the following morn-



ing, and beat down part of the wall; but the enemy's musketry fired with great effect from loopholes in the upper windows, and their fire was more than ordinarily destructive, because of the large openings of the embrasures which were necessary for such short pieces as the howitzers. More ammunition was sent for to Almeida. Early on the third day, the lower part of the convent wall, three feet and a half thick, was pierced through, and at a single shot half the length of that face of the building came down, bringing the roof with it, and laying the interior open: the men were seen firing through the loopholes at the moment of its fall, and they of course were buried in the ruins. Carcasses were then fired into the convent, to set it on fire, but the enemy's precautions prevented them from taking effect.

Marmont at this time moved forward from Fuente Sabuco, making the most display of the force which he could then bring together: it was estimated at about 16,000 men. He advanced as if with a determination of giving battle, firing artillery the whole way to give the forts notice of his approach. Lord Wellington immediately formed the allied army upon the heights: his left, where the rains had formed a deep ravine, rested on a chapel; his centre was in the village of S. Christobal de la Cuesta, and his right on another eminence in front of Castellanos de los Moriscos. . . The advanced posts retired before the enemy with little loss; there was a considerable cannonade on both sides; the enemy's cavalry were dislodged by our guns from the position in which they had halted; and Marmont, after manœuvring for some time in front of the position, took up ground in the plain below it, near the village of Vilares, and just out of cannon-shot, his right resting upon the great road to Toro, his left in Castellanos de los Moriscos. The allies were under arms at day-light, expect-

*Marmont  
moves to re-  
lieve them.*

ing an attack. In the course of the day the French received reinforcements, but not sufficient to justify them in bringing on an action, scarcely in exposing themselves to one. Both armies remained quiet in front of each other, the allies on the heights, the French close under their position, occupying Castellanos de los Moriscos in force, and having a considerable bivouac between that village and another on their right: both villages were soon completely unroofed for firewood, and there were wells in both, whereas the allies were badly off for wood and water, which were brought to them in insufficient supply from Salamanca. There was not a tree on the position; but the midsummer sun was less powerful than it usually is in that country, and the troops did not suffer from heat.

During the night, the French occupied an eminence on the right flank of the allies. Sir Thomas Graham was directed to dislodge them. The 58th and 61st carried the hill immediately, and drove them from the ground with considerable loss. The enemy's troops got under arms, expecting a general attack, but they made no attempt to regain the hill. They retired in the night, and on the following evening posted themselves with their right on the heights near Cabeza Vellosa, their left on the Tormes at Huerta, their centre at Aldea Rubia, their object in this movement being to communicate with the garrison. Lord Wellington therefore changed the front of his army, placing the right at S. Martha, and the advanced posts at Aldea Lingua; and he sent Major-General Bock's brigade of heavy dragoons across the river in order to observe the fords. By this time a battery which had been opened on the Cayetano redoubt had beaten down the palisades and injured the parapet; and when night closed 300 men from the 6th division were ordered to attack it by escalade. The un-

dertaking was difficult, and the men seemed to feel it. Major-General Bowes went forward with the storming party; he was wounded, returned to the attack as soon as his wound was dressed, and was then killed. The enemy made so resolute a resistance, that only two ladders were reared against the redoubt, and no one mounted them: 120 men were killed or wounded in this unsuccessful attempt. On the following evening a truce was made for removing the killed and wounded; till then the French would neither allow them to be removed, nor remove them themselves.

There had been a report on the preceding afternoon, that the enemy had crossed at Huerta. Lord Wellington was on the hill at Aldea Lingua by *June 24.* daybreak. It was certain that they had made some movement, but the morning was so foggy that nothing could be seen. Soon Major-General Bock's brigade was heard skirmishing, and from their fire it was evident that they were losing ground. The French had crossed about two in the morning in considerable force; and when the fog cleared General Bock was seen retiring in the best order before superior numbers, who had also the advantage of having artillery with them. Lord Wellington, upon the first certainty that the enemy had passed the Tormes, ordered the 1st and 7th divisions, under Sir Thomas Graham, to cross and take up a position to the right in front of Santa Martha, and Major-General Le Marchant's brigade of cavalry was sent to support General Bock; the rest of the army he concentrated between Castellanos de los Moriscos and Cabrerizas, keeping the advanced posts at Aldea Lingua. The French, who had crossed with 10,000 infantry and fourteen squadrons of horse, gained possession of Calvarasa de Abaxo; but seeing the disposition which was made for their reception, they did not venture upon an attack. About three



in the afternoon they began to withdraw, and before night they had repassed the river to their former position. The allies also recrossed.

Both armies remained quiet during the following day, but on the next night a communication was carried along the bottom of the ravine between the redoubts and the fort, and a piquet was lodged under the gorge of S. Cayetano. On the morrow a supply of ammunition arrived, and red-hot shot were then fired against *Surrender of the forts.* San Vicente. By the third shot the roof of a large square tower on the convent was set on fire and consumed; but the conflagration did not spread, and during the day wherever fires broke out they were speedily extinguished. The inhabitants said that the powder in the fort was well secured; but no activity on the enemy's part could long counteract the means of destruction which were now employed. Hot shot were fired during the whole night: by ten in the morning the convent was in flames. At the same time a breach had been effected in the gorge of S. Cayetano: the troops were formed in readiness for assaulting it, when a white flag was hoisted there, and the commanding officer offered to surrender that and the other redoubt in two hours, which time he asked for that he might represent his situation to the commandant in San Vicente. Lord Wellington offered him five minutes to march out, in which case he should preserve his baggage; but it presently appeared that he was only negotiating for the sake of gaining time, as in fact he could not venture without the commandant's sanction to carry into effect the capitulation which he had offered. He was ordered, therefore, to take down his white flag. The commandant meantime sent out a flag of truce, and proposed to surrender San Vicente in three hours: five minutes were allowed, and as at the expiration of that short term there was no appearance of their



coming out, both redoubts were stormed, and carried with little resistance. The troops moved forward against the fort: a few shot were fired from it, by which six men were killed or wounded; but with that the resistance ended: the enemy even helped the Portuguese caçadores into the work, and Lord Wellington allowed them to march out with the honours of war, but to be prisoners of war, the officers retaining their personal military baggage, and the soldiers their knapsacks. There were 36 pieces of cannon in the forts, with large depôts of clothing, and military stores of every kind: these were consigned to the Spaniards, and the works were destroyed. The prisoners were somewhat more than 700; the loss of the besiegers about 450.

Marmont commenced his retreat at midnight, as if, said the Spaniards, he had only come thither to witness the capture of his fort, and see the illumination made by it when on fire. At daylight their column was nearly out of sight, and their rear-guard moving off the ground. During this tarriance the French, considering that part of Spain no longer as a subjected but as a hostile country, had acted in the same spirit of disgraceful barbarity as had rendered their name execrable in Portugal; and when they departed they left the villages of Castellanos de los Moriscos, Huerta, Babila Fuente, Villoria, and Villaruela in flames: where they did not burn the villages they sacked the houses, and murdered those who had ventured to remain in them; and where they did not trample down the standing corn, they set fire to it. The popular feeling had been strongly manifested during the operations against the forts: not only were all necessaries and accommodations for the wounded abundantly supplied, but women of all ranks offered their services to attend on them. High mass was performed this day in the Cathe- *Marmont falls back upon the Douro.*

dral, at which Lord Wellington and most of the general officers attended. Lord Wellington gave a dinner in Salamanca, and the Junta a ball in the evening; but some of the principal inhabitants absented themselves because they were partisans of the French, and others from a prudential fear, lest the enemy should return and again obtain possession of the city.

The French withdrew their garrison from Alba de Tormes, and retired towards the Douro in three columns . . one upon Toro, and the others upon Tordesillas. The allies broke up the next day, following their march, and encamped upon the

*June 29.  
Lord Wel-  
lington ad-  
vances to  
the Douro.*

Guarena. On the morrow Marmont had collected his force, as if with an intention of making a stand on the right bank of that river; his rear was on the hills in front of Alaejos: they moved off before the advanced guard could come up. The allies bivouacked every night in an open country, without a tree to shade them, and where it was necessary to seek for wood at the distance of several miles, the inhabitants frequently using straw for fuel. The enemy continued to fall back toward the Douro, closely followed by one who would let no opportunity escape him. On the 2nd of July their cavalry were on the plain toward Tordesillas, and they had a considerable force of infantry in Rueda; but they were compelled to withdraw from thence, and the town was occupied by the advance of the allied army. On the following day, this part of the army was ordered into the plain, as if with a view of attacking Tordesillas; while the left column, strengthened by the brigades of Generals Bock and Le Marchant, moved on Pollos, where there is a ford. There was some cannonading on the part of the enemy there, and an affair of light troops; and some of the allies passed the river, but they were withdrawn at night: it was then seen that there was no intention of forcing

the passage, and orders were given for the distribution of the army. Lord Wellington fixed his head-quarters at Rueda. The French occupied Tordesillas in force: they had a considerable bivouac in the rear of that town, and the bridge there was fortified.

After the recapture of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos, Marmont could not be surprised that the forts at Salamanca fell, even if he had known with what scanty means they had been attacked; and as he had not been brought to action, his army took credit to themselves for having braved a superior force. The French had lost much of their confidence in battle against the English, but they still relied upon their skill in manœuvring; and Marmont, knowing that he should soon have the advantage in numbers, availed himself of all the opportunities which the nature of the country afforded him for gaining time. He was in possession of the line of the Douro.

That river rises in the Sierra de Orbion, in Old *The Douro.* Castille, issuing from a large and deep tarn, high on the mountain: passing the site of Numancia, it comes to Soria, and so to Berlanga, Osma, and Santesteban de Gormas: in this part of its course its banks are remarkable for the jessamine with which they are profusely clothed. Having left Aranda, it passes by the Cistercian monastery of Valbuena, a place denoting by its name the happy circumstances of its position, and where the monks used to account among the goodly things which had fallen to their lot the barbel and trout with which the Douro supplied them. The Pisuerga, having already received the Arlanza and the Carrion, joins it by Simancas; and though it brings the larger body of water to the junction, loses its name there. The Douro then makes for Tordesillas: for the first ten leagues of its way its course is s. s. w., then westward till it reaches this old city, where it bends to the southward for a few



leagues, passing S. Roman de Hornija, the now obscure burial-place of Chindasuintho, one of the most powerful of the Wisigoth kings; then it resumes its western course, waters Toro and Zamora, cities of great name in the Spanish annals, and having collected all the rivers of Leon on its way, enters Portugal. Of all the rivers in the Peninsula, the Douro has the longest course. From its junction with the Pisuerga, till it receives the Tormes on the frontier of Portugal, it flows through a wide valley, the right bank for the most part skirting the heights. The French were in possession of all the bridges, and from the mouth of the Pisuerga to Zamora there is but one point favourable for passing an army from the left in presence of an enemy: that point is three leagues above Toro, at Castro Nuño, where there is a good ford, a favourable bend in the river, and advantages of ground. There could be little hope, therefore, of striking an efficient blow against Marmont so long as he kept his force concentrated behind the Douro, and it was in his power to cross the river at any of its bridges or fords whenever he might think that opportunity invited.

*Colonel  
Jones's  
account of  
the war, 2.  
100.*

But the French, according to the barbarous system which Buonaparte pursued, were without magazines, and trusted to their command of the country for subsistence: Marmont therefore had this anxious object to distract his attention; and the Guerrillas were actively employed both upon his flanks and rear in intercepting his supplies, and in occupying troops who would otherwise have reinforced him. Two parties under Sorniel and Bourbon, with 700 cavalry were on the right; D. Julian Sanches, with 500, on the left; while Porlier displayed his usual activity on the side of Asturias; and Mina and Duran in Navarre and Aragon: on that side their efforts were effectual:

*Marmont  
reinforced  
by G. Bon-  
net.*



but General Bonnet joined him from the north, and increased his force to 47,000 men, thus making it numerically superior to that of the allies. Lord Wellington's situation was at this time an anxious one: he had counted upon the aid which the Gallician army might have given him in occupying some of the enemy by besieging Astorga; in that undertaking, however, they were more dilatory than had been intended; and he was now aware that the force intended to cooperate with him by acting upon the eastern coast was upon so small a scale, that he could place little hope upon it, and no reliance. The French suffered at this time nothing for want of magazines or means of transport, because they took what they wanted, and preyed upon the country. The British Government would not, even in an enemy's territories, carry on war upon so inhuman and iniquitous a system; but it exposed its army to privations, and its general to perplexities and difficulties which might have paralysed any weaker mind than Lord Wellington's, by the parsimony with which it apportioned his means. When he advanced from Salamanca, there were but 20,000 dollars in the military chest: the harvest was abundant, but how was bread to be obtained without money? . . . and the same want would be felt in bringing his supplies from Ciudad Rodrigo, and other places in the rear of that fortress. The very difficulty of removing his wounded to the frontier of Portugal was sufficient to deter him from seeking an action on the Douro.

On the 15th and 16th, Marmont concentrated his troops between Toro and San Roman: two divisions crossed the bridge at Toro on the evening of the 16th, and Lord Wellington moved the allies that night to Fuente la Peña and Canizal, intending to concentrate them on the Guarena. But it was

*Lord Wellington retires before him.*

ascertained next day, that during the night the enemy had repassed the bridge, and destroyed it after them; then making forced marches to Tordesillas, which is six leagues above Toro, crossed again there, and early on the morning of the 18th were on the Trebancos. Marmont might well applaud himself both for the celerity and the skill of these movements: he had marched forty miles; had opened his communication with the army of the centre, which was then moving from Madrid to support him; and by advancing in force on Castrejon he endangered the light and 4th divisions, with Major-General Anson's brigades of cavalry, which there had not been time for calling in. The enemy commenced a very heavy cannonade against the cavalry; they were scattered about in squadrons, and so escaped without much loss; and immediate measures had been taken to provide for their retreat and junction. The troops at Castrejon maintained their posts till the cavalry joined them; then they retired in perfect order to Tordesillas de la Orden, and thence to the Guarena, having the enemy's whole army on their left flank or in their rear; and the French getting possession of the heights above that river, before the allies had crossed, brought forty guns to bear upon them, under the fire of which they joined the army on the left bank. Four streams which unite about a league below Canizal, form the Guarena: the French crossed at Castrillo, a little below the junction, and manifested an intention to press upon the left of the allies; with this view they endeavoured to occupy a ridge above Castrillo, but Lieutenant-General Cole's division advanced to meet them with the bayonet; they gave way; the cavalry charged, General Carrier and between 300 and 400 men were made prisoners, and one gun taken. In the course of the day, the allies lost about 100 in killed, 400

wounded, and 50 prisoners; but the check which Marmont received made him more circumspect in his movements.

The allies took up a position for the night on the Guarena, from Castrillo on the left, to beyond Canizal on the right. The enemy occupied the opposite side of the valley with their whole force. Both armies remained quiet till two in the afternoon of the *July 19.* following day, when the French withdrawing all their troops from the right marched by Tarazona, as if with an intention of turning the right of the allies. Counter-movements were consequently made; the artillery fired at the enemy's advance, and in that dry season the corn took fire in several places, and burnt for a mile in extent. Lord Wellington expected a battle on the plain of Vallesa in the morning, and made every preparation for it; the men bivouacked in two lines in order of battle, and stood to their arms at daybreak, ready to receive an attack; but as soon as it was light, the enemy were seen moving in several columns to their left, on Babilafuente; the allies made a correspondent movement to the right: at any moment either commander might have brought on a general action; but it was a game of skill in which they were engaged, not of hazard. Marmont's march was estimated at five leagues, that of the allies at four, being in the inner circle; they moved in parallel lines, frequently within half cannon shot. The enemy encamped that night at Babilafuente and Villamela; the allies at Cabeza Velloso, the 6th division and a brigade of cavalry being upon the Tormes at Aldea *July 21.* Lengua. On the following day, the French crossed that river by the fords near Alba and Huerta, and moved by their left towards the road leading to Ciudad Rodrigo. In the evening the allies crossed also, part by the bridge at Salamanca, part by the ford of



Santa Martha. A dreadful storm came on of thunder and lightning with heavy rain ; the different divisions of infantry were seen by the lightning marching to their ground, their muskets reflecting the flashes. The 5th dragoon guards had just got to their ground ; many of the men had lain down ; their horses were fastened together by their collars for the night, but terrified by the lightning, they set off full gallop and ran over the men, eighteen of whom were hurt ; and two and thirty horses were lost, having probably gone to the enemy's lines.

It was evident from Marmont's manner of manœuvring, that he did not mean to attack the allies, unless at such advantage as might seem to render his success certain ; and it seemed not less evident, that by pursuing this system, turning their flank and keeping possession of the heights, he would drive them to the frontier if they continued to act upon the defensive. All the stores which were at Salamanca were ordered to the rear of the army, and the inhabitants were in the utmost consternation, apprehending, not without good apparent reason, that they should presently be brought under the yoke of the French again. Lord Wellington had placed the troops in a position, the right of which was upon one of two heights called the two Arapiles ; and the left on the Tormes below the ford of Santa Martha. The enemy had still a large corps above Babilafuente, on the right of the river ; for this reason, the 3rd division and Brigadier-General D'Urban's cavalry were left on the same side at Cabrerizos ; and Lord Wellington thought it not improbable, that when Marmont should find in the morning that the allies were prepared for him on the left of the Tormes, he would alter his plan, and manœuvre by the other bank. In the course of the night he was informed that the cavalry and horse-artillery of the army of the north had arrived at Pollos to join Marmont, and that they would



effect a junction with him the next day, or the day after at latest. During the night the enemy took possession of Calvarasa de arriba, and of a height near that village called Nuestra Señora de la Peña; the allied cavalry were in possession of Calvarasa de abaxo, which is between three and four miles from the upper village, and near the river.

The last night's storm had not cleared the atmosphere, and the morning rose threateningly, in clouds. *July 22.*  
The French were early in motion, and from the *Battle of*  
manner in which they marched and counter- *Salamanca.*  
marched their troops, it was impossible to divine what might be their intention. Soon after daylight detachments from both armies attempted to gain the yet unoccupied Arapiles hill; but the enemy had been concealed in the woods nearer that point, and their infantry were discovered on the summit when the allies were in the act of advancing to it: their detachment was also the strongest. By occupying this point they materially strengthened their own position, and were the better enabled to annoy that of the allies. Early in the day the light troops of the 7th division and the 4th *caçadores* of General Pack's brigade were engaged with the enemy on the height of N. Señora de la Peña, which they gained and kept through the day. But the possession of the farther Arapiles by the French made it necessary for Lord Wellington to extend the right of his army to the heights behind the village of that name, and to occupy that village with the 4th division under Lieutenant-General Cole. Doubtful as Marmont's intentions still were, the British commander judged that his objects were on the left of the Tormes, and therefore he ordered the 3rd division and D'Urban's cavalry from the other bank, and placed them behind Aldea Tejada.

During these movements the French kept up a heavy

cannonade and fire of light troops. The day, meantime, had cleared. Their force was formed in columns of attack in rear of the Arapiles hill, the left resting upon an extensive wood; thence they could either by a rapid march interpose between Lord Wellington and Ciudad Rodrigo, or wait an opportunity for debouching from behind the Arapiles, and separating the corps of his army. Marmont was too skilful a tactician himself not to perceive that all his movements were watched by one who well knew how to counteract them; nevertheless, hoping to deceive his antagonist, he marched a strong force to the right and formed columns of attack opposite the 5th division, which was in rear of the village of Arapiles. Lord Wellington soon perceived that nothing serious was intended by this manœuvre, and returned to direct the operations of his right, which he now threw back to that side of the Arapiles, forming nearly a right angle with that which he had occupied in the morning. About two in the afternoon the French Marshal perceiving that his last demonstration had produced no effect, pushed forward his columns rapidly to the left, with the intent of turning the right flank of the allies, and interposing between them and Ciudad Rodrigo. Till now the operations of the day had induced a belief in the British army that it was intended only to meet manœuvre by manœuvre, and to continue their retreat as soon as it was night. Indeed the army of the centre, with the Intruder at its head, was on the way to join Marmont within three days' march, and a considerable body of cavalry and horse artillery was still nearer. But Lord Wellington had anxiously been looking for the opportunity which was now presented him: he was at dinner when information was brought him of this movement, which was made under cover of a heavy cannonade, and accompanied with skirmishers in his front and on his flank, and with a body of

cavalry who made the British dragoons and light troops give way before them. But the generals of division had either misunderstood or ill executed their commander's intentions, and they weakened their line by dangerously extending it: Lord Wellington at once perceived this; he rose in such haste as to overturn the table, exclaiming, that Marmont's good genius had forsaken him: in an instant he was on horseback, and issued his orders for attack.

The right he reinforced with the 5th division, placing it behind the village of Arapiles, on the right of the 4th, and with the 6th and 7th in reserve. These having taken their stations, he ordered Major-General Pakenham to move forward with the 3rd and General D'Urban's cavalry, and two squadrons of the 14th light dragoons under Lieutenant-Colonel Hervey, in four columns, to turn the enemy's left on the heights, while Brigadier-General Bradford's brigade, the 5th division, under Lieutenant-General Leith, the 4th, under Lieutenant-General Cole, and the cavalry under Sir Stapleton Cotton, should attack them in front, supported in reserve by the 6th and 7th under Major-Generals Clinton and Hope, and D. Carlos d'España's Spanish division; Brigadier-General Pack, with the 1st and 16th Portuguese regiments, was to support the left of the 4th division, by attacking the hill which the enemy held. The first and the light divisions occupied the ground on the left of the Arapiles in reserve.

As soon as the formation was effected, the attack commenced from the right. Major-General Pakenham moved along a valley at a quick rate, crossed the extended left of the enemy, almost before they were aware of his intention, drove them back in confusion and overthrew everything before him. Brigadier-General D'Urban's Portuguese cavalry and Lieutenant-Colonel Hervey's squadrons of the 14th, supported him in the most gallant



style, defeated every attempt which was made upon his flank, cut in upon the enemy's broken infantry, and put numbers of them to the sword. The attack in front was made with equal ardour: the fifth division had been exposed for about an hour to a continued and heavy cannonade; no orders were ever more welcome to the soldiers who were stretched on the ground to avoid its effects, than those which bade them advance against the enemy. The distance was more than a mile, up a steep height crowned by twenty pieces of cannon, and their left had to pass through the village which formed a considerable obstruction; they advanced in perfect order, not firing a shot till they had gained the summit, from whence the guns which had annoyed them were hastily withdrawn, nor till they had received the fire of the enemy, who were formed into squares to resist them. When they were within some thirty yards the word was given to fire and charge; this instantly threw the squares into disorder; the heavy cavalry coming up on the right increased their confusion; they fled then, and in their flight fell in with the remains of their extreme left, flying before Major-General Pakenham's division. Lieutenant-General Leith was severely wounded in the act of breaking into the squares. Pakenham and the cavalry constantly bringing up their right, so as to outflank the points on which the French attempted to make a stand, drove them from one height to another and made above 3000 prisoners. The 4th and 5th divisions acquiring in like manner strength upon the enemy's flank in proportion as they advanced, carried height after height, till at length the enemy's left rallied on their centre; and on the last height, after its crest had been gained, one division of their infantry charged Cole's division, which, after a severe contest, in which Cole was wounded, gave way.



This temporary success was owing to the failure of Pack's attack upon the Arapiles; it was bravely made, but the Portugeze failed to carry it against the disadvantage of such strong ground; the attempt, however, was not without some good effect, for it occupied troops who would otherwise have been engaged against General Cole in his advance, and who were not now at leisure to oppose him, till, notwithstanding this temporary success, it was too late. Beresford, who happened to be on the spot, directed a brigade of the 5th division, which was in the second line, to change its front, and bring its fire on the enemy's flank; while thus engaged he was wounded. Three British generals had thus been disabled, and in a most successful charge against a body of infantry, Major-General Le Marchant was killed, at the head of his own brigade. Lord Wellington now ordered up the 6th division under Major-General Clinton. That division marching under a heavy fire deployed at the foot of a hill, and beginning then to fire regular volleys, suffered severely as it advanced; it was vigorously attacked by a body of cavalry which had been concealed behind the Arapiles, and for some minutes the contest appeared doubtful; but when Clinton was enabled to form his two right battalions into line, and charge, the French again lost heart, and abandoned the important point which they had till then maintained. Their right still resisted, having been reinforced by the troops who now withdrew in good order from the Arapiles, and by those who had fled from the left.

They re-formed and took up their ground with equal promptitude and skill almost at right angles to their original front, the infantry along the crest of the hill in line, supported by heavy close columns in reserve, the cavalry in masses on their flanks, and the artillery posted at the advanced knolls, so as to sweep the whole

face of the height. The 1st and light divisions were ordered against these, with two brigades of the 4th, to turn their right, while the 6th supported by the 3rd and 5th, attacked the front. Clinton advanced up the rocky and steep height in line, without firing a shot, and under a murderous fire of musketry and artillery: but he charged with the bayonet, drove them from a commanding conical eminence, and captured two guns. Their flank was attacked at the same time; and then, beaten at all points, they fled through the woods towards the Tormes, cavalry, infantry, and baggage all mixed together. The defeat was complete, and so would have been the destruction, if darkness had not opportunely covered their flight. Lord Wellington, with the 1st and light divisions, and Major-General William Anson's brigade of the 4th, and some squadrons of cavalry under Sir Stapleton Cotton, pursued them towards Huerta and the fords of the Tormes, as long as any of them could be found together; but night soon put an end to the pursuit, and enabled great numbers who had been taken prisoners to escape. A sentinel mistook Sir Stapleton Cotton in the dark for an enemy, fired, and wounded him.

This memorable battle, which lasted from three in the afternoon till ten at night, took place within sight of the city; the ground with its heights rising gradually one behind another, forming, as it were, a fine theatre for such a spectacle. On the part of the allies, nearly 5000 were killed and wounded. General Le Marchant's loss was greatly regretted: he was a native of Guernsey, who having served in the light dragoons under the Duke of York in the years 1793 and 1794, applied himself with zeal and ability to the study of his profession, introduced the Hungarian sword exercise into the British army, and drew up a manual for the use of the cavalry, which was

published by the war-office. The royal military college was in great measure planned by him; he was appointed lieutenant-governor of that institution, and discharged the duties of the office till 1811, when he could no longer retain it, being promoted to the rank of Major-General. He then joined the army in Portugal in command of a brigade, but had not been long in that country, when the unexpected death of his wife rendered it necessary that he should return to England for the arrangement of his domestic affairs: that mournful business having been performed, he rejoined the army, and shortly afterwards fell, being in the 47th year of his age. His eldest son, who was an ensign in the guards, was at his side when he fell. The Prince Regent manifested with proper munificence his sense of General Le Marchant's worth, by granting a pension of £300 to that son, £100 to each of three younger sons, and £120 to each of his five daughters. . . The loss of the French was very great; besides the dead and wounded, they left 7000 prisoners on the field. Eleven guns and two eagles were taken: it is said that more than ten were captured, but that there were men base enough to conceal them, and sell them to persons at Salamanca, who deemed it good policy as well as a profitable speculation, to purchase them for the French. Marmont was disabled early in the action, Bonnet also was wounded, and the command then devolved upon General Clausel, who was wounded also, but not so as to incapacitate him. Generals Ferey, Desgraviers, and Thomieres were killed.

At break of day, the pursuit was renewed with the same troops, and with Major-General Bock and Anson's brigades, which had joined them during the night. The first and light divisions were ordered to the ford of Huerta, Lord Wellington having supposed that the enemy must make their passage there, because the castle at Alba



de Tormes was occupied by the Spaniards; but the troops who garrisoned it had, without his knowledge, been withdrawn, so that Clausel, making a most rapid march during the night, crossed the river there without molestation. Having crossed in pursuit, the cavalry came up with the enemy's rear-guard of horse and foot between Garci Hernandez and Peñarandilla : a detachment from the 11th and 16th dragoons charged their cavalry, which fled, and left the infantry to their fate. Major-General Bock, then, with the heavy brigade of the King's German legion, attacked them, when posted upon a hill in square, and in what is described as one of the finest charges that was ever seen, rode completely through them. The whole body, consisting of three battalions, were made prisoners, the brigade losing in the charge 30 killed and nearly 50 wounded. In the course of the day, the enemy were joined by 1200 cavalry belonging to the army of the north, who, though too late to be of any greater service, covered the retreat of their centre to Peñaranda de Bracamonte : one column went by Macotora ; the other which had crossed the Tormes at Encina and Huerta moved on El Campo and Cebolla. They had their head-quarters at Flores de Avila, ten leagues from the field of battle, for a few hours on the second night, and hastened from thence by Arevalo, towards Valladolid. Their dead were found in many places by the road-side, and their stragglers met with as little mercy from the peasantry as they had been accustomed to show ; yet many of their rear-guard were taken without arms, having thrown them away as impediments in their flight.

The pursuit was continued on the 24th ; but the enemy made exceedingly long marches, and had little to encumber them while hastening to their resources both in men and means, and the pursuers having to



bring up their supplies far from behind could not keep up an equal pace. On that day they only came up with the rear-guard, which hastened away at their approach. On the following the advance halted for the army to close up; Colonel Arentschild's brigade entered Arevalo; and a non-commissioned officer's patrol captured two officers and 27 men of Joseph's own cavalry, in Blasco Sancho, between Arevalo and Avila. The Intruder had reached that place, hastening with the army of the centre to join Marmont upon the Tormes; he was met there with tidings of the defeat, and then turned towards Segovia, as if retreating upon Madrid: soon however receiving fuller advices, he endeavoured to divert the pursuers by threatening an advance upon their flank. The routed army, meantime, whose movements were conducted with great ability by Clausel, concentrated themselves on the right bank of the Douro, between Puente de Duero and the other bridge at Tudela de Duero; they crossed the river as soon as the allies advanced towards them, hastened to Valladolid, and making no tarriance there, continued their retreat to Burgos. Lord Wellington entered Valladolid on the 30th amid the acclamations of the people. There he discontinued the pursuit, and prepared to march against the Intruder, with the intention of either bringing him to action, or driving him from Madrid.

Meantime, a squadron under Sir Home Popham which sailed from Coruña, to co-operate with the Guerillas, and occupy the enemy upon the side of Biscay, rendered all the service which had been expected from it. Sir Howard Douglas and General Carrol embarked in the Venerable with Sir Home. They arrived off Lequeitio on the 18th of June, where the French had possession of a hill-fort, commanding the town, and strong enough to resist any

*Proceed-  
ings of Sir  
Home Pop-  
ham on  
the coast of  
Biscay.*

body of infantry; they had also 200 men fortified in a convent within the town, and into this the garrison retired when the Pastor D. Gaspar Jauregui arrived with his party to act in concert with the squadron. The convent might have been destroyed by the ships, but the town must in that case have suffered also; it was determined, therefore, to attack the fort, which was so situated that the enemy thought it quite inaccessible to cannon. They knew not what British seamen are capable of on shore. At a time when the sea broke with such violence against the rocks at the foot of the hill, that it was doubtful whether a boat could reach the land, Lieutenant Groves succeeded in landing a gun there. It was hove up for a short distance by a moveable capstan; but this was too tedious an operation, and it was dragged to the summit by six and thirty pair of oxen, 400 of the Pastor's men, and 100 seamen, headed by the Honourable Captain Bouverie. It was immediately mounted; the first shot was fired at four in the afternoon, and so well was it served, that by sunset a practicable breach was made. The Guerrillas volunteered to storm; they were repulsed in the first attempt, but succeeded in the second, and such of the enemy as escaped on the opposite side got into the convent. In the course of the evening the sea had abated, a landing was effected upon the island of S. Nicholas, from whence the convent could be battered without damage to the town; three carronades were planted there; at dawn, a 24-pounder was brought to the east side of the town, within 200 yards of the convent, and another was in the act of being landed upon the island to bombard it, when the French commandant beat a parley, and surrendered with 290 men. The Guerrillas had lost 50 in killed and wounded, not a man belonging to the squadron was hurt. The muskets, stores, and three small guns, which were

found there were given to the Pastor. Two 18-pounders in the fort were rendered useless; the fort itself was demolished and the convent blown up. The next morning a column of 1100 men were seen which had arrived within two leagues of Lequeitio, but hearing from the peasantry that the English had disembarked 2000 men, they retired. Some intercepted letters were now transmitted to Sir Home, by which the commandant at Guernica was instructed to prepare rations for a French general and 2600 of the Imperial Guards.

The squadron was now to have co-operated in an attack upon Bilbao, but the wind proved unfavourable for getting round Cape Machichago, and part of the ships fetched the anchorage of Bermeo. The enemy had retired from that place, leaving a small magazine of provisions in a fortified convent; these were distributed to the poor; and the battery on the hill *June 23.* and all the fortified places which the French had occupied were destroyed: the works at Plencia were in like manner demolished, and the batteries on each side of the inlet below the bar of the Ybeyzabal, or Narrow *June 24.* River, the beautiful and tranquil stream which forms the port of Bilbao: on one side were the castle of Galea, and the batteries of Algorta and Begona; on the other the batteries of El Campillo, Las Quersas and Xebiles. Early on the following morning some parties of the enemy entered the destroyed batteries of Algorta, but retired upon the squadron's making a disposition to stand up the inlet; they then formed in the plain, and were found to consist of 2000 men at Algorta, while 400 were sent to Puerta Galetta. Three of the British sloops closed with the fort there, silenced it, and drove them from thence. It was supposed that this was the corps for which rations had been ordered at Guernica, and that it had been thus drawn off from its original destination.



The squadron then made for Guetaria ; two companies  
*July 2.* of marines were landed for the purpose of reconnoitring the place, previous to an intended attack, but the Guerrillas who were expected to co-operate were engaged with the enemy in a different quarter ; parties of the French were seen crossing the hills ; the intention, therefore, was relinquished, and the marines re-embarked without loss. Sir Home  
*July 6.* then sailed for Castro, where Sir George Collier had landed a company of marines to assist Longa in a concerted attack. Longa was there at the time and place appointed ; more marines were landed, and guns with hearty exertions of well-directed skill were drawn up heights that might have seemed inaccessible to men less earnest in their duty. They were placing them in a battery to the east of the town, when 2500 of the enemy appeared on the heights of S. Pelayo ; the parties upon this were re-embarked, and Longa found it necessary to change his ground, after which he sustained an action, in which no advantage was gained over him. Somewhat disheartened by this, the French marched into the town that evening, and were driven out of it on the morrow by the fire of the squadron : they then took post on the hills, and under favour of the night retired towards Laredo. The castle then surrendered with 150 men, and having been put in a state of defence, was garrisoned by  
*July 10.* the marines and Spanish artillerymen of the Iris.  
*July 11.* Their next attempt was a combined attack upon Puerta Galleta, which was abandoned because the enemy were found to be in greater strength than had been expected ; the French on their part failed equally in endeavouring to recover Castro. Their moveable column had now been drawn by a feint to Santona ; from thence it could not reach Guetaria in less than four days ; another attempt therefore was



made upon that place in concert with the Pastor, and with one of Mina's battalions. The latter, after two days' severe march, did not arrive till it was too late; for when the enemy's guns on one side had been silenced, and a battery was ready to open upon them on *July 19.* the other, intelligence was received that a considerable body of French troops was hastening thither by forced marches. The Guerrillas maintained a brave action against them, till the superiority of the enemy's numbers was ascertained, and made it necessary for them to retreat; but this action prevented the re-embarkation of the British in time, so that two guns were in consequence destroyed, and 32 men made prisoners.

These operations of Sir Home Popham's squadron were of service in many ways. Troops were thus occupied who would otherwise have joined Marmont before the battle of Salamanca; the corps which relieved Gue-taria was recalled from that direction, and Caffarelli was prevented from sending the infantry who were to have assisted in driving the English into the Tagus. The ports which were liberated lost no time in conveying supplies to the free parts of the kingdom, and vessels from them arrived daily at Coruña laden with corn and wine. And the Guerrillas, as well as the regular troops of Spain, received a countenance and support which enabled them to hold towards the enemy the language of confident hope. Renovales, who was Commandant-General in Biscay, addressed a letter to the French Governor of Bilbao, General Roquet, remonstrating against the cruelties which General Mouton had committed with his column: "for the security of a fortress," he said, "or to prevent an insurrection, the rules of military precaution might render it proper to put some few persons of respectability in confinement, but that cottages and private dwellings should be outraged, and that peaceable

persons should be tortured by stripes, by the bayonet, and by fire, was what no laws of war could justify. The Spaniards were a people who might be softened by generosity though not subdued by it; but if this system of terror were persisted in towards them, . . if it were still to be war at the knife's point, the Biscayans, instead of yielding a foot to him, would meet him half way in such warfare. Four and twenty officers were in his hands, and should suffer for the next act of cruelty on the part of the French. He concluded by assuring Roquet that the day was not far distant when Bilbao would be delivered, and that he, Renovales, would then, at the head of 10,000 Biscayans, fulfil his duty as he had hitherto done, and first of all towards himself.

## CHAPTER XLII.

LORD WELLINGTON ENTERS MADRID. THE FRENCH RETIRE FROM ANDALUSIA. SIEGE OF BURGOS, AND RETREAT OF THE ALLIES.

BUONAPARTE could keep the French people ignorant of the course which events had taken in Portugal and Spain; but even the vigilance of his military tyranny could not prevent the Spaniards from knowing that the allies, having driven out the French from the one kingdom, had entered the other, and had recovered the two strong places of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz. Fresh appeals were made by the Intrusive Government to the fears and jealousies of a people whom they had now began to apprehend it would be found impossible to subdue. “What would it avail them,” it was asked, “if they were to set up Infantado, or the Empecinado, or Ballasteros, or any other of their countrymen for king? Wherefore should they persist in an obstinate and unavailing resistance after the Bourbon dynasty had been extinguished by that great man whom Providence had appointed to regenerate Spain, and who for their happiness had selected Joseph to reign over them? Why did they not rally round his throne?” The Spaniards only ridiculed such appeals; and the French themselves, in derision, called Joseph King of the Highways, as one whose authority extended no farther than his patrols and armies could enforce it. His was indeed a miserable condition; the brother, of whose wicked will he had, in

*July.*

*Appeal of  
the Intruder  
to the Spaniards.*

despite of his own understanding and heart, consented to become the instrument, regarded him with displeasure, because he had met with a resistance which was not to be overcome; the nation upon which he had been insolently intruded, regarded him with deeper hatred than perhaps had ever before been co-existent with the feeling of sincere contempt; the army by which alone he was scarcely supported despised him, and the French generals kept up towards him a semblance of respect.

But odious as the usurpation was everywhere, it was rendered peculiarly so at Madrid, by the presence of the Intruder and of his ministers. Being the seat of the Intrusive Government, more of those traitors were collected there who had made the miseries of their country a means for their own advancement; and as the commanders in other parts cared little for the necessities of the court, heavier imposts were exacted from the inhabitants, at the very time when a remission of taxes was announced in edicts, which, if intended to be executed, were never carried into effect. The duties payable upon the entrance and exit of wheat, rice, and pulse of every kind, were repealed by a decree, but continued to be exacted as before, and at the same time, new duties were imposed upon wine, oil, meat and vegetables. A loan of 20 million reales was soon exhausted, a contribution of eight millions was then demanded from the trading part of the people; and an equivalent proportion was taken in kind from the occupiers of land. Eight per cent. upon the value of houses were first required, then ten, and then fifteen; the poorest artisan was compelled to take out an annual license for the exercise of his calling; even the water carriers were subjected to this tax. Having collected a great quantity of grain, the Government sold it at a price more suited to its own wants than to the condition of the people: the hospitals were crowded with



sick and starving poor ; and of the persons who died during the first six months of this year, two-thirds perished in consequence of misery and want. Patient endurance was all that the people of Madrid could oppose to their oppressors ; but they lived in firm belief that the day of deliverance would come, believed every rumour of success on the part of their countrymen and their allies, and with the same determined will, discredited whatever was related of their reverses. They looked upon the account of Ballasteros's defeat at Bornos as so much exaggerated that it was unworthy of belief ; and with more reasonable incredulity when it was reported that Marmont had totally defeated the allies and taken 20,000 prisoners, while the French and their partisans congratulated each other upon the news, they required dates and details, and assured themselves that it was nothing more than one of the enemy's customary falsehoods.

Indeed, before the battle of Salamanca, it was made sufficiently apparent by circumstances which the French were unable to conceal, that however confidently they might expect some great success, they had as yet obtained none. The garrison at the Puerto de Miravete, which had been relieved after the destruction of the bridge at Almaraz, was withdrawn now, the Puente del Arzobispo was abandoned, and they withdrew also from Talavera, which was immediately entered by the Medico. Most of their garrisons at the same time withdrew from La Mancha, and they were followed by those miserable people, who, having accepted offices, whether high or low, under the Intrusive Government, dared not remain without French protection in any place where they were known. Exertions were made for fortifying Toledo ; and in the works which were carried on for the same purpose at the Retiro, the people of Madrid saw unequivocal proof, that the French

*Measures  
of Joseph  
before the  
battle of  
Salamanca.*

apprehended at least the possibility of an advance of the allies upon the capital. To prevent that danger, they had thus collected their forces from all quarters, thinking then to attack Lord Wellington with such superior numbers as would render success certain: but Joseph and M. Jourdan were too slow in moving from Madrid, and meantime Marmont had been too confident of his strength and of his skill. If he had delayed his passage of the Tormes only for two days, till the army of the centre should have joined, the enemy persuaded themselves that Lord Wellington could not have escaped from utter defeat, and that that victory would have secured the entire conquest of Spain.

The event could not be kept secret at Madrid; every one knew what no one dared publish; and while *Advance of the allies.* false intelligence was sedulously spread abroad by the Intrusive Government, and the police was more than ordinarily active in arresting suspected persons, every one congratulated his friends and neighbours upon a victory the extent of which was magnified in proportion to their hopes. They entertained no doubt but that Marmont had been killed, and his whole army destroyed. Lord Wellington moved from Cuellar on the 6th of August, leaving General Clinton's division there, and General Anson's brigade of cavalry to observe the line of the Douro. He arrived at Segovia on the 7th, and at S. Ildefonso on the 8th, the beautiful summer retreat of the kings of Spain: there he halted one day that the right of the army might have time to come up. The passage of the Guadarama mountains was effected without opposition. Brigadier-General d'Urban, with the Portuguese cavalry, the first light battalion of the German Legion, and Captain M'Donald's troop of horse artillery, drove in on the morning of the 16th, about 2000 French cavalry; they moved toward Naval Carnero, and returned

from thence in the evening with the Intruder himself, to make a reconnoissance. D'Urban formed the Portuguese cavalry in front of Majalahonda, and ordered them to charge the enemy's leading squadrons, which seemed too far advanced. The Portuguese pushed on, but unexpectedly disgraced themselves; their officers set them a brave example, but in vain, and the Visconde de Barbacena, who behaved remarkably well, was taken prisoner; the men turned about shamefully, fled through the village, and left the guns behind them which had been moved forward for their support. M'Donald's troop exerted themselves to bring them off, but owing to the rough ground, one carriage was broken, two were overturned, and thus the three fell into the enemy's hands. The German dragoons who had been formed behind the village rallied the fugitives, charged the enemy, and stopped their progress, but suffered considerable loss. In this affair, about 200 men were killed, wounded, or taken, and 120 horses. The left of the allied army being not three miles distant, two brigades of horse and foot moved forward to support the troops in advance; the French retired as soon as they saw them, and withdrew during the night, leaving the guns. The piquets of the allies took post that evening on the mountains, in sight of Madrid.

The enemy, who from Madrid had been looking through telescopes toward the passes of the Guadarama, had seen D'Urban's detachment on the evening of the 9th. Orders were then given and revoked by the resident members of the Government, with the precipitation of fear: it was determined to abandon the capital on the following morning, and the adherents of the Intruder prepared in all haste for their departure; some selling their goods for any price that could be obtained for them, others, intrusting them to the care of

*August.**Affair at  
Majalahonda.**The enemy  
retire from  
Madrid.*



their friends, and not a few soliciting the compassion of those who had been found faithful to their country. The families of these unhappy men were objects of compassion even to the populace, notwithstanding the indignation which was felt at the men themselves, who bitterly repented now, not so much their guilt as their short-sightedness in supposing that they had taken the stronger side. The troops under whose protection they retired would have saved them from any outrage or insult if any had been intended ; but they had not proceeded far from the gates before many of them were plundered by these protectors. Two of Joseph's ministers entered Madrid with a strong escort the next day, for the supposed purpose of destroying papers, and securing effects which could not be carried away in the hurry of the removal. They retired in the evening, and on the morning of the 12th all the troops who remained shut themselves up in the Retiro. The shops which, during the two preceding days, had been closed were then opened, and Madrid became a scene of such joy as had never been witnessed in the days of its proudest prosperity. Soon after middle day the allies began to enter through streets so crowded with gratulating multitudes, that the officers who were on horseback at the head of their men, could scarcely make their way, and scarcely keep their seats, so eagerly did the Spaniards press to shake hands with them, as if nothing but an English mode of greeting could make their exultation and their hearty welcome sufficiently intelligible.

Madrid had lost more than two-thirds of its inhabitants since its occupation by the French, but an influx of people from all the surrounding country now filled it as if there had been no depopulation ; and amid this multitude, on the following day, the new constitution was proclaimed by D. Carlos

*The allies  
enter.*

*The new  
constitution  
proclaimed.*



de España, who was appointed governor of the capital and province, . . a charge for which no one could be better qualified by clearness of judgment, and promptitude in executing what he saw to be right. Their acclamations were hushed as soon as they knew what they were called upon to hear; and the deep silence with which they listened to the constitutional act was interrupted only by the enemy's cannon from the Retiro, which seemed rather like a salute in honour of the ceremony, than an enemy's artillery employed in defence of their last hold in the capital. The act was received with exultant delight; young minds and generous ones, whose natural ardour enabled them to believe what they eagerly desired, persuaded themselves that the Spaniards had now established their freedom as well as achieved their independence; the happy days of Athens and of Sparta, they said, seemed to be restored; and the people of Madrid already appeared like a nation accustomed to liberty, and to deliberate concerning their own interests.

On that evening Lord Wellington invested the Retiro, where Marshal Jourdan, with little prudence, had left a garrison of 1700 men. At the eastern *The Buen Retiro.* extremity of Madrid, Philip II. had a small palace, or rather house of retreat, pleasantly situated by the Prado or public walk, on a rising ground, and immediately adjoining the convent of S. Geronimo. Philip IV. took a fancy to the site; and Olivares, whose chief object seemed to be that of amusing his royal master at whatever cost, purchased adjacent land enough for a large palace, with its gardens and a park four miles in circuit; and such enormous sums were lavished upon the edifice and the grounds, that the additional imposts which were required for this expenditure, or artfully, perhaps, imputed to it, were one of the causes which provoked the revolt in Catalonia, and occasioned the separation of

Portugal from the Spanish monarchy. The palace contained a theatre, spacious itself, and opening into the gardens, which might thus be made upon occasion a continuation of the scene; in this theatre the master-pieces of the Spanish drama were represented before a court who delighted in dramatic literature; and Ferdinand VI. gratified his dear Queen Barbara's hereditary love of music, with Italian operas, performed under Farinelli's direction. Formerly the Buen Retiro contained a large collection of pictures by the greatest masters of Italy, Spain, and the Low Countries; many of these were transferred to other palaces when this began to be neglected, and the French had now made spoil of the rest. But there were ceilings painted by Luca Jordano, which were not removable; and in a compartment of that in the great saloon, Spain was pictured, ruling the terrestrial globe, . . . a dream of ambition which her kings of the Austrian line had entertained, which the craftiest as well as the wildest heads among the Romish clergy encouraged, and which many circumstances seemed to concur in favouring, when, under the blessing of Providence, the Dutch, by their patriotic and religious virtue, averted that evil from the world. Two other noted works of art were still to be seen in the Buen Retiro; one, remarkable for its design, was a bronze statue of Charles V. trampling upon the Spirit of Reformation which lay, personified as Heresy in chains, at his feet; the other, which for the surpassing skill of the sculptor was even more remarkable, was an equestrian statue of Philip IV. cast by Pietro Tacca of Florence, weighing, it is said, not less than nine tons, and yet supported only by the hind legs, the horse being in the act of galloping. Within the precincts of the palace were many pavilions which used to be assigned to the courtiers when the court resided there. The gardens were of that formal style in

which art allows as little as possible of nature to be seen, . . where water is brought at great expense to spout from fountains and fill circular fish-ponds, the gardener exercises his topiary genius upon trees and shrubs, and humble evergreens are compelled to grow in fantastic patterns, like a vegetable carpet. The park was a thick wood, with broad avenues, a central pond having a pavilion in its centre, and a large piece of water at its termination, on which gilded gondolas awaited the king's pleasure when he was disposed to take the diversion of fishing, his retinue beholding the sport from the little pavilions which decorated its sides. Like all the other palaces of the kings of Spain, the Buen Retiro was a place in which a meditative beholder was forcibly reminded of the vanity of human greatness. Those kings, above all other European sovereigns, had been loved and revered by their people; their palaces were among the wonders of the modern world, and no expenditure, no efforts of ingenuity and art had been spared in embellishing their summer retreats: but these things had been grievously compensated, not alone by the never-ending anxieties of state, and the gloom of disappointed ambition, but by a more than ordinary share of the afflictions incident to human nature, coming upon themselves or their families, . . maladies of body and of mind alike incurable and painful; . . madness, fatuity, weak intellects, . . conscious of their weakness, and of the awful responsibility in which their birth had placed them, . . morbid consciences, and broken hearts.

After the accession of Charles III. the Retiro ceased to be a royal residence, and part of its buildings were converted into a royal manufactory of porcelain. Its park, however, continued to be a fashionable promenade, the more agreeable, because carriages were not allowed to enter; but the French had now made it a dépôt for



their artillery stores, the victims whom they arrested for political offences were confined there, and they had fortified it as a military post, but with less judgment than

*Surrender  
of the Re-  
tiro.*

their engineers had displayed on any other occasion. The outer line was formed by the palace, the museum, and the park wall, with flèches thrown out in part to flank it; the second was a bastioned line of nine large fronts, but with no outworks except a ravelin and a lunette; the interior was an octagonal star fort, closely surrounding what had been the porcelain manufactory. The garrison was far too small for the outer enceintes, and Marshal Jourdan had therefore left written orders, that if they were seriously attacked, they should confine their defence to the star fort, which, however, itself would be rendered nearly indefensible if the manufactory were destroyed. A copy of this order was found, and on the night of the 13th, Major-General Pakenham drove in their posts from the Prado and the botanical garden, made them retire from the outer enceintes, broke through the wall in many places, and established his troops in the palace. In the morn-

*August 14.*

ing arrangements were made for driving them from the bastioned lines, and for battering the manufactory; but the governor saw that resistance was useless, and he surrendered. The number of prisoners taken there and in the hospital amounted to 2500, and there fell into the hands of the allies 189 pieces of cannon, and above 20,000 stand of arms, with a great quantity of ammunition and stores of all kinds. The eagles also of the 13th and 51st regiments were found there, and sent to England.

*The consti-  
tution  
sworn to.*

The inhabitants of Madrid, who looked upon this strong hold of their oppressors as a Bastille, were desirous of thronging thither to see the place where so many of their countrymen had been



sacrificed ; but this was not permitted, both the British commander and the Spanish authorities seeking as much as possible to prevent any thing which might excite the vindictive feelings of the people. That same day, the churches in every parish were opened for administering the oath of fidelity to the new constitution ; and multitudes crowding thither with an eagerness which might well have excited apprehension of its stability, swore to they knew not what. Napoleon, it was said, had promised to regenerate them, and they were regenerated ; for through his means, who had intended nothing less, the Spaniard had been converted from a slave to a citizen ; the superstitious had thrown off his prejudices, the coward his fears, the credulous his credulity ; the idle had become industrious, the selfish man generous, and the reckless one had learned to think. While those who knew little of history and less of human nature exulted thus in the persuasion, that the habits of a whole people might be changed as lightly as an inconsiderate man changes his opinion, and that inveterate evils may suddenly be cured by legislation as if by miracle, and leave no scar behind ; the general joy was kept up by fast following tidings from all parts of successes, which, though little more than the necessary consequences in most instances of the battle of Salamanca and the occupation of Madrid, were considered each by the multitude as an important achievement in itself. On the same day that the Retiro was surrendered, the French withdrew from Toledo to join the army of the centre, with which the Intruder was retreating towards Valencia : they destroyed their artillery, and all the ammunition which they could not carry ; and hardly had they left the city before the Abuelo's party entered, and the bells rung, and the squares and streets were illuminated. *August 16.* Guadalaxara was attacked by the Empecinado, and after a vain resistance, above 700 French were

made prisoners there. The enemy retired from Logroño, and Duran hastened thither and destroyed its outer fortifications, its fort, and its inquisition. A detachment was sent from Zaragoza to bring away the garrisons from Tarazona and Borja, and destroy the works there.

General Foy, with 6000 infantry and 1200 horse, part *Gen. Foy's movement.* of Marmont's army, now under his command, moved from the neighbourhood of Valladolid with the intent of raising the blockade of Toro and Zamora, and the siege of Astorga. The garrison at Tordesillas, consisting of 250 men, had previously surrendered to

*August 17.* Santocildes. The Spaniards retired from before

Toro at their approach, in good order and with little loss; the enemy bringing off their garrison, were then joined by another body of equal force, and proceeded towards Astorga; 300 of their cavalry were sent forward to that city, but when they entered it they found that the Spaniards had withdrawn, and had marched the garrison, consisting of 1200 men, prisoners towards Coruña: for Castaños knowing that a force was advancing which his army was in no condition to meet, had successfully employed the easy artifice of representing to the commander that relief was impossible, and resist-

*August 18.* ance hopeless, and thus he had induced him to surrender. Foy was at Baneza, half way be-

*August 21.* tween Benevente and Astorga, when he received this mortifying intelligence; he then turned back to the Ezla, and marched upon Carvajales, thinking to surprise the Conde de Amarante, who with the militia of Tras-os-Montes, then serving voluntarily beyond their own frontier, was blockading Zamora; the Conde re-

*August 29.* treated without loss, and the French general bringing off the garrison marched for Tordesillas.

Some of the traitors who had made themselves con-

spicuous in the Intruder's service, fell into the hands of their countrymen at Guadalaxara; others who were conscious that they had been weak rather than wicked, and that in submitting to him for their own good, they had not aggravated the crime by injuring those who had persisted in their duty, presented themselves voluntarily to the newly constituted authorities in Madrid, thinking it better to take the chance of mercy, than to fly they knew not whither, without resources, without friends, and without the consolation which those who act righteously find in their own hearts. There were writers on this occasion who cried for vengeance in a most ferocious spirit. They called upon the people of Madrid to prepare graves for their guilty countrymen who had thus presented themselves at the foot of the gallows! They advised them to go to the governor, and with one voice require justice upon these wretches, as what the nation was entitled to demand; . . the sword for some, chains for others, and strict confinement till the conclusion of the war for those who were suspected, and who, if they were left at large, might act as secret agents for the French. This atrocious language failed of its intended effect, for the presence of the allied troops maintained order; and a vigilant police had been established, not for the oppression of the people, but for their security.

*Measures  
of police at  
Madrid.*

No needless severity was used. D. Carlos d'España made known by an edict, that persons of both sexes in that capital carried on a correspondence with those unhappy Spaniards who had followed the French, and that in this manner they supplied the enemy with intelligence; all such communication, therefore, was prohibited to all persons, on pain of being brought before a council of war, and condemned irremissibly to suffer the punishment appointed for spies. The families of the



fugitives, and of those who had enriched themselves by the purchase of what the Intrusive Government called national goods, were ordered to remain in their houses under the word of three respectable sureties, and not to leave them except for the purpose of attending their religious duties ; but their wives and daughters were advised to retire into a convent, as the course which consisted best with their own honour, and with that of their husbands and fathers, for whom they might there offer up their prayers, supplicating Providence to bring them in its mercy back to the path of duty which they had forsaken.

How to deal with the *juramentados*, as those Spaniards were called who had entered into Joseph's armies, was a question which now became of great importance. Hitherto it had been possible to execute the rigour of the law, and put to death those who were taken in arms against their country ; but the tide having now turned, it might reasonably be expected that they would eagerly desert a cause in which they had never heartily engaged ; and the policy of thus recruiting the Spanish army, instead of driving these men to despair, was so evident, that Alava, immediately on the occupation of Madrid, issued a proclamation, as commissary for the Government, inviting them to accept the free pardon which the Cortes had offered them on the publication of the new constitution. Great numbers in consequence came over. Another measure of the Intrusive Government, which was not less obvious and dangerous in its possible results, than the scheme of raising a Spanish force to be employed in the subjugation of Spain, was that of selling or otherwise disposing of confiscated houses and lands, and thus binding the new possessors to their allegiance by the only tie which they would not be likely under any circumstances to break. They had contrived thus to

connect with the French interest many who would have been unwilling or unable to purchase property of this description ; for under pretext of embellishing the capital, they pulled down about a fourth of it, and by way of compensating the owners of the demolished dwellings, assigned among them in exchange the houses of those who adhered to the national cause. This policy the Cortes met by a timely decree, declaring all purchases of confiscated estates null, and empowering the rightful owners to enter upon them whenever the fortune of war should permit, and authorising them to exact from the intrusive proprietors the mean profits, and the amount of any waste which they might have committed.

Lord Wellington was now enjoying the highest reward which can fall to the lot of a successful commander. He was living in a palace, the most magnificent in Europe, from which he had driven an Usurper ; and the blessings of the people accompanied him wherever he went. The municipal authorities gave a bull-fight in his honour, and when he appeared in the royal box, the air rung with the repeated shouts of not less than 12,000 spectators. He could not walk abroad by daylight because of the pressure of the multitudes who gathered round him ; even in the dark when he went into the Prado, though he and his suite were dressed in blue great coats in hopes of escaping notice, they were generally recognized and followed by crowds, the women pressing to shake hands, and some even to embrace them. Welcomed as he was with overflowing joy by a grateful people as their deliverer, his satisfaction would have been complete, if the same difficulties with which he had struggled since the commencement of the war had not still impeded his plans ; for he was still embarrassed by the want of adequate means, and disappointed in his hopes of co-opera-

*Lord Wel-  
lington's  
situation.*

tion. He was without money. The United States of America had declared war against Great Britain, with no just cause, nor even plausible pretext for hostilities. Lord Wellington received the news of this declaration immediately after the battle of Salamanca. The troops in Portugal depended in great measure for corn upon the importation from America to that country ; and he deemed it necessary, without delay, to make large purchases at Lisbon, that the subsistence of the army might not be endangered. But this required a great expenditure, the effect of which was now severely felt, for no pecuniary resources were to be found in Madrid. The inhabitants fed the garrison, and the produce of the sequestered and crown lands was readily given up to the allies, on promise of future payment ; but when money was required for the military chest, a few thousand dollars were all that could be procured upon the most unquestionable security, and of this sum much was in base coin.

*Col. Jones's  
account of  
the war, 2.  
122.*

Lord Wellington had counted with as much confidence as he ever allowed himself to place upon arrangements which were not wholly under his own control, on the promised co-operation of an expedition to the eastern coast. The most urgent solicitations from that part of Spain for aid had long been disregarded by the British Government ; and the Catalans, who of all the Spaniards made the greatest and most persevering exertions in their own defence, had been left from the commencement of the struggle until this time with no other help than occasional supplies of money and arms, scantily apportioned, and the assistance of a few ships of war. And now, when the strong fortresses one after another had fallen, and the British Government at length resolved to withdraw part of its troops from Sicily, where the intrigues of that poor kingdom, and the expect-

*Anglo Sici-  
lian army.*



tation of chances in Italy which were little likely to occur, and of little importance if they had occurred, had unduly detained them ; only 6000 men were detached from Sicily, without cavalry, and a considerable number of them consisting of such foreigners as could be enlisted in the Mediterranean. Lieutenant-General Maitland was appointed to the command, and they sailed in company with a squadron from the Mediterranean fleet under Rear-Admiral Hallowell. The common opinion was that they were destined for Corfu, because heavy artillery was embarked with them.

The Majorcan division of Spanish troops which was to co-operate with them, was supposed to be *Majorcan division.* in a more efficient state than any of the Spanish armies. This division had been raised upon the suggestion of General Whittingham, Majorca being a safe place, where they might be properly trained before they were brought into the field ; but the materials were not so unexceptionable as the design. Some 250 Germans who had been made prisoners with Dupont's army, were taken from the island of Cabrera as volunteers ; though, if free-will had influenced them, they would, like the Swiss, have entered the Spanish service upon the first opportunity, instead of remaining two years in that miserable place of confinement. Majorca itself supplied so few willing soldiers, that criminals who had been transported thither from Catalonia and Valencia were enlisted, . . fellows of such a description, that those who were not deemed capable of service were kept in prison : discipline, however, and equitable treatment, of which even bad men are sensible, made them better than was expected. Cuesta sent to this division all who were discharged from the hospitals ; and as runaways from the routs in Valencia and Murcia could be collected or caught, they were shipped for Majorca, and incorporated

in this hopeful force. No officer however was appointed without secret and strict inquiry into his character. Other difficulties, which might not so probably have been anticipated, impeded the equipment of this division. The plan was unpopular in the island, the more so, perhaps, because it was set on foot by an Englishman who was also invested with the command. Upon Cuesta's death, the situation of affairs was critical; the authorities withheld all supplies from the troops, who were also threatened as well as insulted in pasquinades: convents had been converted into barracks for their use, and this may possibly have been one cause of offence. An agreement had been concluded with the Dey of Algiers for a supply of horses, but it was broken off for want of money, the Superior Junta of Majorca disregarding all orders from the Regency. The institution of a military academy was another cause of dislike, owing to the habits of insubordination which prevailed in Majorca, as in every other part of the Spanish dominions. By prudent conduct, however, impediments were removed, and dislike softened or overcome; the troops were clothed and armed by Great Britain, and their hospital supplied: and when the expedition from Sicily called for them at Palma, 4500 men embarked, in a state of efficient discipline.

The fleet made for the eastern coast of Spain, and on the first of August anchored in the bay of Blanes, at the mouth of the Tordera. The enemy occupied Tosa, and had a redoubt there which covered the town and protected the coast. On that and the following day demonstrations of landing were made; but upon an interview with Eroles, it was found that any such measure would be worse than useless, with so inadequate a force. That able Spaniard saw that it was better for the Catalans to be left as they had so long been to their own exertions, than to give the

July 24.

*The expedition arrives on the coast of Catalonia.*

French an opportunity of bringing superior numbers against a British expedition: and it was agreed that the best service which such a force could then perform was to secure the city of Alicante, at that time endangered in consequence of a defeat which Joseph O'Donell had suffered in its vicinity. He had endeavoured to drive the vanguard of Marshal Suchet's army, under General Harispe, back upon the Xucar, from the line which it occupied at Castalla and Ibi, and other points of the mountainous country; but as usual, when the Spaniards were brought forward in regular war, against well-disciplined and well-commanded troops, some of the officers either misunderstood their orders or executed them ill, and some of the men losing courage as soon as they lost hope, threw into confusion those who were braver than themselves; their loss amounted to 4000 men, being little less than the whole number which they attacked, and they left more than 10,000 muskets in their flight. Suchet, who was the most enterprising and successful of all the French generals in Spain, would have taken advantage of this shameful defeat, and endeavoured to obtain possession of Alicante, if the force at his disposal had not been greatly diminished. Buonaparte had withdrawn all the Poles in his service from the peninsular, for the Russian campaign; and this deprived him of six thousand of his best troops, at a time when his army was otherwise greatly weakened by sending succours to Caffarelli in Navarre, and by the increased exertions which it was necessary to make against Duran and the Empecinado, Villacampa and Bassecourt. Before the battle of Salamanca the Intruder, in his dreams of triumph, informed Suchet that he must prepare for marching towards Madrid, and then accompanying him to the Tagus; and he ordered him to form a camp of

*Defeat of  
the Spaniards at  
Castalla.*

*June 21.*

*August.*



8000 men between Albaceyte and San Clemente; such a force it was impossible for him to spare; he could not venture to weaken himself further than by detaching 1500 men to Requena and Cuenca, to relieve General Darmagnac, and he represented to Joseph that he could not move for Madrid with one of his divisions, unless he received orders to evacuate Valencia. The last orders from Paris were to direct all his efforts to the preservation of the countries under his command, and to keep his force concentrated. General Maitland knew less of Marshal Suchet's actual strength than of his relative superiority to any force that could be brought against him; the best course, therefore, seemed to be that upon which he resolved; to secure the important fortress and port of Alicante, both as a place of arms from whence future operations might be undertaken, and as a rallying point for the wreck of Joseph O'Donnell's army. Thither

*The expedition lands at Alicante.*

accordingly the Anglo-Sicilian expedition sailed: contrary winds and bad weather retarded it some days upon the passage, but on the evening of August the 9th they anchored in the harbour, and on the following day the troops were landed.

The French who were in sight of the fortress retired upon this, and formed their line in Chichona, Ibi, Castalla, Biar, and Villena. But Suchet saw that this position would not be tenable against General Maitland's corps;

*The French fall back to the Xucar.*

he concentrated his divisions, therefore, about St. Philippe; fixed his head-quarters in that city; threw up field-works there, and upon the high road from Valencia to Madrid; and constructed a bridge of boats over the Xucar, near Alberique, which he secured with a *tête-du-pont*. His intention was not to fall back without fighting, provided the allies should attack him only in front, and were not too greatly superior in numbers. But the superiority was soon on his own

side : the allies took the field on the 14th, and occupied the country from which the enemy retired ; on the 18th they received intelligence that the Intruder with the force which he could bring together was about to join the army of Valencia, and then it became necessary for General Maitland to fall back to his position in front of Alicante.

The expedition which was to have effected a diversion in the east of Spain, was thus for the time rendered useless, not having been upon a sufficient scale to accomplish the purpose for which it was designed. Meantime the squadron on the north-east coast proceeded successfully, acting in concert with some of the ablest Guerrilla leaders. Caffarelli found it prudent to withdraw his garrisons from Torrelavega and Santander, lest they should be made prisoners ; the latter place was entered by Porlier ; the constitution was proclaimed there while salutes of joy were fired by the Spanish troops and the British vessels ; and Renovales made good his word to General Rouget by driving him from Bilbao, and defeating him in an attempt at recovering it. There also the constitution was proclaimed. The *Te Deum* was performed in Santiagos church, and the Cid Campeador in the theatre ; and all the unmarried men from the age of 17 to 45, were enrolled for Mendizabal's army. On that side there had been no want of exertion, and no disappointment ; but the Gallician army, from which more might have been looked for, considering the resources of the province, served for little more than to manifest the gross incapacity or negligence with which affairs of the greatest moment were conducted : nominally it amounted to 30,000 men, and nearly that number were supposed to be mus-

*The French withdraw from Santander.*

*August 2.*

*They are driven from Bilbao.*

*State of the Gallician army.*

tered, paid and fed, and yet 11,000 infantry and 350 horse were all that Santocildes had under his command, and these were badly disciplined and miserably equipped.

On the night of the eighth day after the entrance of the allies into Madrid, the news of that event reached Cadiz, where it excited among the inhabitants the joyful hope of being speedily delivered from the blockade : and deeper emotions in those exiles who had left their houses and families in the metropolis. On the 24th the French broke up the siege ; they threw shells during the preceding night ; those which were filled with lead and discharged from howitzers with a velocity of about 2000 feet per second,

ranged to the astonishing distance of three miles. They burst their guns by overcharging them, placing their muzzles one against another and exploding them by means of portfires and trains ; and thus almost the whole of their artillery between Chiclana and Rota, consisting of 600 pieces, were rendered unserviceable. Many, however, were left uninjured for the Spaniards to take possession of, as well as thirty gun-boats, and a great quantity of stores. The necessity of this retreat had been foreseen by Soult as soon as he was informed of the battle of Salamanca. Before that action he had been meditating another attack upon Tarifa, as a place from whence he could easily communicate with Tangiers and the Barbary coast, and thus secure supplies for feeding the army under his command. Sir Rowland Hill's movements withdrew him from this project : and after Marmont's defeat he prepared to abandon Seville, but to hold the Carthusian convent there, which he occupied as a citadel. Strong working parties were employed in adding to its defences, while at

*The French  
break up the  
siege of Ca-  
diz.*

*August 20.*

*Sir How-  
ard Doug-  
las's Naval  
Gunnery,  
p. 61.*



the same time the French packed up their public documents and their private plunder for removal. But on this occasion the Spaniards were on the alert.

As early as the middle of August the enemy had blown up the Castle of Niebla, and retired from the whole county of that name; and on the very day that they broke up from before Cadiz, Camp Marshal D. Juan de la Cruz Mourgeon, in concert with Colonel Skerrett, judged it advisable to make a forward movement on Seville, and for this purpose to force the corps of observation at San Lucar la Mayor, consisting of 350 cavalry and 200 foot. Brigadier-General Downie was second in command of the Spanish force. This officer was born in Stirlingshire, and commenced his military career by accompanying Miranda in his first expedition to Venezuela, an adventure for which those foreigners who were taken in it paid the forfeit of their lives. He joined Sir J. Moore's army as Assistant Commissary-General, was with Sir Arthur Wellesley in the campaign of 1809, and in the ensuing year, having entered the Spanish service, raised, with the approbation of his own government, the loyal legion of Extremadura and was appointed Colonel-Commandant thereof. The legion was armed and clothed by the British Government, and he revived in it the old Spanish costume, . . or something resembling it; and several of the young nobility are said to have entered it on that account. By this and by his character, which in some respects resembled their own, he made himself popular among the Spaniards; insomuch that the Marquesa de Conquista, the representative of the Pizarros, presented him with the sword of her ancestor, the famous, or infamous, conqueror of Peru.

*Movement  
of La Cruz  
Mourgeon  
and Col.  
Skerrett  
upon Se-  
ville.*

They marched from Manzanilla with 800 men, consisting of the 1st regiment of guards, the 87th, and a

Portuguese regiment, accompanied by 600 Spanish troops: the Spaniards attacked on the right, the British and Portuguese on the left: the enemy were driven through the streets, leaving some killed, wounded, and prisoners, and the allies took post at San Lucar without the loss of a man. Leaving his advance in that town, and the British and Portuguese on the right bank of the river San Lucar, the Spanish general returned to Castilleja del Campo, being the place whither the persons from whom he received intelligence directed their communications. Various and contradictory accounts were brought thither on the morning of the 26th concerning the intentions of the enemy in Seville; but in the afternoon he received positive information that Soult, with the greater part of his force, was about to move by way of Alcala upon Marchena. Arrangements were immediately made, that the troops should collect at San Lucar, and after two hours' rest there, proceed towards Seville at three on the following morning, in the hope that by this movement they might accelerate the retreat of the French, and save Seville from being plundered. On arriving at Espartinas, they ascertained that Soult had left the city with 5000 foot and 500 horse. General Mourgeon, upon this, sending out some Guerrillas to cover his flanks, proceeded, and arrived on the heights of Castilleja de la Cuesta, immediately above Seville, at six in the morning. The French, occupied some olive grounds close to the village, and some forty infantry garrisoned the redoubt of Santa Brigida from which the guns had been withdrawn. They were driven from the olive grounds into the plain, where for awhile the cavalry, 100 in number, protected the retreat of the foot, some 150: but they were so pressed by the Spanish vanguard and annoyed by an English field-piece, that they took to flight, and many of

*August 27.*

the men were made prisoners. The redoubt was attacked at the same time, with more bravery than judgment, and the Spaniards sustained some loss; the columns then advanced into the plain, by which the redoubt was turned and its communication cut off: and Colonel Skerrett ordered it to be masked by a detachment of Portugueze.

The Spaniards then made a detour to the right, in order to reach the bridge of Triana by the road of S. Juan de Alfarache, and thus intercept the retreat of the enemy and prevent them from cutting or burning the bridge. Skerrett, meantime, advanced a field-piece to keep in check the enemy's fire at one of the gates opposite; and after allowing time for the Spanish column to arrive, the British and Portugueze advanced to the attack in front, the cavalry and artillery at a gallop, supported by the grenadiers of the guards and the infantry following. The enemy abandoned the gate: the British and Portugueze entered the suburb, and advanced near to the bridge as rapidly as possible; they were checked at the turn of the street by a fire of grape-shot and musketry; the grenadiers advanced to their support; the Spanish cavalry under D. José Canterac, (whom Mourgeon, foreseeing the necessity, had ordered to leave the column and hasten straight through the suburb, arrived at this point of time,) and the allies, drove every thing before them. They advanced to the bridge under a heavy fire. The enemy had retired from the plain in three columns, with two pieces of artillery and 200 horse; and had taken a position with the river on their right, and their rear resting on the suburb: two guns were brought to bear on them by Captain Roberts of the artillery; they were driven from their position, and then made a stand upon the bridge, which they hoped to defend long enough to

*The French  
driven from  
Seville.*



gain time for destroying it. Downie with his legion twice attempted to force a passage, and was twice repulsed, and each time wounded. In a third attempt he leaped over the chasm which the enemy had then made; and at the same moment a grape-shot shattered his cheek-bone and destroyed one of his eyes. He fell from his horse, stunned by the wound; when his recollection returned he found himself a prisoner, but in time to throw Pizarro's sword among his own people. On their part the attack was kept up with so much spirit, aided as they now were by some guns well placed and well-worked, that the enemy could not extend the breach which they had made: and the inhabitants, even while their fire continued, set all the bells ringing, displayed hangings from their balconies as for a festival, hastened to the bridge and laid planks across the chasm, and enabled their deliverers to pass. The French then retired to the Triunfo and there again made a stand; but soon retreated through the city, and leaving it by the Puerta Nueva and the Puerta de Carmona, took the direction of Alcala. They left there two pieces of artillery, many horses, much baggage, and some two hundred prisoners. The deliverers could make no speed in pursuing them, for the streets were crowded with rejoicing multitudes, and their previous exertions as well as their want of cavalry would have made it imprudent to continue the pursuit. Downie was treated with great barbarity by his captors. Miserably wounded as he was, he was tied upon the carriage of a gun, and in that condition dragged along with them in their retreat; and this is said to have been done by General Villatte's direction. Having taken him some forty miles, and not expecting him to survive, they left him in a hut, taking however, his parole not to serve again in case of recovery, till he should have been regularly exchanged.

By this well-timed enterprise, Seville was saved from

the contribution which would have been exacted from it, and the devastation which was threatened. A division of French troops, about 7000 in number, from the blockade of Cadiz, passed by during the following night; they meant to have taken up their quarters there; but supposing that it was occupied by Sir Rowland Hill's force, they had no inclination to encounter such an enemy, and moved hastily to their right, on Carmona. Ballasteros had hung upon their flank from Ronda, and continued to harass them till they reached Granada. From thence Soult concerted his movements with Suchet and the Intruder. Sir Rowland meantime was ordered to the Tagus with his corps, there to connect its operations with the main body of the allied army, and the British troops from Cadiz were embarked for Lisbon.

On the second day after the deliverance of Seville, the constitution was proclaimed there in the Plaza de S. Francisco with the same success as in *Rejoicings at Seville.* other parts of Spain. A bull fight also was exhibited, for the twofold purpose of gratifying the people in what to the disgrace of the Spaniards was their favourite diversion, and of raising money for the troops. Among other rejoicings, the Inquisition prepared to celebrate a thanksgiving festival; but General Mourgéon intimated to them that he had no authority to re-establish them, and that they would not be suffered to appear as a corporate body. By the retreat of the French from Andalusia, a large and populous, and most productive province reverted to the legitimate government: but, though its resources were thus increased, there was little ground for hoping that they would be directed with more ability than in the early part of the struggle. There was the same generous and devoted sense of duty to their country in individuals; the same strong spirit of nationality in the great body of the people; but on the part of the

government there were the same embarrassments to contend with; the same inexperience which the frequent changes in administration allowed no time for curing, and the same incapacity which no experience could cure. The ablest heads were more intent upon carrying into effect their own theories of political reformation, than of devising means to complete the deliverance of the country. The indiscretion with which they hurried on measures that the people were wholly unprepared for, provoked a strong resistance in the Cortes itself; and the obstinate bigotry of the one party was not more manifest than the presumptuous confidence, and the political intolerance of the other. A jealousy of the English prevailed even in persons whose hatred of the French could not be doubted; and in some it seemed to acquire

*Honours rendered to Lord Wellington.* strength in proportion to the celebrity which Lord Wellington had obtained; the people however rendered justice to his merits, as in such cases they will always do when they are not artfully misled; the Great Lord was the appellation which they commonly gave him, and no indication was wanting of that national gratitude which he so well deserved. The Regency had conferred upon him the order of the Golden Fleece; and through their hands the Condessa de Chincon, D. Maria Teresa de Borbon, presented him with the collar of the order, which had belonged to her father the Infante D. Luiz; that it had been her father's, she said, was the only thing which made it valuable to her; but for its intrinsic value it was a princely present.

A subject not less characteristic than curious had been brought before the Government. The barefooted Carmelites in Cadiz presented a memorial, stating that Philip III. and the Cortes of 1617, had chosen St. Teresa for patroness and advocate of Spain, under the Apostle Santiago, that the nation in

*St. Teresa appointed co-patroness of Spain.*



all its emergencies might invoke her, and avail itself of her intercession. At that time the saint had only been beatified ; but her canonization shortly afterwards took place, and then the Cortes of 1626 published the decree, which was confirmed by Pope Urban VIII., without prejudice to the rights of Santiago, St. Michael the Archangel, and the most Holy Virgin. Jealous, nevertheless, of the imprescriptible rights of their own saint, the chapter of Compostella exerted their influence at Rome with such success, that the decree was suspended against the wishes both of the King and Cortes. That wish, however, continued in the royal family ; and Charles II., in a codicil to his will, declaring that he had always desired to establish the co-patronship of St. Teresa for the benefit of his kingdom, charged his successors to effect it. The Carmelites now urged that at no time could it more properly be effected than at the present, when her potent patronage was needed against invaders, who sowed the seeds of impiety wherever they carried their arms. This memorial was referred to a special ecclesiastical commission ; and in conformity to the opinion of that commission the Cortes elected St. Teresa patroness and protectress, under Santiago, of those kingdoms ; decreed that her patronship should forthwith take effect ; enjoined all archbishops, bishops, and prelates, to see that the correspondent alterations should be made in the ritual for the saint's day ; and required the Regency to give orders for printing, publishing, and circulating this decree. The community of the barefooted Carmelites then returned thanks for this appointment of their Mother the Saint. " It was a decree," they said, " which would fill all the natives of those kingdoms with consolation and hope, and they flattered themselves that from that moment Spain would experience the powerful intercession of its new protectress."

“ My great Mother, S. Teresa de Jesus, Co-patroness of the Spains !” exclaimed the prior, in an address which was printed among the proceedings of the Cortes, “ the very idea makes me eternally bless the law that sanctions it. This has been a business of much time, an affair of some ages, a work of many and mighty hands ; but the glory of completing it has been reserved for the fathers of the country, for the congress of lights, for your majesty the Cortes, which has been the glorious instrument of this work of the Eternal. And it was fitting that the country of heroes should have the heroine of nations at its head, who like another mother of the Maccabees should encourage its sons to triumph and to glory. This Deborah is not less sage than she who judged Israel, not less valiant ; and the Baraks who will come forward under her protection will not be intimidated by danger. She is not a Moabitess to pervert the armies of Israel. She is a Jael who will destroy the forces of *Sennacherib* ; a Semiramis, who will overthrow the hosts of the sanguinary Cyrus. At the sight of this fortunate Esther, Spain would lift her head and conceive higher hopes. The unanimous consent of the whole nation, the vows of the Spaniards of both hemispheres, would rise to heaven, and uniting themselves at this moment with the intercessions of their great Co-patroness, form that imperious voice which commands the winds and the tempests, rules the seas, makes itself felt in the dark regions of the abyss, and ascending the eternal mountain of the Lord, puts aside the decree of extermination that threatens us, substitutes for it that of our aggrandizement and elevation, and brings a blessing upon those judicious, prudent, and sage Mordecais, whose wise resolution has been the cause of this portent.” In this language did the descendants of the Prophets who dwelt on Mount Carmel, the children of the

great Teresa, offer upon the altar of gratitude the incense of their respect and veneration to the Cortes !

While one set of unbelievers promoted this act of superstition, and another condescended to it, a decree of more consequence was obtained from the Spanish Government, which had become sensible that the war must now be carried on upon one plan of operations, under the direction of a single mind, and that a mind equal to the emergency had been manifested in Lord Wel-  
linton. The Cortes therefore conferred upon him the command in chief of the Spanish armies, during the co-operation of the allied forces in the defence of the peninsula ; and the Marquis signified his acceptance of the charge, subject to the Prince Regent's approbation, " the delay of obtaining which," he said, " would not impede his operations, because, upon all occasions on which he had communicated with the Generals and Commandants of the Spanish troops, he had received from them the utmost attention, and all the assistance which they could afford him." The Prince's consent was not delayed ; and in signifying it, his Royal Highness expressed his satisfaction in the measure, as considering it to be a just and signal proof that the Spanish nation rightly appreciated the military talents and reputation of Lord Wellington, and that the Cortes had taken a comprehensive view of the manner in which the war ought to be conducted.

*Lord Wel-  
linton ap-  
pointed  
Commander  
-in-Chief of  
the Spanish  
armies.*

Lord Wellington meantime had more reason to be satisfied with the approbation of his own Government, than with the support that it afforded him. Successful as his campaign had thus far  
been, there had been a loss of time in it, for want of means, and that want had occasioned much to depend upon the chance of circumstances ; whereas, had there been an adequate force under his command, the results

*His Situa-  
tion at  
Madrid.*



would have depended as far as possible in war, upon his own sagacity, and the superiority of British troops. An additional force of 15,000 men, with which to have covered the northern frontier during the siege of Badajoz, would have enabled him to fulfil his first intention of marching upon Seville, after the fall of that fortress; the campaign might then have been commenced two months earlier, and time would have remained, after having freed the south of Spain, for operations in the centre and north. Having been compelled to abandon that intention, lest Marmont should recover Ciudad Rodrigo and overrun the north of Portugal, he had succeeded to his utmost hopes in the plan which he had of necessity adopted, not of choice. After that success, the want of adequate means left him as little choice as before. To have marched into Valencia against the collected armies of Soult, Suchet, and the Intruder, would have rendered it impossible to keep up his communications with Portugal; and except on that communication he could have no safe dependence for supplies. There was moreover the weighty consideration that the yellow fever had broken out in Murcia, and had approached so near to Alicante, that the most rigorous precautions were deemed necessary for preserving that part of the country from the contagion. But independent of all other considerations, he had neither sufficient troops to attack the united forces in the south, nor sufficient money to subsist his army beyond Madrid. Of the 70,000 dollars which he had borrowed there, he was obliged to make over half to the Portuguese, for the relief of their pressing necessities; and he had raised the loan on condition of repaying it at the expiration of a month. By acting in the north he should keep open his communication and his retreat; and in the north also the reinforcements, which after the tidings of his success he was sure would be expedited by

all possible exertions, might join him before the enemy could move against him with their combined forces, from all quarters. The Intruder had with him 14,000 men, Suchet had 28,000 disposable in the field, and the army of the south, under Soult, consisted of 55,000; in all 97,000: in the north, there were the army of the north 10,000 strong, and the remains of Marmont's army, now under Clausel, estimated at 25,000. Against this force, which had resumed its activity, it was resolved to act; and to this determination there was the farther motive, that if the Galician army were put in possession of Burgos, the castle there might enable it to make a stand upon that front, and with the assistance of a British and Portuguese corps to hold the army of Portugal in check while he should be engaged in active operations in the south. The castle would thus become a *tête-de-cantonment* to this corps of observation, and the French when deprived of it would not possess any strong post on the great line of communication between France and the interior of Spain, this castle commanding the only good road for artillery, and for the movement of convoys.

Accordingly, on the 1st September, Lord Wellington departed from Madrid, leaving the two divisions which were most in need of rest in garrison there. Sir Rowland was ordered to the Xarama, so to cover the capital on that side; and Ballasteros was requested to join him, in case Soult, whose retreat from Andalusia was not yet known, should move on Madrid; otherwise to be in readiness for acting upon the Marshal's line of march. The troops collected at Arevalo, moved from thence on the 4th, and on the 6th crossed the Douro at the fords of Herrera and El Abrojo; the enemy withdrew from Valladolid at their approach, crossed the Pisuerga, blew up the centre arch of the bridge, and retired

*Lord Wellington moves toward Burgos.*

*The French withdraw from Valladolid.*

along the right bank of that river to Dueñas. Some skirmishing took place in front of that town, and the cavalry picket drove the enemy out, and established themselves there on the night of the 10th. On the following day, Lord Wellington entered Palencia, where the English as usual were received with joyful acclamations, and where the new Constitution was proclaimed. From thence he communicated with Santocildes, and there learned from him to how small a force the Galician army amounted, and how little that force could be relied on. With all Lord Wellington's experience of Spanish co-operation, he had not expected this; knowing both the ability and good-will of Castaños, he hoped to have found the army in a state of such efficiency that he might have stationed it at Burgos in a few days, and then without loss of time have returned to Madrid, there to prepare for the contest which might be expected in that quarter. The Galician army joined at Pampaliega on the 16th; the 11,000 of whom it consisted were then separated into three divisions, and each was directed to march in rear of a British division, no doubt being entertained but that they would behave well if they were not exposed to heavy attacks of the enemy's cavalry.

The allies now moved up the beautiful valley of the Pisuerga, from Valladolid, along the right bank of the river, to the place where it receives the Arlanzon; and then along both banks of the Arlanzon, up its valley towards Burgos. It is a tract of country in which nature seems to invite human industry, and man has not been negligent in profiting by the advantages of soil and climate and running waters. Every inch of the valley is cultivated, and the hills are on both sides covered with cornfields and vineyards. The country is as strong also in a military point of view as it is fertile; out of the high road in the valley the way is

*The allies  
advance to  
Burgos.*



continually interrupted by rivulets and deep ditches : the hills on either side afford admirable flanks for the movements of an army, and there are heights from the river to the hills on either side for strong defensive positions. The French General was not a man to overlook this advantage, and the enemy were found on the 16th strongly posted with their left on the Arlanzon and their right on the mountains. Lord Wellington made arrangements to turn their position ; but they decamped during the night, and in the morning their whole army was seen retiring in five columns along the valley, and the hills on either side. They were estimated at about 18,000 infantry and more than 2000 horse, and their line of baggage was longer and closer than men who had served in India had ever seen with an Indian army ; for they had pressed all the cattle in the country, and left nothing transportable for any marauders who might follow them. Clausel entered Burgos on the evening of the 17th ; Marmont and Bonnet, who were still incapacitated by their wounds, had left that city a few days before. Caffarelli came thither from Vittoria to confer with him : a council of war was held that night ; at two in the morning the French commenced their retreat, and by ten o'clock they had left the city and the suburbs.

Fabling authors have ascribed the foundation of Burgos to an imaginary King Brygus, and mistaken antiquaries have endeavoured to identify *Burgos.* its site with that of the one or other Augustobriga, both having been far distant. The earliest authentic accounts speak only of some scattered habitations in this well-watered part of the country, till, at the latter end of the ninth century, D. Diego Rodriguez, Count of Castile, better known in Spanish history as Diego Porcelos, erected a castle there by order of Alfonso III., and founded a frontier town under its protection, which, from

the old Burgundian word for a fortress, obtained the name of Burgos. The castle was built upon a hill which commands the rich plain watered by the rivers Arlanzon, Vena, and Cardenuela : in former times it was of great strength and beauty, cresting the summit of the hill, and towering above the houses, which in those times covered the slope ; but when the succession to the throne of Castile was disputed by Alfonso V. of Portugal, against Ferdinand and Isabella, in right of his wife Juana, the castle took part with that injured and most unfortunate princess, and firing upon the city, destroyed the best street, which was upon the descent : after this, the lower ground was built upon, and the castle was left standing alone upon the heights. During the sixteenth century, Burgos was the mart through which the whole interior trade with the ports in the Bay of Biscay was carried on, and from whence the Segovian cloth was sent to all parts of Europe. Its population was then from 35,000 to 40,000, exclusive of foreigners, who were many in number ; it had been reduced to 8000 or 9000, the place having declined after the seat of government was fixed at Madrid. Most of the Spanish cities may be traced to much higher antiquity ; many exceed it in size ; but there are few which are connected with so many of those historical recollections in which the Spaniards seem above all other nations to delight. It was the birth-place of Count Ferran Gonzalez, and of the Cid Campeador ; the former used to knight his warriors in St. Lorenzo's church. A beautiful triumphal arch has been erected to his honour upon the site of the dwelling in which he was born ; and his statue, with those of the two judges, Nuño Rasurez, and Layn Calvo, Diego Porcelos, the Cid, and the Emperor Charles V., adorns the gate of St. Maria, which opens upon one of the bridges.

Our Edward I. was knighted by his brother-in-law,

Alfonso the Wise, in S. Maria de las Huelgas, a nunnery founded by Alfonso V. and his English Queen Leonor, within sight of the city. Its church was preferred by the Castilian kings for the performance of any remarkable ceremony, the place for which was not prescribed; three kings therefore in succession were crowned there, and it was long a place of interment for the royal family. Except that at Fulda, no other nunnery ever possessed such privileges, or was so largely endowed. The cathedral, than which there is no more elaborate or more magnificent specimen of what may be called monastic architecture, was founded in 1221, by King St. Ferdinand and the Bishop Maurice, (who is said to have been an Englishman, either by birth or blood,) about 150 years after the see of Oca had been removed thither: among the relics which were shown, there was a handkerchief of the prophet Elijah, and a lock of Abraham's hair, and one of St. Apollonia's innumerable teeth. Two short leagues from the city is the monastery of St. Pedro de Cardena, a far older foundation than the cathedral; where, from the time that two hundred of its monks were massacred by the Moors the pavement used on the anniversary of their martyrdom to sweat blood, till that blood, which through so many centuries had cried for vengeance, was appeased by the final subjugation of the misbelievers. There the Cid lies and his wife Ximena: some of the French officers at the commencement of this treacherous invasion used to visit the church and spout passages from Corneille's tragedy over their tomb. There too lie his daughters, D. Elvira and D. Sol; and his father Diego Laynez; and his kinsman Alvar Fañez Minaya, and his nephew Martin Antolinez, and Martin Pelaez, the Asturian, names which will be held in remembrance as long as chivalrous history shall be preserved. And before the gate of the monastery the Cid's good



horse Bavioca lies buried, and Gil Diaz his trusty servant, by the side of that good horse, which he had loved so well.

But of objects of antiquity or veneration, that on which the people of Burgos prided themselves most was a miraculous crucifix in the convent of St. Augustine, which a merchant of that city, on his homeward voyage from Flanders, found at sea, floating in a chest shaped like a coffin. The learned have concluded, upon a comparison of dates and circumstances, that it is the identical image which was carved by Nicodemus, and carried from Jerusalem to Berytus; where, being again nailed and pierced by unbelieving Jews in the 8th century, blood issued from its wounds, and miraculously healed both Jews and Christians of their diseases. When Berytus fell under the yoke of the Saracens, the Christians, to save it from farther profanation, confined it thus carefully and committed it in faith to the waves. Strong, however, as the circumstantial evidence for this identity was admitted to be, many persons piously preferred believing that it was no work of human hands, but had been sent from heaven, in order that there should be on earth one perfect resemblance of our crucified Saviour. They supported this opinion by the alleged and admitted fact, that no one has ever been able to ascertain of what material the image is made: the flesh, they say, is so elastic that it yields like that of a living body to the touch, and resumes its natural rotundity when the pressure is removed; the head moves to whatever side it may be inclined, and the arms, if they are unfastened, fall like those of a corpse; and the hair, and beard, and nails, seem not as if they were carved, or fixed there, but as if they grew. Volumes have been published filled with authenticated accounts of the miracles which this crucifix has performed. Kings, nobles, and prelates, have vied

with each other in enriching the chapel wherein it is placed. So many lamps have been presented, that they are said literally to have hid the vault of the chapel, covering its whole extent; and of these the meanest were of massive silver. On each side of the altar stood thirty silver candlesticks, each taller than the tallest man, and heavier than many men could lift. The candlesticks upon the altar were of massive gold; between them were gold and silver crosses, set with precious stones; and crowns rich with pearls and sparkling with diamonds were suspended over the altar. Above the altar the miraculous crucifix is placed, behind three curtains embroidered with jewellery and pearls. It was shown only to persons of great distinction, and not to them till after many ceremonies, and till they had heard two masses: bells were then rung to give notice that all who were present must fall upon their knees, while the sacred curtains were undrawn. The great captain Gonsalvo de Cordoba, when he would have ascended to inspect it closely, was overcome with sudden awe, and withdrew, saying he would not tempt the Lord. And Isabella, the Catholic Queen, for whom one of the nails which fastened the image to the cross was taken out, that she might enshrine it among her relics, fainted when she saw the arm drop; and when she came to herself, repenting of her intention, as though such piety had partaken of the sin of sacrilege, ordered the nail to be reverently replaced. . . It is a relief for those whose thoughts have been long employed upon the wickedness and the sufferings of their fellow-creatures, if their attention can sometimes be drawn away by such examples of their weakness and their credulity.

When the enemy withdrew from Burgos they were joined by 9000 infantry of the army of the north *The allies enter Bur-*  
under General Souham, who took the command, *gos.*

and retiring to Briviesca halted there in a strong position. On the morning of the 18th the allies took possession of the heights to the north-west of the castle, and entered the city, where they were received with the usual acclamations. But this was no day of joy to the inhabitants: the garrison, who from their fort completely commanded both the city and the suburbs, opened a fire of musketry and grape into the principal streets, and burned the houses which were nearest them; and on the other hand the Guerrillas began to plunder, as if it were an enemy's town of which they had taken forcible possession. Alava, by threats, by blows, and by unremitting exertions, restored order at last; and his efforts were not a little assisted by a rumour which he caused to be spread among them, that the French were returning in great force: these marauders then took to their heels, and a Spanish battalion was posted in the city, and a battalion of *caçadores* in the suburbs.

On the following day the castle was invested. One division remained on the left of the Arlanzon; *Castle of* *Burgos.* part of the army forded it, and marched round the heights of St. Miguel; their advance drove the enemy from three detached flêches which they were constructing, to see into the hollows on the side of the hill, and took possession of such parts as were under cover. The remainder of the army was advanced on the high road in front of Monasterio to cover the attack. Upon reconnoitring the castle it was found much stronger than had been expected: it was a lofty building, built with the solidity of old times, flanked with small round towers, and its roof sufficiently strong to bear guns of large calibre which the French had placed upon it. The keep had been converted into a casemated battery; the lower part of the hill had been surrounded by an uncovered scarp wall of difficult access, and between these defences two



lines of field-works had been constructed, thickly planted with cannon, and encircling the hill. The garrison under General Du Breton consisted of nearly 3000 men, well provided with stores of all kinds. It was apparent that approaches against them must be carried on regularly: the most sanguine entertained no hope of succeeding in less than seven or eight days; nor would that hope have been entertained if the deficiency of means had been considered, unless an undue reliance had been placed upon military courage in circumstances where skill and science are of far more avail. The siege establishments of the army had been deficient in all the former sieges, in all which, therefore, success had been dearly purchased; but here there was not even the skeleton of an establishment. There were five officers of engineers, but not a sapper or miner; and only eight men of the royal military artificers, to whom 81 artificers of the line were added. The artillery consisted of three 18-pounders, and five 24-pounder iron howitzers, with 300 rounds of ammunition for each, and 15 barrels of powder. The engineers' stores were scanty in proportion; but in a store which the enemy had left in the town a considerable number of entrenching tools were found. Lord Wellington had no other means within his reach when he moved from Madrid. He had no means of transporting more guns and ammunition from Madrid, or from Ciudad Rodrigo, to Burgos. The Intruder and the French armies had swept Castille of all the mules and horses upon which they could lay hands; and if some might still have been purchased at high prices, there was no money to pay for them in the military chest.

On the side toward the country the castle was commanded by the heights of S. Miguel, which are separated from it by a deep ravine. The summit is about the same level as the upper works

*The horn  
work on S.  
Miguel's  
taken.*

of the castle, at a distance of 300 yards. On this height the enemy had nearly completed a large horn work : the branches were not perfect : the rear, on the advance of the allies, had been closed by an exceedingly strong palisade ; and in front they had begun to throw up three *flèches*, from which they had now been driven. As a preliminary to any attack, it was necessary to win the horn work. The arrangements for this were, that two parties should march that night, one upon each salient angle of the demi-bastions, enter the ditch, the counter-scarp being unfinished, and escalade them, under protection of 150 men, who were to march direct on the front of the work, halt at the edge of the ditch, and keep up a continued fire on those who defended the parapet. . . A third storming party under the Honourable Major Cocks was to march round the rear of the work, and endeavour to force in at the gorge. This plan was better arranged than executed. The covering party began to fire as soon as they were put in motion, and continued firing as they advanced, till they reached the ditch where they ought to have begun their fire : by that time so many of their men had been killed and wounded that the rest dispersed. The attack on both semi-bastions was not more fortunately conducted : the ladders were not long enough for the face of the work ; . . and the troops, remembering the murderous character of the former sieges which they had witnessed rather than their eventual success, hung back. Major Cocks lost in advancing nearly half his party by the fire of the castle, but he found that the garrison of the horn work neglected the gorge, being fully occupied with the attack in front. He therefore with little opposition got over the palisades and entered the body of the work with about 140 men : these he divided, posting one-half on the ramparts to ensure the entry of the co-operating force in front, and

with the other he formed opposite the gateway, in the hope of making the garrison prisoners: they were about 500 in number, under a *chef de bataillon*, and had his support been brought up in time there was every probability of his capturing them; but the French running from their works, mere weight of numbers did for them as much as determined courage could have done; they literally ran over this little party and escaped into the castle. Their loss did not exceed 70 men, that of the assailants amounted to 420, including six officers killed and fifteen wounded.

*Col. Jones's  
account of  
the sieges,  
p. 191.*

Such a beginning, though successful, was not likely to give the troops confidence. And it was now found, . . which could not be understood by a ground-plan of the works, nor indeed be exactly ascertained till they were in possession of St. Miguel's hill, . . that although this hill commanded from its narrow side that on which the enemy's works were erected, it was itself commanded by the terrace of the castle. The breadth of St. Miguel's is parallel to the length of the castle-hill, and consequently St. Miguel's is outflanked by the castle-hill; and as the surrounding ground is so low as to be completely overlooked, and commanded by that hill, it was impossible to erect batteries on any spot except the narrow ridge, which was not only out-flanked by the opposite height, but commanded by it. Trenches however were now opened to secure a communication with the horn work, and afford cover for the men; batteries were erected; and in order to save the troops from unnecessary fatigue, Lord Wellington resolved to assault the outer line, on the night of the 22nd, without waiting to form a breach in it. A party of Portuguese were to advance from some houses in the suburb close to the wall, cut down the palisades, and take the line in flank and rear, while a British party were to advance

*Failure in  
assaulting  
the first  
line.*



under a ridge of ground, and escalade the wall in front. The houses afforded cover to the one party, the ridge to the other, until the moment of attack. But no serious attack was made; the Portuguese were checked by a fire from a guard-house on the line, and could not be induced to enter the ditch: the British planted their ladders, and the officers mounted, but very few men followed them. Major Lawrie of the 79th, who commanded this party, was killed. Captain Frazer Mackenzie was struck down by a blow on the head; he recovered himself, mounted a second time, and was shot through the knee. The enemy, whose attention was not diverted by any other attack, mounted the parapet, and fired down upon the assailants, who stood crowded in the ditch unable now to advance, and still unwilling to retire. Lord Wellington was watching the attack from the hill of St. Miguel, under a fire of musketry, grape shot, and shells; and when he saw that the Portuguese did nothing, and that the party in front made no progress, he ordered the attempt to be relinquished, after the loss of about three hundred and thirty men. The wounded were brought in in the morning during an hour's truce.

The original plan was now resumed of working up to the wall, and mining under it. The enemy placed two or three guns behind a projecting palisade, which was so close as perfectly to secure them, and from whence they did great execution. As there were neither sappers, miners, nor pioneers, the engineer officers were obliged not only to direct every operation, but to stand by and instruct the working parties; and while thus employed, Captain Williams was killed. It seemed miraculous that any of these valuable officers escaped. The enemy could not now but have discovered that the besiegers were miserably provided with

*A second  
assault  
fails.*

artillery, and that they had no ammunition to spare; nevertheless they began to prepare their second line for an obstinate defence. On the evening of the 29th the miners hit upon the foundation of the wall, mined it, and charged the mine with twelve barrels of powder. At midnight it was sprung, and threw down the wall. Three hundred men were in readiness for storming: a serjeant and four men, the advance of a party of twenty who were to lead the way, mounted without opposition, for the enemy were panic-stricken: they remained some minutes on the top of the breach before the French, perceiving that they were not supported, took courage and drove them down. The officer in command of the first advance did not discover the breach, . . he returned into the parallel, reporting that the mine had failed, and the storming party, in consequence of this error, was withdrawn. After this, Lord Wellington determined to have no more night attacks.

A supply of gunpowder having been obtained from Sir Home Popham's squadron, a second mine was completed: the first breach was rendered practicable, and the explosion which made the second was the signal for assaulting both. Immediately before the explosion, and while in the act of communicating that all was ready, Lieutenant-Colonel Jones of the engineers was severely wounded, an officer whose Journals of the Sieges, and whose general Account of the War have been the most useful as well as the most trust-worthy of the printed authorities from which the present history has been composed. About an hundred feet of the wall were thrown down by the explosion: the storming party, instead of being composed of detachments from different regiments, consisted of the 24th regiment, supported by the working and covering parties in the trenches, a reserve of 500

*A third by  
daylight  
proves suc-  
cessful.  
Oct. 4.*

men having also been formed in the parallel. This assault was made in the face of day. The officer who led the left party was at the foot of the old breach before the smoke had cleared away, and he was the first man on the top of it; and the dust had scarcely subsided before the troops had gained the summit of both breaches, and driven the enemy into their covered way, and behind their new palisades. During the night the besiegers established themselves in both breaches, and along the wall to the left of them, and began an approach towards the second line of works. But the rains now began to set in heavily; and on the following afternoon 300 of the garrison made a sortie from their covered way, gained possession of the first breach, and retained it long enough to ruin the lodgment and carry off the tools. They did not get possession of the second breach, nor of the parallel along the parapet: but the advantage which they had gained was sufficient to encourage them, and to lessen the confidence of the besiegers, who could not but perceive that they were struggling against all advantages of situation, and with means the most inadequate. The enemy could not depress their guns so as to bear upon the new works, but they kept up a constant fire of musketry upon them, and from time to time rolled large shells down the steep glacis, and these either carried away the gabion where the men were breaking ground in the night, or lodging against it and bursting, blew it to pieces. The rain was now so heavy that much time was daily expended in draining and keeping the communications up the steep banks and breaches practicable. The garrison meantime were never idle: they had now disabled two of the three 18-pounders; and making another sortie at two in the morning of the 8th, from the covered way with 400 men, they surprised the advanced covering party, drove the remainder from the parallel of



the outer line, and once more levelled the work and carried off the tools. Major Cocks was killed in a charge to regain it: he was shot through the body when ascending the breach, by a French infantry man close to him: the ball entered on the right side between the fourth and the fifth rib, passed through the great artery immediately above the heart, and so out at the left side, breaking the left arm. Major Cocks was a young officer of the highest promise. He was the eldest son of Lord Somers, and by the demise of his maternal grandfather, in possession of a large landed estate; but preferring the military profession to the peaceful enjoyment of good fortune, and to the pursuits whereto his station in society invited him, he devoted himself to the study of that profession with an ardour, of which an ordinary observer would not, from his mild manners and habitual composure, have supposed him capable. Entering early into the service, and leaving his regiment in England, he joined the army at Lisbon in the spring of 1809, for the purpose of acquiring the Portuguese and Spanish languages. He was in the south of Spain when the French attempted to surprise Cadiz, and he it was who gave Alburquerque the first information of their movements, by which timely advice that magnanimous Spaniard was enabled to prevent their design and throw himself into the place. He read much, and let no opportunity pass unimproved of perfecting by practice the knowledge which he acquired from books: and thus he had distinguished himself on so many occasions, that the promotion which his rank and fortune might have commanded was not more rapid than his conspicuous merit had deserved. When the dispatches relating the capture of the horn work on S. Michael's reached home, his com-

*Major  
Cocks  
killed.*

mission as Lieutenant-Colonel was immediately sent out ; but before these dispatches arrived in Spain, his career was closed. On the day preceding his death he was field-officer of the trenches : the day was very wet, and he went round to every sentry to see that the orders were clearly understood, . . a duty generally left to the serjeant who posts them, and not often attended to by a subaltern having only a picket of twenty men ; but Major Cocks never spared himself, and never left anything which depended upon him undone. The death of such a man (for such men are rare) was justly regarded in the army as a national loss. He was buried in the camp ground of his regiment near Bellema, Lord Wellington, Sir Stapleton Cotton, Generals Anson and Pack, with the whole of their staffs, attending his funeral, and the officers of the 79th (his own regiment) and of the 16th light dragoons.

After this second successful sortie, no further attempt was made to push the works between the outer and second line : a third breach was effected with the view of making a flank attack at the moment of assaulting the second line in front ; but when it was made, it could not be stormed for want of musket ammunition. The enemy attempted to repair it during the night, but were several times driven in. A small supply of powder having now been received from Santander, the howitzers were put in battery ; but the 24-pound shot were nearly expended, and for the 18-pounders the 16-pound shot fired by the enemy were collected and made to serve : when the embrasures were opened, the guns could not be run in on account of the weather, and one of the batteries was silenced in half an hour by the enemy's fire. By the 18th, a sufficient opening had been made in an exposed part of the second line ; and the church of St. Roman,

which was near the second line, had been mined. The assault was made by daylight; the works were immediately carried with very little loss, and some of the German legion escalated the third line; but they were few, and were presently driven back, for the course of the siege had taken confidence from the besiegers and given it to the besieged; and when the guards gained the parapet, the garrison rallied on the *terre plein* of the work, and assembled in force, then advanced, and drove the assailants back completely from the line. The mine under the church did little injury to it; but it so alarmed the enemy, that they exploded their own mines, which destroyed the greater part: the troops lodged themselves in the ruins, and a communication was carried to this point during the night. A convoy of heavy artillery and ammunition was now on its way from Santander, and the castle might then have been reduced in a few days, without further loss; but it was now too late, and after that failure all circumstances induced Lord Wellington to think only of retreat.

*The second line assaulted with ill success.*

On the day of that failure, the enemy were joined at Breviesca by the army of observation from Alava, and the remainder of the army of the north. This force considerably outnumbered that which Lord Wellington could bring against them, and in cavalry they were greatly superior. They made a show of coming on in front; and in consequence, the covering army moved up near Quintana-palla, and was joined by most of the besieging corps. On the 20th they advanced in force, drove in the pickets, and obtained possession of Quintana-palla; but Sir Edward Paget drove them back, and recovered the place, and they then desisted from their offensive movements. Intelligence which Lord Wellington had reason to expect

*Movements of the French in the north.*



arrived on the following day, that the united forces of the enemy in the south were in motion. Ballasteros, who had hitherto, if with little success and no great skill, displayed the most indefatigable activity, had in a mood of sullen resentment at the appointment of Lord Wellington to the chief command, ceased to molest the enemy. He had hung upon the flanks of Soult's army, and harassed it as far as Granada, with more effect than in any of his former enterprises, because the enemy were dispirited and on their retreat; but upon receiving instructions to obey Lord Wellington's orders, he took no farther measures for annoying the French, refused to act in concert with Sir Rowland Hill, according to the plan which the British Commander had laid down, and remained obstinately inactive at the most critical time. At length he published a letter to the minister at war, saying, that from the time when the French treacherously seized the four fortresses, he had spared no efforts for raising the nation, and that no person had contributed more to the event of the second of May than himself, without which events, Spain would not have been in its present state. From that time he had never laid aside his arms, and had resisted all solicitations which the foreigners had made him to the prejudice of his country, . . . inexorable in being a Spaniard and nothing but a Spaniard, and that his countrymen should be so, like him: this having been his principle, without any regard to his own fortune, he had always found the nation ready to support it in every sense. "And now he was surprised," he said, "to see that the English General, Lord Wellington, was by a resolution of the Cortes appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Spanish armies; those armies, thousands upon thousands of whose companions in arms were in the grave, having fallen in defending the reputa-

*Ballasteros  
refuses to  
act under  
the British  
commander.*

tion of their country, were observing what would be his conduct on this occasion; and he should not consider himself worthy of being an Aragonese, if he did not represent to the government, that he could not condescend to a determination which disparaged the Spanish name." He spoke of the English as a nation to whom the Spaniards were bound by true friendship and fair dealing, but of whose fair promises and bad faith no one could give more information than the then president of the Regency, the Duque del Infantado. "Was Spain," he asked, "like the petty kingdom of Portugal, that the command of its armies should be intrusted to a foreigner? Had its revolution begun like that of Portugal? Had it not still resources of its own? Had it not generals, officers, and soldiers, who still supported the honour which they had inherited from their forefathers; and who in the present war had made both English and French know that they were nothing inferior to them in discipline or in courage, and that they had chiefs of their own who knew how to lead them to victory? Finally, he required that the opinion of the soldiers and of the people should be taken upon this matter; if they condescended to the appointment, he should renounce his employments, and retire to his own house, thus manifesting, that he had only the honour and the welfare of his country in view, not any ambitious or interested end."

Ballasteros was a rude, intrepid, enterprising, and persevering soldier of fortune, handsome in person, strong in body, and of a hale constitution; very useful as a partizan at the head of 4000 or 5000 men, but incapable of conducting any extensive operations with a regular army. Before the appointment of Lord Wellington took place he was in no good humour with the Government, and the Government on its part as little pleased with him. With some better parts of the

*He is  
exiled to  
Ceuta.*

national character, he partook in no slight degree of its boastfulness, and entertaining a most exaggerated notion of his own merits, made no scruple of saying that Ballasteros had done more for Spain than all her other chiefs put together, and that in spite of the Government, Ballasteros, unassisted and discouraged, would continue to do more than the favourites of the Regency, whose pockets were filled with doubloons by the English. But though he had a large party among the lower orders in Cadiz, and some of his regiments were much attached to him, he overrated his own importance as greatly as his own deserts; he was unpopular in the provinces and disliked by his officers: and when the Government put him under arrest for thus defying its authority, marched him under an escort to Malaga, and sent him from thence to Ceuta as an exile, not a hand, and scarcely a voice was raised in his defence. Some seditious writings indeed were published in his favour at Cadiz, but they produced no effect. The loss of an active partizan was regretted, and the error of an honest, though obstinate and wrong-headed man; but the army and the nation concurred in condemning him, and in approving the promptitude and decision with which the Government had acted.

Meantime, in consequence of this inactivity, in dereliction of all duty, on Ballasteros's part, and of the inefficiency of the Anglo-Sicilian army, Marshal Soult and Suchet were enabled, without any impediment, to concert their operations with the Intruder, and carry them into effect. General Maitland's health gave way under the anxieties of his situation, so that it became necessary for him to return to Sicily. Major-General William Clinton was sent from thence to take the command in his stead, and till his arrival, it devolved upon Major-General John

*Gen. Maitland gives up the command of the Anglo-Sicilian army.*



Mackenzie. That general made an attempt to seize the castle of Denia by a *coup-de-main*: from its strength and its position on commanding ground close to the sea it might have easily been maintained against the enemy, and would have afforded great opportunity for annoying him. Major-General Donkin, Quarter-Master-General of this army, was intrusted with the enterprise; it failed, but the men and guns which had been landed were re-embarked with little loss. Knowing that nothing was to be apprehended from this army in its present state, Marshals Jourdan, Soult, and Suchet, held a counsel in presence of the Intruder, at Fuente la Higuera. They had feared at one time that it might have been necessary to abandon Valencia: that apprehension was removed, and they now believed that, as the long and brave resistance which had been made by the garrison at Burgos had given the army of Portugal time to recover strength and to unite with the troops in the north, nothing more was required for restoring their affairs, than that the armies of the south and the centre should co-operate with it, for the double purpose of beating Lord Wellington, and re-establishing the Intrusive government at Madrid. It was not deemed necessary to take any part of Suchet's forces for this service; the state of Aragon and Catalonia on the one hand, and the presence of the Anglo-Sicilian expedition on the other, made it dangerous to weaken him.

*Unsuccessful attempt upon Denia.*

*The French prepare to march from the south against Lord Wellington.*

At the point where the roads from Alicante and Valencia to Madrid join, stands the little castle of Chinchilla; it was in possession of the Spaniards, and while the Intruder was reconnoitring it one day with a telescope, a shot from an eight-pounder passed close by him. This place the

*Castle of Chinchilla taken by the French.*

French besieged ; it was ably defended by the Governor D. Juan Antonio Cearra, who was a lieutenant-colonel of engineers : but the enemy were not scrupulous as to any means which could accelerate their success ; and during a night's truce they erected a battery of eight guns, in the most advantageous situation ; by this battery the works were much injured, and the garrison considerably reduced in number ; and of twenty artillerymen, there only remained eight to work the guns,

*Oct. 9.* when some of these men were struck dead by

lightning, many more, and among them the governor, wounded by it, and the works so shaken, that it became necessary to surrender. The enemy's prepara-

tions were complete soon after this obstacle was

*They begin  
their  
march.*

removed ; and on the 16th of October, the Intruder set out from Valencia towards the Tagus, with Marshals Jourdan and Soult at the head of 70,000 troops, 10,000 being cavalry. Lord Wellington received intelligence of this from Sir Rowland Hill on the 21st, and the same advices informed him that the Tagus was already fordable by individuals in many places, and was likely soon to be so for an army. As long as the Tagus remained unfordable, Sir Rowland's position was tolerably secure ; but when the river fell, it became too hazardous for him to maintain an advanced position near Madrid in front of an enemy so greatly superior. It was necessary that Lord Wellington should move towards him, lest the corps under his own command should be insulated in consequence of the movements which Sir Rowland might find himself compelled to make. He determined therefore to fall back upon the Douro, so as to afford Sir Rowland a point upon which to return, and by uniting their forces, to secure a retreat into Portugal.

This resolution was executed as promptly as it was formed. He instantly raised the siege, and filed his whole army in the night of the 21st under the walls of the castle and over the bridge, which was closely enfiladed by its artillery; a bold and unprecedented manœuvre, which military men adduce as a proof that the march of troops cannot be stopped by the fire of artillery in the night. The allies moved in silence and good order; but a party of Guerrillas, regardless of discipline, then, as at all times, put their horses to their speed, and the clatter which they made alarmed the garrison. A fire was consequently opened from the guns which were directed on the bridge, and the first discharge was most destructive; but the gunners then lost the range and direction, and their farther fire served only to quicken the speed of the carriages. Every thing was brought away in this retreat except the three disabled guns, and the eight pieces of the enemy which had been taken in the horn-work. The loss of the allies during the siege amounted to 24 officers and 485 men killed; 68 officers and 1487 men wounded and missing. The enemy did not begin to follow till late on the ensuing day; 10,000 of their troops encamped that day on the south of Burgos, and on the morrow at noon they came up in force with the retreating army. Sir Stapleton Cotton detained them for above three hours at the passage of the Hormaza, in front of Celada del Camino; they were twice charged there by Major-General Anson's brigade with great success, and the rear-guard continued to fall back in the best order, till the Guerrillas on their left were driven in and came flying upon them, four or five of the enemy's squadrons being mixed with them in pursuit. In the confusion which ensued, the French were mistaken for Spaniards, and, favoured by that mistake, they fell upon the

*Lord Wellington raises the siege of Burgos.*

*Retreat from Burgos.*



flank and rear of the allies. Some loss was sustained, and Lieutenant-Colonel Pell, of the 16th dragoons, was taken prisoner, having had his horse shot. A very superior body of cavalry, in which the enemy were strong, now came up, and the allied cavalry fell back hastily, lest they should be surrounded; but having crossed a wide and deep ditch by a narrow bridge, the brigades of Major-Generals Bock and Anson charged their pursuers when only part had filed over: in this they were repulsed, hardly pressed, and forced upon the infantry rear-guard of German light troops under Colonel Halkett; that officer formed his troops in four squares, and the men behaving, as that legion ever did, admirably, repulsed the enemy in several charges, and checked the pursuit. The right of the army crossed the

*The allies cross the Pisuerga.* Pisuerga that afternoon at Torquemada, and the left at Cordovilla, where head-quarters were established that night.

*Disorders during the retreat.* The army continued its march on the 24th towards the Carrion. Throughout the north of Castille, which is a great wine country, the wine is stowed either in caves dug in the hill sides, or excavated in the earth, the soil from the excavation being formed into a mound over them, and the entrance appearing like the chimney of a subterraneous dwelling. These cellars were now filled with new wine; the soldiers broke into them during the night, and it was not without the greatest exertions that the officers in the morning could put their battalions in march. The enemy, however, after their yesterday's repulse were less pressing; and the whole army having that day marched twenty miles, took up its ground behind the Carrion with its right at Dueñas and its left at Villa Muriel; and here the brigade of guards which had disembarked at Coruña joined them. The retreating army did not exceed 20,000 men;

the French displayed above thirty; they were confident also in the superiority of their cavalry, in that country the most efficient force; and as it is their national character to be easily elated, they might well be elated now at having baffled Lord Wellington before so poor a fortress as the castle at Burgos, and compelled him who had driven Massena out of Portugal, and routed Marmont at Salamanca, to retreat before them. English soldiers are neither lightly elated, nor soon cast down; they keep their courage on a retreat, for that never gives way; but they become disdainful of control when they have no opportunity of wreaking their wrathful feelings upon the enemy who is in pursuit, and insubordination is then the sin which most easily besets them. This was already felt, though as yet they had suffered little, and though the retreat was so deliberately made, and with so firm a face toward the enemy, that the men lost none of their confidence in their Commander.

The army halted on the 25th, and measures were taken for impeding the pursuit. A battalion of the royals was posted at Palencia, to cover the operations for destroying the bridges over the Carrion at that old city; but the French assembled there in such force that the commanding officer being attacked and overpowered, found it necessary to retire upon Villa Muriel, and the bridges were left uninjured for the pursuers to pass. Two other bridges over the same river at Villa Muriel and at Dueñas were mined, that they might be exploded on the enemy's approach, and one in like manner over the Pisuerga at Tariago. The two former were successfully exploded, that at Villa Muriel under a fire of grape-shot from the enemy; but they discovered a ford there, and passed over a considerable body both of horse and foot. A false report that the enemy had already crossed at Tariago, delayed the commencement of the work there; the

French came up before it was completed; it was exploded prematurely, and consequently to no effect; their cavalry galloped over and made the party prisoners. This enabled them to push a corps on the right into contact with the posts on the Carrion; their passing at Palencia made it necessary for Lord Wellington to change the front of his army, and this second success rendered his farther retreat difficult, and even precarious. Major-Generals Pringle and Barnes were therefore ordered to attack those who had crossed the Pisuerga; the Spanish troops co-operated in this, and the enemy were driven across the river with considerable loss. Neither could they maintain themselves upon the Carrion after having forded at Villa Muriel; the Spaniards who were employed to dislodge them, faltered in the charge, and Alava, while leading them on and in the act of encouraging them, fell badly wounded: the fall of this gallant leader did not inspire them with more courage, but the Brunswickers were then ordered to advance; those brave men ran into the village without firing a shot; the Spaniards took heart and followed them, and the French withdrew; and the fifth division under General Oswald advancing against their main body, compelled it to recross.

The next day the allies retreated sixteen miles without molestation, and crossed the Pisuerga at  
*Oct. 26.* Cabazon del Campo; the bridge there was barri-  
*The allies* cadoed and mined, and the army halted in its  
*halt.* rear. The ruined bridges at Dueñas and Villa Muriel had impeded Souham's movements, so that he did not approach till evening; he then halted his whole army  
*Oct. 27.* on the right bank of the Pisuerga. The morning of the 27th was foggy, but when the mist cleared, their whole force was seen encamped at about three miles' distance. They brought up two brigades of



artillery and cannonaded the town, with little other harm than that of severely wounding Lieutenant-Colonel Robe of the artillery. Being opposed to a superior fire, they made no farther attempt in front, but made considerable detachments to their right, through Cigales, with a view of getting possession of the bridge at Valladolid, and thus interposing in the rear of the retreating army. Lord Wellington had an opportunity of seeing their whole force from a high ground, and saw that they were in very great strength. On the 28th they extended their right still farther, and endeavoured in the morning to force the bridge over the Douro at Simancas, which was defended by Colonel Halkett, with his brigade of the 7th division, while the Earl of Dalhousie, with the remainder of the division, defended the bridge at Valladolid. Halkett being hard pressed blew up the bridge, and disappointed them of their passage there; at the same time he sent the Brunswick Oels regiment to Tordesillas, whither the enemy detached troops in the evening, and where also the bridge over the Douro was destroyed in time. Lord Wellington sent orders to the Brunswickers to take post on its ruins, in such manner as to prevent them from repairing it; and breaking up from the Pisuerga, he crossed the Douro on the 29th, by the bridges of Puente Douro, and Tudela, both which, and that at Quintanilla also, were blown up, and subsequently those at Toro and Zamora. The pursuers that evening displayed more enterprise than they had hitherto shown; they passed a body of men in the night of the 29th, by swimming the Douro near Tordesillas, and these gallant fellows falling upon the guard who had been left in a tower on the south end of the bridge, and looked for no attack on that side, surprised and overpowered them, and immediately fell to work to restore the communication. Lord Wellington was apprised of this in time, or

it would have frustrated all his former precautions; he marched his army early on the morrow, and posted them on the heights, between Rueda and Tordesillas, immediately opposite and near the bridge: the bridge by this time had been nearly repaired, but the French had made no attempt to pass; and in that position, which he strengthened with batteries, Lord Wellington remained from the 30th till the 6th of November, the enemy meantime extending along the river from Toro to Valladolid. He thus obtained the double object of resting the troops, and gaining time for Sir Rowland Hill's movements; for, . . though his first view had been in falling back upon the Douro to afford Sir Rowland a point upon which to retire when he should no longer be able to maintain an advanced position in front of Madrid, against the very superior force which would be brought against him, . . having seen the strength of Souham's army, it had become necessary to order Sir Rowland to break up from the Xarama, for the purpose of securing his own retreat.

Sir Rowland was an officer upon whom Lord Wellington might always rely with the most perfect confidence. He expected such orders, and receiving them on the 29th, intended to begin his march on the following morning; but the mine which should have destroyed the Puente Larga, on the Xarama, failed; and the enemy, who had collected a large body between that bridge and Aranjuez, immediately made an attack upon the allied post there. They were repulsed by Colonel Skerrett with considerable loss on their part, and that of some forty men on ours: this affair delayed the march of Sir Rowland's right till the evening, the enemy however made no subsequent attempt to molest him, farther than by picking up such stragglers as fell behind for the sake of plundering and drinking; and these were numerous. The army marched all night and reached

*Sir Rowland Hill retreats from the Xarama.*

Madrid on the following morning. That capital presented a melancholy scene: it was known that these allies could make no attempt to defend it, *State of Madrid.* and that their retreat would be followed by the entrance of the enemy; and two days before, when the Military and Provisional Government were about to transfer their authority to the *Ayuntamiento*, that body dissolved itself, regardless of its duty. Upon this, the Regidor D. Pedro Baranda, who had been on the point of resigning his office, came bravely and honourably forward to take himself the charge from which they had shrunk, and summoning persons to his aid who had been in authority when the French withdrew, began to take measures for averting the evils which there was so much cause to apprehend. The letters in the post-office were sent off to Avila, lest they should be seized by the enemy, and many persons brought into danger by their contents. And to prevent the excesses which must be expected, if on the entrance of the enemy the prisons should be thrown open, the alcaides were called upon to deliver in a list of those persons who were imprisoned for disloyalty to the national cause, and they were *November.* set at liberty while there yet existed an authority which could restrain them from acts of immediate vengeance.

There were large depôts of provisions in the Retiro and in the convent of Monserrate, which the allied army had no means of carrying with them *The allies withdraw from Madrid.* in their retreat, and orders were therefore given that they should be burnt. The municipality requested that they might rather be disposed of either by sale, or as a loan, for the inhabitants and the hospitals; it was not at the commissary's discretion to accede to this proposal; but instead of destroying the stores, the people in the immediate vicinity were invited to help themselves there. It seemed, indeed, in this retreat, that in the



economy of an army the English had yet every thing to learn: the troops were at this time scantily provided with food, their line of supply had been along the valley of the Tagus, the arrangements for changing its direction failed, and before the men effected their junction with Lord Wellington's army, the sweet acorns which they found in the wood formed no slight part of their subsistence. The works at the Retiro were destroyed before the troops withdrew from Madrid, and the artillery there was rendered useless: their departure resembled that of the French in this respect, that they were accompanied by a considerable number of Spaniards, for whom it would have been dangerous to place themselves at the mercy of the Intrusive Government; but such persons were objects of commiseration and respect to their countrymen, not of contempt and execration.

While the allies retired leisurely towards the pass of *The French* the Guadarrama, a French officer presented him-  
*enter.* self on the afternoon of November 1, at the bridge of Toledo, announcing on the part of General Drouet, that King Joseph would enter on the morrow with his army, and requiring that a deputation should go out to meet and welcome him. On the morrow, accordingly, the *Ayuntamiento* went forth accompanied by some of the parish priests, of the titular nobility, and of those who held office under the Intruder. Baranda briefly represented the peaceable conduct of the inhabitants, and expressed to Joseph's minister of the Interior, that his only wish was to retire to his own house, where he might consult his own health, and look after his own affairs. This permission was easily obtained, as the French presently re-established the former functionaries; but on the 6th, the municipality were informed that circumstances rendered it necessary for the troops to leave the capital for some days; and that, in the meantime,

they must take upon themselves the charge of preserving tranquillity. Baranda was then summoned from his short retirement, and required again to act as President of the *Ayuntamiento*. At two on the afternoon of the 7th, the troops departed to reinforce Marshal Soult, who had followed Sir Rowland's movements; and in less than two hours after their departure, Lieutenant-Colonel Mondedeu, the commandant of a Guerrilla party, entered; on the morrow, the Medico arrived with part of his band, the Empecinado's division on the following day, and on the 11th, the Camp Marshal Bassecourt with some of his troops. Fewer disorders were committed than might have been expected under such circumstances, and those chiefly by peasants and deserters, who thought to take advantage of the sort of interregnum in which the capital was left; but the officers caused these offenders to be arrested, and exerted themselves to prevent excesses. But the inhabitants were told that, as the human means of effecting with God's blessing their own deliverance, they must contribute towards the support of the soldiers as much as their necessities could spare; and it may be supposed that this contribution was exacted with less compunction on the one part, and submitted to with less unwillingness on the other, because both well knew that when the French returned, the locust would devour what the palmer-worm had left.

On the 6th Sir Rowland reached Arevalo, which is about 80 miles from Madrid; the troops had suffered much from the weather, more from the gross ill management on the part of the commissariat and the staff, and not a little from their own irregularities, moral discipline having long been disregarded in modern armies. He was now in communication with Lord Wellington, and was instructed to continue his march by Fonteveros upon Alba de Tormes.

*Junction of  
the retreat-  
ing armies.*

By this time Lord Wellington's army had been recruited by rest, and the enemy had rendered the bridges passable at Toro and at Tordesillas : he broke up therefore from his position in front of the latter city before daylight, leaving the fires burning : that day he fell back to Torrecilla de la Orden, continued his march the following day, and on the 8th took up the position which he had twice before occupied in front of Salamanca. Sir Rowland crossed the Tormes the same day at Alba, occupied that town and castle with Major-General Howard's brigade, and stationed a Portuguese division on the left of the Tormes, under Major-General Hamilton, to support them. They were not followed during their retreat from the Douro ; the enemy halted to collect provisions

*Junction of  
the French  
armies.*

and bring up their detachments, and the armies of Portugal and the north then formed their junction with those of the south, and of the centre under Soult and the Intruder : their united force amounted to not less than 80,000 foot and 12,000 horse, being the whole of their disposable force in Spain, and it was believed that they had with them not fewer than 200 pieces of cannon. The allies had 48,000 foot and 5000 horse. On the 9th the enemy drove in the piquets in front of Alba, and Major-General Long was obliged to withdraw his brigade through that town on the following morning. The enemy then, who were directing their main efforts against the right of the allies, approached their position on the Tormes, and prepared to force a passage. They attacked the troops in Alba with twenty pieces of cannon, and bringing up 15 squadrons and a considerable force of infantry threatened an assault, their light troops advancing close to the walls which had been hastily thrown up. They continued their fire from two o'clock till darkness had closed ; but they made no impression on the brave troops who were



opposed to them, and therefore they did not repeat the attempt. The intermediate time till the 14th they employed in reconnoitring the fords, and the position which Lord Wellington occupied in front of Salamanca; and on the 14th they commenced the passage at three fords, about two leagues above Alba, near Lucinas.

Lord Wellington immediately broke up from St. Christoval, ordered the troops to move towards Arapiles, and as soon as he had ascertained the direction of the enemy's march from the fords, moved with a division of infantry and all the cavalry he could collect to attack them; but they had already crossed in too great force. The wind at this time blew strong, and a thick rain rendered all objects indistinct at little distance; Lord Wellington, nevertheless, under cover of a cannonade, reconnoitred their position, and saw that they were too strongly posted at Mozarbes to be attacked. In the evening therefore he withdrew the troops from the neighbourhood of Alba, having destroyed the bridges, and leaving only a Spanish garrison of 300 men in the castle, into which the remains of an old palace had been converted. During the night, and in the course of the ensuing morning, he moved the greater part of the troops through Salamanca, and placed Sir Edward Paget, with the first division of infantry on the right, at Aldea Tejada, to secure the passage there over the little river Zunguen, in case the movements of the French on his right flank should compel him to make choice either of giving up his communications with Ciudad Rodrigo or with Salamanca. The inhabitants of that city were some preparing for the worst, and others helplessly expecting it, yet with a lingering hope that another battle upon that ground which had proved so destructive to Marmont's army might once more deliver them. Lord Wellington him-

*Lord Wellington retreats from Salamanca.*

self had this possibility in mind, and did not order the commissariat and hospital stores to be removed from Salamanca till the movements of the French rendered it certain that, notwithstanding their great superiority in numbers, they would not venture to bring on a general action. They fortified their position at Mozarbes, and sent out bodies of horse and foot towards their left, to act upon the communications of the allies with Ciudad Rodrigo. This was a sure game; they were too strong and too strongly posted for Lord Wellington to think of attacking them; nothing therefore remained for him but to retreat upon his resources; and this was the more necessary because the men were nearly exhausted with the fatigues of so long and arduous a campaign; there was little regard to discipline among them, except when in the immediate presence of an enemy, and the horses were dying of exhaustion and for want of forage.

On the 15th the army was put in motion to retire, in three columns, observing, as well as the country would allow, parallel distances. Sir Rowland commanded the first, Sir Edward Paget the centre, the third consisted of the Spanish army. They crossed the Zunguen, passed the left flank of the enemy's position, and encamped that night in the olive-grounds, on the Vamusa, one of the smaller rivers which find their way into the Tormes. The weather was most unfavourable, and the way sometimes over stony and ploughed grounds, sometimes over swampy or inundated low lands. The troops arrived at their halting places greatly fatigued. They were without shelter of any sort; it was impossible to kindle fires because of the heavy and incessant rain; and they were still farther dispirited by finding that the supplies had been forwarded to Ciudad Rodrigo. Bread for three days in advance had been issued to them as usual, but English

*Retreat to  
the Agueda.*

*Sufferings  
of the  
army.*

soldiers are seldom provident, and when such demands were made upon their strength, the natural means of supporting and recruiting it could never be more needful. There was no provender for the horses, the bark of trees and sprigs of wild briar were the only and miserable substitutes that could be found. The French never displayed less vigour than at this time; the overweening contempt which they had once affected for the British troops had been so thoroughly corrected, that they made no attempt to overwhelm an enemy greatly inferior in number, and retreating under circumstances of great difficulty and distress. They only sent a body of cavalry with light artillery in pursuit; and these contented themselves with picking up stragglers and such baggage as fell behind. The army bivouacked on the 16th in a wood about two leagues from Tamames; the ground in many places was covered with water, but the rain ceased, and some biscuit was issued. The day's march had been most painful, over such heavy ground that at every step the horses sunk to the fetlock, and the men to their ancles; but while the men were filling their havresacks with sweet acorns, which they rejoiced to meet with, in the want of other food, the horses now and then picked up a little grass.

The 17th was another wet and misty day; the army left its bivouack at six; an extensive wood lay before them: the enemy now followed close upon their rear, and the light companies were ordered to extend themselves through the wood for the purpose of protecting the flanks and the baggage. This service was not easily to be performed against so great a force of cavalry as was now harassing the movements of a disorderly army. Wherever the way was through the woods, the officers as well as men carried on a successful warfare against the herds of swine which at that season are turned there to



feed upon the acorns ; the Spaniards, it is said, began ; the wretched state of their commissariat was their excuse, and the allies had the same excuse for following the example ; and so eagerly was it followed, that the continued firing of musquetry on all sides, often occasioned an apprehension that the piquets were warmly engaged, and even that the army was surrounded. This occurred so often that it produced incaution at last, and the enemy's fire was mistaken for pig-shooting. Owing to the badness of the roads, and the swollen state of the rivulets, there was an interval of about a mile between two of the infantry divisions. Sir Edward Paget, *Sir Edward Paget made prisoner.* who commanded the centre column, rode to the rear, alone, for the purpose of discovering the cause of this interval : a body of the enemy's cavalry meantime had entered between these divisions ; they had pursued a troop of Portugeuze horse from the left flank : the firing had been ascribed to the pig-shooters, and Sir Edward falling in with the French was made prisoner, being without support : they might have done much hurt had they been more enterprising or more aware of their advantage. At this time the troops were descending upon the little village of S. Muñoz, in a valley between two hills ; the Huebra which runs into the Douro has its course along this valley, a deep and rapid stream ; both hills are covered with oaks, and the declivity on both sides is difficult and steep. The troops when they had forded were formed in open columns on the heights, and halted. A fog came on early in the afternoon, under cover of which the enemy got possession of a hill upon the right of the British line ; they brought up some mountain-guns, and commenced a fire upon the rear-guard, consisting of the light division, under Major-General Alten, while it was fording the river. Some loss was sustained by them. The guns of

Major Macdonald's troops of horse-artillery returned their fire successfully, but during the cannonade he was severely wounded. The enemy's cavalry followed as soon as the division had crossed, and began to hem them in; and though the troops formed in squares, they succeeded in charging them in the low ground.

There was now some appearance that an action might be brought on; the men were sufficiently eager for this, they longed to revenge themselves upon the French for the privations and sufferings of their retreat; they made no doubt of beating them, and they anticipated with hungry eagerness the pleasure of taking their supplies. As Lord Wellington came to pass the column in review, the word, "here he comes," passed along, and carried with it sure confidence to every heart, . . . that confidence which before the works at Burgos could not be felt, being given in the field as fully as it was deserved. But the French also knew that the British commander and his troops might justly rely upon each other, and they would not hazard a battle. The cannonade was continued on both sides till evening closed. The men bivouacked as usual on the wet ground, their cloaks and blankets soaked with rain; but the rain had ceased, it was a moonlight night, and they had the satisfaction of knowing that another day's march would bring them to Ciudad Rodrigo, beyond which the enemy could not follow them, and where their privations would be at an end. Between three and four in the morning they moved from their bivouack; the enemy followed them that day only with their cavalry. Lord Wellington's head-quarters were in Ciudad Rodrigo that night, and on the 19th and 20th the army entered the Portuguese frontier, crossing the Agueda. The loss during this retreat of about 240 miles amounted to 196 killed, 663 wounded, 421 missing, and 280 horses; many of the

*Lord Wellington reaches Ciudad Rodrigo.*

men who had been returned as missing afterwards came in ; but others, among whom were some valuable officers, died in consequence of the fatigues and hardships which they had endured.

The enemy retired as soon as the allies had reached Ciudad Rodrigo, and they withdrew from the *The French retire to the Tormes.* Tormes also as soon as the castle of Alba was surrendered. The Spanish Governor Don José de Miranda held out there with great gallantry, and made more than a hundred prisoners in some well-directed sallies. Some characteristic correspondence passed between him and the French ; *Castle of Alba de Tormes evacuated.* they required him to surrender and rely upon their generosity, otherwise he must expect to be treated with the utmost rigour ; he in reply spoke of his duties as a soldier, and boasted of his brilliant garrison. The French allowed him an hour for returning a second answer, and bade him tremble if it were a refusal ; in his reply he bade them do their duty as he should perform his, and told them that if the fortune of war should be in their favour, his numerous prisoners, who had been treated in the best manner, would be the victims. In this strain, but in letters which increased in length, and became more and more courteous, the correspondence was continued from the 14th of November till the 24th, on the night of which Miranda left the fortress in the hands of Lieutenant D. Nicolas Soler, with 20 men, the prisoners and the sick ; and informing the French commander, in his last communication, that this officer was instructed to deliver up the place, he with the remainder of the garrison effected their escape, making their way through many dangers, but with little loss, to the Puerto del Pico.

As soon as it was ascertained that the enemy had withdrawn from the Tormes, Lord Wellington distri-



buted the troops in winter cantonments, the left being retired to Lamego, and the right thrown forward as far as Baños and Bejar, to hold the passes. He then addressed a circular letter to the commanding officers of battalions, for the purpose of drawing their attention in a very particular manner to the state of discipline of the troops. “The discipline of every army,” he said, “after a long and active campaign, becomes in some degree relaxed, and requires the utmost attention on the part of the generals and other officers to bring it back to the state in which it ought to be for service ; but I am concerned to have to observe, that the army under my command has fallen off in this respect in the last campaign in a greater degree than any army with which I have ever served, or of which I have ever read. Yet this army has met with no disaster ; it has suffered no privations which but trifling attention on the part of the officers could have prevented, and for which there existed no reason whatever in the nature of the service ; nor has it suffered any hardships excepting those resulting from the inclemencies of the weather at a time when they were most severe. It must be obvious, however, to every officer that from the time the troops commenced their retreat from the neighbourhood of Burgos on one hand, and from Madrid on the other, the officers lost all command over their men. Irregularities and outrages of all descriptions were committed with impunity, and losses have been sustained which ought never to have occurred. Yet, the necessity for retreat existing, none was ever made in which the troops made such short marches ; none on which they made such long and repeated halts ; and none on which the retreating armies were so little pressed in the rear by the enemy. We must look therefore to some cause besides those resulting from the operations in which we have been

*Lord Wellington's circular letter to the commanding officers.*

engaged. I have no hesitation in attributing these evils to the habitual inattention of the officers of the regiments to their duty as prescribed by the standing regulations of the service, and by the orders of this army.

“ I am far from questioning the zeal, still less the gallantry and spirit of the officers ; and I am quite certain that as their minds can be convinced of the necessity of minute and constant attention, to understand, recollect, and carry into execution the orders which have been issued for the performance of their duty, and that the strict performance of their duty is necessary to enable the army to serve the country as it ought to be served, they will in future fix their attention to these points. Unfortunately the inexperience of the officers has induced many to conceive that the period during which an army is on service is one of relaxation from all rule, instead of being, as it is, the period during which, of all others, every rule for the regulation and control of the conduct of the soldier, for the inspection and care of his arms, ammunition, accoutrements, necessaries and field equipments, and his horse and horse appointments, for the receipt and issue, and care of his provisions, and the regulation of all that belongs to his food and the forage for his horse, must be most strictly attended to by the officer of his company or troop, if it is intended that an army, a British army in particular, shall be brought into the field of battle in a state of efficiency to meet the enemy on the day of trial.

“ These are the points then to which I most earnestly entreat you to turn your attention, and the attention of the officers under your command, Portuguese as well as English, during the period in which it may be in my power to leave the troops in their cantonments. The commanding officers of regiments must enforce the orders of the army regarding the constant inspection and super-

intendence of the officers over the conduct of the men of their companies in their cantonments; and they must endeavour to inspire the non-commissioned officers with a sense of their situation and authority; and the non-commissioned officers must be forced to do their duty, by being constantly under the view and superintendence of the officers. By these means the frequent and discreditable recourse to the authority of the provost, and to punishments by the sentence of courts-martial will be prevented, and the soldiers will not dare to commit the offences and outrages of which there are too many complaints, when they know that their officers, and their non-commissioned officers, have their eyes and attention turned towards them. The commanding officers of regiments must likewise enforce the orders of the army regarding the constant, real inspection of the soldiers' arms, ammunition, accoutrements and necessaries, in order to prevent at all times the shameful waste of ammunition, and the sale of that article, and of the soldiers' necessaries. With this view both should be inspected daily."

He proceeded to say that he had frequently observed during the late campaign with how much more ease and celerity the French soldiers cooked their food than the British. This disadvantage on our part, he said, must be ascribed to the same cause as the other evils which he lamented, "the want of attention in the officers to the orders of the army and to the conduct of their men, and the consequent want of authority over their conduct. Certain men of each company should be appointed to cut and bring in wood, others to fetch water, and others to get the meat, &c. to be cooked: and it would soon be found if this practice were duly enforced, and a particular hour for serving the dinners, and for the men dining, named, as it ought to be, equally as for the parade, that



cooking would no longer require the inconvenient length of time which it had lately been found to take, and that the soldiers would not be exposed to the privation of their food at the moment when the army may be engaged in operations with the enemy." He concluded by repeating that the great object of the general and field officers must be to get the captains and subalterns of the regiments to understand, and to perform the duties required from them, as the only mode by which the discipline and efficiency of the army could be restored and maintained during the next campaign.

This letter excited no little surprise in the nation, mortifying and disgraceful as the faults were which were thus openly and manfully exposed. But it was not more severe than the occasion called for. No retreat had ever been conducted with greater military skill; and nothing but that skill, and the reputation which the British troops had established for themselves under its direction, could have saved the army from the consequences of the ignorance or neglect of duty in many of the officers, and the insubordination of the men, which was a consequence of such neglect or ignorance. The circumstances of that retreat justified the whole severity of Lord Wellington's remarks, and would more evidently have done so, if the sufferings of the army had been more broadly stated; for though the marches had indeed been short, and the halts long and frequent, no army which was not flying from an enemy, but retreating before it, in strength, ever suffered so much from exposure, and hunger, and exhaustion. Nothing could be more judicious than his orders during the whole retreat, and nothing more irregular than the way in which they were carried into effect; and this, though in part owing to casual and unavoidable obstructions on the way, arose in a far greater degree from negligence and incapacity. Sometimes divisions were moved

too soon, more frequently too late, and kept standing on wet ground, in the rain, for two hours, perishing with cold, waiting the order to move. Their clothes were seldom dry for six hours together,\* and during the latter part of the retreat continually wet; sometimes they were bivouacked in a swamp, when better ground was near: they lay down upon the wet ground, fell asleep from mere exhaustion, were roused to receive their meat, and had then no means of dressing it, . . the camp-kettles had been sent on, or by some error were some miles in the rear, or the mules which carried them had foundered on the way; and no fire could be kindled on wet ground, with wet materials, and under a heavy rain. The subalterns threw the blame upon their superiors, and these again upon theirs, all complaining of incompetence in some of the general officers, and carelessness or supercilious neglect in some of the staff. But the intended effect was produced. That something was deficient in the equipments of the army was perceived, and in part remedied. Alas! no one observed that there was an utter want of that discipline by virtue of which Cromwell conquered, which rendered the Swedes invincible under their great Gustavus, and to which the Prince of Parma owed little less than to his own military genius, admirable as that was.

## CHAPTER XLIII.

OPERATIONS DURING THE WINTER AND SPRING. BATTLE OF VITTORIA.

LORD WELLINGTON's failure at Burgos, and his consequent retreat to the Agueda, gave the Whigs a last opportunity of repeating their predictions, that the war in the Peninsula must prove unsuccessful, and they availed themselves of it with unabated confidence. The more rancorous radicals insulted the nation for the hopes which had been entertained, exulted in the reverses which they magnified, and reviled the ministers and the General, . . the ministers both for having continued the war, and for "starving" it; Lord Wellington both for inactivity and for rashness, for doing too little and too much, for wasting time at Madrid, and for attempting a siege with such inadequate means, that nothing but the most profuse expenditure of blood could afford even a forlorn hope of its succeeding. Even when the events of the Russian campaign made it evident that the formidable tyranny against which we had so long contended must soon be overthrown, the opposition, as well as the revolutionists, turned away their eyes from the prospect.

Parliament met at the latter end of November. In the Prince Regent's speech it was stated, that the southern provinces of Spain had been delivered in consequence of the battle of Salamanca; and that, though it had been necessary to withdraw

*Marquis  
Wellesley  
calls for in-  
quiry.*



from the siege of Burgos and to evacuate Madrid, the effort of the enemy for rendering it so had occasioned sacrifices on his part, which must materially contribute to extend the resources and facilitate the exertions of the Spaniards. On this occasion, Marquis Wellesley called upon the Peers, to inquire whether Nov. 30. the system which had hitherto been pursued was founded upon just and extended principles ; whether an able and efficient exertion of our resources had been made ; whether such means as the country possessed had been fully employed ; and whether the result had been such as the nation had a right to expect from the possession of those means, and the right application of them. He wished it were possible to fix in the minds of their lordships something like a definite and precise object, as the issue of the contest in the Peninsula. In his mind, the only legitimate object was, the expulsion of the French armies from Spain ; and the war had been carried on in a way totally inadequate to the production of that result. The plan which of all others all mankind must reprobate, was that of employing our resources with a view rather to what might be spared in expense, than to what might be effected by exertion : thus exposing the sinews of our strength to hourly danger, and bearing hard upon our finances, yet effecting neither economy nor success, but falling dead as it were between both. A vast expense of blood and treasure had been lavished, without accomplishing any one definite object. The best assistance we could afford to Russia was by carrying on the war in Spain upon a broad and extensive scale ; it had not been so carried on, and he charged upon that system, therefore, a defection from the cause of Russia. He did not mean to dispute that the last campaign had been beneficial to Spain ; but his objection was, that those benefits

were imperfectly secured, and that they could not expect them to be permanent.

Lord Grenville repeated and persisted in his old opinion, that the deliverance of Spain was beyond  
*Lord Grenville.* the utmost means of this country to effect ; and that it was cruel and base to embark the population of that country in so hopeless a cause, merely for the sake of a little temporary advantage. The ministers had not advanced one step in the accomplishment of this object ; and this third advance into the interior of Spain had, by its failure, proved the correctness of the data on which his opinion was founded. Their boast of having delivered Andalusia was an empty boast : no one doubted that the deliverance was more than temporary, and that the French could not re-occupy the provinces whenever they pleased. It was the want of means, the failure of supplies and resources, which had led to the unproductive results of all their exertions. The blame did not lie with the Spaniards, but with those who encouraged the hopes which they had no right to entertain : the fault was with the English ministers, who in their ignorance over-rated the condition of Spain, and anticipated more from her than she could by possibility perform. He asked also, why ministers, with a revenue of one hundred and five millions, or more, by estimate, extorted by means the most grinding and oppressive from a suffering people, were yet unable to supply Lord Wellington's military chest ? The difficulty arose from their incapacity, not from the deficient resources of the country, much as they had been drained. They might diminish by one half the income of every individual in this country, with as little effect or promise of ultimate success as had attended those plans which led them to circulate a vile and adulterated currency in paper coin throughout the nation.

When such had been its effects, why not at this moment stop the contest in Spain?

In the House of Commons, Mr. Ponsonby said, it was useless to carry farther an unprofitable contest; *Mr. Ponsonby.* it was useless to waste the blood and the treasures of England for an unattainable object; it had been proved that the power of England was not competent to drive the French out of the Peninsula.

Mr. Freemantle was decidedly of opinion, that by the battle of Salamanca we had gained nothing but *Mr. Freemantle.* glory; that the deliverance of Spain was no nearer its accomplishment than when Lord Wellington was posted at Torres Vedras, and that our prospects at the present moment were not nearly so bright as at the commencement of the last session, . . . at which time his declared opinion had been, that we could entertain no rational prospect of making any impression upon *Mr. Whitbread.* the enemy in Spain. Mr. Whitbread's tone upon that subject was somewhat modified; he admitted that the situation in which we now stood in Spain was glorious beyond example, in so far as related to the achievements of our armies, though with respect to the expulsion of the French, we were not so near our object as some people supposed. There was this difference between an offensive and a defensive war; that an offensive war ought always to be a war of spirit. When vigorous efforts therefore were to be made in Spain, there ought to be no limit to that vigour. Let an application therefore be made to the Prince Regent, to know from him whether the greatest possible use had been made by ministers of the means with which they were intrusted for carrying on the war, before coming to a decision on the merits of ministers, or the probability of the war being in future carried on with success. He was far



from wishing to refuse them the means necessary for carrying it to a successful issue ; but feeling for the people who were groaning under accumulated burdens and threatened with the Chancellor of the Exchequer's financial abilities, he thought the last resources of the country ought not to be granted without security for their being properly applied. Under all these circumstances, he was desirous of imploring the Prince Regent to take into consideration, whether or not it was at present possible to bring about a pacification. Buonaparte was on his retreat to his resources, his force not annihilated, though certainly in great danger, and this was what the House were to congratulate themselves on, and for which they were to go to the Prince Regent with an address on the prosperous state of the country ! If the situation of affairs on the continent was good for any thing, it was this, that the Emperor of France having failed in his object, an opportunity was now offered when it would not be inglorious, and when it would certainly be highly useful to propose to the enemy some arrangement for peace. Buonaparte was at present in a perilous situation, and every exertion ought to be made, by taking advantage of it to procure a peace. But a feeling seemed to pervade the minds of certain persons, that peace should not be concluded with that man, . . . a feeling which he wished to eradicate from this country : for, in the probable course of events, we should be obliged to make peace with him. Let him therefore be sent to openly and manfully ! The fate of the mission would be speedily known ; and the issue would be a conviction on the mind of every one, whether a permanent and honourable peace could be procured or not.

When a motion for thanks to Lord Wellington and his army for the battle of Salamanca was brought forward,

Sir Francis Burdett said, he was far from wishing invidiously to detract from the merits of men who had devoted their exertions to the service of their country, or to withhold from them any recompense that it was in the power of Parliament to bestow : but when he heard the battle of Salamanca represented as having been equal in importance to the battle of Blenheim, and to other great battles which had completely changed the aspect of the whole affairs of Europe, he could not suffer such delusions to go forth uncontradicted, . . delusions which were calculated to plunge the country, under the direction of the same persons, still more deeply in a destructive and ruinous war : for after their boasted and over-praised victories, we were still as far from our object as ever. What ! were we to suffer the French troops to recover from the effect of their discomfiture and exhaustion, and to wait until the tide of good fortune which had attended us flowed back on its source ? Were we to be satisfied with a retreat ? Yet, where now was the Marquis of Wellington ? In what direction were we to look for the glorious results of the campaign ? In what manner was the diminution of the French power in Spain evinced ? Nothing seemed to have resulted from all our advantages but calamity and distress ; and it followed, therefore, that either Lord Wellington was not entitled to the praise which the House was called upon to bestow, or that the fault of our failure was attributable to the gross negligence and imbecility of the ministers. Lord Castle-reagh, Sir Francis pursued, in the plenitude of his satisfaction, had not confined himself to Spain, but had travelled out of his course, and taken the House to Russia, where in the destruction of from 200,000 to 300,000 human beings, in the burning of Moscow, and in the devastation of an immense tract of Russian terri-

*Motion of  
thanks to  
the armies.*

*Sir Francis  
Burdett.*

tory, he found new causes of congratulation, new sources of national pride and gratitude! Would he be equally inclined to consider it a matter of triumph, if Buonaparte (which in his opinion was more than probable) should extricate himself from his perils, and after having found good winter-quarters, return to the contest with renovated ardour in the spring? Could he believe it possible that Russia could continue such a contest, and undergo a repetition of similar dreadful experiments and sacrifices? Supposing he marched to Petersburg, which seemed to be his ultimate intention, would the same mode of defence as at Moscow be adopted? Would Russia burn Petersburg too? He for one could not greatly admire the magnanimity of burning that, the preservation of which ought to have been fought for; nor could he see the shining character of the Emperor Alexander, who was not, like the Emperor of the French, personally sharing in the dangers of the war. He could not subdue the conviction which arose in his mind on viewing all these things, of the utter impossibility of the Emperor of Russia's feeling any exultation whatever: on the contrary, he thought that unfortunate individual must be oppressed by a view of the irreparable calamities to which himself and his people had been, and were likely still further to be, exposed. Farther than this,

*Dec. 7.*

when a grant was moved to the Marquis of Wellington, Sir Francis said, he did not wish to divide the House upon it, but he wished to move, that the consideration of the grant should be deferred till some inquiries had been made into the late extraordinary campaign. Lord Wellington's victories had none of the characteristics which distinguished those of Marlborough. It had been observed, and by military men too, that he had brought his army into difficulties, but that his men had fought him out of them again; and that in



the capture of the fortresses which he had won, a waste of life was to be complained of. The cause of Spain appeared to him infinitely more hopeless than it was at the commencement of the campaign, . . the case of the Peninsula more deplorable than ever.

Marquis Wellesley moved for a committee to inquire into the conduct of the war in the Peninsula.

“My Lords,” said he, “what secret cause amidst the splendid scene that has been exhibited in the Peninsula, . . what malign influence amidst the rejoicings and acclamations of triumph, has

*M. Wellesley moves for a committee of inquiry.*

*March 12.*

counteracted the brilliant successes of our arms, and has converted the glad feelings of a just exultation into the bitterness of regret and disappointment? With an army in discipline and spirit superior to any that had ever been assembled, uniting in itself qualities so various, as never to have entered into the composition of any other such assemblage of force ; . . with a general, pronounced by the whole world to be unsurpassed in ancient or modern times ; the pride of his country, the refuge and hope of Europe ; . . with a cause in which justice vied with policy, combining all that was ardent in the one motive, with all that was sober in the other ; . . with the eyes of Europe fixed on our movements ; . . with the admiration of the world excited by our achievements : . . how is it that our hopes have been raised only to be frustrated? How is it that we have been allowed to indulge in expectation of an approaching completion of success, only to behold the utter disappointment of our wishes? Why has a system of advance suddenly and inevitably been converted into a system of retreat? When victory actually sprung from the bosom of retreat, why was the glorious victor compelled to relapse into his retrogression? Why has it happened that we have seen the great conqueror who chased the French armies from

the plains of Salamanca, pursued in his turn, by those whom he had conquered, over those plains which had been the scene of his former triumphs? Why, in conclusion, has a system of offence shrunk into a system of defence, and what is the reason that our military operations in the Peninsula have ended where they began?

“I should be lost to every feeling of honour, and to every sense of duty to the country, if I did not state that the effect of this campaign altogether has been not to approximate you towards your object, but to remove you from it; and that this calamity has arisen from the insufficiency of those means which, by a small addition, might have been rendered effective. I maintain, that the object we had in view, (the only honest object . . the only great object . . which we could pursue, or hope to obtain by our operations in Spain,) was the expulsion of the French, or, at least, a considerable diminution of their power, with a view to the freedom of the people, and the independence of the Spanish monarchy. This was, certainly, the main object which we ought to have contemplated; the ultimate object of the British nation was, certainly, by the deliverance of the peninsula of Spain, to lay a solid foundation for the establishment of a permanent and honourable peace.

“What I have contended is, that the efforts we have made have not been equal to the resources of the country; that they have not been such as the magnitude, the infinite importance of the cause demanded, and as the favourableness of the opportunity particularly called for; that we have not made even a faint approximation to the object of the war, the expulsion of the French from the Peninsula; but that the French have been enabled, by our reverses, to consolidate their power in Spain, and to systematize the moral and military subjugation of the country. We ought to have called forth all our re-

sources, . . and we have made no extraordinary sacrifices ; we ought to have strained every nerve at this momentous crisis, . . and we have remained little better than idle spectators of the fate of Spain. We have been deterred by petty objections ; by calculations of expense, which are but as dust in the balance."

Earl Grey supported the motion for a committee, saying, that the great objects of the campaign had not been realized, but that, on the contrary, *Earl Grey.* there had been a complete failure, . . a great and lamentable failure ; and that it was one of the most important duties of that house, in cases of ill success, to vindicate the interests of the country, by visiting with its severest censure the causers of the misfortune. Aware as the ministers were, he said, of the state of Europe, and knowing, as they must have known, the effect that at such a crisis would have been produced by a vigorous and decisive effort in the Peninsula, it was their bounden duty to have provided Lord Wellington with ample means for carrying through his enterprising projects, and crowning them with brilliant and unqualified success. Nothing had happened which induced him to repent of his opinion, that the efforts of the Spanish people could alone enable them to withstand the overwhelming power of France. This sentiment he had uttered under the supposition that no other power would stand up against the French Emperor, and that that Emperor would not depart from the unity of council and of action, by which his greatest successes had been achieved. And, indeed, if with such a commander and such an army as ours, and at a time when the army of France in the north had met with disasters, greater than which never fell upon a host assembled for the purposes of injustice and ambition, . . if under these circumstances we had achieved so little in Spain, what would have been the issue, if one-tenth



only of the forces employed against Russia had been turned against us? The time had called for exertion, and the exertions had failed, . . failed almost entirely as to their great object: the French were left in possession of the best parts of Spain; and we had not advanced in any degree, considering the effects of the last campaign upon the minds of the Spaniards, to the accomplishment of our object. Such was the case, and it called loudly for inquiry.

To these assertions the Earl of Liverpool replied, that *The Earl of Liverpool.* the campaign which had been thus represented as a failure and a defeat, was, in fact, the most brilliant that had been achieved by British arms in any period of our history. They had been seeking as a great object, that the whole force of Spain should be placed under the command of Lord Wellington, and that object had at length been accomplished. Every exertion that could be made had been made, for sending out troops to the Peninsula and for supplying them there, and the success of the war was indisputable. Portugal had been rescued from the enemy, and placed in a state of security, and now one-third of Spain was relieved from their presence. Spain and Portugal had set the example which Russia had followed, with the great advantage of having a government in full activity to direct all its strength. The example thus set and thus followed would have an effect among the other nations of Europe, would rouse their spirit, animate their exertions, and teach them in what manner to resist oppression, . . teach them that an united nation, determined to resist an invader, could not

*Earl Bathurst.*

be conquered! . . Earl Bathurst argued to the same purpose, saying, that something had been effected, if the views of England were what Marquis Wellesley had powerfully described them to be at the beginning of the war in Spain, . . first, to create a diver-

sion in favour of our allies ; secondly, to encourage resistance in other countries, by showing its effects in Spain ; and thirdly, to prevent the commercial and military means of that country from falling into the hands of our enemy. Those had been the views of England, those were the views of the present Government, and those views had been forwarded by the last campaign. And Lord Wellington was satisfied with the conduct of the administration during that campaign, . . a declaration which had not been sought for by the ministers, but which he had voluntarily made.

In these debates the Whigs manifested the same disposition to magnify our reverses and depreciate our success, and the same propensity for predicting discomfiture and disgrace which had characterized their conduct during the whole struggle. The feeling with which they continued to regard Buonaparte, notwithstanding his inordinate ambition and his remorseless tyranny, was farther exhibited by Lord Holland, when, upon *April 2.* presenting some petitions for peace, he expressed *Lord Holland.* his trust that ministers entertained no chimerical notions of wresting from France what she had acquired during the last twenty years, nor of humiliating the great prince who now ruled that country ; and his willingness to believe that they had not neglected the opportunity which the successes of Russia afforded for opening a negotiation ! But they better understood their duty to their allies, and to Europe, and to their country ; and being instructed by experience as well as encouraged by sure hope, they spared no efforts now for enabling Lord Wellington to open the ensuing campaign with means which should render success certain. Lord Wellington *Lord Wellington goes to Cadiz.* went to Cadiz at the close of the year, to make arrangements with the Spanish ministers for the co-operation of the Spanish armies. A deputation

from the Cortes was sent to compliment him on his arrival; he paid his respects, in consequence, to that assembly; expressed his thanks in a brief and modest speech, for the different marks of honour and confidence which he had received from it; and said, that not the Spaniards alone looked to it with hope, but the whole world was concerned in the happy issue of their vigorous endeavours to save Spain from general destruction, and to establish in that monarchy a system founded upon just principles, which should promote and secure the prosperity of all the citizens, and the greatness of the Spanish nation. In reply, the president complimented him upon his victories, which had been celebrated, he said, like those of the Genius of Good over the Genius of Evil. The Cortes did not now hope or trust for new triumphs from the Duque de Ciudad Rodrigo, they looked upon them as certain; and looked, not only that the Spanish and allied armies under such a leader would drive the French beyond the Pyrenees, but that, if it should be needful, they would pitch their victorious tents upon the banks of the Seine; it would not be the first time that the Spanish lions had trampled on its banks upon the old fleur-de-lys of France.

It was arranged that 50,000 Spanish troops should be placed at his disposal. The army under Castaños formed part of these; it consisted of what had formerly been called the 5th, 6th, and 7th armies, now comprehended under the name of the fourth: Castaños was to hold also the captaincies-general of the province of Extremadura, Old Castille and Leon, Galicia and Asturias. There was to be an army of reserve in Andalusia under the Conde de Abisbal, and an army of reserve in Galicia. The other armies were that of Catalonia, which was the first; of this Copons held the command: he was also captain-

*Arrangements for the co-operation of the Spanish armies.*



general of that province, and of that part of Aragon which was on the right of the Ebro ; the second, which Elio, captain-general of Valencia, Murcia, and New Castille, commanded ; and the third (formerly the fourth) under the Duque del Parque, who was also charged with the captaincies-general of Jaen and Granada.

From Cadiz, Lord Wellington repaired to Lisbon. Triumphal arches were erected in all the towns through which he passed, from Elvas to the Tagus. *Lord Wellington goes to Lisbon.* The ships, the troops, and the people of Lisbon, received him with such honours as he deserved ; greater could be paid to no man ; and there was a general and voluntary illumination during three successive nights. A drama was composed to celebrate his victories, and represented in his presence at the royal theatre of San Carlos, where all the boxes were decorated with angels bearing crowns and shields, on which the initials of Lord Wellington were inscribed ; *O Nome*, “ The Name,” was the title of the piece, and it was preluded by a hymn in honour of the Prince of Brazil, and the exhibition of his portrait under a canopy. The scene then represented the Elysian fields, where, in the pitiable style of operatic invention, Glory, and Posterity, and Camoens, and the Great Constable, Nuno Alvares Pereira, with sundry other Lusitanian worthies, recitativied in praise of Lord Wellington, Lord Beresford, and the Portuguese and British armies ; and down came angels and genii presenting illuminated scrolls, inscribed with the names of his victories.

The Portuguese army was, at this time, reproved by Lord Beresford for its want of discipline during the late retreat, in terms not less severe than those of Lord Wellington’s letter. *Relaxed discipline of the Portuguese army.* Certain officers were suspended for scandalous neglect and total disregard of their duties : and it was stated, that, in every

instance, complaints had been made by the commandants of corps or brigades, of inactivity and want of zeal in the officers of all those corps which had suffered extraordinary loss during the retreat. That such losses were occasioned by the negligence of the officers was proved by the fact, that other corps in the same marches, and under the same circumstances, difficulties, and privations, had none of their men missing; the officers of those corps were named with due praise. Marshal Beresford added, he deemed it important to remind the army, that with all the reasons which he had (and he was happy to say that he had every reason) for praising the conduct of the Portuguese officers, when they were in presence of an enemy, and exposed to fire, valour, nevertheless, was not the only thing needful; firmness and constancy were equally so for supporting the reverses, and fatigues, and privations, to which a military life is subject; and if the officers did not yield under such circumstances, the soldiers certainly would not; for no soldier, and especially no Portuguese soldier, ever would be backward in any thing when his officer set him an example; nor would ever commit any fault or manifest any discontent, so long as he saw his officer doing his duty under the same circumstances, and setting him an example of courage, firmness, and constancy. One of the army surgeons had been brought before a court-martial for neglecting the sick and wounded under his care, while they were in the hospital at Madrid. He was sentenced to a month's imprisonment, and the loss of a month's pay. Marshal Beresford, in confirming the sentence, expressed his disapprobation of it; a punishment so little in proportion to the crime, he said, was not likely to impress persons who had neither the proper feelings of men or of Christians; for what could be more horrible, than to see men who had been wounded in the service of their Prince and

of their country, or whose health had been broken in that service, neglected by one who had received rank, honour, and pay, for the express intent of making him more attentive in his treatment of them? What could be worse than that such a person should be found preferring his own ease, or interest, or temporary convenience, to his duty towards his God, and his Prince, and his fellow-creatures, and leaving them either to perish through his neglect, or to fall into the hands of the enemy?

The consequences of the retreat were severely felt; in January, more than a third of the British army *January.* were on the sick list, fever being the principal disease, which want of clothing had, with fatigue, contributed to produce, and want of cleanliness to propagate. In personal appearance and in clothing, the British troops were at this time much worse than the Portuguese. But supplies of every kind, as well as large reinforcements, were received during the winter, no time being lost, and no care neglected. The infantry had suffered so much from want of cover, that they were now provided with tents, three for each company, and these were borne by the animals which used before to carry the camp kettles, tin kettles being substituted for iron ones, . . one to six men, and light enough for the men to carry it by turns on their knapsacks. Tents were not thought necessary for the cavalry, because not being either heated or exhausted so much in their marches, they were better able to stand the cold at night.

While the British force in the Peninsula was increased, and the Spanish rendered more available than it had been in any former campaign, that of the French was weakened; the enormous loss which Buonaparte *Buonaparte withdraws troops from Spain.* had suffered in Russia, and the obstinate ambition with which he kept large garrisons in the north of Germany, rendering it necessary for him to withdraw



troops from Spain. From 10 to 20,000 repassed the Pyrenees; not fewer than 140,000 were still left, . . good troops, well-officered, and under commanders of high reputation and approved skill. But both officers and men had had their confidence abated; the generals felt that even the resources of the conscription were exhaustible; and as little hope, when they considered the present state of their Emperor's fortunes, could be entertained of subjugating the Spaniards, the object upon which all seemed to be most intent was that of enriching themselves by plunder, while it was still in their power to do so. M. Suchet left scarcely one picture of any value in Valencia, either in the convents, churches, or private houses; and that city was thus deprived of the finest works of Juanes, . . works which, precious as they are, were there enhanced in value by the local and religious feeling with which his fellow-citizens regarded the productions of their saintly painter. There and everywhere contributions were imposed and exacted in a manner which made it apparent that the Intrusive government treated them now not as subjects who were to be taxed, but as enemies from whom all that could be extorted was to be taken. Their operations on the side of New Castille and Leon were at this time confined to periodical circuits for the purpose of enforcing the payment of contributions. On the side of the Tagus they fortified the right bank of the river, repaired the Puente del Arzobispo, and occupied Almaraz, though they did not restore the bridge there.

Meantime the Spaniards were not idle. Longa surprised General Fromant in the valley of Sedano, when returning to Burgos with the requisitions which he had collected, and with sixty respectable householders whom he was taking away as hostages for the contribution: the hostages were rescued,

*Longa acts successfully against the enemy.*

*Nov. 28.*

Fromant with about 700 of his men killed, and nearly 500 taken prisoners. A party of the enemy had entered Bilbao, these also he surprised, and they suffered the loss of 200 men; then making for Salinas de Anaña, which was the strongest hold of the French in that district, he besieged it with 2500 men and five pieces of artillery, and after three days, the remainder of the garrison, consisting of 250, surrendered at discretion. This so dismayed the enemy that they abandoned Naucles and Armiñon, which he was proceeding to attack, and both fortresses were demolished by his orders. His next object was the Fuerte del Cubo de Pancorbo, a post of importance for its situation, and for the care with which it had been strengthened; here too the garrison were made prisoners and the fort demolished. Caffarelli meantime was vainly besieging Castro, where he suffered some loss, and found it necessary to give up the attempt, that he might check Longa in his career of success. That active partizan was now threatening Breviesca; he eluded Caffarelli and Palombini when they moved against him, and retreating to Zovalina, there to refresh his troops, ordered his retreat so well that they were uncertain what direction he had taken; Caffarelli therefore reinforced his garrisons, and repairing to Vittoria himself, left Palombini at Poza with 3000 foot and 300 horse to protect the high road, and be ready to act against Longa.

But while a third of that force was detached to *Feb. 13.* levy contributions, Longa surprised the remainder at day-break: their collected plunder and some 300 prisoners fell into his hands, and they suffered a further loss of between two and three hundred in killed and wounded. The approach of their detachment, and of a large body on its way from Burgos to Vittoria, then rendered it necessary for him to retire.

While Longa thus harassed the enemy in the north of Spain, Mina was assailing them with his wonted activity in Navarre and Aragon. The English landed two 12-pounders for him in the Deva, together with clothing, ammunition, and other things of which he was in need; 600 of his men were ready to receive and escort these. The French endeavoured to intercept them, and were repulsed in the attempt; and Mina was no sooner possessed of the guns than he attacked the enemy in Tafalla, where they had a garrison of 400 men. General Abbé moved to relieve it with all the disposable force from Pamplona; but he was beaten back by a part of Mina's force which had been left to observe that city, and on the fifth day of the siege the garrison surrendered as prisoners of war. The wounded he sent under an escort to Pamplona; destroyed the fort at Tafalla, and the works, . . also a Franciscan Convent, and an old palace in which the French might have established a garrison; and he demolished in like manner two other such edifices at Olite, that the road might be clear between Pamplona and Tudela. From Tafalla he proceeded to Sos in Upper Aragon, a fort which the enemy had occupied more than three years, and fortified sufficiently as long as the Spaniards could bring no guns against it. They were on the point of surrendering after a four days' siege, when General Paris arrived from Zaragoza and carried off the garrison, leaving the fort half ruined: Mina completed its demolition, and by this enterprise laid open the road between Pamplona and Jaca. Shortly after, Fermin de Leguia, who was under his orders, ventured, without instructions, upon an adventure which was executed as boldly as it was designed. With only fifteen men, being the whole of his party, he approached the castle of

*Mina's  
movements.*

*Feb. 11.*

*Feb. 20.*

*March 11.*



Fuenterrabia in the night, scaled the wall with one man by the help of spikes and ropes which supplied the place of a ladder, surprised the sentinel, got possession of the keys, opened the gates for his men, and took eight artillerymen prisoners, while the remainder of the garrison, who dreamt of no danger, were sleeping in the town. He then spiked the guns, threw into the sea all the ammunition which he could not carry away, set fire to the castle, and though pursued by the enemy retreated without loss. Mina was heard of next at Lodosa, where he attacked a detachment of 1000 French, few of whom escaped, 635 being made prisoners. Caffarelli *March 29.* had at this time been called to France, giving *Caffarelli* up the command in the north to Clausel; that *recalled* able general hoped to signalize himself by de- *from Spain.* destroying an indefatigable enemy who had baffled the efforts of all his predecessors; and this was the first proof which he made of that enemy's ability. Mina next attempted to intercept a convoy which was going from Tolosa to Pamplona; the convoy was alarmed in time, but the attempt led to an affair with Abbé's force, in which the French retired with the loss of full 300 men.

Clausel had left a considerable garrison in Puente la Reyna, well fortified for the sort of war which *Clausel en-* they might have to sustain; and an advanced *deavours to* post of 50 men at Mendigorria, in an old *hunt Mina* church of S. Maria, which they had fortified. While he *down.* was in pursuit of Mina from Estella, and Abbé from Pamplona, their skilful antagonist led them to suppose that he was in the valley of Berrueza, . . then making a rapid counter-march with one of his regiments, appeared in Mendigorria. The garrison at Puente outnumbered him both in horse and foot, but they did not venture to interrupt him in his operations; and *April 21.* he set fire to the church. The French had no other

resource than to ascend the tower, and fire upon them from thence. He sent a trumpet to offer terms, but they would not allow him to approach, either in the confident expectation of being succoured from Puente, or because they were confounded by the situation in which they found themselves; for the smoke and the flames distressed them so dreadfully, that in the course of half an hour, they prepared to let themselves down by ropes; but Mina ordered ladders to the roof of the church, from whence they descended, and were made prisoners. The Guerrilla chief, now Camp-Marshal in the regular service, took credit to himself for sparing their lives when by the laws of war they had placed them at his mercy: by this time indeed both the invaders and the Spaniards in Navarre had found it their interest to revert to the humanities of civilized warfare. His own hospital was in the valley of Roncal, and from the combined movements of Clausel and Abbé he inferred that it was their intention to deprive him of that retreat, the only one which there was for his wounded and invalids. Not being strong enough to resist the force which was now brought against him, he removed all who were in a condition to bear removal, and left the others to the enemy's mercy, calling to mind no doubt with satisfaction his own recent conduct at Tafalla and Mendigorria: as he had hoped, the men were humanely treated by General Abbé, though the hospital effects were destroyed, and Isaba, which had been deserted by its inhabitants, was set on fire, and 150 houses burnt. Clausel employed the months of April and May in endeavouring to hunt this formidable enemy down, of whom in an intercepted letter to the Intruder, he said, that he would be Lord of Navarre unless it were occupied by a corps of from 20 to 25,000 men; because when he was weak he always avoided an action, and fell upon detachments when he

was sure of victory. In the course of this attempt the loss which his own men sustained from fatigue far exceeded any that he inflicted upon Mina's hardy troops, who were intimately acquainted with the country, and accustomed to the hair-breadth scapes of such campaigns. At no time, however, was so much apprehension entertained for Mina's safety, though he himself relied with his wonted confidence upon his resources and his fortune, now too not without certain knowledge that his pursuers would soon be called off to a contest which for them would be of a far more serious kind.

On the side of Biscay the enemy were more successful; they surprised and captured Renovales, *Renovales made prisoner.* with six of his officers, at Carvajalez de Zamora; and Castro, from which Caffarelli had been repulsed, was taken by General Foy, after a siege of eighteen days. The Governor Don Pedro Pablo Alvarez discharged his duty to the utmost, and the Lyra, *Castro de Urdiales taken by Gen. Foy.* Royalist, and Sparrow sloop of war, and the Alpheia schooner, under Captain Bloye, assisted in the defence. Foy brought all the force which he could collect against it, and proceeded as if he hoped to strike the province as well as the garrison with terror, . . for he offered no terms, and seemed determined to take the place by storm, let it cost what it would. When he had made a breach wide enough to admit twenty men abreast, he turned his guns on the town and castle, and threw shells incessantly at the bridge that connected the castle with the landing-place, hoping thus to cut off the retreat of the garrison, which at the com- *May 11.* mencement of the siege consisted of 1200 men. At noon the enemy entered in great numbers through the breach and by escalade in various parts; the garrison when they could no longer defend the town retreated into the



castle, the ships' boats were in readiness to receive them, and they were embarked by companies under a tremendous fire of musquetry, two companies remaining to defend the castle, till the last gun was thrown into the sea. Every soldier was brought off, and many of the inhabitants, and landed at Bermeo on the following day. The town was burnt. Foy indeed acted in the spirit of his Portuguese campaign; as he had offered no terms he showed no mercy, but when the town was entered put the defenders to the bayonet without distinction.

*Enormities committed there by the French.* It had been well if the wickedness of the enemy had ended there; but in one of their unsuccessful attacks many of their men had been pushed down a ravine by their fellows while pressing forward to the charge, the bridge by which they expected to cross having been destroyed by the English; and because the inhabitants had not informed them of the destruction of this bridge, they butchered men and women, sparing none, and inflicting upon them cruelties which nothing but a devilish nature could devise.

Little attempt was made on the enemy's part to annoy the allies during the winter and spring. Foy, with 1500 infantry and 100 horse, had endeavoured, in February, to surprise the post at Bejar, but was promptly repulsed; and the French in the same month advanced from Orbiga and Castro Gondoles as far as Astorga and Manzanal in one direction, and to the Puebla de Sanabria and Mombuey in another, the Gallician army retreating before them, and then resuming their former position when the enemy in their turn had retired. Much greater activity was shown in plundering the inhabitants; and this kind of war, wherein there could be no resistance, was carried on so shamelessly, that the Intruder, it was said, deemed it necessary to call one of the generals to account.

Clausel was of opinion that an error had been committed in not concentrating their forces more upon the Ebro, which might have been done, he said, without abandoning Castille, and this error, he feared, they should find cause to repent. But the Intruder's council had determined upon taking the Douro for their line of defence; and with this view they threw up works on the right bank at every assailable point, relying, as Soult had formerly done at Porto, upon the security which that deep and rapid river might afford them. Marshal *M. Soult called from Spain.* Soult had been called away in March to take part in the campaign in Germany. The headquarters of what had been his army were removed from Toledo to Madrid early in April, and Toledo was abandoned; but troops were kept at Illescas, and reconnoissances made by the cavalry towards Escalona, the Alberche, and Añobes del Tajo, apprehending some movement of Sir Rowland's army in this direction. The Intruder, leaving that capital to which he was *The Intruder goes to Valladolid.* never to return, removed his court, or rather his headquarters, to Valladolid, where the Palace Gardens were put in order for his recreation, and some defensive works constructed. On the 11th of April, General Hugo, who had been left with the command in Madrid, informed the *Ayuntamiento* that the troops were about to depart, and that they must take measures for preserving tranquillity and guarding the public buildings, civil and military. The most precious articles in the cabinet of natural history were sent off, with whatever else could be removed from the other public establishments, and all arrears of contribution were exacted with the utmost rigour. Beasts enough were not left in Madrid for the scavengers' use, so that the inhabitants were ordered to collect the sweepings of the streets into the squares, and there burn what used to be carried into

the country for manure. The people of that poor capital had always clung to the hope of deliverance with a strength of belief which characterizes the nation, and in the movements of their oppressors they now saw reasonable ground for expecting that it could not be long delayed.

The pride of the French too had been at this time abated on the eastern coast, where Suchet had hitherto boasted of success in all his undertakings. Major-General William Clinton arrived at Alicante in November to take the command from which his health had compelled General Maitland to retire; and notwithstanding the difficulties which were opposed by a false point of honour, by a jealousy as ill-founded as it was ill-timed, and perhaps by treasonable intentions, he succeeded in obtaining consent to garrison the castle with British troops. In December a reinforcement of 4000 men, British and foreign, arrived from Palermo, under Major-General James Campbell, who by seniority superseded General Clinton in the command, which he was to hold till the then hourly expected arrival of Lord William Bentinck from Sicily. But Lord William was detained by political circumstances in that island, where the hopeless attempt had been undertaken of improving a government before any improvement has been effected either in those who are to govern or be governed; and, as no end could be seen to this delay, Lieutenant-General Sir John Murray was sent out from England to command the allied forces in that part of Spain. Feeble as that allied force was, and inert as its feebleness had compelled it to be, it had yet employed Suchet's attention during the autumn and winter.

*Sir John  
Murray  
takes the  
command.*

That general had his head-quarters for the most part at San Felipe, between Alicante and Valencia, and



about three leagues from the Xucar. Some trivial affairs were all that occurred, till Sir John Murray soon after his arrival took the army out of its cantonments, apparently with the view of making the French marshal fall back and concentrate his forces on that river. After an unsuccessful attempt at surprising an enemy's detachment in the populous village of Alcoy, he moved forward and took up a position near the town of Castalla, where in the preceding summer Don Joseph O'Donnell had sustained a severe defeat. While Sir John made this movement on the right, General Elio with a separate Spanish corps of 12,000 men moved on the left to Yecla, Villena, and the flat country in that direction. There was an old castle in Villena, and Elio garrisoned it with 800 of his best troops. Suchet was not a man to lose any opportunity which was presented him: he saw that one of Elio's divisions had taken post at Yecla, within reach of Fuente-la-Higuera, where his own advance was placed, and too far from that of the allies which was at Villena, 25 miles distant. During the night he collected the flower of his army at Fuente-la-Higuera, and marched with one division, the cavalry and the reserve, upon Villena, while, with the other part of his force, General Harispe proceeded rapidly to Yecla, unseen by the Spaniards. At break of day he came in sight of them; they retreated from one position to another, but were out-manœuvred and beaten, and after losing some four or five hundred men, 1200 laid down their arms.

*Defeat of  
Elio's  
corps.*

*April 12.*

On the afternoon of the same day, Suchet was seen advancing within a few miles of Villena, which is about two leagues to the westward of Castalla. Sir John Murray immediately withdrew the Majorcan division from Alcoy, and concentrating his force, occupied the strong position of Castalla.

*Suchet  
marches  
against the  
Anglo-Sici-  
lian army.*

His left, consisting of that division, was placed on the rocky and almost inaccessible hills south of the town, . . the range terminating there. Major-General Mackenzie's division, and the 58th regiment from Lieutenant-General Clinton's occupied the town, and the ground to the right; here and in front of the castle some redoubts and batteries had been constructed. The remainder of the position was covered by a strong ravine which rendered it almost inaccessible on that side; and there Lieutenant-General Clinton was stationed, supported by three battalions of General Roche's division as a column of reserve. The position was well taken. The second battalion of the 27th foot, the 1st Italian regiment, and the Calabrian free corps, had on the first alarm been pushed forward beyond Villena, under Colonel Adam, and with them a detachment of cavalry commanded by Colonel Lord Frederick Bentinck. The object of this movement was to observe the enemy's motions: it brought on a cannonade, and the French endeavoured to break in upon our troops, and enter Villena pell-mell with them; but Colonel Adam, following his instructions, fell back upon Biar without loss. Sir John, being now assured that Suchet meditated a serious movement, urged General Elio to withdraw his 800 men from Villena, where the castle, in its imperfect state of defence, was not tenable against such an enemy; but the Spanish general was not to be persuaded. The French entered Villena that evening, pushing their light troops beyond it towards Biar; and on the morrow the commandant surrendered at the first summons, and he and his battalion were made prisoners of war.

*April 12.*

In the afternoon, Suchet advanced in force towards Biar; which village is situated at the entrance of a strong pass, in a range of hills running nearly parallel with the position of the allies. About four o'clock he commenced

a serious attack upon Colonel Adam's detachment. That officer's orders were to fall back upon Castalla, but to dispute the pass; and this he did for five hours against a very superior force, with the utmost gallantry and skill; till being overpowered by numbers, and having both flanks turned, he retreated then to the pass, and took the place which had been allotted to him in the position, on the high ground to the left of Castalla, having in this unequal conflict both inflicted and sustained very considerable loss. Two mountain guns fell into the enemy's hands; they could not be brought off, because they were disabled; Colonel Adam therefore directed Captain Arabin to fight them to the last, and then abandon them. Before day closed, the French were seen in great force on the road to Biar, and on the hills opposite the position; but darkness prevented any farther operations for the night. At day-break they were perceived in great numbers along the defile of Biar, and in the plain ground which separates it from the hills near Castalla; and in the course of the morning they posted several large masses of infantry, as if in preparation for a decided attack. Their success against Elio's corps had increased their confidence; and they had accustomed themselves to speak of this army as composed of the rabble of the allied nations, and to talk of driving them into the sea.

*Battle of  
Castalla.*

*April 13.*

About one, they pushed forward a large column of cavalry to the village of Onil, about two miles in front of Castalla, and this movement was continued parallel to the front of the allies, until nearly opposite the right of the position. Sir John Murray had foreseen this: the ground was unfavourable for cavalry, and no notice was taken of the movement. Three masses of infantry at the same time moved rapidly from their right, crossed the plain ground in front of the pass, and with a gallantry,



which, in the words of the British general, entitled them to the highest praise, commenced an attack on the centre and the left. The left had been weakened ; for about an hour before the attack, General Whittingham had been ordered, with the three regiments which he had in position there, to make a reconnoissance upon the enemy's right flank ; but this was the key of the position ; and the consequence of thus weakening it might have been disastrous if Colonel D. Julian Romero had not opportunely arrived there with two regiments from Alcoy. Upon this point, from whence more than half its force had been withdrawn, the main attack was made ; and notwithstanding the difficult approach to it, the assailants gained ground. The Spaniards, who had expended all their cartridges, were observed to be retiring, and the enemy moving in considerable force to the left of our centre. The moment was critical. Just as the assailants had gained the summit, Colonel Adam, whom they were proceeding to attack in front, prevented them, and giving them no time to recover breath after the exertion of such an ascent, charged and overthrew their column, killing, wounding, or taking prisoner, during the pursuit, almost every man opposed to his brigade. The Spaniards resumed their ground. Whittingham too had no sooner apprehended the intention of the enemy, than he returned with all speed, and arrived in time to take part in the action, in which, and in the pursuit, the Spaniards distinguished themselves. The total failure of the enemy here seemed to be felt along their whole line of attack ; they retreated every where. The cavalry, which had now advanced toward the front of the allies, fell rapidly back on perceiving this unexpected reverse, and entered the defile in such confusion, that had the advantage been vigorously pursued, a signal victory might, in all likelihood, have been obtained. Suchet,

having united his broken battalions with those which he kept in reserve, took up a hasty position at the entrance of the defile. Sir John Murray, still retaining the height, moved a considerable part of his army into the plain, and formed it in front of the enemy, within cannon-shot, his right flank covered with the cavalry, his left resting on the hills. In this state, Marshal Suchet thought that the English did not choose to make an attack, and Sir John Murray, that the French did not choose to wait for one; . . for the line of the allies was scarcely formed when the enemy began their retreat, and continued it through the night, the action terminating at dusk with a distant cannonade.

The French had 18,000 infantry in the field, and 1600 cavalry: the allies were not much inferior in infantry; but greatly so in horse. The loss of the allies was 670 killed, wounded, and missing, the greater number of the killed being Spaniards: 800 of the enemy were left dead in front of the line which they had attacked: no prisoners were taken except such as were wounded; but Suchet sent 2000 of Elio's soldiers prisoners to Tortosa on their way to France, and represented that his success on the one part of the operations balanced his failure on the other. If this had been the case numerically, which it was not, it was far otherwise in reputation. He had suffered a mortifying defeat; but what must most have tended to console him for it was, his satisfaction at perceiving that there was no intention on the part of the allies to pursue their victory. He retreated that night to Villena through Biar, where he left many dead and dying. Sir John, on the following day, marched his army in two columns to Alcoy, hoping (though with little confidence in that hope) that he might force the strong pass of Albayda, and reach the intrenched position of the enemy at S. Felipe before they

could ; this he thought better than a direct pursuit, because the road which the French had taken was favourable for cavalry, and he was greatly inferior in that arm. In the vicinity of Alcoy he remained till the 17th, and then advanced with the whole army into the open country, to the foot of the Albayda pass, about a league in front of Alcoy. But this being a lateral movement, made after the enemy had so far the start as to have passed all that was perilous for him, and got into a strong country, with his forces collected and restored to order, was an unimportant demonstration which had no effect ; and he returned after it to his position at Castalla.

Marshal Suchet had not been more successful in machinations of another kind. Before the battle of Castalla, an Italian regiment in the Anglo-Sicilian army had been corrupted, and would have betrayed its post in an attack concerted with that view, if a timely discovery had not been made. A scheme also had been formed for delivering Alicante into his hands ; but this also was detected, and three of his emissaries suffered death for it at Alcoy. Frey Assensio Nebot, known as a Guerrilla chief, by the name of *El Frayle*, the Friar, had more than any other partizan annoyed the French in Valencia. His party was well organized, and provided with a regularity which was seldom to be found in the regular Spanish armies : so rigorous were the measures employed against him, that women were put to death for supplying him with means and intelligence ; and at length it was affirmed, that three criminals who had been condemned to capital punishment obtained their lives, and the promise of a good reward, on condition of presenting themselves to the Friar as volunteers, and taking an opportunity to assassinate him. Mr. Tupper, who had been the British consul at Valencia, and whose zealous services were never wanting to the common cause, obtain-



ed information of this villany, and the Friar was thus put upon his guard.

Lord Wellington was now prepared to open the campaign, and, for the first time, with such means as enabled him to act in full confidence of success. If the Anglo-Sicilian army should not achieve any signal service, he was yet assured that it would give sufficient employment to Suchet, so that the Intruder could look for no support from that side. The British force under his command consisted of 48,000 effective men; the Portuguese of about 28,000; the Galician of 18,000. The enemy were not inferior in number, and could more surely rely upon the whole of their troops; but the change in their Emperor's fortune and in their own had been such, that they looked only to a defensive campaign, and trusted to their strong position on the Douro. In the middle of May Lord Wellington put his troops in motion. The cavalry which had wintered in the neighbourhood of Coimbra began their movement at the end of April: they went by the way of Porto to Braga, where they rested some days, and proceeding to Braganza, reached that place, which was the point of union for the left of the army, on the 22d of May. The left of the army under Sir Thomas Graham crossed the Douro in Portugal, between Lamego and the frontier. The siege of Ciudad Rodrigo in the preceding year could not have been undertaken unless that river had been rendered navigable far above the point to which the Portuguese barks formerly ascended: it had now been opened as high as to the mouth of the Agueda; and boats had been quietly collected at different points, without exciting any suspicion that they were designed for the passage of the troops. Five divisions of infantry and two brigades of cavalry were thus placed upon the right bank of the

*Lord Wellington opens the campaign.*

*May.*

*The left of the army crosses the Douro.*

Douro, while the enemy supposed that they had only to guard against an attempt from the left. The difficulties of the march were indeed very great; most of the roads are so narrow that carriages could barely pass between the thick walls which bounded them; and the mountain streams had their course in ravines, from whence the ascent is so laborious that sixty men could not without great exertion enable the horses to drag the artillery up. Nevertheless, hope and ardour overcame all difficulties; and the advantage which the troops derived from being provided with shelter was sensibly felt: out of a division of 6000 men, there were but 120 sick after a march of 250 miles, through such a country. When these were far on their way, Lord Wellington, with two divisions of British infantry, a Portuguese one under the Conde de Amarante, a Spanish one under Morillo, and some corps of cavalry, advanced from Ciudad Rodrigo by the direct road to Salamanca; the remainder of the army under Sir Rowland Hill moved upon the same point by Alba de Tormes.

The line of their retreat in November was still too evidently marked by the skeletons of the poor animals who had been worked to death in that cruel service. A division of infantry under General Villatte had been left in Salamanca, with some artillery, and three squadrons of horse. They evacuated the city upon the approach of the allies, but they lingered too long upon the high ground in its vicinity. When Lord Wellington was within half a league of Salamanca, he and his staff got upon a rocky height which commanded a full view of the city and adjacent country. Below him were his own videttes, and beyond them those of the enemy, each supported by piquets. To the right were the Arapiles, a name known only in topography before, but which had now a place in military history; and in the same direction, but more

May 26.

*Affair near  
Salamanca.*

behind him, the heads of two columns, forming Sir Rowland's division, were seen on two nearly parallel roads. Through a glass, the enemy were observed drawn up; two battalions and a squadron to the right of the city, near a ruined convent; two squadrons on the Tormes, near the bridge; half a squadron guarding the ford, about a mile above the city, near S. Martha; . . and behind the city a battalion in reserve. Villatte having barricaded the bridge and the principal communications throughout the town, seemed to have thought himself sure of an easy retreat. The 1st German hussars, favoured by ground which concealed them from the enemy, inclined toward the ford, while the 14th light dragoons, keeping beyond the reach of fire, edged along the left bank of the river. The enemy appeared in some confusion, but remained stationary, as if waiting for something; and beyond the city, in the direction of Miranda de Duero and Zamora, their piquets were withdrawing, and mules and baggage joining them from all sides. It was now nearly ten in the forenoon, and the day very hot. The head of Sir Rowland's right column, which consisted of cavalry, and a troop of horse artillery, under General Fane, were within two miles of S. Martha, marching for the ford: the enemy now began to move, first in the direction of Toro, but presently, as if wavering, bending to their right, they kept close to the Tormes, in the direction of Arevalo; and retired rapidly, but in good order, when Fane with his six squadrons had crossed the river. It was well for them that this cavalry was already jaded by a long march; but the horse artillery, as soon as, owing to the ravines and the intricacies of the ground, it could be brought into use, opened upon them with great effect, every shot going through their crowded ranks. They retired with



extreme rapidity, but in excellent order, and the artillery pursued as quickly as a very deep country, occasionally intersected with hollow roads, would allow. When the enemy came to Aldea Lengua, there was an opportunity of attacking them with every probability of forcing them to lay down their arms; but strict orders had been given not to pass a ravine just by that village; and the moment (never to be regained in war) went by. When orders came to proceed, it was just too late; the pursuit however was continued, and some three miles beyond the village a charge was attempted by two squadrons, but feebly, for the horses were now far spent; the enemy formed into squares, and repulsed them by a volley, though with little loss. The pursuit was continued about three miles farther. Some of the French were taken, being unable to march farther from fatigue; and many threw away their knapsacks, and sacks full of biscuit, and of corn, but no troops under such circumstances could have behaved better; . . . and some proofs were given of what better deserves to be called ferocious intrepidity than courage. One of their men who was severely wounded attempted to destroy himself; and another obstinately refusing to surrender when it was not possible for him to escape, compelled those who would fain have saved his life to cut him down. The affair ended in front of Aldea Rubia; a corps of infantry and cavalry retiring from Alba, when threatened by Major-General Long and by Morillo's division, joined the enemy here; and Lord Wellington, as his infantry had not come up, recalled the troops from the pursuit. Above fourscore of the French lay dead on the road, and many fell among the standing corn: some 200 were made prisoners; and some baggage, ammunition, and provisions, with Villatte's coach, were taken.

During the two following days, Lord Wellington established the troops which had marched from the Agueda and Extremadura Alta between the Tormes and the Lower Douro. On the 29th he left Salamanca, and reached Miranda de Duero. The enemy had destroyed all the bridges upon the river except that at Zamora. Opposite Miranda there is a ferry, where this deep and rapid stream is from 80 to 100 yards wide, and the rocks on either side from 400 to 500 feet high. When it is so swoln that the ferry is impracticable, the only way by which travellers can cross is after the old Peruvian manner, in a sort of hammock or cradle, fastened to a rope, which is secured upon two projecting points of rock, about thirty feet above the ordinary level of the water. Here Lord Wellington crossed, and on the following day joined Sir Thomas Graham's corps at Carvajales on the Ezla. This river, which upon good grounds is believed to have been the Astura of the ancients, and in Leon is called the Rio Grande, descends from the Puertos de Asturias, passes by Mansilla to Benevente, near which town it receives the Cea from the east, and the larger river Orbigo from the west, and enters the Douro below Zamora. At day-break on the 31st the troops began to ford: the enemy so little apprehended danger on that side, that they had only a piquet there, and thus no opposition was offered to a very difficult and perilous passage. The ford was intricate; the water nearly chin deep; the bottom rough and stony; and the stones large and loose. The hussar brigade began the passage, entering in a body; and as it was supposed that a village on the opposite hill was occupied by the enemy, and as it was necessary that some infantry should cross to support the advance of the hussars, each dragoon had a soldier holding by his stirrup. But this impeded the horses: alarmed both

*Passage of  
the Ezla.*

*Florez Esp.  
Sagrada,  
t. 16, p. 3.*

by, the stream and the unsafe footing, they became unmanageable and plunged forward : the men, who before could scarcely keep their feet against the force and weight of the stream, lost at once their footing and their hold ; they were plunged into the water, their knapsacks overweighed them and kept them on their backs, and in this manner they struggled at the mercy of the current. There were, fortunately, three or four small islands just at this part ; and by these most of the officers and men were stopped, but several valuable lives were lost. The hussars exerted themselves with exemplary humanity to assist the infantry, and one of their corporals lost his own life in the performance of this generous duty. In this way the 51st and the Brunswick Oel's corps, as well as the cavalry, passed. Their orders were to ascend the hill and take the village : the enemy's piquet were made prisoners. A pontoon bridge was then thrown across, and the remainder of the corps passed over.

The French seem now for the first time to have  
*June.* comprehended Lord Wellington's plan, and found themselves out-manœuvred by an enemy to whom they had hitherto allowed no credit for any thing except courage, and that only because they had been so often beaten by them that it was no longer for their own credit to deny it. No sooner were they menaced by the advance of the columns than they destroyed the bridge at Zamora, and retired from that city and from Toro. Both cities were entered by the allies ; and at daybreak on the first of June the hussar brigade under Colonel Grant came up near Toro with the enemy's rear-guard, who retired rapidly to the village of Morales, in the direction of Tordesillas. After having been cannonaded by two guns, which were all that could be brought up in time through the deep sandy roads, the French formed behind the village. The



hussars passed on both sides of the village, and instantly charged them ; upon which they made off with all speed for a little bridge across a marshy bottom, faced about there, being supported by some guns belonging to their infantry, and stood a charge. They were worsted in it, but passed the bridge ; part of the 10th hussars pursued, and Captain Lloyd advancing with great spirit, but few followers, was taken : they were again pressed, and retired hastily on the infantry, losing more than 200 prisoners in these affairs, and so many in killed and wounded, that the 16th regiment of dragoons was almost destroyed. Captain Lloyd was ill-treated by his captors ; they beat him and rifled him, but left him in their retreat. Though the fighting was almost in the street of Morales, the Spaniards were now so accustomed to sights of war, that within ten minutes after the firing had ceased the women were spinning at their doors, and the little children at play as if nothing had happened.

Lord Wellington halted at Toro, that the light division and the troops under Sir Rowland might cross the Douro by the bridge there, that his rear-guard might come up, and that the Galician army should unite itself with his left. The whole of the allied force was now on the right side of the Douro : leaving then half the reserve-ammunition near Zamora to spare the horses (which were already suffering), he proceeded : the French, whose force was distributed between Valladolid, Tordesillas, and Medina, retiring as he advanced, their rear crossing at the Puente de Duero, on the same day that the allies accomplished their first object in the campaign, by uniting on the right side of that river. The enemy now concentrated their force behind the Pisuerga : there also there was strong ground for defence ; but abandoning that also when Lord Wellington manœuvred on their right, they withdrew

*Sir Rowland Hill crosses the Douro.*

*June 3.*

behind the Carrion. The Intruder quitted Palencia on the 6th, and the greater part of his troops early on the following morning, after a night passed in the fear of close pursuit. When Lord Wellington entered that city, flowers were thrown upon him from the windows, and a shower of roses from the upper gratings of a nunnery. The enemy had not left a morsel of bread, nor a drop of wine in that city : and when they hastily retired from a bivouac near Tordesillas, leaving it to be occupied by a part of Sir Rowland's corps, the fuel which the troops found collected there consisted of doors, window-frames, tables, and drawers, from the houses in the neighbourhood.

From the Ezla to Palencia the troops had marched through one continued track of corn, where villages were so thinly scattered, that it seemed unaccountable where the cultivators were to be found. The land was generally in wheat, with a fair proportion of barley, and here and there a crop of vetches and clover. They moved generally by two roads, and on each side of each at least twenty yards were trampled down. The horses were fed on green barley nearly the whole march. The intention of the British Government was to pay the inhabitants for whatever the army must of necessity take from them ; and on the part of the Government, the full payment was in fact made : but little of that payment reached the poor people to whom it was due. For want of specie, the commissaries could pay upon the spot only in bills ; to the peasantry these were worth no more than what the land-sharks who follow in the wake of an army chose to offer for them ; and in this iniquitous manner large fortunes were amassed, . . a species of roguery which many of the Portugeze (though as a people the Portugeze are eminent for probity) were not slow in learning.

The army crossed the Carrion on the 7th, following an enemy who seemed undetermined where to make a stand. On the 12th, Lord Wellington found it necessary after such rapid movements to halt his left, while the right under Sir Rowland advanced to reconnoitre the strength of the French, and the position which they had taken up near Burgos, where great pains had been taken to strengthen the fortifications of the castle. They were posted in considerable force on the heights to the left of the Hormaza, with their right above the village of that name, and their left in front of Estapar. Part of the allied force flanked them on their right, another marched against the heights of Hormaza, the remainder threatened those of Estapar; without waiting to be attacked they were dislodged, and retreated hastily for Burgos, suffering considerable loss from the horse artillery, and losing a gun and some prisoners, but retreating in the best order. More presence of mind indeed was shown by them hitherto in presence of the enemy, and in action, than in their counsels. They posted themselves on the left of the Arlanzon and of the Urbel, which were then greatly swoln with rains: but in the night they retreated into the city, and hurrying from it, blew up the castle early in the morning, about an hour after the Intruder had left it. They seemed to have been aware that there was no longer any hope of recovering their ascendancy, and to have intended to bring upon the city a destruction which should prevent the inhabitants from rejoicing in their deliverance. But the hurry, and fear, and confusion, with which their preparations were made defeated this malignant purpose. Several mines failed; some which were primed did not explode; others were so ill managed that they blew the earth inwards: and as the explosion took place some hours sooner than was intended, the destruction which

*The French  
abandon  
Burgos.*



was intended for their enemies fell in part upon themselves. Many of their men who were lingering to plunder perished as they were loading their horses with booty in the streets and squares, and three or four hundred were blown up in the fort. Above 1000 shells had been placed in the mines: the explosion was distinctly heard at the distance of fifty miles; and the pavement of the cathedral was covered with the dust into which its windows had been shivered by the shock. The town escaped destruction owing to the failure of so many of the mines, but the castle was totally destroyed, . . . gates, beams, masses of masonry, guns, carriages, and arms lying in one heap of ruins; . . . some of the mines had laid open the breaches, and exposed the remains of those who had fallen during the siege.

The object of the enemy now was to occupy a position behind the Ebro, blocking up the great road by  
*The Ebro.* placing a garrison in the castle of Pancorbo, and calling to their assistance the corps from Biscay, Navarre, and Aragon. But Lord Wellington, repeating the manœuvre which had before so perfectly succeeded, had already sent his left column to effect its passage in a quarter from whence they apprehended no danger. The Ebro rises in the mountains of Santillana, its principal source being at the northern extremity of Old Castille, towards the Asturian frontier, near a town which from that cause is called Fontibre. The Sierra de Oca prevents it from trending westward, like the other great rivers of Spain; and at Miranda de Ebro, the point at which the Intruder had instructed the different divisions of his army to make for with all speed, it appears nearly as large a stream as at Tortosa, though in the course of the intervening sixty leagues it receives many and large rivers, one of them the Aragon, of such magnitude, that it is called the husband (*el varou*) of the Ebro. While

the remainder of the army were pushing the enemy back upon Burgos, the left column had been detached to effect its passage above Frias by the bridges of S. Martin and Rocamunde: the road thither had been deemed impracticable for carriages, and on that supposed impracticability the enemy relied; but the confidence of the British General was partaken by his army, and well seconded by them in all ways; exertions which nothing but zeal and eager hope could have accomplished were made; and the artillery was lowered down the steep banks of the river where there were none to offer any resistance. The French had calculated not without reason on the line of the Ebro, if they had had foresight or been allowed leisure to occupy it. The road begins to descend the mountains about three miles from the right bank, and for more than half that way winds down a continued defile, which admits only eight or ten men abreast, and being withal tremendously steep, is so paved that horses can scarcely keep their feet there. Another such defile, and of greater length, is to be passed on the opposite side. A few ditches cut across the route, a few trees placed as barricadoes, a rock blown up to block the pass, a hundred or two of men to defend it, and to roll stones from the crags and precipices above, might have stopped any force that attempted the passage. The left column crossed on the 14th, the remainder of the army on the 15th, at the same points and by the Puente de Arenas, and on the following day they moved to the right, in the direction of Vittoria.

They knew at this time little of the enemy, not even who commanded their united force, whether Marshal Jourdan or General Gazan, the Intruder's command being of course merely nominal; it was thought that their intention was to have given battle upon the main road, near Briviesca; but this alone was

*Passage of  
the Ebro by  
the allies.*

*The French  
fall back  
upon Vit-  
toria.*

certain, that their plans had been disconcerted by Lord Wellington's movements and sudden advance, and that they were in that state of irresolution which prepares even the best soldiers for defeat. On the 16th and 17th they assembled a considerable force near Espejo, composed of troops which had been employed against Longa and Mina, and of others detached from the main body of their army. They had also a division of infantry, with some cavalry, at Frias, to observe the movements of the allies after the passage of the Ebro. These detachments, in all about 16,000 men, moved on the 18th, those from Frias upon S. Millan, and those from Espejo upon Osma. The light division, under Major-General Alten, drove them from S. Millan, and cut off the brigade of their rear-guard, of whom it killed and wounded many, took 300 prisoners, with a considerable quantity of baggage, and dispersed the rest among the mountains, . . from thence to be brought in by the peasants and the guerillas. Sir Thomas Graham arrived at Osma at the same time with the enemy's corps; they were considerably superior in numbers, nevertheless they retired as soon as an intention was shown of attacking them: presently they returned briskly, as if to become assailants in their turn, but their reception was not such as to encourage them, and they once more retired towards Espejo, and being followed thither, withdrew to the heights. The enemy's head-quarters were that day at Pancorvo. During the night they moved from thence towards Vittoria; and on the following day their rear-guard was found strongly posted, having its right covered by the village of Subijana, and its left upon the heights in front of Pobes. The light division attacked them in flank on the right, Sir Lowry Cole with the 4th in front, and they were driven back upon their main force, of which a view was then obtained, but no correct judg-

*June 19.*



ment could be formed of its numbers, because they were in part concealed by the mountains, and a thick rain was falling during the whole day. On that night they took up a position in front of Vittoria.

This city, which is now the capital of the province of Alava, and stands in a valley, bounded on one side by a part of the Pyrenees, and on the other by a range of bold though inferior mountains, was founded in 1181 by Sancho VII. of Navarre, a king distinguished by the appellations of the Wise and the Valiant. There had been a village called Gasteiz on the site; Sancho thinking it a good situation for a fortress which might check the incursions of his Castillian neighbours on that side, rebuilt, peopled and fortified it, and gave his new town the name of Victoria, in memorial of some now forgotten victory obtained in that vicinity over them. Juan II. of Castille made it a city. It is now divided into the old and new towns, the latter being the larger and better part of what in peaceful times was a populous, industrious, and prosperous place, containing more than a thousand houses, and twice that number in the suburbs.

In front of this city the enemy had taken their position, under the nominal command of the Intruder, but actually commanded by Marshal Jourdan, as the Major-General of the army. Their left rested upon the heights which terminated at the Puebla de Arlanza; and they had a reserve in rear of their left, at the village of Gomecha: their centre extended along a range of strong heights on the left bank of the Zadorra, its right resting on a circular hill that commands the valley to which that river gives name; this hill they had covered with infantry, flanked and defended with several brigades of guns; their right was in advance of the river, above the village of Abechuco, to defend the

*Vittoria.*

*Garchay,  
L. 24, cap.  
13. p. 187  
—8.*

*Position of  
the French  
army.*

passage. This position, extending about eight miles, covered the three great roads which from Bilbao, Logroño, and Madrid, converge upon Vittoria; it crossed also the main road to Bayonne, upon which immense convoys were seen, moving towards France with the last harvest and the last gleanings of their plunder. The city was filled with others awaiting their turn for departure. It is remarkable that, within sight of this ground, the battle of Najara was fought, in which Edward the Black Prince, acting as the ally of a bad man, defeated the best troops of France under their most distinguished leader Bertram du Guesclin, who was come in support of a worse. It is also remarkable that the Prince of Brazil, before the battle of Vittoria was fought, should have conferred the title of Duque da Victoria upon Lord Wellington.

Lord Wellington halted his columns on the 20th, in order to close them up, for since reaching the Ebro they had necessarily been extended, because of the nature of the country: only the 6th division was left at Medina de Pomal to cover the march of supplies from the rear. That day he made a close reconnoissance of the enemy's position in every part, with the determination of attacking them on the following morning, if they should continue there. There was little disparity of numbers between the two armies, each having from 70 to 75,000 men. Lord Wellington instantly perceived that the position, though in most respects well chosen, was too confined, that it showed an inconsiderable front, and was liable to be taken in flank.

At daybreak on the 21st of June the allied army was put in motion. The right under Sir Rowland, *Battle of Vittoria.* consisting of the second British division, the Conde de Amarante's Portuguese division, and Morillo's Spanish corps, was to commence the action by attacking

the heights of La Puebla, upon which the enemy's left rested. Sir Thomas Graham with the left, composed of the 1st and 5th divisions, Generals Pack and Bradford's brigades of infantry, Generals Bock and Anson's brigades of horse, and Longa's Spanish division, was directed to turn their right by a wide movement, and, crossing the Zadorra, to cut off their retreat by the road to Bayonne. As soon as either of these corps should be in a situation to manœuvre on the other side the river, the centre, consisting of the 3d, 4th, 7th, and light divisions, in two columns, was to advance, and the whole then push forward on the city, and attack it simultaneously in front and in flank, . . whereby the French would be compelled either to abandon it and their precious convoys, or risk a battle in the hope of preserving them. The Spaniards, under Morillo, began the action, and attacked the heights with great gallantry; their leader was wounded, but remained in the field; the enemy stood firm, and made great efforts to retain their ground, perceiving when too late, that they had neglected to occupy it in sufficient strength. Strong reinforcements were sent from their centre to its support, so that Sir Rowland found it necessary to detach thither, first, the 71st regiment, and the light infantry battalions of Major-General Walker's brigade, and successively other troops; the contest was very severe, and the loss considerable. Here the Hon. Lieutenant-Colonel Cadogan was mortally wounded, an officer, in Lord Wellington's words, "of great zeal and tried gallantry, who had acquired the respect and regard of the whole profession, and of whom it might have been expected, that if he had lived he would have rendered the most important services to his country." At length the enemy were driven at the point of the bayonet from these heights; and under the cover which the possession of this ground afforded, Sir Rowland crossed the



Zadorra at La Puebla, passed the difficult defile, two miles in length, which is formed by the heights and the river, and then attacked and won the village of Sabijana de Alva, which covered the left of the enemy's lines. They on their part made repeated attempts to regain this important point, and with that hope drew from their centre a considerable force; again and again they endeavoured to recover the village, but their efforts, though bravely and perseveringly made, were unsuccessful.

The difficult nature of the country delayed the communication between the different columns, and it was late before Lord Wellington knew that the 3d and 7th divisions, under the Earl of Dalhousie, had arrived at their appointed station. The 4th and the light divisions, however, crossed the Zadorra immediately after Sir Rowland had gained possession of Sabijana, the former at the bridge of Nanclores, the latter at the Tres Puentes; almost at the same time the Earl of Dalhousie's column arrived at Mendonza, and the 3rd division, under Sir Thomas Picton, charged and took the bridge higher up, and crossed and was followed by the 7th. These bridges the enemy ought to have destroyed, but from the beginning of the campaign a want of foresight had been manifested in all their operations, though when in action their generals displayed the habitual promptitude of experienced commanders. The four divisions which had now crossed, and which formed the centre of the allied army, were destined to attack the heights on which the right of the enemy's centre was placed, while Sir Rowland should move forward from Sabijana to attack the left. The French had lined those heights with artillery, which opened on the allies as soon as they attempted to advance from the river, and with so destructive a fire that it became necessary for them to halt and bring two brigades of guns to oppose it. Meantime the contest was main-

tained at Sabijana with great obstinacy; the enemy feeding their attacks from a wood, in which their troops were assembled in great force. But when a brigade which Sir Rowland had detached along a range of mountains to turn their flank appeared, and at the same time Sir Thomas Picton approached their front, they gave over their attempts to recover the village, and began to think rather of retreat than of a successful resistance. And when Sir Thomas pushed on to take the large circular hill in flank, while the fourth division moved simultaneously upon the village in the centre, their whole force prepared to fall back upon the town, retreating before the allies could close, but keeping up a hot fire from their artillery. The third division first came in contact with their columns, and by a gallant attack captured 28 of their guns which they had not time to draw into the road. The other divisions pressed them in front. At this moment both the winning and the losing game were played with equal skill, "the allies advancing by echellons of battalions, in two or three lines, according to the nature of the ground; and the French retiring before them in the most orderly manner, and taking advantage of every favourable opportunity to make a stand." And here it happened, that General Colville's brigade, which was on the left of the centre, and most in advance, became, by an accident of the ground, separated from its support; the enemy, who lost no opportunity in action, attacked it with a far superior force, but the brigade stood firm, though out of 1800 men it lost 550.

*Colonel  
Jones's  
Account,  
2. 158.*

While the right and the centre, following up their success, were pushing the enemy back upon Vittoria, the left was advancing upon that town by the high road from Bilbao. Sir Thomas Graham with that column had been moved on the preceding evening to Margina, and had

then so considerable a round to make, that it was ten o'clock before he began to descend into the plain. General Giron with the Spanish army had been detached to the left under a different view of the state of affairs; but having been recalled and reached Orduña on the yesterday, he marched from thence in the morning so as to be in readiness to support Sir Thomas Graham, if his support should be required. The enemy had a division of infantry and some cavalry advanced upon the Bilbao road, resting their right on some strong heights covering the village of Gamarra Mayor, and both that village and Abechuco were strongly occupied as *têtes-du-pont* to the bridges over the Zadorra at those places. The heights were attacked both in front and flank by Brigadier-General Pack's Portuguese brigade, and Longa's Spanish division, supported by Major-General Anson's brigade of light dragoons, and the 5th division of infantry, all under the command of Major-General Oswald; and they were carried, both Spaniards and Portuguese behaving admirably. Longa then with little resistance got possession of Gamarra Menor, and the larger village of the same name was stormed and taken by Brigadier-General Robinson's brigade of the 5th division, which advanced under a heavy fire of artillery and musketry without firing a shot: the enemy suffered severely there, and lost three pieces of cannon. Sir Thomas Graham then proceeded to attack the village of Abechuco with the 1st division; they formed a strong battery against it, under cover of which Colonel Halkett's brigade advanced to the attack, supported by General Bradford's brigade of Portuguese infantry. Three guns and a howitzer were taken on the bridge here, and the village was carried. While the contest at Abechuco continued, the enemy seeing their communication with Bayonne threatened, marched a strong body to their right in the



hope of recovering Gamarra Mayor: they were driven back in confusion; made a second attempt, and were again repulsed, for Sir Thomas had loop-holed the houses in front of the bridge, placed artillery to flank the approach, and stationed several battalions concealed along the walls, and their fire repelled the enemy upon a third advance. But the French had two divisions of infantry in reserve upon the heights on the left of the Zadorra; Sir Thomas, therefore, could not cross the river with such a corps in front, till the troops which had moved upon the centre and the left of the French should have driven them through Vittoria. About six in the evening this was done, and the corps which held him in check retreated then lest it should be taken in rear. The left then crossed the Zadorra, took possession of the high road to Bayonne, and forced the right as well as the left centre of the enemy back into the Pamplona road; and now they were unable to hold any position long enough for drawing off their artillery and baggage. In the expressive language of an officer who bore his part in the victory, "they were beaten before the town, and in the town, and through the town, and out of the town, and behind the town, and all round about the town." Every where they had been attacked, every where beaten, and now every where were put to utter rout. They themselves had in many actions made greater slaughter of a Spanish army, but never in any instance had they reduced an army, even of raw volunteers, to such a state of total wreck. Stores, baggage, artillery, every thing was abandoned; one gun and one howitzer only were they able to carry off, and the gun was taken before it could reach Pamplona. 151 pieces of brass ordnance on travelling carriages were taken; more than 400 caissons, more than 14,000 round of ammunition, and nearly two millions of musket-ball

cartridges. The loss on the part of the allies consisted of 501 British killed, 2808 wounded: 150 Portuguese and 89 Spaniards killed, 899 and 466 wounded, . . the total loss not amounting to 5000. The French acknowledged a loss of 8000, . . unquestionably it was greater; not more than a thousand prisoners were taken; for so soon as they found themselves irretrievably defeated, they ran, and never did brave soldiers when beaten display more alacrity in flight. Having abandoned all their ammunition waggons, they had not powder to blow up the bridges; had this been done, the pursuit would have been greatly impeded; attempts were made to break them up with pick-axes, and in this they partly succeeded in several places. But the country was too much intersected with ditches for cavalry to act with effect in a pursuit; and infantry who moved in military order could not at their utmost speed keep up with a route of fugitives. Yet, precipitate as their flight was, they took great pains to bear off their wounded, and dismounted a regiment of cavalry to carry them on. And they carefully endeavoured to conceal their dead, stopping occasionally to collect them and throw them into ditches, where they covered them with bushes. Many such receptacles were found containing from ten to twenty bodies.

The Intruder, who now appears for the last time upon the stage of his everlasting infamy, narrowly escaped. The tenth hussars entered Vittoria at the moment that he was hastening out of it in his carriage. Captain Wyndham with one squadron pursued, and fired into the carriage, and Joseph had barely time to throw himself on his horse and gallop off under the protection of an escort of dragoons. The carriage was taken, and in it the most splendid of his trinkets, and the most precious articles of his royal plunder. Marshal Jourdan's

staff was among the trophies of the field ; it was rather more than a foot long, and covered with blue velvet, on which the imperial eagles were embroidered ; and it had been tipped with gold ; but the first finder secured the gold for himself. The case was of red morocco with silver clasps, and with eagles on it, and at either end the Marshal's name imprinted in gold letters. Lord Wellington sent it to the Prince Regent, and was gracefully presented in return with the staff of a Field Marshal of Great Britain. The spoils resembled those of an Oriental rather than of an European army ; for the Intruder, who in his miserable situation had abandoned himself to every kind of sensuality, had with him all his luxuries. His plunder, his wardrobe, his sideboard, his larder, and his cellar, fell into the conqueror's hands. The French officers, who carried the pestilential manners of their nation wherever they went, followed his example as far as their means allowed, and thus the finest wines and the choicest delicacies were found in profusion. The wives and mistresses of the officers had gathered together in one house, where they were safe, and from whence they were sent in their own carriages with a flag of truce to Pamplona. Poodles, parrots, and monkeys, were among the prisoners. Seldom has such a scene of confusion been witnessed as that which the roads leading from the field of battle presented ; . . broken down waggons stocked with claret and champagne, others laden with eatables dressed and undressed, casks of brandy, apparel of every kind, barrels of money, books, papers, sheep, cattle, horses, and mules, abandoned in the flight. The baggage was presently rifled, and the followers of the camp attired themselves in the gala dresses of the flying enemy. Portuguese boys figured about in the dress coats of French general officers ; and they who happened to draw a woman's wardrobe in the lottery, con-



verted silks, satins, and embroidered muslins, into scarfs and sashes for their masquerade triumph. Some of the more fortunate soldiers got possession of the army chest, and loaded themselves with money: "Let them," said Lord Wellington, when he was informed of it; "they deserve all they can find, were it ten times more." The camp of every division was like a fair; benches were laid from waggon to waggon, and there the soldiers held an auction through the night, and disposed of such plunder as had fallen to their share to any who would purchase it. Even dollars became an article of sale, for they were too heavy to be carried in any great numbers; eight were offered for a guinea, . . guineas which had been struck for the payment of the troops in Portugal, and made current there by a decree of the Regency, being the gold currency. The people of Vittoria had their share in the spoils, and some of them indemnified themselves thus for what they had suffered in their property by the enemy's exactions.

The city sustained no injury, though the French were driven through it, and though great part of the battle might be seen from every window. Nothing could be more mournful than its appearance that night, . . . a lantern at every door, and no one in the streets. It was the first place where the allies had found that the inhabitants were French in feeling. Two days of heavy rain impeded the pursuit; but that rain saved many houses from the flames, for the French wreaked their vengeance upon every thing which they could destroy in their flight. Every house at which the pursuers arrived had been gutted by the fugitives, every village set on fire, and the few inhabitants who had not taken flight in time had met with no mercy; at every step the allies found havoc, and flames, and misery, the dying and the dead. Such was the panic among the fugitives,

that, finding the gates of Pamplona closed, they attempted to force their way over the walls, and did not desist till they were opposed by a serious fire of cannon and musketry. A council of war was held there, in which it was resolved to blow up the works and abandon the place; with this intent they destroyed ammunition and tore down palisades from the outworks. But the Intruder knew that the possession of so strong a fortress would in some degree cover his flight; and the last act of his usurped authority was to order that every article of food and fuel should be taken from the Spaniards who were within reach. By the rigorous execution of this order, the quantity in the town was more than doubled; and having left a garrison there, the flying force continued their way to the Pyrenees. Their rear was still in sight of Pamplona, when the right and centre of the allies were checked in their pursuit by a fire from the walls.

Sir Thomas Graham with the left of the army was ordered to march by Puerto S. Andrian upon Villa Franca, in the hope of intercepting General Foy, who occupied Bilbao after the atrocities which he had committed in Castro. The orders were not received till the 23rd, when the weather and the ways in consequence were so bad, that only a small part of the column could pass the mountain that day; and it was not till the 24th that Sir Thomas, with Major General Anson's brigade of light dragoons, the light battalions of the German legion, and two Portuguese brigades could march from Segura, the rest of the troops not having come up. The roads were so slippery with the rain, and in many places so steep, that horses could scarcely keep their feet, or the infantry make any progress. This allowed Foy time to withdraw the troops from some of the military stations there, and with his collected force he began his retreat into France. The

*Sir T. Graham proceeds against G. Foy.*

allies came to the junction of the roads from Bilbao and from Vittoria to Bayonne just as the enemy's rear had passed it. The French occupied in force some strong

*June 24.* ground on the right of the Oria, in front of the village of Olaverria, about a mile and a half from Villa Franca; they were dislodged from thence, and allowed the pursuers to take possession of the town, meaning to make their stand at Tolosa. During the night, Longa's corps joined Sir Thomas, and the advance of General Giron's. On the following morning the enemy evacuated Celequiz, and took up a very strong position between that place and Tolosa, covering the road to Pamplona. Longa was then directed to march by Alzo upon Lizara in order to flank his left, while General Mendizabel was requested to dispatch some battalions from Aspeytia to flank his right, which rested upon a mountain with an inaccessible ravine in front. The French were driven from the summit of a hill lying between the Pamplona and Vittoria roads, on the right of the allies, by a very skilful attack of Lieutenant-Colonel Williams, and the possession of this important point enabled the assailants to act on the Pamplona road. In the course of the afternoon the Spaniards arrived at their destination, and between six and seven a general

*The French  
driven from  
Tolosa.*

attack was made, one column advancing upon the Vittoria road, another on the left; General Bradford driving the enemy in on their front by the Pamplona road, and Longa still more on the right from the side of the mountains, turning, and forcing from very strong positions, all their posted bodies on the right of the town. Still they held the town; and it was found much more capable of defence than had been represented; this was generally the case with their fortified posts, so prone were the Spaniards to report things always according to their hopes; the walls had been loop-holed, and



new towers erected to flank it. The Vittoria gate was barricadoed and the Pamplona one on the bridge; both were flanked by convents and other large buildings which the enemy occupied; the place was nowhere open, and a strong wood block-house had been constructed in the Plaza, of so much importance had it been deemed. A nine-pounder was brought up close to the Vittoria gate, under cover of the light battalions' fire; the gate was burst open: at the same time, the walls were attacked and gained under a considerable fire, and about half an hour after night closed, the enemy forsook the place, flying from every point, and the troops entered amidst the *vivas* of the inhabitants, who had fully expected to have been plundered that night by the retreating enemy. The British officer who first entered thought they were in some danger from their deliverers, considering the mixed composition of the troops, and how likely it was that some parties away from their regiments might take advantage of the darkness and the confusion. He advised them therefore to shut their doors, and, to the credit of the troops, it must be added, that no outrage or excess was committed. Longa and the German legion passed on, and formed immediately beyond the town. The loss of the allies on this and the preceding day amounted to about 400. Sir Thomas Graham was struck during the attack by a musket ball; the hurt was not serious, and he attempted to conceal it, but could not, and was obliged to dismount.

On the morrow one brigade was placed on the Pamplona road, and another on the Bayonne, each about a league from Tolosa; a third occupied Alegria, and Sir Thomas then halted two days to ascertain the advance of Lord Wellington on his right. Foy had retreated to Anduain, where he destroyed the bridge; but he now knew himself

June 26.

Foy retreats into France.

to be no longer safe within the Spanish territory, and lost no time in making his way into France. A brigade of the Galician army attacked his rear-guard on the Bidassoa at Irun, and drove them over the bridge. They still maintained a strong stone block-house there, which served as a head to the bridge, and some loop-holed houses on the Spanish side of the river. General Giron sent for some Spanish artillery to dislodge them; an

*June 30.* English brigade of nine pounders was sent from

Oyarzun to act with it; the French then found it necessary to abandon their post, and they blew up the block-house and burnt the bridge. In all these affairs no troops could have behaved better than the Spanish; and General Giron, with a natural and becoming feeling, had been very desirous that this last exploit should fall to their part. The garrison at Passages, 150 in number,

*Passages is  
surren-  
dered.*

*Castro  
abandoned  
by the  
enemy.*

surrendered on the same day to Longa, and on the following the garrison of Guetaria, being blockaded by land, evacuated the town and fort, and went by sea to St Sebastian. Castro de Urdiales, the scene of General Foy's atrocities, had been abandoned the day after the battle of Vittoria, the British squadron having cut off the garrison from all supplies by sea, and the Spaniards by land. A British vessel heaving opportunely in sight, the commandant withdrew precipitately, without destroying his artillery and powder, or injuring the castle. A few old women were the only survivors in the town, and their tale of the barbarities which the French and Italian troops had committed there is too dreadful for recital; there is, however, a satisfaction in recording that fourteen of the perpetrators were among the prisoners taken at Bilbao, and were deservedly put to death. The garrison got by sea to Santona, that and St. Sebastian being the only points which the enemy now occupied upon

that coast. The French had left 700 men in Pancorbo, a post commanding a ravine through which the high road from Burgos to Vittoria passes. The Andalusian *Pancorbo taken.* army of reserve, under the Conde de Abisbal, was on its way to join the main force. Lord Wellington requested him to make himself master of the town and lower works, and blockade, as closely as he could, the castle, which is situated on a high rock. Abisbal assaulted and took the town and the fort of Santa Marta on the 28th; and cutting off the garrison in the castle from the spring which supplied them with water, compelled them to surrender two days afterwards, when in all other respects they were well provided for a regular defence.

General Clausel's corps, consisting of part of the army of the north, and one division of the army of Portugal, 14,000 in all, had been recalled *Clausel retires to Zagoza.* from its operations against Mina to join the collected force of the Intruder. Coming in a direction which none of the fugitives had taken, he approached Vittoria the day after the battle, and finding that city in possession of Major-General Pakenham's division, which had just arrived there, and having no means of communicating with the routed army, he retired immediately towards Logroño. There he halted, hoping to obtain information whereby to direct his movements; and Lord Wellington thinking there was some prospect of intercepting his retreat, moved three divisions towards Tudela, and the 5th and 6th from Vittoria and Salvatierra towards Logroño. Clausel, who was at this time harassed by the indefatigable Mina, and by Don Julian Sanchez with his regiment of cavalry, left Logroño on the 24th, taking with him the garrison of that place, and marching on the left bank of the Ebro, crossed it by the bridge at Lodosa, and reached Calahorra on the following day.



On the next he arrived at Tudela; but the Alcalde of that city informed him that the allies were on the road to meet him, upon which he marched toward Zaragoza, taking with him this garrison also.

Sir Rowland meantime following the main body of the *Prepara-* defeated army on their retreat over the Pyre-  
*tions for the* nees, dislodged them from every point which  
*siege of* they attempted to hold, and obtained possession  
*Pamplona.* of the passes of S. Esteban, Donna Maria, Maya, and Roncesvalles. It was now Lord Wellington's intention to besiege Pamplona: with this intent the heavy guns and stores for the siege were brought from Santander to Deba, a little town to the westward of S. Sebastian's: there they were landed, and cows and bullocks had been collected for transporting them to the trenches: but the intelligence which Lord Wellington received from the Anglo-Sicilian army rendered it necessary to give up this intention, and every thing therefore was reshipped.

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## CHAPTER XLIV.

OPERATIONS OF THE ANGLO-SICILIAN ARMY. RECOVERY OF ZARAGOZA.  
SIEGE OF ST. SEBASTIAN. BATTLES OF THE PYRENEES.

IT was part of Lord Wellington's plan that Marshal Suchet should be engaged on the eastern coast by the Anglo-Sicilian army, and thus prevented from sending assistance to the French in Aragon and on the upper Ebro. His position upon the line of the Xucar was too strong to be attacked in front by the force under Sir John Murray's command, or acting in concert with him; and a movement by Requeña and Utiel upon their right flank, and by Tortosa and Lerida towards the rear, seemed as hazardous as it would have been circuitous and difficult. A naval expedition remained for consideration; and if a vigorous attack were made either upon Tarragona or Rosas, Suchet's attention must necessarily be drawn thither, so that he could give no aid to the armies in the north, and must leave the open part of the kingdom of Valencia to the Spaniards. Tarragona was preferred as the point of attack, and Sir John was instructed to embark with that view. *Expedition from Alicante.*  
 If he should succeed in his attempt against that place, an establishment would be secured on the coast north of the Ebro, so as to open a communication with the Spanish army in Catalonia: but this was a question of time and means, and if Suchet should be strong enough in Catalonia to frustrate the attempt, Sir John was directed in that case to return immediately, and *April 14.*

land as far north in the kingdom of Valencia as he could,  
*June.* and there join with the right of the Spanish  
 armies, to assist them in profiting by the opportunity which Suchet's absence and the withdrawal of a considerable part of his force from the Xucar might be expected to afford.

The expedition was to have been kept secret; but the preparations which were made at Alicante for the embarkation of a considerable corps could not be concealed, and Suchet was speedily informed of them. Already he had apprehended, by a movement of the Spaniards from La Mancha upon Cuenca, and of Villacampa from the frontiers of Aragon upon the upper Guadalaviar, that it was intended by a combined operation to compel him to evacuate Valencia; but as at that time Clausel's activity relieved him from any inquietude with regard to Mina, he was enabled to withdraw a division from Aragon, and to place Pannetier's brigade between Tortosa and Valencia, that he might direct it upon whatever point should be threatened, without leaving the line of the Xucar exposed.

By the end of May the expedition, consisting of 700  
*Col de Ba-* cavalry, and 14,600 infantry, including Whit-  
*laguer* tingham's division of 5000, and above 4000  
*taken by* Italians, had embarked, and on the last day of  
*the Anglo-* that month the fleet, commanded by Rear-Ad-  
*Sicilian* miral Hallowell, sailed from Alicante. It was seen  
*army.* from Valencia; and the French troops from the side of  
 Tortosa were instructed to be ready for moving whithersoever the debarkation might call them. After a very favourable passage, the fleet anchored on the evening of the 2nd in the port of Salon, within sight of Tarragona. The soldiers who had been ordered to hold themselves in readiness to land were put into the boats, but the surf ran so high that Admiral Hallowell pronounced the



attempt too dangerous, and therefore they returned to the ships. But before the fleet came to anchor a brigade, under Lieutenant-Colonel Prevost, was judiciously detached to get possession of the fort at Col de Balaguer, that point commanding the only road by which artillery could be brought to the relief of Tarragona. General Copons, who had been apprized of the expedition, occupied Reus at that time, and sent two battalions, at first, to co-operate in the attack upon this fort, and afterwards two more in consequence of some movements from Tortosa. The attack was vigorously pressed. On the 5th the place was battered in breach; on the 7th a magazine exploded; the garrison, consisting of 80 men, were intimidated by this, and the commandant capitulated. On this side, therefore, no succours could now reach Tarragona, which is about six leagues from Col de Balaguer, except by a circuitous march of three days, through a very difficult country: there was a pass indeed by which the place might be approached, but it was not practicable for artillery.

Meantime the debarkation had been effected on the 3rd, in broad day, and with an order, a precision, and a rapidity, peculiar to the English in their naval operations. Having reconnoitred the fortress, Sir John Murray determined upon attacking it on the western side, which was the weakest, and that on which stores might most conveniently be brought up to the batteries. General Bertoletti, who commanded in Tarragona, did not confine himself within the walls; he occupied the Fuerte Real, and the ruins of the bastion of St. Carlos, which, though, like all the external works, it had been demolished, presented still an imposing appearance; and great exertions were made for repairing it. These works were between 350 and 400 yards from the body of the

*The expedition lands near Tarragona.*

*M. Suchet's Mem. 2, 311.*

place, to the southward, and nearer the sea, the approach being exceedingly difficult, and covered by the fire of the town. But they were thought to be the key of the place, and that if the besiegers could establish themselves there, Tarragona must fall in three days. Accordingly two batteries were begun on the evening of the 4th, and on the morning of the 6th they opened their fire with good effect; another was erected during the night, and on the morning of the 8th the commanding engineer reported that a practicable breach in the *Fuerte Real* had been made; but he requested that it might not be stormed, because its immediate possession could be turned to no account, and to retain it would cost the lives of many men. The fire therefore was continued only to prevent its re-establishment. Meantime, when the weather would permit, the artillery and engineer horses, and the cavalry and artillery stores, were landed, and the operations of the engineers were so far advanced that two heavy batteries were constructed to enfilade the place. The city was then summoned to surrender; but as none of the batteries were as yet within 500 yards of the place, and the fire of the besieged had been very superior to that of the besiegers, General Bertoletti would not listen to the summons. On the 11th, the commanding officer of engineers reported that he was perfectly prepared to push the siege with vigour; and according to Sir John Murray's order, Major-General Sir William Clinton, who had that day been left in temporary command of the siege, resolved to storm the *Fuerte Real* at nine that night. Accordingly a disposition for the assault was made, and arrangements for distracting the enemy's attention by a simultaneous show of attack along the whole of his front, aided from the side of the sea by the bomb-vessels and gun-boats.

Marshal Suchet meantime, leaving General Harispe

with the command on the Xucar, had made for Tortosa by forced marches with one division, his reserve, and a brigade of cavalry: and before his arrival he had dispatched orders for the garrison of that place to secure the Col de Balaguer; but the fort there was taken before any attempt to succour it was made, and he could therefore bring with him no artillery in his attempt to raise the siege of Tarragona. He had directed also Generals Decaen and Maurice Mathieu to march for the relief of the place. On the side of Tortosa all due precautions had been taken, by getting possession of the fort which absolutely commanded that singular pass. On the other side, Sir John Murray had ordered General Whittingham to see if the road could by any means be broken up or impeded, . . but in an open country this was found impracticable in any part, except at a point near the sea, and within two miles of Tarragona. When Whittingham was at Torre de Embarra upon this investigation, Manso, who had 2000 men at Vendrell, came there to inform him that Decaen, from Hostalric and the country beyond it, would arrive that night at Barcelona, where there would then be a force of 12,000 foot and 400 horse, disposable for the relief of Tarragona. This information General Whittingham communicated to Sir John Murray on the 9th, observing that the enemy might advance to succour that place, in two columns, one by the road along the coast, the other by the heights, upon the left of the besieging army; the Spanish division, which formed the left, would thus be exposed in flank to a superior force, and in a position that was commanded by the heights, and had the fortified city in its rear: and he suggested to Sir John that he should leave General Copons with the Catalan army to cover the siege, while he, with the British troops and the Majorcan division, marched imme-

*Suchet's  
movement  
for the re-  
lief of Tar-  
ragona.*



diately upon Villa Franca to attack Decaen ; that General would have advanced beyond Villa Franca ; victory, considering the number and the quality of the allied troops, would not be doubtful, and it would decide the contest in Catalonia ; and after driving him from Molins de Rey, and destroying the stone bridge over the Llobregat, by which bridge alone artillery could be brought across that river, there would be time to return and encounter Marshal Suchet.

To this suggestion Sir John paid no regard ; but late in the evening of the 11th, when every thing was ready for an immediate assault upon the Fuerte Real, he received intelligence that Suchet was advancing with 12,000 men from the side of Tortosa, and Decaen with 8000 from Barcelona ; upon which he determined immediately to raise the siege, and with such haste as to abandon all the heavy artillery, ammunition, and stores that had been landed. He thought it would have been an useless waste of the lives of British soldiers to assault a work which, if carried, must, in his opinion, have been abandoned the next day : he placed no reliance upon the Spaniards under Copons, who had not more than 8500 disposable men, and those without pay, discipline, artillery, or means of subsisting, and whom he considered totally incapable of acting in the field. He distrusted his own foreign troops, who worked slowly at the siege, with great unwillingness, and with so little steadiness, that it had required an additional party of 200 British soldiers to carry to the batteries the ammunition which one of their parties threw away when they came under fire. The French too, he thought, had all advantages ; they had fortresses in every direction to furnish them supplies, to retire upon if they wished to avoid an action till they could bring together more troops, or to cover them if they were defeated ; whereas

*Sir John  
Murray  
raises the  
siege.*

he was in the open field, without any point of support, or of retreat, except to the ships : and how serious an operation would it be to embark an army in an open bay, and on a beach where he had learned by experience that it was impossible to disembark in any but the lightest boats ! Three days at least would be required to complete this re-embarkation. He decided, therefore, upon beginning it without delay.

Admiral Hallowell strongly remonstrated against abandoning the artillery, and engaged to bring off every thing, if Sir John would only give him the night from the 12th to the 13th ; but that commander gave ear to less hopeful counsels, most unfortunately for himself. For public opinion loudly condemned his conduct ; it became the subject of a court-martial ; and though the sentence acquitted him upon all other charges, it pronounced that he had committed an error of judgment in abandoning his artillery, when it might have been brought off. The embarkation was commenced at daybreak. At first some of the valuable stores were sent off, but orders were given to abandon them. Great part of the infantry were put on board during the day in full view of the besieged, who crowded on the ramparts to behold what they were unable to understand. Sir John himself embarked early in the evening ; but it was not till near midnight that the 1st division, under Sir William Clinton, who was left in command of the troops on shore, moved to the beach ; and so completely were the enemy deceived as to its movements, by the piquets of this division having been kept at their advanced stations till darkness had closed, that not a man ventured without the walls, and not a shot was fired during the night, except from the ramparts, nor did any enemy show himself to molest the embarkation. The cavalry of the Majorcan division were embarked on the morning of the 13th, by means of

a mole constructed for the purpose, about two leagues from the town ; but the other cavalry and a great part of the field artillery were ordered by land to the Col de Balaguer, whither Sir John Murray repaired in the Bristol early on the 13th, and where the whole armament was directed to assemble.

While the allies were thus re-embarking with discreditable precipitance, two other armies thought it necessary in consequence of this movement to retreat also, in equal haste, . . General Copons from the vicinity of Reus to the mountains, lest he should be exposed to a combined attack from Decaen and the garrison of Tarragona ; and Decaen himself to Barcelona, apprehending that the allies had raised the siege for the purpose of bringing him to action. On the evening of the 13th an enemy's detachment was seen advancing by the piquets in front of the fort at Col de Balaguer, and judging that this might be the advance of Suchet's force, Sir John ordered part of the infantry to be re-landed as it arrived from Tarragona, in order to cover the embarkation of the cavalry and field-artillery, which had reached that point in the course of the day. He was not mistaken in this judgment, . . Marshal Suchet having found the way by the mountains impracticable, thought to force his way by the Col, expecting to reduce the fort with as little difficulty as the allies had done ; and on the 14th he presented himself there on the road from Tortosa with the main body of his army. He found a battalion in position covering the fort ; but, to his astonishment, he also discovered the British fleet at anchor between the Col and Hospitalet. His light troops and skirmishers extended themselves along the hills, and approached within cannon-shot of the fort. But he found it impossible to advance, so completely was the road on that side commanded by the fort and by

*Suchet approaches  
Col de Balaguer, and  
retires again.*



the judicious station taken by the ships of war, which could anchor there close to the shore; and it was equally impossible for an army to remain there many hours, there being no water within many miles. He found it necessary, therefore, to retire the same evening to the village of Perillo, not knowing what had occurred at Tarragona, alarmed as well as surprised at what he had seen, and holding himself prepared to follow the movements of the fleet.

On the following morning he made a second movement on Valdellos, as if intending to attempt the mountain road. As soon as Sir John Murray was informed of this he apprehended that it was  
*June 15.  
Sir John  
re-lands  
the troops.*  
Suchet's intention to turn the position which the allies occupied, and enter the plain of Tarragona in their rear; upon which the farther embarkation of the cavalry was suspended, and nearly the whole of the infantry were put on shore. He also sent a strong division, and all the cavalry, under Major-General Mackenzie, to observe the enemy's motions, and attack them if they should attempt to press farther forward. They remained on the 16th nearly in the same position; but intelligence came that a column was in march from the side of Tarragona, and as this would have rendered General Mackenzie's situation extremely critical, he was ordered to retire to Hospitalet, and accordingly retreated thither in the course of the night. Sir John now determined to take up a position in the plain, between the high ground of the Col and the sea, and this was done on the 17th. The left rested on the hills, which are almost inaccessible on that side; the ground in front, though level, was impracticable for cavalry, because it is intersected from the hills to the sea with gullies and deep ravines caused by the winter rains. The right extended to the shore, and was greatly protected by the gun-boats and the fire of the shipping.

In this strong position he had resolved to wait the enemy's attack, but in the forenoon it was ascertained that they had retired on both sides, Suchet toward Tortosa, and Decaen toward Barcelona, after throwing supplies into Tarragona. Sir John then assembled a council of war, in which it was concluded that as nothing farther in the way of offensive operations could be attempted by the army in its then state, and as no advantage could be expected from remaining where they were, and acting defensively, the most advisable measure was to re-embark and return to Alicante, there to re-equip the army.

In the afternoon of this busy day Lord William Bentinck, who had long been looked for, arrived from Sicily to take the command. The Mediterranean fleet, under Sir Edward Pellew, came with him, having quitted its station off Toulon in the hope of assisting the operations against Tarragona, either by its presence there, or by making a show of landing at and attacking Rosas. Lord William on assuming the command confirmed the opinion of the council of war, and ordered the troops to be immediately re-embarked. The weather being such as to raise a high surf, rendered this very difficult; nevertheless by great exertions on the part of the navy, every thing was got on board by the midnight of the 19th. At the same time the fort at Col de Balaguer, having been dismantled and ruined, was blown up; and on the ensuing day, Admiral Hallowell and the Anglo-Sicilian army made sail for Alicante from their bootless expedition, and Sir Edward Pellew returned with the Mediterranean fleet to his wonted station.

The explosion of the fort announced to the French that the English had abandoned all thought of any further operations in lower Catalonia, . . much to Marshal Suchet's relief, who while they remained there deemed

it necessary to observe their movements, and yet felt that he was wanted upon the Xucar. General Elio's army, joined by that which Ballasteros had formerly commanded, but was now under the Duque del Parque, had endeavoured to take advantage of his absence with so large a part of his force. On the 11th they had attacked General Harispe's rear-guard, under General Mesclop, when on the road from S. Philippe to its position on the Xucar, but were repulsed at the village of Rogla with some loss, and Elio himself was for a little while in the enemy's hands, but he had the good fortune to escape without being recognized. The French then pursued their march without farther molestation to the bridge over the Xucar. On the 13th the Spaniards presented themselves in force there, and while a cannonade was kept up on that side, the Duke del Parque attacked Alcira by the two roads of Carcagente and of Gandia. General Habert let their principal column approach the suburb, then charged it at the moment when it began to deploy, threw it into confusion, routed it with the loss of 400 killed and more than 600 prisoners; and this in time for repairing to support his left on the Gandia road, and there also to defeat the assailants. Notwithstanding this success, General Harispe was far from feeling secure in his position. He informed Marshal Suchet that there were in his front not less than 28,000 of the least bad Spanish infantry, and from 2000 to 3000 cavalry in a good state; this, he said, the prisoners agreed in affirming, and the intelligence was not of a kind to make them feel more secure than they ought to be. The departure of the expedition from Balaguer Roads after the total failure of its object enabled the Marshal to hasten back towards the Xucar, and he did this with the more speed, because there was a report that its intention was to intercept him on his way

*Unsuccessful movements of the Spaniards in Valencia.*



to Valencia, by landing either at Puerto de los Alfaques, or at Castellon de la Plana. But the fleet had no other object in view than that of returning to Alicante, and in this it suffered much from storms. Eighteen transports were driven on the Alfaques; the troops were taken out, and fifteen of the vessels were got off, but the others were lost.

On landing at Alicante, Lord William received intelligence of the battle of Vittoria. Suchet had apprehended no such tidings. Buonaparte seems to have entertained till the last a blind persuasion that his schemes of ambition in Spain and every where else must finally be successful, and the instructions which he had sent to the Marshal were that he should endeavour to gain time, and lose no ground, till the affairs of the north should be finished, when, if it were then necessary, dispositions would be made in favour of the armies in Spain. The Marshal, however, knew that he must lose no time in retiring from Valencia; that province therefore was delivered by the battle of Vittoria, as Andalusia had been by the battle of Salamanca. He thought to retain upon it a hold which would enable him at any time to return by leaving a garrison of 1200 men in Murviedro, stored for twelve months, the place having been materially strengthened during the eighteen months which had elapsed since the French obtained possession of it: 500 men were also left in Peñíscola, 120 in Denia, and as many in Morella, that little fort commanding a mountain-road, by which a corps of infantry without cannon could at any time re-enter Valencia from Aragon. Looking forward therefore to the probable resumption of their conquests, with the hopefulness which characterizes the French character, and with the confidence which he might justly feel in his own ability of improving all circumstances to the best advan-

*The fleet  
suffers on  
its return to  
Alicante.*

*Suchet's  
measures  
after the  
battle of  
Vittoria.*

tage, he commenced his retreat with the less reluctance because Clausel apprized him that he had arrived at Zaragoza with 14,000 men, and would establish himself upon the Gallego, in readiness either to co-operate with the army of Aragon, or with the Intruder, if the army on that side should resume the offensive.

*Suchet's  
Mémoires,  
2, 310—  
324.*

A junction between Clausel and Suchet was what Lord Wellington apprehended as soon as he heard that the expedition against Tarragona had failed, and that consideration made him at once give up his intention of laying siege to Pamplona. Unwelcome as the tidings were, this change of purpose may have compensated for the failure, . . Pamplona being so much stronger than it was at that time supposed to be by the allies, and the British army still so defective in its engineer's department, that the siege might probably have proved unsuccessful. Resorting therefore to the surer method of blockading a city, which there was reason to believe was not provided for a long siege, he intrusted that service to the Spaniards, and ordered works to be thrown up on every side, to prevent the escape of the garrison, and to cut them off from all supplies; and he determined to besiege St. Sebastian's, where farther means of attack could be obtained by sea. The service was intrusted to Sir Thomas Graham, with 10,000 men.

*Lord Wellington undertakes the siege of St. Sebastian.*

*July.*

But the failure in Catalonia was soon compensated by the events which took place in Aragon. Clausel, not waiting for Marshal Suchet's movements, nor to consult with him, left his artillery at Zaragoza, and made for France by way of Jaca. The Spaniards supposed that his chief motive was the desire of securing the riches which he had amassed. Mina was marching upon the same point with a far inferior force,

*Clausel retreats into France by way of Jaca.*

in the hope of intercepting some of this booty, when he received orders which suspended his progress. Duran at the same time, as commandant in Lower Aragon, was instructed to take such opportunity as might offer for acting against the enemy in Zaragoza. This veteran, who was then at Ricla, sent Colonel Tabuenca to inform Mina of Clausel's retreat, and to confer with him upon a plan of speedy operations for the recovery of that capital, where there were no other troops remaining than a not numerous garrison, and against which he should immediately move. Tabuenca was then with his regiment at Borja; Mina was supposed to be at Gallud: not finding him there, Tabuenca hastened to Pedrola; but there he found D. Julian Sanchez, who directed him to look for Mina at Alagon; and from Alagon Cruchaga directed him to Las Casetas, and there at one in the morning Tabuenca arrived and found him. Upon delivering his dispatches, he stated that General Duran had selected him to be the bearer, because, being a native of Zaragoza, and having been present during both sieges, he could give him the fullest local information, upon which their combined operations might be concerted. Mina replied, that their forces were not sufficient for such an enterprise. He had approached the city, he said, upon an assurance that the enemy had evacuated it; but an intercepted letter had just been brought him, in which the governor, General Paris, ordered the garrisons on the left of the Ebro to maintain their posts, because succours were on the way to them from Marshal Suchet.

Tabuenca had not expected such a reply. He represented that the united force of the two divisions amounted to from 10,000 to 12,000 infantry, and 1500 horse; that the garrison did not at the utmost exceed 5000, including invalids; that when with that number so wide a circuit

*Duran invites Mina to act with him for the deliverance of Zaragoza.*



was to be covered, various false attacks might distract their attention, and an entrance be effected where they least apprehended it: and that when once the Spaniards should have set foot upon the walls, they might count upon as many brave soldiers as there were men of Zaragoza. The reinforcements which the governor looked for were, he said, far off, and could not, if time were made good use of, arrive till they would be useless. There was more reason to fear that Clausel might march back; but even in that case they could maintain themselves in Zaragoza. Paris could not defend the city, if he were vigorously assailed: and though he might bring off the garrison by the bridge over the Ebro, the French could not carry off their booty. Mina replied, that he had only three regiments of infantry on the right of the Ebro, and cavalry was of little use; but in the morning he expected information from the place, and would then determine whether to remain or to retire. Tabuenca observed, that the regiments on the left bank would not be useless if they were made to approach, and that the cavalry might be dismounted; and he requested him at least to bring down the regiments which he had at Alagon and Pedrola, that the enemy's attention might thus be drawn toward Las Casetas, when Duran came with his division, as he would do, to Maria or Cadrete. To this Mina consented.

Early in the morning, Tabuenca's regiment, which had followed him, arrived at the Puente de la Claveria, where he joined it, and proceeded on the right of the canal of Tauste toward the Puente de la Muela, meaning to give the men some rest there, while he went in search of Duran. They had scarcely been an hour upon the way, when a fire of musketry was heard on the left toward Las Casetas, and an orderly of Mina's came in all haste to recall them,

*July 8.*

*Affair before Zaragoza.*

because the enemy had attacked him. Tabuenca, confiding in his own knowledge of the ground, represented to Mina, that instead of obeying this order, it would be better that he should occupy the Puente de la Muela, whereby he should divert the enemy's attention, if, as might be expected, more troops should issue out, and at the same time secure that point in case Duran should make for it. Mina approved of this suggestion. The alarm had been occasioned by a body of horse, some 150 in number, who had been sent on an exploring party; they were charged by Mina's cavalry, and compelled to retreat with all speed; but other bodies presently sallied to their support, and one of about 1000 foot and 100 horse made for the Puente de la Muela. Tabuenca, who had with him about 1400 men, quickened his pace and anticipated them; and seeing this they halted, hesitated, and then fell back. Their main force advanced against Mina upon the road to Las Casetas; troops also came to his support, and his men behaved with their wonted gallantry. The enemy were superior both in horse and foot, and when the body which had been disappointed in their intention of occupying the bridge of La Muela joined them, the Navarrese could with difficulty keep their ground; but Tabuenca hastening with part of his men, approached the enemy on their left flank, under cover of some olive yards, and opened upon them a fire as opportune as it was unexpected; taking advantage of the movement which this occasioned among them, Mina charged with such effect, that they retreated hastily till they were under the fire of their works. Mina then encamped his troops between the Casetas and the heights of La Bernardona, . . he had now with him 4000 foot and 1500 horse; and Tabuenca regarding this affair as a preliminary to the recovery of Zaragoza, ordered his regiment to march immediately upon the Casa Blanca

and the Torrero, while he took the same course with the detachment which had been engaged. These posts, which had been so obstinately disputed in the former sieges, were abandoned by the French at their approach; and the Spaniards entered them, rejoicing in their success, and in being enabled to rest, after a march of four-and-twenty hours, during which they had had no other refreshment than a hasty meal at Grisen.

Between four and five in the afternoon the French sallied a second time and in greater force. They attacked Mina's division, which was supported by D. Julian Sanchez with his Castilian lancers; but while thus engaged, Tabuenca, leaving just troops enough in the works which he had taken to cover his retreat should that be necessary, attacked the enemy on their left and in their rear, and the result was that they were driven into the city, leaving some two hundred killed. Mina's loss in killed and wounded amounted in the course of the day to 115; Tabuenca's to 28.

*Second  
sally of the  
French.*

Duran arrived after the affair, just as evening was closing; that morning, as he was about to march from Muel for Cadrete, he was informed that a French detachment had gone from Zaragoza to bring off the garrison of Almunia which a party of his troops were blockading; and he was preparing to intercept them when a dispatch from Tabuenca made him hasten with all speed to the more important scene of action. Early on the morrow, Mina and Julian Sanchez came to confer with him in the Casa Blanca, and Duran proposed that they should assault the city on the following night: the wall, he said, might be escaladed at many points; the enemy's attention might be distracted by false attacks, and they were sure of assistance from within. This veteran had frequently distinguished himself by assaulting towns that were imperfectly fortified; Mina was less

*Duran ar-  
rives before  
the city.*



accustomed to such service, and more disposed to watch for and profit by any opportunity that might be offered him in the field: he was of opinion that they ought to remain before the city and collect thither the remainder of their forces; and in that opinion he persisted when Duran on the following evening renewed the proposal: for he judged rightly, that by a little delay success would be rendered more certain, and obtained at less cost of life.

D. Julian Sanchez removed with his lancers that evening to the Casa Blanca. The enemy allowed no one to go out of the gates: they had suffered too much in the two sallies of the preceding day to venture upon a third; and their vigilance was such that eager as the inhabitants were to communicate with those through whom they expected now to obtain the deliverance for which they so long offered up their prayers, they could convey no intelligence: neither, indeed, was it easy for them to determine what were the intentions of the French; for though they had their plunder packed up for removal and the carriages laden with it, and though they mined the stone bridge over the Ebro, they made at the same time other demonstrations, which were intended to show that it was not their purpose to abandon the city. A little before eight in the evening two guns were fired, which were the signal for a general movement, . . coaches, carts, and sumpter beasts were collected about the Puerta del Angel, and the troops began to file over the stone bridge. This movement was succeeded by stillness, and just before midnight the bridge was blown up. Duran was presently informed by his outposts where the explosion had been, and that the French had abandoned the city; immediately he sent D. Julian Sanchez and Tabuenca to ascertain what damage had been done to the bridge, and whether it were possible to

*The French  
withdraw  
from Zara-  
goza.*

pursue the enemy : he charged them also to give immediate directions for rendering it passable, and not to enter the city unless it should be absolutely necessary, nor suffer any soldier to enter it, that there might be no opportunity for any of those excesses which on such occasions were so likely to be committed ; for the same purpose he posted guards at all the gates. The *Ayuntamiento* however deemed it best, that Sanchez should enter with his lancers, and with a patrol of the citizens maintain order : the principal streets were presently illuminated, the people waiting for no orders or concert, but acting with one common feeling ; and the Coso was crowded to see the entrance of the deliverers.

Duran had lost no time in apprizing Mina of what had occurred, and requesting to see him that they might arrange their joint entrance. The *Ayuntamiento*, between one and two in the morning, came to the Casa Blanca, bringing the keys to Duran, and informing him that the enemy had left about 700 men in the Aljaferia, whose presence, they added, could not prevent him from entering Zaragoza and giving the inhabitants a day of jubilee. Duran replied, that he waited for General Mina to enter with him ; but Mina neither appeared, nor any messenger from him, till about seven in the morning, when, passing by the Casa Blanca, without alighting, or turning aside to the building in which the *Ayuntamiento* and Duran were awaiting him, he sent a chaplain to inform the old general that he was going on to the Torrero. Not a little surprised at this, they all went out in hope of speaking with him, but it was too late ; and when one of the *Ayuntamiento* was deputed to seek him at the Torrero, and let him know that they were waiting for him, he was not found there. The forenoon was far advanced before he, with some of his chief officers,

approached the Puerta Quemada, where Duran with his division and the *Ayuntamiento* were expecting them; his cavalry was at that time fording the Ebro; and merely saying to Duran that he was about to pursue the enemy with them, he rode away. Even noble minds are not always free from infirmity, and this conduct was ascribed to a jealous desire of engrossing to himself the glory of having delivered Zaragoza; for which reason he did not choose to enter with Duran, who was an older camp marshal, and as such, and also as commandant-general of Lower Aragon, must have entered at the head of the troops. But if this unworthy feeling existed, there were fairer motives that mingled with it; he thought it better that his infantry should remain encamped than that they should be quartered in the city; and the pursuit of General Paris was certainly an object of no trifling importance. Two of Mina's regiments thinking that they were following Paris toward Leciñena, fell in with him unexpectedly, and were attacked by him in the rear, and found it necessary to take up a position, first upon a height near that place, and then near the Ermita de Magallon. The French, whose business should then have been rather to secure themselves by a rapid retreat, than to seek for trivial advantages, lost some time in vainly endeavouring to dislodge them. Giving up the attempt, at last they took the road to Alcubierre; the Spaniards then pursued, harassed their rear, and compelled them to abandon, at the foot of the mountain there, the greater part of the coaches, *calesas*, and carts, laden with spoil which they had brought from Zaragoza. Paris meantime accelerated his retreat, and effected it, but not without losing the greater part of his convoy, all his artillery, and considerable numbers in killed and wounded, and some fifty prisoners, of whom



about twenty were Spanish traitors. Mina arrived with his cavalry after the spoil had been taken, and when it was too late to continue the pursuit.

Paris's orders had been to make for Mequinenza if he were compelled to leave Zaragoza; this he found impossible, and was glad to effect his escape by Huesca and Jaca. Marshal Suchet, after leaving a garrison of 4500 men in Tortosa, under Baron Robert, moved toward the frontier of Aragon, with the double view of saving Paris, and of enabling a detachment to rejoin him which he had sent to destroy the castles at Teruel and Alcañiz, and bring off the garrisons. The detachment having arrived at Caspe, Suchet pushed his columns to Fabera, and had now his army on the right bank of the Ebro . . having its right at Caspe, its centre at Gandessa, and its left at Tortosa. Here he received intelligence that Paris was driven upon Jaca; that Clausel, who had moved down from Jaca with a view of securing Zaragoza, finding it too late, had again retreated, and retiring still further, had taken a position with his corps upon the frontier of France, and that the whole of Aragon was lost. Nothing remained for him but to draw off the garrisons of Zuera, Gurrea, Anzanigo, Ayerbe, Huesca, Belchite, Fuentes, Pina, Bujaraloz and Caspe, and to think only of combining his operations with General Decaen for maintaining Catalonia. He crossed the Ebro therefore at Mequinenza, Mora, and Tortosa; and in passing between Hospitalet and Cambrils, was cannonaded by the English fleet. To maintain the line of the lower Ebro after the deliverance of Aragon was impossible; it was equally so to feed his army in the sterile environs of Tortosa, where he was also in danger of having the defiles in his rear occupied by the enemy, who might come by sea, and interpose between him and the strong places in

*Suchet  
draws off  
the remain-  
ing garrisons in  
Aragon.*

*July 15.  
Suchet's  
Mémoires,  
2, 329—  
331.*

Catalonia; he determined therefore upon moving on Reus, Valls, and Tarragona.

Meantime Duran, manifesting no displeasure at the discourtesy which had been shown towards him, made his entrance into Zaragoza. His first business was to march through the rejoicing streets

*Duran enters Zaragoza.*  
*July 10.* to the church of Our Lady of the Pillar, and

here offer up thanksgiving; his second was to lay siege to the castle. The heavy artillery of his division was sent for, and approaches regularly made; and the Zaragozans, after having so often seen the Spaniards who had been made prisoners in Aragon or Valencia, marched through their streets, had now the satisfaction of seeing a French garrison brought prisoners thither in their turn from La Almunia, where they had surrendered to a detachment of the Sorian division. During the first days of the siege, Mina, finding it in vain to pursue General Paris, returned, and took up his quarters with his troops in the suburb; and this was supposed to be a farther indication of jealousy towards Duran, because by remaining on that side of the Ebro which appertained to his own district of Upper Aragon, he was not under his command; it was deemed more strange that he took no part whatever at this time in the operations of the siege, but left it wholly to be carried on by the Sorian division; in fact, he was daily expecting to be appointed to the command of the whole province. Before that appointment arrived, intelligence came that Suchet had advanced to Fabara and Caspe; upon which he crossed the bridge, began his retreat to Las Casetas and to Alagon, and sent orders to Tabuenca to follow him with his regiment: Tabuenca replied that he was under General Duran's command, and could not leave Zaragoza without his orders. And Duran, as soon as he was informed of this, sent to Mina, saying he could not allow the regiment of

Rioja to accompany him in his retreat (a retreat of which he was no otherwise informed than by the orders which had been sent to its colonel), because being determined to defend the city, he required its presence, and indeed he requested the support of some of his troops also; for if the enemy should advance to Zaragoza, which he did not expect, the retreat of the Spanish troops would have a most prejudicial effect upon the public mind; the two divisions were strong enough to meet the French and give them battle, and this they ought to do; but for himself, with his single division, he could defend the city. This indeed Duran at that juncture could well have done; but if the alternative had been to meet Suchet in the field, or to retreat, the course which Mina followed, in pursuance of his usual system, would have been unquestionably the most judicious.

It was soon ascertained that Suchet had retreated, upon which Mina returned to Zaragoza; he then took up his quarters in the city, and the *Mina takes the command.* siege of the Aljaferia was carried on jointly by the two divisions; and on the fourth day after his return, the commission which he had looked for arrived, appointing him Commandant-General of all Aragon. The same day brought orders for Duran to join the army of Catalonia, leaving, however, such regiments as Mina might think proper to detain. Mina took two out of four regiments, and one of three squadrons of cavalry; with the remainder Duran departed for Catalonia, leaving to Mina the reputation of effecting the deliverance of Zaragoza, which certainly was not due to him, and was not needed for one who had rendered more signal services to his country, when its fortunes were at the lowest ebb, than any other individual. Duran was remarkable among all the partizans who distinguished themselves in this war for the



discipline which, as an old officer, he introduced among his troops, and which he maintained by means that made him equally respected and beloved. *Reconquista de Zaragoza, pp. 23—84.* Father, or grandfather, were the appellations by which they called him, and which he deserved by the care which he manifested on all occasions for them. On the second day after his departure a redoubt was blown up, in which the commanding officer of the artillery, and 28 men who were in garrison there, perished. This was said to have been his own act; and it was said also that another artillery officer intended to set fire to the powder-magazine, but was prevented by the soldiers, who with their besiegers must otherwise have been destroyed, and with them no small part of the city. The motive assigned for this insane desperation was resentment against the commandant of the place for determining to capitulate, though the works had sustained little injury, and were abundantly provided for a long defence. Immediately after this the garrison surrendered.

Thus, after four years of captivity, Zaragoza was delivered from its detested enemies. During the greater part of that time no tidings but those of ill fortune had reached the Zaragozans, . . the defeat of their armies, the capture of one strong hold after another, some having yielded through famine, others to the strength and skill of the besiegers, and more having been basely or traitorously given up. And though they well knew that the journals of the Intrusive Government, like those in France, were conducted upon a system of falsehood, suppressing every thing which could not be made appear favourable to Buonaparte's views, they could not doubt the substance of these tidings, nor, in some of the worst cases, the extent of the

*Conduct of the Zaragozans during their captivity.*

national loss. The prisoners who were taken in Blake's defeat before Murviedro, and the still greater number who surrendered with him at Valencia, had been marched through the streets of Zaragoza, in the depth of winter, and in a condition which would have moved any soldiers to compassion except those of Buonaparte and of the generals whom he employed in Spain: without shoes and stockings, foot-sore, half naked, half famished, they were driven and outraged and insulted by an enemy who seemed, together with the observances of civilized war, to have renounced the feelings of humanity. At such times the Zaragozans, without distinction of rank or sex, crowded about their unfortunate countrymen to administer what consolation they could, to weep over them, and to share with them their own scanty supplies of clothing and of food. On such occasions, too, all the respectable families, as if by one consent, kept days of mourning and humiliation\*, each in their houses: and more earnest prayers were never offered up than they breathed in bitterness of soul for the deliverance of their injured country, and for vengeance upon their merciless and insolent oppressors.

At the time of the deliverance, and long after, the city and its environs bore miserable vestiges of the two sieges. Ruined houses were to be seen far and near on every side, and the broken walls of what once had been fertile inclosures. Some streets were merely ruins; in others, the walls of the houses were literally covered with the marks of musket-balls, and in some places large holes had been made in them by the numbers which had struck there. Most of the churches and convents were nothing

\* These affecting circumstances are stated in a letter written from Zaragoza, 22d of January, 1812, to D. Mariano de Lope, a priest who distinguished himself by his heroic conduct during both sieges. A copy of this

letter I had the honour of receiving from the Countess de Bureta, who transmitted it to me at the time, that I might see what were the feelings and the conduct of her fellow-citizens during their captivity.

but heaps of ruins ; the Capuchin's convent had been so totally demolished, that only a solitary cross remained to mark the spot where it had stood. Nothing had been repaired except the Aljaferia and such of the fortifications as the French re-fortified for their own security. Much of this material destruction was repairable ; but precious monuments of antiquity had been destroyed, . . precious libraries and precious manuscripts, which never could be replaced ; and upon most of the inhabitants irreparable ruin had been brought. The loss of life which had been sustained there may be summed up : broken fortunes and broken hearts are not taken into the account ; but the sufferers had the proud and righteous satisfaction of knowing that they had not suffered in vain. The two sieges of Zaragoza, that in which it was overcome, not less than that which it successfully resisted, contributed more than any other event to keep up the national spirit of the Spaniards, to exalt the character of the nation, and to excite the sympathy and the admiration of other countries. And the good will not pass away with the generation upon whom the evil fell. There is no more illustrious example of public virtue in ancient or modern history than this of Zaragoza. Such examples are not lost upon posterity ; and such virtue, as it affords full proof that the Spanish character retains its primitive strength, affords also the best ground for hope, not only that Spain may resume its rank in Christendom as a great and powerful kingdom, but also that the Spaniards may become, religiously and politically, a free and enlightened nation ; not by the remote consequences of a sudden and violent revolution, which always brings with it more evils than it sweeps away, but by the progress of wisdom and truth, working their sure though slow effect in God's good time, among a patient, thoughtful, and devout people.



Aragon having now been wholly delivered from the enemy, no attempt could be made from that side to relieve Pamplona; the blockade of that city was safely intrusted to the Spaniards, who were now becoming an efficient part of the allied armies; and meantime the siege of St. Sebastian's was made Lord Wellington's immediate object. St. Sebastian's, which is the most important town in Guipuzcoa, stands at the mouth of the little river Urumea, on a peninsula between two arms of the sea, and at the foot of a high hill. A bay forms its port, which has been widened and deepened, but is still small and shallow, and so insecure in certain winds, that ships have been driven from their anchors there; yet to this port the town owes its origin, and its fortifications, which were first erected to protect the shipping. Close at hand, on the side towards France, is the capacious harbour of Passages, surrounded by mountains, with an entrance between the rocks so strait, that only a single ship can pass, and that only by towing; formerly it served for ships of the line, but under the mal-administration of later years it had been neglected, and was now so far filled up, that none but small craft and vessels of 200 or 300 tons came in: for this reason, probably, the Caraccas Company, whose port it had been, removed to St. Sebastian's. There also the entrance is very narrow, being confined between two moles. The town contains from 600 to 700 houses, in twenty streets, all which are paved with large smooth stones, and several of them long, broad, and straight: the suburbs were more extensive, and the whole population was estimated at 13,000.

Few places present a more formidable appearance; the only land approach is over a low sandy isthmus, occupied by one front of fortification, and this narrow road is commanded by the castle; but on the left flank there are

considerable sand-hills some 600 or 700 yards distant, which completely enfilade and take in reverse the front defences. Those which cross the isthmus are a double line of works, with the usual counterscarp, covered way, and glacis ; but those which run lengthways consist only of a single line, and trusting to the waters in their front to render them inaccessible, are built without any cover. The northern line is from top to bottom quite exposed to the sand-hills ; the Urumea, which washes the town on that side, is fordable for some hours before and after low water, and the tide recedes so much that during that time there is a considerable space left dry by which troops can march to the foot of the wall. Yet the wall had been left uncovered, though Marshal Berwick had availed himself of this defect when he attacked the place in 1719, and by effecting a breach there had made the garrison retire into the castle. In the revolutionary war, St. Sebastian's was taken by the French without resistance ; for though the troops would have done their duty in defending it, the inhabitants, rather than endure the horrors of a siege, allowed the magistrates, some of whom were timid and others traitorous, to surrender.

After the battle of Vittoria, Jourdan had thrown a garrison of between 3000 and 4000 men into the place. The conduct of the siege was intrusted to Sir Thomas Graham, and the fifth division, under Major-General Oswald, consisting of Major-Generals Hay and Robinson's British brigades, and Major-General Spry's Portuguese, were employed in carrying it on. The first division, under Major-General Howard, consisting of the 1st and 2nd brigades of guards under Colonel Maitland and Major-General Stopford, with the brigades of the German legion, and Lord Aylmer's, were in position covering the great road between Irun and Oyarzun, and supporting Don Manuel Freyre's

*Distribu-  
tion of the  
allied army.*

Spanish corps which crowned the heights of S. Marzial and guarded the line of the Bidassoa from the Crown Mountain to the sea. Giron and Longa kept up the communication with the left of the centre at Vera: this consisted of the 7th and light divisions, under the Earl of Dalhousie and Baron Alten . . the former posted in the pass of Etchalar, the latter on the mountain of S. Barbara, and in the town of Vera. The right of the centre, commanded by Sir Rowland, occupied the valley of Bastan, and with Major-Generals Pringle and Walker's brigades of the 2d division, under Lieutenant-General the Hon. Sir William Stewart, guarded the passes of Maya. The Conde de Amarante, with Colonel Ashworth and Brigadier-General Da Costa's Portuguese brigades, held the minor passes of Col d'Ariette and Col d'Espegas on the right, leading also into the valley of Bastan. Another Portuguese brigade of this division, under Brigadier-General Campbell, occupied a strong position between the valleys of Aldudes and Hayra, keeping communication on its left through the Port de Berdaritz with the valley of Bastan, and through the Port d'Alalosti on its right, with the right wing of the army, in the pass of Roncesvalles. The 6th division, under Major-General Pack, occupied S. Estevan, and formed the reserve of the centre, ready to support the troops at Maya or at Etchalar. The right wing covered the direct approaches to Pamplona from St. Jean de Pied-de-Port: in its front Major-General Byng's brigade of the 2d division guarded the passes of Roncesvalles and Orbaicete; Morillo, with a division of Spanish infantry supporting the latter post; Sir Lowry Cole, with the 4th division, was in second line, at Biscarret, in rear of the pass of Roncesvalles. The 3rd division formed the reserve under Sir Thomas Picton, and was stationed at Olaque. This was the distribution of the allied army, guarding the passes of the



Western Pyrenees, and covering the blockade of Pamplona and the siege of S. Sebastian's. As the best means of saving time and labour in that siege, it was determined to follow Marshal Berwick's mode of attack, breach the exposed wall from the sand-hills, and storm it as soon as the breach should be made practicable, trusting by quick movement to pass through the fire of the front line of works.

When the troops appointed for the siege arrived in sight of the place, the whole of the works and *Siege of S. Sebastian's.* of the castellated hill appeared to be in motion, so busily were the enemy every where employed in strengthening their defences. The Spaniards, who were previously blockading the place, could offer little interruption to them, because they had no artillery; but serious operations were now to commence, and the French, though they neither distrusted their own skill, nor that every possible exertion would be made for their relief, knew that all that skill and all those exertions would be called for. As a preliminary measure, it was necessary for the besiegers to drive the garrison from a post which they occupied, about 700 or 800 yards in advance of the town, formed by the convent of S. Bartolomé, and an unfinished redoubt, adjoining it, on the extremity of the steep hill towards the river, and from a small circular work which they made with casks on the causeway. Approaches were made, and batteries erected in the course of the night, between the 13th and 14th of July, with a celerity that surprised the French; and in the morning the guns opened upon the side of the convent. It was soon beaten down, . . the chapel, with its organ and costly adornments, was laid open, and demolished, and the roof fell in; but the French were not driven from the ruins. A false attack was made to ascertain whether they intended to maintain an obstinate resistance

there; the troops carried it farther than their orders directed, and were fain to return with some loss. It was then attempted to drive the garrison out by means of red-hot shot; the Portuguese were less expert at this service than they had shown themselves in the field, they fired shot which had not been half heated, and frequently missed the whole building. Beams and whatever else was combustible from the neighbouring houses were used for heating the furnace; and at length the convent was set on fire in several places, but the garrison succeeded in extinguishing the flames as often as they broke out. The enemy, meantime, kept up from the town an incessant fire of shot and shells upon the batteries. After 2500 eighteen-pound shot and 450 shells had been fired at the convent, it was found that the French were not to be dislodged by any other means than by the bayonet. Accordingly two columns were formed, one under the direction of Major-General Hay, on the right, to cross the ravine near the river, and attack the redoubt; the left, under Major-General Bradford, to attack the convent. Major-General Oswald commanded. The attack was begun about ten in the forenoon: the enemy in the convent were not aware of it till it was made; but the movement was perceived from the town and castle; troops were sent to reinforce the garrison, and a heavy fire was opened upon the assailants; . . it was soon discontinued, because they came to close quarters, and it must then have proved equally destructive to both parties. The reinforcement was not of more advantage, for thinking to take one body of the assailants in the rear, they were encountered and charged by another, and driven upon the convent, where the garrison had already been overpowered, and those who escaped were driven with the fugitives from the works down the hill, through the

*Convent of  
S. Bartolo-  
mé taken.*

*July 17.*

village of S. Martin's, immediately below, which the enemy had burnt. The impetuosity of the pursuers could not be restrained; their directions not to pass the village were disregarded; they followed the French to the foot of the glacis, and suffered on their return. The garrison behaved gallantly, and lost 250 men; the loss of the allies amounted to 70. A fire from the town was kept up upon this post for twenty-four hours; and most of the dead with which the ground between it and the town was strewn, remained unburied there during the remainder of the siege, so great was the danger in collecting them, each party being jealous of the approach of an enemy to their works, even upon such an office.

Two batteries were thrown up during the night in a situation to enfilade and take in reverse the defences of the town. This in the loose sand was a most difficult work, and the fire of the enemy was directed with great precision to interrupt it; four sentinels were killed in succession through one loop-hole. The only eminence from whence artillery could be brought to bear directly on the town, though still about a hundred feet below it, was above the convent, and almost adjoining its walls. Here a battery was erected; the covered way to it passed through the convent, and the battery itself was constructed in a thickly-peopled burial-ground. A more ghastly circumstance can seldom have occurred in war; . . . for coffins and corpses in all stages of decay were exposed when the soil was thrown up to form a defence against the fire from the town, and were used indeed in the defences; and when a shell burst there, it brought down the living and the dead together. An officer was giving his orders, when a shot struck the edge of the trenches above him; two coffins slipped down upon him with the sand, the coffins broke in their fall, the bodies rolled with him for some distance, and when he recovered



he saw that they had been women of some rank, for they were richly attired in black velvet, and their long hair hung about their shoulders and their livid faces. The soldiers, in the scarcity of firewood, being nothing nice, broke up coffins for fuel with which to dress their food, leaving the bodies exposed; and till the hot sun had dried up these poor insulted remains of humanity, the stench was as dreadful as the sight.

The village of S. Martin, or rather its ruins, were now occupied, and approaches were struck out there *The batteries open.* to the right and left. On the 20th the batteries opened, and early in the evening the enemy abandoned the circular redoubt. The next day a flag of truce was sent with a summons to the governor, but not received. Meantime a parallel across the isthmus had been begun; in cutting it, the men came upon a channel level with the ground, in which a pipe was laid for conveying water into the town. The aqueduct was four feet high, and three feet wide. Lieutenant Reid of the engineers ventured to explore it, and at the end of 230 yards, he found it closed by a door in the counterscarp, opposite to the face of the right demi-bastion of the horn-work. It was thought that if a mine were formed at this point, the explosion would throw up earth enough against the escarp, which was only twenty-four feet high, to form a way over it; and accordingly sand-bags and barrels of powder were lodged there.

The service of the breaching battery was severe; the enemy of course directed every disposable gun against it, and their shells repeatedly blew up every platform there, and dismounted the guns. The seamen who assisted them did their duty nobly, as they always did; but with characteristic hardihood disregarded all injunctions tending to their own preservation, till many of them had suffered. Three of their officers and sixteen of their

men were killed and wounded there in the course of three days. By mid-day of the 22nd, a breach had been made about 600 feet long, and, as it seemed, perfectly practicable, the wall being entirely levelled. It was strongly advised that this should be stormed on the following morning, as early as the light and the tide would admit ; instead of this, orders were given to make another breach to the left in a more oblique part of the wall ; one sure disadvantage of delay being that the time employed in making the second breach would be well used by the enemy in intrenching the first. After battering this second point for some hours, information was received from a civil engineer who was well acquainted with the place, that the wall to the right of the breach was a toise thinner than elsewhere ; thither therefore the guns were directed, and before the night of the 23rd, a practicable breach was made there also. Great part of the town had already been ruined by the fire ; it was at this time in flames, and the frequent crashing of houses was heard amid the roaring of the artillery. Before daybreak the trenches were filled with troops for storming and for supporting the assault, which was ordered for four o'clock ; the batteries were to continue their fire upon the second breach till the moment of attack, and then all available guns were to be directed so as to restrain the enemy's flanking fire from two towers, . . which, though much injured, were still occupied, . . or otherwise to assist as occasion might be perceived. All was in readiness, when about an hour after daybreak the order was countermanded, upon a misconception that because the houses at the back of the breach were on fire, the troops would not be able to advance after they should have gained the summit. The remainder of the day was spent in widening the second breach ; time at this juncture was of such value that it was hoped

the delay might only be for twelve hours, and the assault made at four in the evening ; but it was thought a more important consideration that there would then be but few hours of daylight, and therefore the following morning was appointed.

Major-General Hay's brigade formed the column of attack ; Major-General Spry's Portuguese brigade, Major-General Robinson's, and the 4th *Caçadores* of Brigadier-General Wilson's, were in reserve in the trenches, the whole under the direction of Major-General Oswald. The attack was made an hour before, instead of after daylight, because the tide was returning, and was already two feet deep under the wall where the ground is dry at low water. But some confusion was probably occasioned by the darkness ; and the chance of success would have been greater if the arrangements had been made known to more of those officers who were to take part in executing them. The distance of the uncovered approach from the trenches to the breach was about 300 yards, over rocks covered with sea-weed, and intermediate pools of water, and in the face of an extensive front of works ; the breach was flanked by two towers : the fire of the place was yet entire, and when the troops rushed from the trenches, it was presently seen that the French were not unapprized of the intended attempt, and that they had lost no time in making their preparations for defence ; every gun which looked that way from the castle, and from the hill, was brought to bear upon the assailants, and from all around the breach they were flanked and enfiladed with a most destructive fire of grape and musketry. Blazing planks and beams were thrown transversely across the walls and on the breach ; and stones, shot, shells, and hand grenades, were showered upon the allies with dreadful effect.

At this time the mine was sprung, and with as much



effect as had been intended. It brought down a considerable length of the counterscarp and glacis, and astonished the enemy so greatly, that they abandoned for awhile that part of the works. When the Portuguese who were to take advantage of this hastened to the spot, there were no scaling ladders, . . an officer ran to the foot of the breach, in hope the engineers there might be provided with them; . . if he had but one ladder, he said, he could post his whole party in the town: . . but ladders had not been needed here, and not thought of for the point where they might be required. The enemy had thus time to recover from their surprise; and the Portuguese, standing their ground with soldier-like fidelity, were miserably sacrificed, nearly the whole of this party being killed before the order for recalling them arrived.

Meantime Lieutenant Jones of the engineers with an officer and nine men of the first royals, gained the top of the great breach; and men were rushing up to follow them, when the enemy sprung a mine in one place, and in another drew the supports from under a false bridge, thus blowing up some of the assailants, and precipitating others upon the spikes which had been fixed below. The men who were at the foot of the breach were then panic-stricken; they, as well as the French, remembered that in such situations the victory is not to the brave or the strong, if superior skill is opposed to courage and strength: they ran back, . . it was impossible to rally them, and they suffered much. The intention was, that another column should pass in the rear of the first, between it and the sea to the second breach, and storm it; but the discomfiture of the first party prevented this, and none of these reached their destination. The whole was over before morning had fairly opened, and in the course of an hour, 45 officers and above 800 men were killed, wounded, or missing.

The river prevented any immediate communication, so that at the batteries it was thought that hardly anything more than a false alarm had taken place, till, as day dawned, they discovered through their glasses the bodies of officers and men in the breach, and under the demi-bastion and retaining wall. Presently one or two of the enemy appeared on the breach, and a serjeant came down among the wounded, raising some, and speaking to others. The firing which had been continued occasionally on the breach was then stopped; more of the French appeared; a kind of parley took place between them and the men at the head of the trenches; and half an hour's truce was agreed on for the purpose of removing the wounded and the dead; but so jealous were the French that they would not allow the dead who were nearest them to be approached; some of the wounded they carried into the town, and others were borne by their soldiers into the British lines. While the troops were yet under arms, not knowing whether another attack might be ordered, a British officer saw one of his Portuguese soldiers start off, and reproved him for so doing, when after awhile the man returned; but the Portuguese replied, scarcely able to command his voice or restrain his tears as he spake, that he had only been burying his comrade, . . and in fact it appeared that with no other implement than his bayonet and his hand, he had given his poor friend and countryman a soldier's burial in the sand. The officers who fell in this attack were buried together, each in a shell, in one grave, in a garden near the encampment.

Lord Wellington came over from Lesaca on the same day about noon, and determined upon renewing the attack; the second breach was to be completed, the demi-bastion thrown down, and fresh troops appointed for another assault. But the ammunition was

*The siege suspended.*

now running low; and upon his return that night he received intelligence of movements on the enemy's part in the Pyrenees, which made him forthwith dispatch orders for withdrawing the guns from the batteries and converting the siege into a blockade.

Marshal Soult had been sent back from Germany as Lieutenant of the Emperor, and Commander-in-chief of the French armies in Spain. Of all the French Generals employed in the Peninsula, he had obtained the highest reputation; and undoubtedly no one could be better entitled to the praise of those authors who write history, with a mere military feeling, reckless of all higher considerations. That *impassibility* which he considered as one of the first essentials for a general in such a war, and of which proof had been given in his proclamations and his acts, recommended him to Buonaparte not less than his great ability. The remains of the armies of Portugal, of the centre and of the north, were united; their ranks, which had so often been thinned, were filled by a new conscription; and the whole being re-formed into nine divisions of infantry, was called the army of Spain; the right, centre, and left, were under Generals Reille, Drouet, Comte d'Erlon, and Clausel; the reserve, under General Villatte: there were two divisions of dragoons under Generals Treillard and Tilly, and a light division under General Pierre Soult. In the expectation of success every exertion had been used to increase the strength of their cavalry, though of little use in the Pyrenees, that the war might be once more carried beyond the Ebro; and with the same view a large proportion of artillery was provided. The decree which appointed Marshal Soult bore date on the first of July; he took the command on the 13th, and his preparations were forwarded with the ability, activity, and hopeful-



ness by which the French are characterized in such things. He issued an address to his troops, containing more truth than was usually admitted into a French state paper, because the truth in that place could not possibly be concealed; but it was sufficiently coloured with artful misrepresentations and with falsehood. “The armies of France,” it said, “guided by the powerful and commanding genius of the Emperor Napoleon, had achieved in Germany a succession of victories as brilliant as any that adorned their annals. The presumptuous hopes of the enemy had thus been confounded; and the Emperor, who was always inclined to consult the welfare of his subjects, by following moderate counsels, had listened to the pacific overtures which the enemy made to him after their defeat. But in the interim, the English, who, under the pretence of succouring the inhabitants of the Peninsula, were in reality devoting them to ruin, had taken advantage of the opportunity afforded them. A skilful leader,” said Marshal Soult, “might have discomfited their motley levies; and who could doubt what would have been the result of the day at Vittoria if the general had been worthy of his troops? Let us not however,” he continued, “defraud the enemy of the praise which is their due. The dispositions and arrangements of their general have been prompt, skilful, and consecutive; and the valour and steadiness of his troops have been praiseworthy. Yet do not forget that it is to the benefit of your example they owe their present military character; and that whenever the relative duties of a French general and his troops have been ably fulfilled, their enemies have commonly had no other resource than in flight.” In one part of this address Marshal Soult rendered justice to Lord Wellington; but this latter assertion strikingly exemplifies the character of the vain-glorious people whom he was addressing.

*His address  
to the  
troops.*

He himself had been repulsed by a far inferior British force at Coruña; had been driven from Porto, and defeated in the bloody field of Albuhera. He was addressing men who had been beaten at Vimeiro, beaten at Talavera, beaten at Busaco, beaten at Fuentes d'Onoro, routed at Salamanca, and scattered like sheep at Vittoria. They had been driven from Lisbon into France; and yet the general who had so often been baffled addressed this language to the very troops who had been so often and so signally defeated! "The present situation of the army," he pursued, "is imputable to others: let the merit of repairing it be yours. I have borne testimony to the Emperor of your bravery and your zeal. His instructions are to drive the enemy from those heights which enable them arrogantly to survey our fertile valleys, and to chase them across the Ebro. It is on the Spanish soil that your tents must next be pitched, and your resources drawn. Let the account of our successes be dated from Vittoria, and the birth-day of the Emperor be celebrated in that city."

*Critical situation of the allied army.*

Lord Wellington's situation had not during the whole war been so critical as at this time. He had two blockades to maintain, and two points to cover, sixty miles distant from each other, in a mountainous country, where the heights were so impassable that there could be no lateral communication between his divisions. His force was necessarily divided in order that none of the passes might be left undefended, but the enemy could choose their point of attack, and bring their main force to bear upon it; thus they would have the advantage of numbers; and they had the farther advantage, that a considerable proportion of their troops, all who had belonged to the army of the north, had been accustomed to mountain warfare, in which the British and Portugeze had had no experience.

Soult's first object was to relieve Pamplona, which could only be relieved by some such great effort as he intended; whereas S. Sebastian's, as long as the garrison could maintain themselves there, had always the possibility of receiving supplies along the coast. With this view he collected a convoy of provisions and stores at St. Jean de Pied-de-Port. Meantime the hostile forces, though each within their own frontier, were encamped in some places upon opposite heights, within half cannon-shot; and their sentries within 150 yards of each other. Hitherto with the Spaniards and Portugeze it had been, in the ever-memorable phrase of Palafox, war at the knife's edge; but that national contest, in which the aggressors had treated courtesy and humanity with as much contempt as justice, was at an end; it was a military contest now, and the two armies offered no molestation to each other in the intervals of the game of war. The French, gay and alert as usual, were drumming and trumpeting all day long; the more thoughtful English enjoying the season and the country, looking down with delight upon the sea and the enemy's territory, and Bayonne in the distance, and sketching in the leisure which their duties might allow the beautiful scenery of the Pyrenees. The right of the allied army was at Roncesvalles, the sacred ground of romance, where in the seventeenth century a spot was shown as still reddened with the blood of the Paladins; and where Our Lady, under some one of her thousand and one appellations, may perhaps still continue to work miracles in the chapel wherein they were interred. From that pass, and from the pass of Maya, the roads converge on Pamplona; and Soult made his arrangements for attacking both on the same day in force, . . for doing which he had the great advantage

*Soult's  
movements  
for the re-  
lief of Pam-  
plona.*



that Lord Wellington was at the opposite extremity of the line, near S. Sebastian's.

*Battles of  
the Py-  
renees.* Accordingly, on the 24th, he assembled the right and left wings of his army, with one division of his centre, and two divisions of cavalry, at St. Jean de Pied-de-Port; and on the 25th (the same day that the unsuccessful assault upon S. Sebastian's was made) he began his operations, and in person, with about 35,000 men, attacked General Byng's post at Roncesvalles. Sir Lowry Cole moved up to his support with the 4th division; and they maintained their ground obstinately, against very superior numbers, though with considerable loss. But in the afternoon the enemy turned their position; and Sir Lowry deemed it necessary to withdraw in the night, and marched accordingly to Lizoain, in the neighbourhood of Zubiri. General Drouet, with 13,000 men, was to force the position of Maya: early in the morning he manœuvred against each of the four passes, and against the Conde de Amarante's division, which was posted on the right. Under cover of these demonstrations, he collected his main strength behind a hill immediately in front of the pass of Aretesque, and from thence about noon made a sudden and rapid advance, favoured by a most unexpected chance. Two advanced videttes, who had been posted on some high ground to give timely notice of an enemy's approach, had fallen asleep during the heat of the day; the French were thus enabled to advance unseen, and the piquet had scarcely time to give the alarm before the enemy were upon them. The light infantry companies of the second brigade sustained the attack with great steadiness; when they were overpowered, the 34th and 50th regiments came up, and afterward the right wing of the 92d; for as the other passes were not to be left unguarded, troops could only

be brought from them by successive battalions, as the need became more urgent. Opposed as they thus were to very superior forces, the 32d lost more than a third of its numbers, and the 92d battalion was almost destroyed. The allies retired slowly, defending every point as succours enabled them to make a stand, but still over-matched; till, about six in the evening, Major-General Barnes's brigade of the 7th division came to their support; then they recovered that part of their post which was the key of the position, and might have reassumed their ground; but Sir Rowland, having been apprized that Sir Lowry Cole must retire, deemed it necessary to withdraw them during the night to Irurita. They had been engaged seven hours, and lost four guns and more than sixteen hundred men.

During the whole of the following day, the enemy remained inactive beyond the Puerto de Maya. On that day Sir Thomas Picton, who, as soon as he was informed of Soult's movements, had crossed to Zubiri with his division, moved forward to support the troops at Lizoain, and assumed the command there as senior officer. The enemy's whole force advanced against them early in the afternoon, and they retired skirmishing to some strong ground, which they maintained, in order of battle, till night closed. Generals Picton and Cole concurred then in opinion that the post of Zubiri would not be tenable for so long a time, as it would be necessary for them to wait there. Early on the 27th, therefore, they began to retreat still farther, and took up a position to cover the blockade of Pamplona. The garrison of that fortress had been informed by some deserters from the Walloon guards that Soult, with a powerful army, was advancing victoriously to their relief, and that relief was certain. Their hopes were raised to the highest pitch; the firing was only five miles distant. The state of things appeared

so critical to Abisbal, that he prepared to raise the blockade, and spiked some of his guns; and the enemy sallied, got possession of several batteries, and took fourteen pieces of cannon, before Don Carlos d'España could repulse them. The position which the retreating troops took to cover the blockade had its right in front of the village of Huarte, extending to the hills beyond Olaz, and its left on the heights in front of the village of Villalba, the right of this wing resting on a height which covered the road from Zubiri and Roncesvalles, and the left at a chapel behind Sorauren, on the road from Ostiz. Morillo's division of Spanish infantry was in reserve, with that part of Abisbal's corps which was not engaged in the blockade; and from the latter two regiments were detached to occupy part of the hill by which the road from Zubiri was defended. The British cavalry under Sir Stapleton Cotton were placed on the right, near Huarte, being the only ground on which cavalry could act. The river Lanz runs in the valley which was on the left of the allies, and on the right of the French, in the road to Ostiz. Beyond this river is a range of mountains connected with Ligasso and Marcalain, by which places it was now necessary to communicate with the rest of the army.

Lord Wellington arrived as these divisions were taking up their ground; and shortly afterwards Soult formed his army on a mountain between the Ostiz and the Zubiri roads, the front of the mountain extending from one road to the other. One division he placed on a bold height to the left of the Zubiri road, and in some villages in front of the third division, where he had also a large body of cavalry. The same evening he pushed forward a corps to take possession of a steep hill on the right of General Cole's division: it was occupied by a Portuguese battalion and a Spanish regiment; these troops defended



their post with the bayonet, and drove the enemy back. Seeing the importance of this point, Lord Wellington reinforced it with the 40th and with another Spanish regiment, so that the further efforts of the French there were as unsuccessful as the first ; but they took possession of Sorauren, on the Ostiz road, whereby they acquired the communication by that road ; and they kept up a fire of musketry along the line till it was dark.

In the morning General Pack's division arrived. Lord Wellington then directed that the heights on the left of the valley of the Lanz should be occupied, and that this division should form across the valley in rear of the left of General Cole's, resting its right on Oricain, and its left upon the heights. They had scarcely taken the position in the valley when they were attacked in great force from Sorauren: the enemy advanced steadily to the attack ; but the front was defended from the heights on their left by their own light troops, and from the height on the right, and on the rear, by the 4th division and a Portugueze brigade ; and the French were soon driven back, with great loss, by the fire in their front, both flanks, and rear. This was a false move from which Soult never recovered: with a view of extricating his troops from the situation in which they were now placed, he attacked the height on which the left of the 4th division stood, and where the 7th *Caçadores* were posted, at an *ermida*, or chapel, behind Sorauren. Momentary possession was obtained of it ; but the *Caçadores* returned to their ground, supported by Major-General Ross at the head of his brigade, and the enemy were driven down. The battle now became general along the whole of these heights, but only in one point to the advantage of the French, which was where a battalion of Major-General Campbell's Portugueze regiment was posted ; that battalion was overpowered, it gave way immediately on the right of

Ross's brigade: the French then established themselves on the line of the allies, and Ross was obliged to withdraw from his post. Upon this, Lord Wellington ordered the 27th and 48th to charge, first that body of the enemy which had established itself there, and then those on the left. Both charges succeeded; the enemy were driven back: the 6th division at the same time moved forward nearer to the left of the 4th; the attack upon this front then ceased entirely, and was but faintly continued on other points of the line. Every regiment in the 4th division charged with the bayonet that day, and the 40th, 7th, 20th, and 23rd, four different times. Their officers set them the example, and Major-General Ross had two horses shot under him. The events of that day abated Marshal Soult's confidence, and made him feel how little he could expect to succeed against such troops and such a commander. He no longer thought of dating his report of the operations from Vittoria, and celebrating the Emperor Napoleon's birth-day in that city; and he sent back his guns, his wounded, and great part of his baggage, to S. Jean de Pied-de-Port, while they could be sent in safety.

On the 29th both armies remained quiet in their positions, each expecting the result of its combinations. Sir Rowland had been ordered to march upon Lizasso by Lanz, and the Earl of Dalhousie from San Esteban upon the same place; both arrived there on the 28th, and Lord Dalhousie's division came to Marcalain, thus assuring Sir Rowland's communication with the main body. Marshal Soult's manœuvres were now baffled, for the allies were become one army; but he saw one chance for victory still remaining, and he was not a man to let any opportunity escape him. Drouet's corps, before which Sir Rowland had retired, followed his march, and arrived at Ostiz on the 29th. Thus the French force also

became one army. The Marshal thought his position between the Arga and Lanz was by nature so exceedingly strong, and so little liable to attack, that he might without apprehension withdraw from it the bulk of his troops. Occupying, therefore, still the same points, but drawing on to his left the troops which were on the heights opposite the third division, he reinforced Drouet with one division, and during the night of the 29th occupied in strength the crest of the mountain opposite to the 6th and 7th divisions, thus connecting his right in its position with the force which had been detached to attack Sir Rowland, his object being thus to open the Tolosa road, turn the left of the allies, and relieve St. Sebastian's, now that he had failed in the attempt for the relief of Pamplona.

On the morning of the 30th his troops were observed to move in great numbers toward the mountains on the right of the Lanz, with what intent Lord Wellington at once perceived, and determined to attack the French position in front. He ordered Lord Dalhousie to possess himself of the top of the mountain opposite him, and turn their right, and Sir Thomas Picton to cross the heights from which the French division had been withdrawn, and from the Roncesvalles road turn their left, and he made his arrangements for attacking them in front, as soon as the effect of these movements on both flanks should appear. In every point these intentions were effected. Lord Dalhousie with General Inglis's brigade drove them from the mountains: Major-General Pakenham who had the command of the 6th division, Major-General Pack having been wounded, then turned the village of Sorauren, and Major-General Byng's brigade attacked and carried the village of Ostiz. Sir Lowry Cole attacked their front, when their confidence in themselves as well as in their ground had thus been shaken,



the French were then compelled to abandon a position which Lord Wellington declared to be one of the strongest and most difficult of access that he had ever seen occupied by troops.

While these operations were going on, and in proportion as they succeeded, troops were detached to support Sir Rowland. Late in the morning the enemy appeared in his front, and made many vigorous attacks, while Drouet manœuvred upon his left: every attack was repulsed, and the allies maintained their ground, till Drouet, by a more distant movement, ascended the ridge, and came absolutely round their left flank; Sir Rowland then leisurely retired about a mile to a range of heights near Eguarras, and repelled every attempt to dislodge him from that strong ground. Lord Wellington meantime pursued the enemy after he had driven them from their position on the mountain, and at sunset he was at Olaque, immediately in the rear of their attack upon Sir Rowland. Their last hope had failed, and, withdrawing from Sir Rowland's front during the night, they retreated with great ability through the pass of Doña Maria, and left two divisions there in a strong position to cover their rear in the pass. Sir Rowland and Lord Dalhousie were ordered to attack the pass; they moved by parallel roads; and the enemy, closely pressed by the 7th division, were ascending the hill in great haste, when Sir Rowland arrived at the foot of the pass, not in time to cut off any part of their rear. Both divisions ascended the hill, each by its own road; and the French took up a strong position at the top of the pass, with a cloud of skirmishers in front. On the left, which was Sir Rowland's side, the attack was led by Lieutenant-General Stewart with Major-General Walker's brigade; they forced the skirmishers back to the summit of the hill, but coming there upon the main body, found it so nu-

merous and so strongly posted, that they deemed it necessary to withdraw till the 7th division should come into closer co-operation. They had not long to wait for this: General Stewart was wounded, and the command devolved upon Major-General Pringle; he renewed the attack on that side, while Lord Dalhousie pressed the enemy on the other; both divisions gained the height about the same time, and the enemy, after sustaining a very considerable loss, retired; they were pursued for some way down, but a thick fog favoured them, and prevented the allies from profiting further by the advantage they had gained. Lord Wellington meantime moved with Major-General Byng's brigade and Sir Lowry Cole's division through the pass of Velate upon Irurita, thus turning their position on Doña Maria. A large convoy of provisions and stores was taken by Major-General Byng at Elizondo. The pursuit was continued during *August 1.* the following day in the vale of Bidassoa. Byng possessed himself of the valley of Bastan and the position on the Puerto de Maya; and at the close of the day the different divisions were re-established nearly on the same ground which they had occupied when their operations commenced, eight days before. The enemy had now two divisions posted on the Puerto de Echalar, and nearly their whole army behind that pass; and Lord Wellington resolved to dislodge them by a combined attack and movement of the 4th, 7th, and light divisions, which had advanced by the vale of the Bidassoa towards the frontier. The 7th, taking a shorter line across the mountains from Sumbilla, arrived before the 4th. Major-General Barnes's brigade was formed for the attack, advanced before the others could co-operate, and with a regularity and gallantry which, Lord Wellington says, he has seldom seen equalled, drove the two French divisions from the formidable heights which they vainly endeavoured to main-

tain. Major-General Kempt's brigade of the light division likewise drove a very considerable force from the rock which forms the left of the pass; and thus no enemy was left in the field, within this part of the Spanish frontier. During these operations the loss of the allies amounted to 6000 in killed, wounded, and missing; that of the French exceeded 8000. On both sides great ability had been manifested; seldom indeed has the art of war been displayed with such skill, and upon such difficult ground. To guard against the repetition of so formidable an effort on the enemy's part, the positions which the allies occupied were strengthened by redoubts and intrenchments. While the main scene of action lay in the neighbourhood of Pamplona, that portion of the enemy's force which had been left to observe the allies on the great road from Irun, attacked Longa, who occupied that part of the Bidassoa and the town of Vera with his division. He repulsed them with great loss; and it was not the least of the discouraging reflections, which could not but occur to the enemy after the failure of all these well-planned and well-attempted endeavours, that the Spanish troops had now become as efficient as the Portuguese.

During these eventful days the guns had been withdrawn from the batteries before St. Sebastian's, and, with all the stores, embarked at Passages, and the transports had been sent to sea; but a blockade was kept up, and the guard continued to hold the trenches. The vigilant enemy made a sortie on the morning of the 27th, and carried off between 200 and 300 Portuguese and English from the trenches prisoners into the town. Want of foresight on the part of the besiegers allowed them this opportunity, for some of the guns of the left embrasures had, in apprehension of such an attempt, been arranged so as to take the enemy in

*Siege of St.  
Sebastian's  
resumed.*



flank ; and those guns were withdrawn with the others. On the 3rd the French surprised a patrol in the parallel and made them prisoners : but Soult's defeat was known now ; the stores were re-landed at Passages, and Sir Thomas Graham waited only for the *August 6.* arrival of more artillery and ammunition from England to re-commence the siege. The infantry meantime rested on its arms ; and the cavalry, who longed to eat the green maize (which was prohibited), kept their horses in good exercise in looking for straw. The 17th was Buona-parte's birth-day ; three salutes were fired from the Castle of St. Sebastian's on the eve preceding, as many at four in the morning, and again at noon ; and at night the words "*Vive Napoleon le Grand*" were displayed in letters of light upon the castle : . . it was the last of his birth-days that was commemorated by any public celebration. The expected artillery arrived at Passages on the 18th. That little town had never in the days of its prosperity, when it was the port of the Caraccas Company, presented a scene so busy, nor while it lasted so gainful to the inhabitants and peasantry of the surrounding country. The market for the army was held here, which they supplied with necessaries, the produce of the land ; and which at this time wanted nothing wherewith England could supply it, so frequent now and so easy was the intercourse. Here the reinforcements were landed, which, now that the British government had caught the spirit of its victorious general, were no longer limited by parsimonious impolicy. When the horses were to be landed they were lowered from the transports into the sea, and guided by a rope as they swam to shore ; but this sudden transition from the extreme heat of the hold to the cold water proved fatal to several of them.

The garrison of St. Sebastian's employed the time which the blockade afforded them so well, in strength-

ening their defences and adding new ones, that when the allies had to re-commence the siege, the place was stronger than before. The plan now determined on was to lay open the two round towers on each end of the first breach, and connect it with the second breach, which was to the right, add to it another on the left, and demolish a demi-bastion to the left of the whole, by which the approach was flanked. A mortar battery was also erected for the purpose of annoying the castle across the bay. Sailors were employed in this, and never did men more thoroughly enjoy their occupation. They had double allowance of grog, as their work required; and at their own cost they had a fiddler; they who had worked their spell in the battery went to relieve their comrades in the dance, and at every shot which fell upon the castle they gave three cheers. Little effect was produced by this battery, because of its distance. Between it and the town is the island of St. Clara, high and rocky, about half a mile in circumference, which the French occupied; it was deemed expedient to dislodge them and take possession of it, because the season was approaching when ships might be obliged to leave the coast, and this spot facilitated the enemy's communication with their own country. The only landing-place was under a flight of steps, commanded by a small intrenchment on the west point of the island, and exposed to the whole range of works on the west side of the rock and of the walls; the garrison, consisting of an officer and twenty-four men, were thus enabled to make such a resistance, that nineteen of the assailants were killed and wounded. The island however was taken, and the garrison made prisoners.

The actual siege re-commenced on the 24th; and at the following midnight the enemy made a sortie, entered the advanced part of the trenches and carried confusion into the parallel; but when they attempted to sweep

along its right, a part of the guard checked them, and they retired into the town, taking with them about twelve prisoners. The batteries opened on the morning of the 26th. On the night of the 27th another sortie was tried; but experience had made the besiegers more vigilant, and it was repulsed before the slightest mischief could be done. Nothing that skill and ingenuity could devise was omitted by the garrison; they repaired by night as far as possible the injury which had been done in the day; cleared away the rubbish; and at the points at which the batteries were directed, let down large solid beams to break the force of the shot. But in this branch of the art of war, the means of attack are hitherto more efficient than those of defence; and in the course of the 29th the enemy's fire was nearly subdued. They lost many men by our spherical case shot; and they attempted to imitate what they had found so destructive, by filling common shells with small balls, and bursting them over the heads of the besiegers; but these were without effect. On the night of the 29th there was a false attack made with the hope of inducing the enemy to spring the mines, which it was not doubted that they had prepared; they fired most of their guns, but the end was not answered, for no mine was exploded.

Men were now invited to volunteer for the assault, such men, it was said, "as knew how to show other troops the way to mount a breach." When this was communicated to the 4th division, which was to furnish 400 men, the whole division moved forward. The column of attack was formed of the 2nd Brigade of the 5th division, commanded by Major-General Robinson, with an immediate support of 150 volunteers from the light division, 400 from the first, and 200 from the 4th; and with the remainder of the 5th division in reserve, the whole under the direction of Sir

*Preparations for assaulting the town.*



James Leith. Sir James had been severely wounded in the battle of Salamanca, and his constitution still felt the effects of the Walcheren fever; but leaving England as soon as he was sufficiently recovered to discharge his duties, he arrived at S. Sebastian's on the 29th, and resumed the command of his division in the trenches, Major-General Oswald, who had held it during his absence, resigning it and acting as a volunteer. As the breaches now appeared to be practicable, the assault was ordered for eleven o'clock on the forenoon of the 31st, being the time of low water; and to prepare debouches for the troops, three shafts were sunk at the advanced sap on the right, for the purpose of breaking through the sea wall, which was of masonry, four feet thick and ten feet above the high water mark; they were sunk eight feet below the surface, and each loaded with 540 pounds of powder.

*Soult moves for its relief.* Marshal Soult, meantime, as soon as he knew that the siege had been re-commenced, leaving one division in front of the British light division, and another in front of the 7th, moved the rest of his army to the camp at Urogne, with the obvious intention of making an attempt to relieve the place. Under that expectation all the troops of horse artillery were ordered to march, and the artillery not employed in the siege was sent to the front. The eve of the assault was therefore a time of more than usual anxiety; for if either the assault should fail, or Soult should succeed, the situation of the allies would be rendered critical. In the course of the day the wood and rubbish of the right breach took fire, and a mine near it exploded; and in the afternoon five small mines within the town were blown up by the falling of a shell. The evening closed in with a storm of thunder and lightning and heavy rain. Two hours after midnight the three mines

*Assault of S. Sebastian's.*

were sprung, and completely effected the purpose of blowing down the sea wall ; the etonnoirs were immediately connected ; a good passage out for the troops was thus formed, and the farther object was attained of securing all the works in their rear from any galleries which the enemy might have run out in that direction. In the morning there was such a fog, and the smoke in consequence hung so, that nothing could be seen ; but about nine o'clock a gentle sea-breeze began to clear the mist, and the sun soon shone forth. Sir Thomas Graham, having completed the arrangements with Sir James Leith, left him to command the assault, and crossed the Urumea to the batteries of the right attack, from whence all might be distinctly seen, and orders for the fire of the batteries immediately given, according to circumstances. Sir James held it as an article of his military belief that British troops could not fail in any thing which they undertook. He now took the opinion of the chief engineer, Sir Richard Fletcher, as to the spot from whence he could best overlook and direct the desperate service of the day ; the place they fixed on was upon the beach, about thirty yards in advance of the debouche from the trenches ; and there, without any cover or protection whatever, they both took their stand ; for it was a maxim with him that however brave the troops, and however devoted the officers, the example of those in command was, beyond every thing, essential.

About eleven o'clock the advanced parties moved out of the trenches, and the enemy almost immediately exploded two mines, for the purpose of blowing down the wall to the left of the beach, along which the troops were advancing to the breach ; the passage between the wall and the water was narrow, and they expected, by the fragments of masonry which would be thrown down, to obstruct the line of march. This intent failed ; but

about twenty men were crushed by the ruins of the wall. The garrison, as on the former assault, were perfectly prepared ; and from the Mirador battery, and the battery del Principe, on the castle hill, they opened a fire of grape and shells upon the columns. The forlorn hope, consisting of an officer and thirty men, fell to a man ; the front of the columns which followed were cut off, as by one shot ; and the breach, when the assailants reached it, was presently covered with their bodies ; many of those who were ascending it were thrown down by the bodies of those above them, the living, the wounded, and the dead, rolling together down the ruins. From the Mirador and Prince batteries, from the keep of the castle, from the high curtain to the left of the breach, and from some ruined houses in front, about forty yards distant, which were loop-holed and lined with infantry, a concentrated fire was kept up ; a line of intrenchment had been carried along the nearest parallel walls ; this was strongly occupied, and it entirely swept the summit of the breach ; and, in addition to all this, the horn-work flanked and commanded the ascent. The tower of Ameskita, on the left of the breach, was the only available point of defence which had not been manned ; overlooked it could not have been by such engineers as those who conducted the defence : undoubtedly they considered the means which they had provided to be more than sufficient, and that no courage, however desperate, could in the face of them carry a breach which, upon all rules of art, was actually impracticable. That every art of defence which science and experience could devise would be practised was expected ; it was known, also, that the garrison were as little deficient in confidence as in numbers, and that they had stores in abundance ; but if there had been even a suspicion that the ground at the point of attack was what it was now found to be, it is certain



that the assault, under such circumstances, would never have been ordered.

Nothing, in fact, could have been more fallacious than the external appearance of the breach. Up to the end of the curtain it was as accessible, quite to the terre-plein, as it seemed to be; but there the enemy's situation was commanding, and the ascent itself was exposed to the horn-work: but this was the only point where it was passable, and there only by single files. Except on this point, there was a perpendicular fall from fifteen to twenty-five feet in depth, along the back of the whole breach, extensive as it was. Houses had been built against the interior of the wall; these were now in ruins; and there was no way of descending, except here and there by an end wall which remained standing; but the very few who could by this means get into the streets were exposed to an incessant fire from the opposite houses. During the suspension of the siege, every possible preparation had been made by the enemy, with the advantage of knowing the point which would be attacked; so that they had a great number of men covered by intrenchments and traverses in the horn-work, on the ramparts of the curtain, and in the town itself opposite the breach. The most determined courage was displayed by the troops, who were brought forward in succession from the trenches to this place of slaughter. Military duty was never discharged with more entire devotion than it was at this time both by officers and men. No man outlived the attempt to gain the ridge. The slope of the breach afforded shelter from musketry; but the nature of the stone rubbish rendered it impossible for the working parties to form a lodgement there, notwithstanding their utmost exertions, and the troops were exposed to the shells and grape from the batteries of the castle; and on the way to the breach so severe and continuous a

fire was kept up that Sir James Leith was obliged to send directions for removing the dead and the dying from the debouches, which were so choked up as to prevent the passage of the troops.

A plunging shot struck the ground near the spot where Sir James was standing, rebounded, struck *Sir James Leith wounded.* him on the chest, and laid him prostrate and senseless. The officers near thought certainly that he was killed ; but he recovered breath, and then recollection, and resisting all entreaties to quit the field, continued to issue his orders. Sir Thomas Graham meantime accepted the offer of a part of Major-General Bradford's Portuguese brigade to ford the river and assist in the assault. The advance of a battalion under Major Snodgrass, and of a detachment under Lieutenant-Colonel M'Bean, was made rapidly and firmly, under a very heavy fire of grape, along the beach and over a creek knee-deep. They got over, but not without great loss, and bore their part in what Sir Thomas Graham began now to think was an all but desperate attempt : and desperate it must have proved, if, upon consulting with Colonel Dickson, who commanded the artillery, he had not ventured to direct that the guns should be turned against the curtain. A heavy fire was immediately directed there, passing only a few feet above the heads of our own troops, and it was kept up with a precision of practice beyond all example. The troops who were employed in the assault were astonished at hearing the roar of cannon from behind them ; they saw the enemy swept from the curtain ; a few of their own men were brought down also by the first discharge : the second made the intent fully intelligible ; its effect upon the enemy was visible, and a great effort was then ordered to gain the high ridge at all hazards.

At this time a shell burst near Sir James Leith, tore

off the flesh of his left hand, and broke the arm in two places; still he continued to give directions, till, fainting from loss of blood, he was carried from the field. Major-General Hay succeeded to the command. Almost immediately afterwards, and nearly on the same spot, Sir Richard Fletcher talking to General Oswald, was killed by a musket-ball, which struck him in the spine of the neck. This was a great loss to his friends and his country: he was of such amiable qualities, as well as of such sterling worth, that no man was ever more respected and loved; and that his professional talents were of the highest order had been shown by the lines of Torres Vedras.

*Sir Richard  
Fletcher  
slain.*

As Sir James Leith was carried through the trenches to the rear, he met the remaining part of his division pressing forward to execute his orders; and the men of the 9th regiment, recognizing their general, promised him not to desist from their exertions until the place should be taken. Just as they arrived at the breach, a quantity of cartridges exploded behind one of the traverses of the curtain; the fire of the artillery had occasioned this; and it caused some confusion among the enemy, who already apprehended that the tide of fortune was turning against them. The narrow pass was now gained and maintained; hats were waved from the *terre-plein* of the curtain; the troops rushed forward and drove the enemy down the steep flight of steps near the great gate leading from the works into the town. The troops on the right of the breach about the same time forced the barricadoes on the top of the narrow line wall, and found their way into the houses that joined it. In many places it was necessary to apply scaling-ladders before the men could get down. At the centre of the main breach there was an excavation below the descent, and a barricado at some feet farther back; here, there-

*The city  
taken.*



fore, any who should have descended would have been inclosed as a mark for the enemy, till the way was cleared for them by a flanking fire from a round tower on the right, which took the French in reverse. The French themselves were inclosed in a barricado between that tower and the right breach, and their dead lay there heaped upon each other. The contest was still maintained from barricadoes in the streets, and by firing from the houses; till between four and five in the afternoon, the enemy were driven from their last defence in the town, except the Convent of S. Teresa, and retired into the castle. By that time the town was on fire in many places; and, to add to the horrors of a place taken by assault, the vindictive enemy fired upon it from their upper defences, and rolled their shells into it.

About three in the afternoon, the day, which had been sultry, became unusually cold; the sky was overcast, and between the blackness of the sky, the rain, and the smoke, it was as dark as a dusky evening; but when darkness would in its natural course have closed the town was in flames. A dreadful night of thunder and rain, and wind succeeded; and it was made far more dreadful by man than by the elements. It is no easy task for officers, after the heat of an assault, to restrain successful troops who are under no moral restraint; and on this day so many officers had perished that the men fancied themselves exempt from all control. They sacked the place, and gave way to such excesses that if the French could have suspected the state of drunkenness to which men so excellently brave in action had reduced themselves, they might very probably have retaken part of the town, if not the whole. The loss of the assailants amounted to nearly 1600 British and 800 Portuguese killed and wounded; 700 of the garrison were made prisoners.

On the morning of the assault the French made a second effort for the relief of S. Sebastian's. Three divisions of Spaniards, under General Freyre, occupied the heights of S. Marcial on the left of the Bidassoa, and the town of Irun, thus covering the road to the besieged fortress. The position was exceedingly strong, the front and the left being covered by the river, and their right resting on the Sierra de Haya. They were supported by the first division of British infantry, under Major-General Howard, and by Lord Aylmer's brigade on the left, and in the rear of Irun; and by Longa's division near the Sierra in rear of their right. Still farther to secure them, Lord Wellington, knowing that during the 29th and 30th the enemy were assembling a large force at Vera, moved two brigades of the 4th division to the left of the Sierra, and occupied the heights on the right of that mountain, between the convent of S. Antonio and Vera; and Lezaca with a Portuguese brigade, to prevent it from being turned in that direction. On the 30th also he moved Major-General Inglis's brigade to the bridge of Lezaca, and gave orders for the troops in the Puertos of Etchalar, Zugarramundi, and Maya, to attack the enemy's weakened post in front of their positions.

*The French defeated in their attempt to relieve it.*

Before daylight on the 31st the enemy crossed the Bidassoa with a very large force, two divisions by a ford in front of the left of the Spaniards, while a third, under protection of batteries which they had thrown up during the night, were constructing a bridge over the river, about three quarters of a mile above the high road. The two divisions immediately attacked the Spaniards along the whole front of their position on the heights of S. Marcial. The attack was made with that confidence which the French had always felt when the Spaniards were opposed to them in regular action; but the bold-

ness with which they commenced it was ill maintained; for the Spaniards waited firmly till the assailants had nearly reached the summit of the steep ascent, then charged them with the bayonet whilst in column, and instantly broke them. As often as the French repeated the attack so often were they driven back, some of them even across the river, where many in their haste lost the direction of the ford and perished. The division which had been pushed across the Bidassoa to protect the construction of the bridge, made a subsequent attempt on the right of the Spaniards, with no better success. But as the course of the river was immediately under the heights on the French side, and a considerable bend in that part of the stream was flanked by their batteries, the Spaniards could not prevent the pontooners from completing their work; and in the afternoon the enemy marched over a considerable body, which, with the divisions who had crossed at the fords, made another desperate attack upon the Spanish position. Lord Wellington, who pronounced the conduct of the Spaniards on this day to have been equal to that of any troops whom he had ever seen engaged, appeared in front of their line at the moment when the French advanced to this last attack. He was received with loud and repeated shouts, and the men, proud of supporting in his sight the character which they felt that they had this day deserved, again beat back the assailants. They showed themselves indeed so capable of defending their post without assistance, that the two British divisions were not brought into action, the nature of the ground being such that they could not be employed on the flanks of the enemy's corps. When the French were at length convinced that all their efforts were in vain, they took advantage of a violent storm and the darkness which came on with it, to retire hastily from this front. Many took to the river in



their fear, to sink or swim if they should miss the fords ; and in this attempt so many were seen to perish, the river being swoln by the storm, that latterly the fugitives crowded to the bridge, and at last pressed upon it in such numbers, that it sunk beneath their weight, and most of those who were passing at the moment were lost.

About the same time that the enemy commenced their operations on this side, a very strong body of their infantry crossed the Bidassoa, in two columns, by the fords below Salon, in front of the position occupied by the 9th Portuguese brigade. Major-General Inglis moved with his brigade to their support, and finding he could not maintain the heights between Lezaca and the river, withdrew to those in front of the convent, protecting there the right of the Spanish army, and at the same time the approach by Oyarzun to S. Sebastian's. Major-General Kempt meantime moved a brigadé of the light division to Lezaca, by which he kept the enemy in check ; and the Earl of Dalhousie was directed likewise to support Major-General Inglis ; but being engaged at the Puerto de Zugarramundi, he could not begin his march till late in the afternoon, nor arrive before the ensuing morning, when the operations were at an end. For the enemy, when they found that Major-General Inglis was in a position from which they could not dislodge him, and knew that they had completely failed at the heights of San Marcial, felt that their situation on the Spanish side of the Bidassoa was becoming every moment more critical, and retired during the night. But the river had then so risen, and was still rising so fast, that the rear of their column was obliged to cross by the bridge at Vera : and to effect this, they attacked the posts of the light division about three in the morning. If a sufficient force could have been spared for guarding this point, a very considerable part of Soult's army might have been taken.

The bridge was not wide enough for more than three or four to pass abreast, and a continual fire was poured upon it from the walls of a neighbouring convent, so that they were believed to have lost not less than a thousand men in passing. The loss of the allies on this day amounted to 400 killed, about 2060 wounded, and 150 missing, nearly 1600 of these being Spaniards. The brunt of the action had fallen upon them; and in this respect it was a day of great importance, because it made the French feel their own growing inferiority, and apprehend that San Marcial would teach the Spaniards the same confidence in themselves which the Portugueze had learned at Busaco. Among the British officers who fell was Captain Douglas of the 51st: he is thus mentioned in a work wherein so many crimes have been recorded, because his brother officers bore this testimony to him, that he was the only man they knew of whom they could truly say there was nothing in him in the slightest degree approaching to a vice. The men of his company carried him off the field, made his grave carefully, and gave him a soldier's burial with all the marks of respect which they could bestow.

The effort on Soult's part had been great, and was deemed so by Lord Wellington, for a Portugueze brigade was withdrawn from the besieging corps during the assault. As soon as the town had been carried, preparations were made for reducing the castle.

*Siege of the  
castle of S.  
Sebastian's.*

The enemy still held the convent of S. Teresa, the garden of which, inclosed as usual in such establishments with a high wall, reached a good way up the hill, toward their upper defences; and from thence they marked any who approached within reach of fire, so that when a man fell, there was no other means of bringing him off than by sending the French prisoners upon this service of humanity. The town presented a dreadful

spectacle both of the work of war and of the wickedness which in war is let loose. It had caught fire during the assault, owing to the quantity of combustibles of all kinds which were scattered about ; the French rolled their shells into it from the castle ; and while it was in flames, the troops were plundering, and the people of the surrounding country flocking to profit by the spoils of their countrymen. The few inhabitants who were to be seen seemed stupified with horror ; they had suffered so much, that they looked with apathy at all around them, and when the crash of a falling house made the captors run, they scarcely moved. Heaps of dead were lying every where, English, Portuguese, and French, one upon another, with such determination had the one side attacked and the other maintained its ground. Very many of the assailants lay dead on the roofs of the houses which adjoined the breach. The bodies were thrown into the mines and other excavations, and there covered over so as to be out of sight, but so hastily and slightly that the air far and near was tainted ; and fires were kindled in the breaches to consume those which could not be otherwise disposed of. The hospital presented a more dreadful scene, . . for it was a scene of human suffering ; friend and enemy had been indiscriminately carried thither, and were there alike neglected ; . . on the third day after the assault many of them had received neither surgical assistance, nor food of any kind ; and it became necessary to remove them on the fifth, when the flames approached the building : much of this neglect would have been unavoidable, even if that humane and conscientious diligence, which can be hoped for from so few, had been found in every individual belonging to the medical department, the number of the wounded being so great ; and little help could be received from the other part of the army, be-



cause it had been engaged in action on the same day.

*Excesses  
committed  
in the city.*

The hideous circumstances of war were indeed at this time to be seen in S. Sebastian's, divested of its pomp : and to a thoughtful mind its actual horrors were less painful than the brutal insensibility with which they were regarded by men whose nature, originally bad, had been worsened by their way of life. Great exertions were made to stop the excesses which at such times are to be expected ; but the utmost exertions can do little among troops who believe themselves privileged by the occasion to break loose from the restraints of military discipline, and who are not more fearless of death than they are, while in health and strength, of judgment. The town was sacked : had it been an enemy's town, it could not have suffered more from its captors. Sentries were placed at all the outlets to make the plunderers lay down their booty, but all that could be secreted about the person was carried off ; and the Spaniards of Passages and other places were ready, as at a fair, to purchase the spoils of their countrymen. A reproach was brought upon the British name. The French seized the opportunity of endeavouring to fix upon their enemies the same odious imputation which they themselves were conscious of having deserved ; they accused the British of setting fire to the town, indiscriminately murdering friend and foe, and pillaging the place under the eyes of their officers, who made no attempt to restrain them. These charges were brought forward by that party in Spain who, without inclining in the slightest degree toward the French, manifested on all occasions their jealousy and their envious dislike of England ; and they added the farther calumny, that the captors had plundered the churches, and, by giving way to excess of every kind, lost the

*September.*

favourable time for following up their success and taking the castle. All was false, except that great excesses had been committed: the difference between the conduct of the British at S. Sebastian's, and that of the French at Porto, Tarragona, and other places, being this, that the crimes which the former perpetrated were checked as soon as they could be by the officers, acknowledged by the generals as evils which they had not been able to prevent, severely condemned by them, and punished: those of the French had been systematic and pre-determined; the men were neither checked nor reproved by their generals; and so far were the generals from receiving any mark of disapprobation from their government, that the acts themselves were ostentatiously proclaimed in bulletins and official reports, in the hope of intimidating the Portuguese and Spaniards, and without any sense of shame.

Preparations were immediately made for reducing the castle, the plan being to erect batteries on the works of the town, and breach the Queen batteries, the Mirador, and the keep. On the 3rd, some discussion concerning a surrender was entered into with General Rey, which he broke off when it was required that the garrison should lay down their arms and become prisoners of war. These terms the general knew he could obtain at the last moment, and possibly he still entertained some hope of holding out till another effort could be made for his relief; as, even after he had retired into the castle, some artillery and ammunition reached him there from France, it being impossible, upon such a coast, and when the ports were so near, entirely to cut off the communication. The Convent of S. Teresa was taken on the 5th: by this time the flames, which continued still to spread, had driven the troops from their more advanced stations, and made them retire to

*The garrison surrenders.*

the ramparts. By the evening of the 7th, the roofs of such houses and steeples as remained unburnt were prepared for musketry; and on the following morning nearly sixty pieces of ordnance opened on the castle. With great exertions, directed by Captain Smith, of the navy, guns were got up the steep scarp of the islet of S. Clara, and there mounted on a battery, which the sailors manned. The wall of the Mirador was so hard, that the balls at first split upon striking it; nevertheless, it was peeled by the continual fire, and was beginning to come down, when the white flag was hung out. All the enemy's batteries were at that time utterly demolished, those on the sea line alone excepted; the guns dismounted, the carriages knocked to pieces, and the castle in ruins. There were no barracks, nor any covering for the troops except holes, which had been excavated in every nook and corner, to serve for them as splinter-proofs; and of these many were filled with water, much rain having fallen during the preceding week: but for the prisoners, who were in the hands of the garrison, there was no shelter, and many of them were killed by the fire of their friends. The French general might have obtained credit for an act of generous humanity, and of policy as well, if he had released these prisoners, sending a trumpet with them to declare his reasons for so doing, and to express his reliance upon British honour that an exchange should be allowed for them; for this no doubt would have been agreed to, though the advantage was so manifestly to the enemy.

General Rey, on displaying the white flag, said he would send officers to confer on the terms of surrender. Sir Thomas Graham replied, no others would be offered than what had already been stated; the garrison must lay down their arms, and be made prisoners of war. During the whole siege they had lost about 2400 men,



and they had now eaten all their horses. Yielding of necessity now, they were especially anxious that they should be under British protection, be embarked at Passages as the nearest port, and conveyed directly to England; and this was promised. One article requested that the *Commissaire de Guerre*, having with him the widow and the two daughters of his brother, who had died at Pamplona, might be allowed to return with them to France, he being their chief support. General Rey was indignant that an article about women should appear in the capitulation of such a garrison, and after such a defence; and this he expressed coarsely, as if a soldier disparaged his character by showing any consideration for humanity!

On the 10th, the Portugueze were formed in the streets of the ruined city; the British on the ramparts. Sept. 10.  
The day was fine, after a night of heavy rain. About noon the garrison marched out at the Mirador gate. The bands of two or three Portugueze regiments played occasionally; but altogether it was a dismal scene, amid ruins and vestiges of fire and slaughter: a few inhabitants were present, and only a few. Many of the French soldiers wept bitterly, there was a marked sadness in the countenances of all, and they laid down their arms in silence. Colonel S. Ouary, the commandant of the place, had been uniformly attentive to the officers who had been prisoners. When this kindness was now acknowledged, he said that he had been twice a prisoner in England; that he had been fifty years in the service, and on the 15th of the passing month he should have received his dismissal: he was now sixty-six, he said, an old man, and should never serve again; and if he might be permitted to retire into France, instead of being sent to England, he should be the happiest of men. Sir Thomas Graham wrote to Lord

Wellington in favour of the kind-hearted old man, and it may be believed that the application was not made in vain. Captain Sougeon was recognized at this time, who, on the day of the first assault, had descended the breach to assist our wounded: "There," said he, pointing to his men, "are the remains of the brave 22nd; we were 250 the other day, now not more than 50 are left." Lord Wellington, upon being informed of his conduct, sent him to France. Eighty officers and 1756 men were all the remains of the garrison, and of these 25 officers and 512 men were in the hospital.

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## CHAPTER XLV.

OPERATIONS OF THE ANGLO-SICILIAN ARMY. THE ALLIES ENTER FRANCE.  
PASSAGE OF THE BIDASSOA, THE NIVELLE, AND THE NIVE. TREATY  
BETWEEN BUONAPARTE AND FERDINAND, AND CONSEQUENT PRO-  
CEEDINGS OF THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT.

DURING the siege of S. Sebastian's, some few hundred men, the remains of Romana's army, who had not been able to effect their escape from the North, when their magnanimous general and their comrades went to take part in their country's struggle, and most of them to perish in it, returned to Spain. The resistance to Buonaparte's tyranny, which the Spaniards and Portuguese had begun, had prepared the way for the deliverance of the continent, and thus eventually restored them to their native land.

*The re-  
mains of  
Romana's  
army return  
from the  
North.*

The Anglo-Sicilian army had no sooner returned to Alicante from its ill-conducted expedition against Tarragona, than every exertion was used for enabling it to take the field, and profit by the retreat of the enemy from Valencia. Lord

*Lord W.  
Bentinck  
invests Tar-  
ragona.*

William Bentinck entered that capital on the 9th of July, and leaving General Eliot to observe Murviedro, proceeded with his own troops, and such of the Spaniards as he could find means of providing with subsistence, for in this essential point there was the greatest difficulty. Having arrived at Vinaroz, he detached a corps under Lieutenant-General Sir William Clinton by sea to Tarragona, in the hope of preventing the enemy from dismantling that fortress, if such should be their intention. When the fleet arrived off Tarragona, a French force

*August.*



was discovered in its vicinity ; but there were no indications of any such purpose. The detachment, therefore, landed at the Col de Balaguer ; and there, Lord William, having crossed the Ebro at Amposta on flying bridges, joined him with the advance of the army, some cavalry, and artillery ; the whole then moved forward to the village of Cambrils, and on the first of August they invested Tarragona : that operation was well performed, and cover was obtained three hundred yards nearer than the most advanced point which had been occupied during the previous attack. Preparations were now observable in the place for its destruction ; but it was evident that the

*Col. Jones's  
account,  
V. 2. 201.*

garrison could not effect this in the presence of the allied army, unless Marshal Suchet came in force to cover the operation. That general was at Barcelona ; his troops were at Villafranca and at Villanova de Sitges, being thus divided to lessen the difficulty of subsisting them ; and his advance was at Arbos and at Vendrell : sometimes he seemed to be menacing a movement against the allies, and sometimes preparing for a farther retreat. Lord William, with such an enemy in such force so near, would not expose himself to a failure like that of Sir John Murray ; and he deferred beginning the siege and landing his heavy artillery, till the Duque del Parque's army should come up, and Sarsfield with his Catalan troops. The Duque joined on the third ; the Catalans were actively employed upon the right flank of Suchet's divisions, cutting off his supplies ; and on the 7th they surprised a battalion who were guarding the mills at S. Sadurni, and occasioned them a loss of 200 men. Sarsfield joined on the 11th. But as the appearance of the allies before Tarragona prevented the garrison from demolishing the works, so on the other hand it gave Marshal Suchet time for bringing together as large a force as he thought

the occasion required. The British general, like Generals Maitland and Murray before him, felt all the difficulties of his situation; he was conscious that his ill-composed army was far from being efficient in proportion to its numerical strength; he had no means of feeding the Spanish part of that army if the enemy should manœuvre upon his flank, so as to cut off the supplies which they obtained from the country; he had found it impracticable to throw a bridge over the Ebro; and should he be compelled in his present situation to retreat, the ships could not take off more than a third of his forces. But while the prudence of remaining in that situation became a serious question, preparations for breaking ground were carried on.

Suchet meantime acting as if he were opposed to a much greater force, had waited till Generals Decaen, Maurice Mathieu, and Maximien La-  
*Suchet raises the siege.*  
marque could join him with 8000 men belonging to the army of Catalonia; with this accession his numbers were estimated at from 27,000 to 30,000. They effected their junction at Villafranca on the 14th. The first attempt was by the coast road; but Admiral Hallowell effectually checked this movement, by stationing his troops as close as possible to the low sandy shore in front of the Torre del Barra. On the ensuing morning Lord William was informed that a large body of the French were advancing through the inland country by the Col de Santa Christina; and in the evening a sharp skirmish took place between the advance of hussars and the cavalry under Colonel Lord Frederick Bentinck, which he sent forward to observe their motions: in this the Brunswick hussars distinguished themselves, repulsing the enemy and making several prisoners. Suchet advanced rapidly beyond the Gaya that day, while Decaen advanced upon Valls and the Francoli. Lord William

did not deem it prudent to risk a general action before Tarragona ; at nightfall, therefore, he commenced his retreat, and when day broke the whole army was out of sight of the city ; the British, Germans, and Sicilians, covering the road towards Tortosa, took up a position near Cambrils. Sarsfield occupied Reus ; and the Duque del Parque was directed to proceed to the Col de Balaguer, where, if Suchet should push the retreating army so as to make a general action necessary, it was intended to await his attack. But the French commander had no such

*The French  
abandon  
Tarragona.*

purpose ; his present object was to bring off the garrison from Tarragona, and to demolish its fortifications, so that they might afford no support to the allies. On the night of the 18th the works were blown up ; and Marshal Suchet then withdrew for ever from a place where, by the premeditated atrocities which were committed at its capture, he has fixed upon his memory an indelible stain. The demolition was effectual : the artillery consisted of about 200 pieces of brass ordnance and 46 iron mortars ; 50 of the former were left uninjured ; and he did not tarry long enough to destroy the quantity of warlike stores which he had not the means of removing. Sarsfield on the following day took possession of the city.

*Plans pro-  
posed to  
Suchet by  
Marshal  
Soult.*

Suchet soon fell back upon the line of the Llobregat, having drained the plain of Villafranca of its resources. In a country thus exhausted, General Copons declared it was not possible to provide for the whole Spanish force under Lord William's command ; and in consequence of this, and upon erroneous information that part of the French troops had been detached to aid Marshal Soult, the British general, conformably to an arrangement made with Lord Wellington, sent the Duque del Parque, with the 4th Spanish army, to Zaragoza ; and he reinforced the corps, then employed



under Elio, in the blockade of Tortosa. Early in September he concentrated the greater part of his remaining force at Villafranca. At this time Marshal Soult had proposed to Suchet that he should cross the Pyrenees with the whole disposable force of the armies of Aragon and Catalonia, and unite with him at Tarbes and at Pau, for the purpose of re-entering Spain together by Oleron and Jaca, and making another effort for the relief of Pamplona. A different project was offered to his consideration by the minister at war, . . . that he should as much as possible occupy the enemy upon the Ebro : in either case a reinforcement of conscripts was to be counted on. The difficulties in the way of the first plan were soon perceived by Soult himself to be insurmountable ; and Suchet represented the danger of drawing after him the Anglo-Sicilian army into the southern departments of France, which were defenceless. But as a practicable though a perilous operation, he offered to advance between the Ebro and the Pyrenees, with 70 pieces of field and 30 of mountain artillery, to meet Soult, who might debouche from Jaca with his infantry and cavalry, but without cannon. But for this two things were necessary, . . . that he should have conscripts to place in the garrisons, and that before he marched from Catalonia he should defeat the Anglo-Sicilians.

Lord William's numbers were not equal to those which could be brought against him, the want both of provisions and means of transport having obliged him to leave Whittingham's division at Reus and Valls ; but he had no suspicion that Suchet would advance against him. His army was posted at Villafranca and in the villages in its front, as far as the mountains on the Llobregat ; the advance, under Colonel Adams, consisting of the 27th British regiment, one Calabrian and three Spanish battalions, with four mountain guns, occupied the pass

of Ordal, on the main road, about ten miles in their front, and the same distance from the enemy's posts on the Llobregat. The pass was so strong that Lord William was without any apprehension of its being forced, especially as he thought the probable point of attack would be by turning his left at Martorell and San Sadurni, where Copons was posted. Nor, indeed, was it likely Suchet would have confined himself to the front attack of a position which was strong there, but open on both flanks, unless, because such an attack was improbable, he thought the enemy might be taken there by surprise, before they had strengthened the post.

Accordingly, having concerted his plans with General Decaen, he collected the divisions of Harispe and Habert, with his cavalry at the bridge of Molins del Rey, and at eight o'clock on the night of the 12th moved for the pass. The allies were reposing in position, when about midnight their piquets were rapidly driven in, and they were presently attacked in force. An old work which commanded the main road was well defended by the Calabrians, till they were driven from it by the repeated attacks of superior numbers; they rallied then about sixty paces in rear of it, behind some old ruins, and there, in conjunction with the Spaniards, who were close on their left, stood their ground some time longer. But in a night attack the assailants, acting upon ground with which they were well acquainted, and on a concerted plan, had greatly the advantage over a very inferior force who were taken by surprise. Colonel Adams and the two officers next in succession to him were badly wounded, and obliged to quit the field; owing to the changes this occasioned, the regular directions were interrupted, and the ground in consequence was disputed much longer than it ought to have been against a force so greatly

superior, both British and Spaniards maintaining it so resolutely that the right and the centre were nearly destroyed in their position. The Calabrian corps on the left fell back along the hills, and endeavoured to reach San Sadurni, which Manso occupied with his brigade. Their hope was to rejoin the army by the road leading from thence to Villafranca; but after crossing the river Noya, in front of San Sadurni, they were attacked by a considerable column, and forced back toward the Barcelona road: they succeeded, however, in making their way to Sitges, and there effected their embarkation on the following night. The guns were taken by the enemy, but most of the fugitives joined Manso.

As soon as the attack was known at head-quarters, Lord William put the army in motion to sustain his advance; but before any reinforcements *The Anglo-Sicilians retreat.* could reach the spot, the French had carried every point, and it remained for him then either to retreat without loss of time, or give battle to an enemy superior in numbers and flushed with success, upon ground which afforded no advantage of position. He determined therefore upon retiring; Major-General Mackenzie, with the 2d division, covered the retreat during the most difficult part of its execution, to the village of Monjoz; Sarsfield moved to the left of Villafranca, by the hilly and woody country on that side; and the British, Germans, and Sicilians, took the main road by the villages of Monjoz and Arbos. Marshal Suchet expected that Decaen would arrive before Villafranca in time to co-operate with him, and force the allies to an action; but that general had to cross the Llobregat and the Noya, and was delayed also in the defiles by Manso, and by the Calabrese, with whom he fell in when they were making for San Sadurni. His own cuirassiers and dragoons, under General Meyer, pressed with very superior



numbers, near Monjoz, upon the cavalry under Lord Frederic Bentinck, who covered the retreat, and some sabre strokes were exchanged between the two leaders. At length a most timely and vigorous charge was made simultaneously by Lord Frederic with the 20th dragoons, under Lieutenant-Colonel Hawker, and the Sicilians, and by Lieutenant-Colonel Schrader with the German hussars, by which the enemy were driven back, and so completely checked, that they made no farther attempt upon the retreating army; so it reached Vendrells that evening, without any loss. During the night it retired to Altafulla, and on the evening following took up its ground in front of Tarragona, as the nearest protecting situation; the Spaniards, under Sarsfield, moving upon Reus. The ruins of Tarragona could have afforded little support if the allies had not been better protected by their own strength, and by the opinion which Suchet had learned to entertain of them. He advanced no farther than Villafraanca in pursuit; and after exacting a contribution from the distressed inhabitants, returned to Barcelona.

At this time the uneasy state of affairs in Sicily, and the ill success of political changes there, as premature as they were well intended, rendered it necessary for Lord William Bentinck to repair thither, and the command of the army devolved upon Lieutenant-General Sir William Clinton. That general was left with an inadequate force, and under discouraging circumstances, to attend to objects which were of no inconsiderable importance to the common cause. He had to provide against the likelihood of Suchet's availing himself of his late success to relieve or to withdraw his garrisons in Valencia or on the Ebro; and he had to occupy the attention of that able commander so as to prevent him from sending any considerable detachment to take part in Soult's operations

*The command devolves upon Sir William Clinton.*

against Lord Wellington. It was found impracticable to construct a bridge upon the Ebro as low down as Amposta; and if it had not been so, he could not have spared troops enough from other more important services, to protect it against the sallies of the strong garrison in Tortosa. The best course therefore which he could pursue seemed to be that of repairing the defences of Tarragona, as far as time and means permitted, so as to render it a point of support. Well was it for the Anglo-Sicilian army that, notwithstanding the credit it had lost by Sir John Murray's precipitate retreat, and the recent loss which it had sustained at Ordal, it had yet impressed Marshal Suchet with a most respectable opinion of its ability in the field; skilful as he was, nothing but that opinion withheld him from acting vigorously against it when he had it so greatly at advantage. His disposable force at this time was not short of 25,000 men, with a large body of cavalry; better troops he could not desire; and their supplies were protected by the possession of several important fortresses, all which were garrisoned well. The Anglo-Sicilian army amounted barely to 12,000 effective men, including a small body of cavalry; about half of these were British and Germans, the remainder Italians and Sicilians in British pay, on whom, though they were not ill-disciplined, the same confidence could not be placed in the presence of an enemy. There were about 11,000 Spanish troops whose services General Clinton might have commanded, if there had been means for rendering them available, but they were in a state almost of destitution; without pay, ill-clothed, and worse fed; and he had no control (as his predecessors had had) over the first Spanish army, which army also was prevented by its wants from taking the field, except occasionally, and then from keeping it, except for a very short time. With the commander of that army, General

Copons, and with the other leaders, the best understanding prevailed; nor indeed were there among all the Spaniards better men or more distinguished officers than some of them, . . the names of Manso and Eroles will be held in honour as long as the Catalans retain any of that national spirit by which they are so honourably distinguished. They might be expected to check any movement of the enemy on the side of Lerida, or towards Tarragona; and to interrupt their communication with France along the inland road, by which their supplies were principally brought; but direct co-operation was not to be looked for where there was no unity of command, and . . on the one part . . all but a total want of means. Even the troops in British pay suffered great privations, their communication with the depôts at Malta and Gibraltar being interrupted because of the plague. But the tide of the enemy's fortunes had now turned; and all difficulties were met cheerfully by the allies, in the sure hope that their perseverance would soon be crowned with success. As soon as arrangements were made for restoring the works at Tarragona, and for supplying as far as possible the Spaniards who were attached to the Anglo-Sicilian army, head-quarters were established at Villafranca; the troops which had been cantoned at Reus, Valls, and other places in the environs of Tarragona, were ordered to occupy an advanced line of cantonments: a force, consisting of cavalry, with some field artillery, and Sarsfield's Spanish division of about 5000 infantry, were stationed at Villafranca; the enemy's movements on the Llobregat were narrowly observed; and the remainder of the allied troops (with the exception of those who carried on the works at Tarragona) were so distributed, that, upon any emergency, they could be assembled at Villafranca in four-and-twenty hours.



Meantime, on the opposite side of the peninsula, an interval of seeming inactivity had followed the capture of S. Sebastian's; but the time, though marked by no military movements, was busily employed in preparing for them, by closing up the troops, replacing the ammunition, and re-organizing those divisions which had suffered most. The opposing armies were in sight of each other. There was something mournful as well as impressive to a thoughtful mind in the contrast between the stupendous scenery of the Pyrenees and the diminutive appearance of field works, and large armies upon such a theatre: "the little huts, and the less beings who inhabited them," might have been overlooked as mere specks in the prospect, had it not been for the more mournful knowledge that these tens of thousands were collected there for life or for death; one party having been sent thither by the wicked will of an individual drunk with ambition, and the other brought there by the duty and necessity of resisting his lust of power. The troops who covered the blockade of Pamplona suffered severely from wet and cold, and were unavoidably subject to privations from which their more fortunate comrades near the coast were exempt. When the clouds opened they could see the fertile country of the enemy beneath them, in sunshine. During the weeks of hard, irksome duty, passed thus in a situation where exertion and enterprise were not required, but in their stead continual vigilance and patience, desertions became frequent; they were most numerous, as might be expected, among the Spaniards, because they were in their own country; and least, in a remarkable degree, among\* the Portuguese.

*Position of  
the armies  
on the Py-  
renean  
frontier.*

It was now no longer in Buonaparte's power to allot

\* The weekly average of desertions I find thus curiously stated: 25 Spaniards, 15 Irish, 12 English, 6 Scotch, and half a Portuguese.

conscripts by the hundred thousand for the consumption of his war in the Peninsula. A levy of 30,000 was all that could be ordered to reinforce Soult's army; "the armies of Spain, it was admitted, having been compelled to yield before superior numbers, and the advantages which the enemy drew from their maritime communications, needed reinforcement; for England, while in the north of Europe it lavished its intrigues and its promises, was not less lavish in the south of its resources and sacrifices. The proposed levy, however, raised in the departments adjacent to the Pyrenees, would suffice to stop the successes upon which the enemy were congratulating themselves too soon; it would suffice for resuming the attitude which became France, and for preparing, the moment when England should no longer dispose of the treasures of Mexico, for the devastation of both the Spains!" This was the language of M. Regnaud de St. Jean d'Angely in an official speech; and the senator, M. le Comte de Beurnonville, making a report in the name of a special commission, spake in the same strain, . . a strain that becomes doubly curious when compared with the events which were so soon to follow. "England," said he, "who intrigues much and hazards little, has not dared to compromise her land forces by sending them to combat in the north of Germany, and uniting them with the Russian and Prussian phalanxes; she feared reverses which she could not but foresee, and which for her would be irreparable. In this thorny conjuncture, and that it might have the air of doing something for the powers whom it had set to play, the cabinet of London had preferred mingling the English troops with the Spanish and Portuguese *bands*, being sure that it could withdraw them without inconvenience, according to its interest. Hence that sudden augmentation of its

*Levy ordered in France for Soult's army.*

*Speech of M. Regnaud.*

force, which had determined our armies to a retrograde movement; and these *bands*, encouraged by some ephemeral successes, have carried their audacity so far as to invest the places of S. Sebastian's and Pamplona." . . Buonaparte's ministers never thought proper to inform the senate that these *bands* soon carried their audacity a little farther, and took them both. "The proposed levy," it was added, "would enable the French armies of the Peninsula to resume their ancient attitude."

The orator, and the special commission for whom he spake, were mistaken: it was England who resumed her ancient attitude, . . who re-asserted and resumed her military superiority upon that ground where her Plantagenets had displayed it. Her victorious armies were at this time preparing to plant their banners in France, leading thus the way to the general invasion of what the French in the pride of their military strength had called the sacred territory. As soon, indeed, as the enemy had been driven beyond the Pyrenees, the army had looked forward to this with all the pride of the military spirit, and of excited national feeling: the Spaniards and Portugeze talked of retribution and revenge; and among the British, the question was discussed whether or not they were to be freebooters. That question was answered by Lord Wellington in the general order which he issued as soon as the troops encamped among the Pyrenees. "The commander of the forces," said he, "is anxious to draw the attention of the officers of the army to the difference of the situation in which they have been hitherto, among the people of Portugal and Spain, and that in which they may hereafter find themselves, among those of the frontiers of France." After observing that every military endeavour must thenceforth be used for obtaining intelligence, and preventing surprise, he pro-

*October.*

*Lord Wellington's  
orders upon  
entering  
France.*



ceeded to say that, notwithstanding the utmost precautions were absolutely necessary, as the country in front of the army was the enemy's, he was particularly desirous that the inhabitants should be well treated, and private property respected, as it had been till that time. The officers and soldiers of the army, said he, must recollect, that their nations are at war with France solely because the Ruler of the French nation will not allow them to be at peace, and is desirous of forcing them to submit to his yoke; and they must not forget that the worst of the evils suffered by the enemy in his profligate invasion of Spain and Portugal have been occasioned by the irregularities of the soldiers and their cruelties, authorized and encouraged by their chiefs, towards the unfortunate and peaceful inhabitants of the country. To revenge this conduct on the peaceable inhabitants of France would be unmanly and unworthy of the nations to whom the commander of the forces now addresses himself; and at all events would be the occasion of similar and worse evils to the army at large, than those which the enemy's army have suffered in the Peninsula, and would eventually prove highly injurious to the public interest.

*General orders, July 9, 1813.*

Though it was not possible to act on the offensive upon a great scale, till Pamplona should have surrendered, Lord Wellington determined with the left wing of his army to cross the Bidassoa, and dislodge the enemy from some strong ground which they occupied on the right of that river as an advanced position; the key to it being the high steep mountain called La Rhune, which fronts the passes of Vera and Etchalar. Mount La Rhune is a remarkable spot; and its possession had been obstinately contested in the campaign of 1794, because its summit served as a watch-tower from whence the whole country between Bayonne and the

*Passage of the Bidassoa.*

Pyrenees might be observed. The mountain itself is within the French territory, but there is a chapel, or, in Romish language, a hermitage, on its summit, which used to be supported at the joint expense of the villages of Vera in Spain, and of Sarré, Ascaïn, and Urogne, in France ; people of different nations, and hostile feelings, being there drawn together by the bond of their common faith. . . The right of the army being at Roncesvalles and Maya, could at any time descend from its commanding situation into France.

The Bidassoa, a river not otherwise remarkable than as forming the boundary of two great kingdoms, *The Bi-* rises on Mount Belat, flows down the valley of *dassoa.*

Bastan, and, spreading into a broad stream after it has passed Irun, enters the Bay of Biscay between the Point of Figueras (a rocky promontory in which Mount Jaysquibel terminates) and the heights on the French side. Mount Jaysquibel, which extends along the coast from Passages to this point (its highest elevation being about 1700 feet), is separated from the chain of the Pyrenees by a broad valley, along which the Vittoria road passes ; at its foot stands the old and melancholy town of Fontarabia, . . a name which Milton has made familiar to English ears ; the river rising sixteen feet there, and forming a tide harbour, washes the ruins of its walls, which were blown up in the war of 1794 ; but when the tide is out there is a considerable extent of sand on both sides of the stream. The little town of Andaye, famed for its brandy, is on the French shore opposite. The bridge, which the enemy had destroyed in their retreat, is about a mile from Irun, and a little below it is the Isle of Pheasants, better known by its later name from the Conference held there in 1660, which brought in its consequences so many evils, not upon Spain alone, but upon the greater part of Europe. Between this island and the

mouth of the river three fords had been discovered : Spanish fishermen had been employed in this service, and they performed it so well, as if pursuing the while their ordinary occupation, that the French sentries on the opposite bank never suspected their intent.

A stronger position as to all natural advantages can hardly be imagined than that which the allies were to attack, after they should have crossed the Bidassoa ; the French had strengthened it by redoubts, by *abattis*, and intrenchments at every knoll ; the paths were hardly practicable ; it was laborious work even for an unarmed man to reach points which were now to be assailed in the face of an enemy perfectly prepared. But it was necessary to advance from a country where the nature of the ground rendered it difficult to support the troops ; and where supplies for many of the corps were carried to the mountain encampments on the heads of men and women, long strings of whom were to be seen toiling up the steep and slippery ascents. Preparations for the attack were made on the 6th, and the troops were under arms and in motion soon after midnight. The tents were left standing, that the enemy might discover no signs when dawn appeared of the intended movement. It was a stormy night, with thunder and lightning, and some rain, . . the rain not enough in any way to impede or increase the difficulties of the attempt, and the storm in other respects favouring it ; for it moved in the same direction as the troops, and prevented the enemy from hearing the noise of the artillery and pontoon train. The storm was succeeded by an extraordinary sultry heat, what little wind there was feeling like the breath of an oven. The 1st and 5th divisions, with Wilson's Portuguese brigade, were to cross the river in three columns below, and one above, the bridge, and carry the French intrenchments about and above Andaye ; and General Freyre,

*Attack of  
the French  
position.*



with the Spaniards, was to cross in three columns at the higher ford, and turn the enemy's left by carrying their intrenchments on the Montagne Verte, and on the heights of Mandale. The troops arrived at their appointed stations without having been noticed; and every thing thus far had been so fortunately performed, that the enemy did not begin to fire till the heads of the columns were nearly half over, when a rocket was discharged from the steeple at Fontarabia, as the signal for the simultaneous advance of the troops above.

Every thing succeeded perfectly. The 5th division was the first that set foot on the French soil; they advanced under a brisk fire from the enemy's piquets, against the line which was hastily forming on the nearest range of hills. The first came presently up, and the enemy were driven from the works. Freyre was equally successful on his side; the Spaniards rushed down the mountain, forded the river, and carried the Montagne Verte. The affair began at eight, and at nine it was seen that the huts of the mountain post had been set on fire and abandoned. Meantime Baron Alten, with the light division, and with Longa's, attacked and forced the intrenchments on the Puerto de Vera; and Giron, still farther on the right, attacked their position on Mount La Rhune. The light division drove them from redoubts, and intrenchments, and abattis, such, in the words of a distinguished officer then present, "as men ought to have defended for ever;" and the Spaniards, in like manner, carried every thing before them, till they reached the foot of the rock on which the hermitage stands, which on that side presents a craggy cliff, though on the other it is accessible by a gentle slope. Even that post the Spaniards made several attempts to carry by storm, which failed only because it was impossible to ascend there; the enemy, therefore, remained in possession of

the hermitage that night, and of a rock on the same range of mountains with the right of the Spanish troops.

*Batty's  
Campaign  
in the  
Western  
Pyrenees,  
p. 28.*

In all other parts the firing had ceased early in the afternoon, here it was kept up till late at night; and the conical outline of the mountain was seen far and wide by the light of this awful illumination. Some time elapsed on the following morning before the fog cleared away sufficiently for Lord Wellington to reconnoitre Mount La Rhune, the prominent mountain there, towering above its neighbours; he perceived that it was least difficult of access on its right, and that the attack might advantageously be connected with that on the enemy's works in front of the camp of Sarré. Accordingly, he ordered the army of reserve to concentrate to their right: Giron at the same time attacked the post on the rock, and won it most gallantly; his troops followed up their success, and carried an intrenchment upon a hill which protected the right of the camp: the enemy immediately evacuated all their works in order to defend the approaches to their camp, and these posts were occupied by detachments which Lord Dalhousie sent from the 7th division through the Puerto de Etchalar for this purpose. Giron then established a battalion on the enemy's left upon Mount La Rhune. Night, opportunely for the enemy, prevented farther operations; they retired under cover of the darkness both from the hermitage and the camp, and the allied armies pitched their tents in France. The British loss in these two days was 579 killed, wounded, and missing; that of the Portugueze 233; that of the Spaniards 750. Sir Thomas Graham, having thus established within the French territory the troops who had so often been distinguished under his direction, resigned the command to Lieutenant-General Sir John Hope, who had arrived from Ireland the preceding day, and departed himself to

take a command in the Low Countries. As soon as the left of the allied army had made this important movement, the enemy moved General Paris's division from Oleron to the neighbourhood of St. Jean de Pied-de-Port, and on the night of the 12th they surprised and carried a redoubt in front of the camp of Sarré, taking prisoners a piquet of forty Spaniards, and one hundred pioneers. The redoubt was farther from the line, and from the ground from whence it could be supported, than Lord Wellington had supposed when he gave orders for occupying it; he left it, therefore, now in their possession. On the following morning they made an attack upon the advanced posts of the Andalusian army, hoping to regain the works which they had constructed in front of the camp; but they were repulsed with little difficulty.

The country which was now occupied by the contending armies had been well disputed in the years 1793 and 1794, during the heat of the French revolution, and men whose names afterwards became conspicuous served at that time in both armies: Mendizabal and the high-minded Romana among the Spaniards; among the French, Latour d'Auvergne; Moncey, one of the few French Marshals who brought no reproach upon himself by rapacity or cruelty; and Laborde, who will be remembered in Portugal for both, and for having been the first French General whom Lord Wellington defeated. In that war the Spaniards fought with the manifold disadvantage of having a wretched administration, an ill-disciplined and worse provided army, and a revolutionary spirit showing itself in some of their own countrymen; yet they made a longer and sturdier resistance in the Pyrenees than the French displayed when it was now their turn to defend the passes and protect their own country from invasion. But, honourable as it was for the armies of England, Portugal, and Spain thus to have



driven the enemy from Lisbon and Cadiz to the Pyrenees, and pursued him into his own territories, the spirit in which that invasion was undertaken was not less honourable to the allied nations than the success of their arms. The French, indeed, as soon as they apprehended that their own country must soon become the seat of war, spoke with horror of what might be expected from the Portuguese and Spaniards, remembering then with uneasiness, if not with shame and remorse, the atrocities which they themselves had committed. Their hope was that the peasantry would rise, and carry on that kind of war which within the Peninsula had been found so destructive to the invaders; and no endeavour was omitted for exciting them to such a course. But a circumstance had happened to check this spirit upon its first manifestation, a few days before the passage of the

*Conduct of  
the French  
peasantry.*

Bidassoa. The Portuguese, when they surprised and took a French piquet on the side of Roncesvalles, were fired at by the peasantry: they took fourteen of them, and these men were immediately marched to Passages, there to be embarked for England as prisoners of war. This treatment had the effect of intimidating the people, while it awakened no spirit of vengeance, because it was perceived to be nothing more than what was strictly just. That spirit might have been roused if Lord Wellington had not by timely severity effectually checked the license which the troops were but too ready to have taken, and from which it had not been possible to protect the Spaniards in the Pyrenean valleys. The French peasantry did not forsake their houses when the allies crossed the Bidassoa. The inhabitants of the large village of Urogne did not leave it till the battle approached, and then they collected in an adjoining field; but they dispersed as soon as flames broke out among their dwellings; for the troops who

entered it began to plunder . . they set several houses on fire, and drank to such excess that, had the enemy been on the alert, he might easily have captured or destroyed them. Some of the officers were more culpable than the troops, for they used no exertions to prevent the outrages which they saw. Lord Wellington, as soon as he was informed of this misconduct, republished his former orders, and accompanied them with a severe reprimand, declaring his determination not to command officers who would not obey his orders, and of sending some of them, who had been thus grossly unmindful of their duty, to England, that their names might be brought under the notice of the Prince Regent.

It was now seen how much the moral conduct and character of an army depends upon its general. Lord Melville once made the monstrous assertion in Parliament that the worst men were the fittest for soldiers. His strong understanding should have taught him better, if his heart had failed to do so; and he was properly rebuked for it by the Duke of Gloucester, who observed, that the men who had the strictest sense of their personal duties were those who served their country with most patience and most fidelity in war. But Mr. Wyndham's hope of recruiting our armies with men of a better description than those who used to be forced or inveigled into it, or driven by desperation to enlist, had not been realized, and the want of moral and religious training was still left to be supplied by military discipline . . as far as that could supply it. Lord Wellington enforced that means; and it is not the least of his many and eminent merits, that he made such means effectual, without bringing upon himself any reproach for undue severity. After the excesses at Uroge, not an inhabitant was to be seen in the French territory; they had withdrawn more because of these outrages, than in obedience to the

injunctions of their own government. But a proclamation was issued in French and Basque, assuring them that their persons and property should be respected. Some necessary examples of justice upon those who ventured to violate orders so emphatically repeated, convinced the inhabitants that they might trust to the word of the British general; and, after those examples had been made, never, perhaps, since the days of the great Gustavus, was such excellent discipline observed in an enemy's country. Even the Portuguese and Spaniards, whom it might have been thought almost impossible to restrain from giving way to that desire of vengeance which had been so wantonly, cruelly, and insolently provoked, obeyed the injunction of the great commander who had beaten their invaders out of Portugal and Spain, and demeaned themselves with such good order and humanity, that the French often said their own armies were the foes whom they dreaded.

Two pontoon bridges, and one bridge of boats, were laid over the Bidassoa immediately after the passage had been effected; and works were thrown up to strengthen the position, in which Lord Wellington now waited for the surrender of Pamplona, that he might advance with his whole strength. That city, the modern capital of Navarre (Olite, now a miserably decayed place, was the ancient one), was the great bulwark against the French on that side. Lord Wellington trusted to a sure blockade for reducing it. Its wells supply it abundantly with water; and it was provided with a corn-mill, the largest in existence of its kind, to be worked by hand or by horses, and setting in motion four or five grindstones of such dimensions that four-and-twenty loads of wheat could be ground by each in a day. When corn began to fail for this well-constructed mill, and there was little prospect of relief after

*Pamplona  
is surren-  
dered.*



the failure of Soult's great effort in the Pyrenees, the governor made a bold attempt to obtain subsistence from the very force which blockaded him: he sent to Don Carlos d'España, requiring him to furnish 7000 rations daily for the inhabitants of the city, whom, he said, he could no longer afford to feed. Don Carlos, who knew that the French general had, with characteristic effrontery, included his troops in this estimate, replied, that, unless the inhabitants were fed as well as the garrison, while any food lasted, he should hold the governor responsible for their treatment, and would strictly inquire into this when the place should be surrendered, as it must. When the stores were nearly exhausted it was reported and believed that the enemy intended, as they had done at Almeida, to blow up the works, and endeavour to effect their escape: the attempt would have been far more hazardous; but it is said to have been prevented by an intimation from Don Carlos, that if the place were thus injured he would put the governor and all the officers to death, and decimate the men. Towards the end of October they proposed to surrender, on condition of being allowed to march into France with six pieces of cannon; their second proposal was, that they should march thither under an engagement of not serving against the allies for a year and a day. Don Carlos replied, that he had orders not to grant them a capitulation on any terms excepting that they should be prisoners of war; and to this they declared they would never submit. Upon these terms, nevertheless, on the last day of October, they surrendered, being 4000 in number; and the Spanish general, setting an example of proper determination on such an occasion, refused to grant these till he had ascertained that none of the inhabitants had perished during the blockade either through ill-treatment or for want.

Marshal Soult, meantime, was receiving a considerable reinforcement of conscripts. Papers in all the languages of the allies were thrown into the outposts, and distributed wherever it was likely they might be found, inviting deserters, and denouncing vengeance if France should be invaded: the whole French nation, it was said, was in arms, and if the English and Spanish and Portuguese should set foot upon their territory, they should meet with nothing but death and destruction. Some expectation the French commander placed upon the hardships to which the troops must be exposed, at that season, in the Pyrenees, upon the weather, and in consequence the increased difficulty of supplying the allied armies. Forage, indeed, had become so scarce that some of the cavalry were reduced to graze their horses, which of course could not long have been kept in condition without better food. The cattle brought for the consumption of the troops through a great part of Spain arrived in a jaded and lean condition, . . . those which lived to reach the place of slaughter, . . . for the roads along which they had been driven might easily be traced by their numerous carcasses, lying half-buried or unburied by the way-side, . . . sad proofs of the wasteful inhumanity of war!

*November.*

The weather had been more stormy than was usual even on that coast and at that season. The transports at Passages were moored stem and stern in rows, and strongly confined by their moorings; yet they were considered in danger even in that land-locked harbour: some were driven forward by the rising of the swell, while others, close alongside, were forced backward by its fall, so that the bowsprits of some were entangled in the mizen-chains of others. The cold on the mountains was so intense that several men perished. A piquet in the neighbourhood of Roncesvalles was

snowed up : the parties who were sent to rescue it drove bullocks before them as some precaution against the danger of falling into chasms, and the men were brought off ; but the guns could not be removed, and were buried under the snow in the ditch of the redoubt. Soult, since his failure in the Pyrenees three months before, had been fortifying a formidable line of works in them. The right rested upon the sea in front of St. Jean de Luz, and on the left of the Nivelle ; the centre on La Petite Rhune, and the heights behind the village of Sarré ; the left, consisting of two divisions of infantry, under General Drouet, was on the right of the river, on a strong height behind the village of Ainhoue, and on the mountain of Mondarin, which protected the approach to that village. Two divisions, under Generals Foy and Paris, were at St. Jean de Pied-de-Port. This position described half a circle through Irogne, Ascain, Sarré, Ainhoue, Espelette, and Cambo, the centre projecting very much at Sarré. La Petite Rhune, though overtopped by the greater hill of the same name, from which it is separated by a narrow valley, is a very high ridge : from the sea to its foot the enemy's front was covered by a range of works : the ridge itself was strongly fortified ; and a range of high steep hills, extending from thence to Ainhoue, was defended by a chain of redoubts near enough to protect each other. The enemy's centre was in great force upon this range ; and there was a strong corps in the village of Sarré, which was protected by a regular closed work with ditch and palisades. Their left was thrown back, at nearly an acute angle, upon Espelette.

The first intention was to turn this position, by advancing Sir Rowland's corps from Roncesvalles through St. Jean de Pied-de-Port ; this move-  
*Passage of the Nivelle.*  
ment would turn the sources of the Nive, threaten Soult's rear, and compel him, it was thought, to abandon his



works, and retire beyond Bayonne ; but this plan was given up upon full consideration, Soult's line being so short, and the road behind it so good, that he might have it in his power to fall upon Sir Rowland with a superior force, or to attack Sir John Hope when it would be difficult to reinforce either ; or he might retire untouched, and keep his army in a condition to continue active and harass the allies in their winter quarters. Lord Wellington resolved, therefore, to strike at the centre of his position, strong as it was, and at the same time to attack the heights of Ainhoue, which were its immediate support on the left. With this view Sir Rowland had been ordered, as soon as Pamplona should fall, to move leftward, into the valley of Bastan, and the cavalry to close up his rear in readiness for supporting the right of Beresford's corps at Maya.

The enemy, fully expecting an attack, were always under arms at daybreak, and remained in their redoubts till nightfall ; and they improved every day's delay, which the state of the weather afforded them, in strengthening their works, strong as the labour of three months had already made them. The rain, indeed, continued so many days, and so heavy, that many persons began to fear it would be impossible for them to move ; and Lord Wellington, with all his just confidence in himself and in the troops which he commanded, could not but feel how easily human strength and military skill might be baffled by the elements. The weather cleared on the 4th ; and on the 7th he met Sir Rowland, Marshal Beresford, and all the chiefs of the right and centre at Urdache, from whence he reconnoitred Ainhoue closely, and pointed out the mode by which that part of the position was to be attacked. The object was to force their centre, and establish the army in rear of their right ; and the attack was to be made by columns of

divisions, each led by the general officers commanding it, and each forming its own reserve. Sir Rowland directed the movements of the right, consisting of the 2d and 6th divisions, under Sir William Stewart and Sir Henry Clinton, Sir John Hamilton's Portuguese, and Morillo's Spanish division, Colonel Grant's brigade of cavalry, a brigade of Portuguese artillery under Lieutenant-Colonel Tulloh, and three mountain guns under Lieutenant Robe. Marshal Beresford directed the right of the centre, with the 3rd, 7th, and 4th divisions, under Major-General Colville, Camp-Marshal Le Cor and Sir Lowry Cole. Giron was to act on his immediate left with the Andalusian army of reserve. Baron Alten's light division, with three mountain guns, and Longa's corps, was to attack La Petite Rhune; Sir Stapleton Cotton to follow the movement of the centre, with General Alten's brigade of cavalry, and three brigades of British artillery. Freyre, with the Galician army, was to move from the heights of Mandale toward Ascaïn, prevent the enemy from detaching troops from thence to the support of others, and take advantage of any movement which they might make from their right toward their centre; and Sir John Hope was to act along the remainder of their line to the sea.

The 8th was the day intended for the attack, but the state of the roads prevented the artillery and some of Sir Rowland's brigade from coming up; it was postponed therefore till the 10th. This opened with so clear and beautiful a moonlight morning, that it was scarcely perceptible when daylight began to predominate; and men who had served in India were reminded of an Indian sky. Lord Wellington was on horseback at five, and reached the point of attack at six: he found Sir Lowry Cole's division at its post, with 18 pieces of cannon at the head of the column: it was on a sloping ridge, which ends in a

high point above the village of Sarré; and on that point was the redoubt which he was to attack, and which had been made with the greatest care, having a deep ditch, an *abattis* in front, and *trous de loup*, so named from their resemblance to the pit-falls in which wolves are taken. Giron was close on his left, and Le Cor on the right, both in valleys. Lord Wellington, Beresford, Sir Lowry, General Colville, and other staffs, were in a little grove, which covered them, about 600 yards from the redoubt, walking about till it was light enough to commence the attack. Sir Lowry then drove in the enemy's piquets, and the horse artillery were enabled to gain the ridge, and open in front of the grove within 400 yards of the redoubt: their fire in return rattled through the branches: Colonel Ross dashed forward, and opened six guns within 300 yards, which riddled the curtain: the French, however, stood firm, till after about an hour's firing they saw the Spaniards moving to their rear, and the infantry advancing with ladders to escalate them; they then leaped over the parapet and ran: . . they were about 300, of whom some twenty were taken in the ditch, and not more than eight or ten killed. The artillery was then rapidly advanced against the next redoubt on the right, and that cost only about a quarter of an hour, for it was abandoned with discreditable precipitation.

By this time the troops were advancing with great celerity over most difficult ground. Lord Wellington moved on to the first redoubt, from whence he could direct the movements of the Spaniards, and of the 3rd, 7th, and 4th divisions; one of those bursts of cheering which electrify the hearers indicated his presence. Beresford advanced with the 3rd and 7th, while the Spaniards attacked the village of Sarré by its right, and Sir Lowry turned its left. Downie commanded the battalion of Spaniards to whom this service was assigned, while



Giron remained in the valley with a brigade which was to support the light division; and as in that situation it might not be seen when the village was carried, Downie, as a signal, said he would send his aid-de-camp to toll the church bell. He made the attack with great spirit: the enemy in front of the village made a show of more determination than they kept up, and they rushed from their second line as if ashamed of having too hastily given up the first; but after some skirmishing they retired to the second, and thence from the redoubts and heights cannonaded the assailants. Downie carried the village most gallantly, and the bell tolled. Sir Lowry meantime attacked and carried the works on the low hills in the rear of Sarré, and there halted for orders.

Baron Alten, meanwhile, was equally successful in his operations. He had formed the light division before daylight, in a ravine separating the great and little La Rhune, and within 300 yards of the intrenchments with which the face of La Petite Rhune was covered. Rushing from thence as soon as the day opened, the troops forced line after line: the enemy did not wait in their redoubts to be assaulted; and the assailants having carried all the works, and formed without farther opposition on the summit of the hill, were crossing the valley to attack the right of the high range behind Sarré, when Lord Wellington reached the point which Sir Lowry had gained. The preliminary attacks having thus succeeded, the whole moved forward against the intrenched range of heights which formed the strongest part of the enemy's position. The Spaniards on Giron's left were not sufficiently alert to support the light division: it was not for some time that the guns could be got up over most difficult ground: part of the 95th, who had gained the first high point, were attacked and obliged to retire; and the enemy had the advantage till the Spaniards, quickened

by messages from Lord Wellington, came up ; the French then gave way, and the lower ridge, in the centre of the position opposite to our two central columns, was immediately occupied. The Prince of Orange, who was with Lord Wellington that day, was then sent to Marshal Beresford, desiring him to attack that part of the high range in his front, while Sir Lowry should at the same time assail it on his side.

It was now about ten o'clock, and before this simultaneous effort could be made there was time to look at the position which was about to be attacked. The mountain extends about twelve miles from Ascain to Mondarín ; only one valley intersects it, which is that through which the Nivelle flows ; but there are several dips in the range ; every higher point had its redoubt, and in the intervals the enemy were formed in great strength, some in lines, some in columns, with sharp-shooters half way down the hills. A friend of Lord Wellington's said at the time to Sir George Murray, that he should expect a very difficult task here, if he had not seen the amazing superiority of our troops in the attack on Sarré. Sir George replied, " It is impossible to say how that position may be defended ; it is very formidable, but we probably shall get it very easily ; when the French see the red coats they know we are determined to carry our point, and they never dispute it long." The troops justified this brave confidence ; six columns began to ascend, with a chain of sharp-shooters in their front ; and never could greater intrepidity be displayed than that with which the British and Portugeze advanced against strong works, or solid columns at the top of steep ascents, where they were frequently obliged to use their hands as well as feet in climbing. When they approached a redoubt, they halted a few minutes to take breath : a party was sent to turn it : the sharp-shooters went close up, and

another party went straight at it in front, with as much confidence as if to charge a regiment on a plain: when they got within twenty or thirty paces, the enemy uniformly fled, and the assailants being out of breath, could overtake but few of them. Most of these redoubts had a glacis, with an *abattis* in front, which gave them time to get off. From one large one, which was attacked by the 21st Portuguese regiment, the garrison continued to fire till the assailants jumped into the ditch; then the French hastened out at the rear with all alacrity.

Lord Wellington ascended in the interval between the 7th and 4th divisions. Just as he reached the summit of the range at one of its dips, Beresford and Colville, with the 3rd division, had carried a very high hill, crowned with a strong stockaded redoubt, which was, in fact, the key of the position, and looked down upon the whole range on both sides. The 40th suffered here from having pushed on too fast. The allies were now gaining the upper ridge on all sides, and the artillery attempted to follow: Ross's troop was the only one which succeeded, and that by two hours' of the utmost exertion, and by partly making a road. Sir Lowry, with the 4th division, reached the top at a lower part: two brigades of the enemy were formed upon a height on his left; and beyond them, on a very high point above Ascain, was a large and strong redoubt, manned by a battalion of infantry. The light division was toiling up the hill to the right of this work, and the Spaniards to the left. Sir Lowry attacked the brigades: there were two generals at their heads; but when the assailants came near, the French fired five or six rounds in rather an unsoldier-like hurry, and then moved hastily off, leaving the redoubt to its fate. Downie, seizing a colour, and waving it as he advanced on horseback at the head of his battalion, led on his men: they went against it gallantly, in spite



of their officers, who behaved ill : the light division commenced an attack upon it, in which Colonel Barnard was wounded ; and the 52nd lost a good many men here, before Lord Wellington's orders for desisting and summoning the garrison could arrive. While this attack continued, the troops under Beresford got so far in the rear of the redoubt, that it was impossible for the garrison to retreat. They proved to be the first battalion of the 88th regiment, nearly 600 strong : their colonel had been promoted for his defence of S. Christoval's, at the first siege of Badajoz : he hesitated, parleyed, and requested to confer with his officers, and subsequently with the non-commissioned officers ; but it was in vain to resist, and there was no way to escape ; so they surrendered, and laid down their arms on the glacis. Some of the men expressed their indignation in coarse and indecent language at finding themselves prisoners ; and one serjeant, in particular, who wore the cross of the Legion of Honour, cursed his fortune, that after being present in the battles of Austerlitz and Wagram, he should now be captured in a redoubt !

While these operations were going on in the centre, Sir Henry Clinton, with the 6th division, having driven in the enemy's piquets on both banks of the Nivelles, crossed that river, covered the passage of Sir John Hamilton's Portuguese division, and ascended the hill in line, scarcely firing a shot. The enemy were formed on the top of the hill, as on a fine parade, in front of their huts, and with strong redoubts on both flanks. The first party in its eagerness pushed on too fast, and was driven back ; but as the support came near they dashed forward again ; and the enemy, having thrown away their fire, went off in great confusion, abandoning redoubts, camp, and all. Sir William Stewart's division carried a work on a parallel ridge in the rear. Morillo, by attacking

the enemy's posts on the slopes of Mondarin, and following them towards Itzatce, covered the advance of the whole to the heights behind Ainhoue. Sir Rowland then forced the enemy to retire from those heights towards the bridge of Cambo on the Nivelle; and Sir William Stewart drove a division from Mondarin into the mountains toward Baygorri. By two o'clock the allies had gained possession of the whole of the position behind Sarré and Ainhoue.

The enemy, who had been in front of our centre, were now retiring along the road to St. Pé, a village on the Nivelle, between three and four miles distant. The nature of the country rendered it impossible to cut them off; and Lord Wellington was obliged to wait an hour, that the troops might take breath, and to see that the operations on the right had succeeded; and that the 6th division, after carrying the works in its front, had inclined to the left, and closed upon the third. This having been ascertained, about three o'clock he directed the 7th and 3rd divisions (being the right of the centre) to move by the left of the river upon St. Pé, and the 6th by the right upon the same place; while the 4th and light divisions, with Giron's reserve, held the heights above Ascain, covering the movement on that side, and Sir Rowland covered it on the other. The Nivelle is from twenty to thirty yards wide, rapid like a mountain stream, and not fordable; there is a stone bridge at St. Pé, a wooden one half a mile lower down, and a stone one about the same distance still lower, at the village of Ayan. The first of these bridges was eagerly contested; but, after some severe skirmishing, the allies effected the passage of all three. Lord Wellington halted upon the heights above St. Pé; and, having occupied the bridges and the villages, waited there for reports from the right

and left. During the whole day he could distinctly hear, and generally see, the firing on the right, Sir Rowland's quarter; but the projecting base of La Rhune entirely prevented him from seeing what passed on Sir John Hope's side; and a steady breeze, setting towards the sea, prevented any sound from reaching him in that direction. But on that side there could be no anxiety, for it was not intended to be the scene of serious action; and what service was to be performed there, was performed well. The French had constructed a redoubt round the ruins of a small chapel on a hill, and connected it with the defence of Urogne by intrenchments, and a strong *abattis*. From this work, which formed a sort of advanced post to their right wing, Sir John Hope drove them, and from Urogne, and pushed forward the 5th division to the inundation which covered the intrenchments in front of Ciboure, and those protecting the heights in advance of Fort Socoa. The enemy were kept in expectation here that this position would be assaulted; and they were menaced in their intrenchments, which covered the heights behind Urogne, and extended along the hills in the direction of Ascain: that village they abandoned in the afternoon, and Freyre took possession of it. As soon as Lord Wellington had received the reports, he gave orders for attacking the heights behind St. Pé: they were of difficult access, through vineyards, and were crowned with woods; and the enemy had a considerable force there: during the intervals of severer action, the sharp-shooters had been warmly engaged in the village, and along the river; and shrapnells had been thrown at the heights with visible effect from Ross's brigade. The 3rd division now crossed near the village, the 6th advanced upon its right, and the 7th attacked the left of the heights; the brunt of the action on this side



was borne by this division. The 51st and 68th regiments, light troops, scoured a wood in full cry, like a pack of hounds, and drove out a large body of sharpshooters, whom they drove up the hills, but with so much eagerness as to leave their support behind. Instantly upon this advantage being presented, a strong column moved from behind the hill, and attacked them: the enemy were led by a general officer on horseback, and behaved with more spirit than they had shown in any other part of the engagement. The two regiments, if they had not been two of the best, must have been cut to pieces; but though they were very weak in numbers, and were driven back, they formed in close order, and in the most gallant manner retook the hill. This was the last business of the day. The three divisions took post on the heights beyond St. Pé; thus establishing themselves in the rear of the enemy's right; and the remainder of the army rested on the ground which they occupied, the evening being so far advanced that no further movement could be made.

Lord Wellington was on the heights above St. Pé before daylight; the morning was hazy, and it was noon before he received the reports which *Nov. 11.* enabled him to put the troops in motion. During the night the enemy had abandoned all their works and positions in front of St. Jean de Luz, and knowing no time was to be lost, lest the divisions at St. Pé should interpose between them and Bayonne, retired upon Bidart, destroying all the bridges on the lower Nivelle. Sir John Hope followed with the left, as soon as he could cross the river; but it was mid-day before he could repair the bridge which connects Ciboure with S. Jean de Luz, and construct a flying bridge to expedite the passage of the troops. The 5th division passed here,

part with the artillery by the bridge, part by fords close above the town; the first, with Wilson's Portuguese brigade, by a ford about a mile higher up, and broad enough for the men to cross by platoons. It rained most heavily; the water was deep, the opposite bank muddy, and the shore swampy ground: but no opposition was offered, and the men, elated by the signal success of yesterday, were in high spirits. The centre moved forward about a league, and the right made a corresponding move, which was as far as the state of the roads, after so violent a fall of rain, would allow. Soult showed about 16,000 men at Bidart all day. The army bivouacked a second night. On the following morning Lord Wellington was again in front of the centre at day-break, but a thick fog enveloped every thing; it was noon before it cleared, and he then learned that the enemy had retired during the night into an intrenched camp, in front of Bayonne.

By these operations, in which the allies lost little more than 500 killed, and less than 2400 wounded, the French were driven from positions strong in themselves, and which they had been fortifying with great skill and great labour for six months: 51 pieces of cannon, 1500 prisoners, and 400 wounded, were taken. Soult had full 70,000 men; but though there was no flight, nor any thing like a rout, no determined spirit of resistance was manifested; they fought like brave men, but dispirited ones, and in several instances their officers used every endeavour to bring them on in vain. They had relied upon the difficulty of the ground, not dreaming that artillery could be brought to act against them over rivers and rocks and mountains; and indeed, the allies were beholden for their success, in no slight degree, to the extraordinary skill and activity with which this part of

the service was directed by Colonel Dickson. Mountain-pieces on swivel carriages, harnessed on the backs of mules which had been trained for the purpose, were conveyed to the ridges of the mountains, and brought to bear on the French from positions which they had considered inaccessible for guns. . . The foot and horse-artillery were alike active and expert; and the artillery-men dragged their cannon with ropes up steep precipices, or lowered them down, wherever they could be employed with most effect. Generals Byng and Kempt were wounded: Colonel Lloyd of the 94th, an officer of great promise, and who had frequently distinguished himself, was killed.

The weather, which continued wet, without intermission, from the 11th to the 18th, rendered the cross roads so bad, and the streams so formidable, that Lord Wellington could not follow up his success as he would otherwise have done.

*The allies  
cantonned  
between the  
Nivelle and  
the sea.*

He placed the army, therefore, in cantonments between the Nivelle and the sea; but as the enemy were concentrated in great numbers round Bayonne, two miles only in their immediate front, a defensive line was formed against any sudden advance. It commenced at the sea on the left, in rear of Biarits, passed over the main ridge of heights, and crossed the high road, near a country house belonging to the mayor of that little town. The front of this part of the line was protected by the two small lakes of Chuhigue and Rousta; the high road passes across a valley between them, and here was the most advanced line of sentinels guarding the left wing; from thence it followed the right bank of the valley, in front of Arcangues, and coming there upon the Nive, near a chateau belonging to Garat (one of the contemporary historians of the French revolution, and himself an actor in it), it was thrown back along the left of that



river by Arrauntz, Ustaritz, Larressore, and Cambo; from which latter place the enemy, who occupied a tête-de-pont there, withdrew their posts on the 18th, and blew up the bridge. Head-quarters were at St. Jean de Luz, *St Jean de Luz.* a town which dates its decay from the peace of 1763, when France was deprived of its possessions in North America. The Nivelles divides it from Ciboure (a smaller town), spreading just above both into a beautiful bay, and forming an island where it spreads, which is connected by bridges with both. The bay terminates on the north-east by a rocky point of land, on which a battery called Fort St. Barbe was erected, and on the opposite side is the harbour of Socoa, defended by a martello tower. Between these points the bay is nearly a mile in width, and on both sides a pier had been begun, which it was intended to have carried so nearly across, as only to have left a sufficient entrance, and thus to have afforded safe anchorage on this stormy coast, where it is grievously needed. When the Spanish fleet was wrecked here in 1627, the dead who were cast up on the immediate shores filled ninety-six carts. On that occasion the inhabitants of St. Jean de Luz behaved with exemplary kindness to the survivors; and it was proposed in the Spanish council that, as a becoming acknowledgment, its ships and merchants should enjoy a perpetual exemption from all duties in Portugal, whither they

*D. Francisco Manoel. Epanaphoras, p. 256.* traded largely for salt: I wish it could be added, that such a proof of national gratitude had been given. During the action of the 10th, a naval demonstration was made opposite Fort Socoa, by four of Sir George Collier's squadrons: the swell would not admit of a close approach, but they came near enough for one of them to be struck by some shot from the sea-batteries.

The inhabitants of St. Jean de Luz had mostly remained in their own houses, shutting themselves up there to abide their fate, in dread of invaders whom they had been taught to consider as being equally rapacious and merciless. There was still a disposition in the allied troops to take that license which brutal spirits promise themselves in war; but, during the action of the 10th, two offenders had been hanged, each upon the nearest tree to the spot where his crime was committed, with a paper upon his breast declaring for what offence this summary justice had been executed. Such severity was equally politic and just; and the allies soon acquired as good a character for their conduct toward the inhabitants as for their behaviour in the field. The people were the more sensible of this, because it was strikingly contrasted with the predatory habits in which their own troops had long been licensed, and which those troops had not laid aside when they were driven within the French frontier. Marshal Soult would gladly now have withheld them from courses which he had so long permitted or encouraged; and just at this time an instance occurred in which he endeavoured to strike terror by a wholesome example. When they were quitting St. Jean de Luz, a woman complained to an officer whose company was quartered there, that the men, expecting to depart, were beginning to plunder her house: he gave no ear to her entreaties that he would restrain them, and the woman at length, in her emotion at seeing her goods thus given up to spoil, exclaimed, that "if those who ought to be their defenders would not protect them, the English might as well be there at once." "Oh!" said the officer, "if you are a friend to the English, you shall see how I will protect you!" and immediately he set fire to her house himself. A *gendarme* who was present took the woman's

*Discipline  
observed by  
the allies.*

part, and declared that though he could not take the officer into custody, nor prevent him by force, he would report the circumstance to the Marshal: he did so; and the officer, who was a captain of infantry and a member of the Legion of Honour, was brought to a court-martial, condemned, and shot.

But it was too late for Marshal Soult to correct the inveterate habits of men who, during all their campaigns in the Peninsula, had been supported by a predatory system; and though most of the people, and especially the villagers, forsook their houses at the approach of the allies, yet, when proclamations were issued in French and in Basque (which is the language of these parts), assuring them that their persons and property should be respected, and when they understood that British discipline would afford them a security which it was in vain to hope for amid their own armies, they returned. The French authorities endeavoured in vain to dissuade them; the general wish was expressed so strongly, that at length no farther impediment was opposed to it than that of forbidding them to carry back anything with them. Above 3000 persons came back to St. Jean de Luz and the neighbouring places before the end of November, and as many more passed through the line of the allied out-posts, in one day early in December, on their return; . . among them were several young men, escaping in women's clothes from the conscription.

The weather had prevented Lord Wellington from passing the Nive, as he intended to have done, immediately after having forced the French position, and the army in consequence occupied only the confined space on the left of that river; while the enemy profited by all the resources of the country on its right, and had a free communication between Bayonne and St. Jean de Pied-



de-Port. They occupied an intrenched camp in front of Bayonne, about twelve miles from St. Jean de Luz, and this position they had been fortifying with provident care from the time of their defeat at Vittoria. Bayonne obtained its present name in the twelfth century, *Bayonne*, till when it was called Lapurdum, as when the cohort of Novempopulania had its head-quarters there. This ancient city, which during three centuries belonged to our Plantagenet kings, is memorable in military history for the invention of the bayonet, a weapon that in its name indicates the place of its origin, and that, in British hands, has proved more destructive than any other to the nation by which it was invented. In the war of the French revolution this city would not have been tenable against a single division of an enemy's army: the war of the intrusion made it immediately a place of great importance, as a *dépôt* for the French; and therefore it was well fortified, to secure it against a sudden attack from the English, before the possibility of any more serious danger had been contemplated. It stands at the junction of the Nive with the Adour; the latter a great river, and the former not fordable for several miles up: the city is on the left of the Adour, the citadel on the other side. The position which Marshal Soult occupied was under the fire of the fortress; the right resting on the Adour, and covered in front by a morass, formed by a rivulet which falls into that river. The right of the centre rested upon the same morass, and its left upon the Nive; the left was between the Nive and the Adour, resting on the latter river and defending the former, and communicating with a division of the army of Catalonia, under General Paris, at St. Jean de Pied-de-Port. The roads from that place, and from St. Jean de Luz to Paris, pass through Bayonne; and these are the only paved roads, all the others are so bad as to be impracticable in

winter. The enemy had their advanced posts, from their right, in front of Anglet, and toward Biaritz ; and they had a considerable corps cantoned in Ville-Franche and Monguerre.

As soon as the weather and the state of the roads  
*December.* allowed, preparations were made for crossing  
*Passage of* the Nive. On the 8th of December Lord Wel-  
*the Nive.* lington moved the troops out of their cantonments. The preceding day had brought intelligence that Hanover was delivered from the French, . . and that the Dutch also had risen against their oppressors, and asserted their independence. With this news to encourage them, at which even the French people appeared to rejoice, because it gave them a hope of peace, which could only be obtained by the total defeature of Buonaparte's ambitious schemes, the allies recommenced their operations on the morrow. Sir Rowland, with the right of the army, was to cross at Cambo, and Beresford to support him by passing Sir Henry Clinton's division at Ustaritz : the bridges at both places had been destroyed. The river, dividing into two branches, forms an island of considerable extent opposite Ustaritz ; our piquets had previously occupied this, and here a pontoon-bridge was thrown across during the night. The bridge at Campo had been hastily and insufficiently repaired, so that very few succeeded in getting over its broken slope. There were fords above and below ; the lower was good enough for cavalry, but ten men were drowned in attempting it ; the upper one, therefore, was chiefly used by the infantry, . . and it was no easy passage, the left bank being steep, and the water rising at the time, in consequence of renewed rain. At both places, however, it was effected with little opposition, and the enemy were immediately driven from the right bank. The troops, advancing then through swampy meadow-land and very deep roads, soon

found themselves on the high road from St. Jean de Pied-de-Port; and the French retired skirmishing, being followed and pressed; those opposite Cambo were nearly intercepted by Sir Henry Clinton. The enemy now assembled in considerable force upon a range of heights running parallel with the Adour, keeping Ville-Franche upon their right; and they kindled fires, as if intending to remain there. A galling fire was kept up from the detached houses of this village; but houses, village, and heights were carried by the 8th Portuguese regiment, the 9th Caçadores, and the light battalions of the 6th division; and the French, after one or two hasty volleys, retired. The advance of the allies had been so much impeded by the condition of the ground, that by this time evening had closed; and Lord Wellington contented himself therefore with the possession of the ground that he occupied.

This had been a day of great fatigue for the left wing of the army. At one in the morning the drums had beat to arms; and, after a most toilsome march through heavy rain, the first division, under Major-General Howard, was assembled by day-break at the Plateau of Barouillet, in advance of Bidart. At dawn the rain ceased; and the 5th division, under Major-General Hay, supported by the 12th light dragoons, was seen crossing the valley which separates the hilly ground of Biaritz from that of Bidart; its right in communication with the first, and its left extending to the sea-coast. At eight o'clock the whole line of light troops commenced their fire; those of the enemy contested every hedge and bank which afforded them shelter, and from whence they could take deliberate aim; but a fire of shells from the artillery, who posted themselves on the eminences along the whole line, assisted greatly in dislodging them. The whole line gradually advanced, and the enemy retreated



before them to Anglet, not venturing to await their approach. About one the first division gained the heights on the right of the chaussée, opposite to Anglet, the light infantry driving the enemy down the slopes to their intrenched camp. The 5th division made equal progress, sweeping the country between Anglet and the sea as far as the banks of the Adour, and occupying with its light infantry the Bois de Bayonne, a large pine wood which covers the whole space on the left of that river, between the intrenched camp and the sea. General Alten, meantime, made a corresponding advance with the light division, between the left wing and the Nive; they drove the enemy from behind the deep morass which

*Batty's  
Campaign,  
p. 83—5.*

covered their advanced posts in front of Bassus-sarry, and compelled them to retreat to their intrenched camp near the Chateau de Marrac, . . . that castle to which, in the first act of this great drama, Ferdinand had been decoyed by Buonaparte.

As the movements on this side were intended only to favour the operations on the right, Sir John Hope's instructions were to return to his cantonments, and to commence retiring thither at six in the evening, unless a countermand should arrive. It began again to rain heavily in the afternoon; and the troops, supposing they were to remain on the ground which they had gained, lighted, not without difficulty, their bivouac fires; but the weather was far too bad for them to remain in such exposed situations; and at the appointed time they began their march back toward their several cantonments, the 5th division forming the rear guard. By this time it was quite dark; even the main road had been completely broken up by the passage of artillery, and of so many troops; the hollow ways were knee deep in mud: one little drummer stuck fast in it, and was obliged to be lifted out and carried for some distance by two soldiers;

many of the men were so completely exhausted that they sunk down by the way-side ; and before they reached the place of rest, they had been little less than four-and-twenty hours on foot, and during the greater part of that time in a heavy winter's rain.

On the morning of the 10th Sir Rowland found that the enemy on his side had retired into their intrenched camp, on the right of the Nive. He established himself, therefore, in the position intended for him, with his right on the Adour, his left on the heights of Ville-Franche, above the Nive, and his centre across the chaussée at the village of St. Pierre. Marshal Beresford's troops were again drawn to the left of the Nive ; and Sir Rowland communicated with the centre of the army, by a bridge which had been laid over that river. Morillo's division was placed at Urcuray, and Colonel Vivian's brigade of light dragoons at Hasparren, to watch Paris's movements, who, upon the passage of the Nive, had retired towards St. Palais.

Thus the allied army formed a sort of crescent, which was intersected by a river, and along which the communications were exceedingly bad. On any part of this bending line Marshal Soult could direct an attack with his main force ; and, if he should be repulsed, there was a secure retreat for him within his intrenched camp. Supposing, therefore, that the allies would have their principal strength on the right of the Nive to support Sir Rowland, he left just troops enough to occupy the works opposite to that General's position, and with the rest of his army moved at daybreak against Sir John Hope, expecting to overpower the left wing by numbers. The 5th division occupied the Plateau of Barouillet, having General Campbell's Portuguese brigade in its front, on the high road. Baron Alten, with the light division, was posted at Arcangues, about two miles to

the right. Both were on strong ground ; but there was no defensive connexion between them, except along a range of hills, which projected too much to be occupied otherwise than by small posts ; and between Barouillet and Arcangues there is a broad valley, which was left almost without defence, because it was thought that Marshal Soult would not attempt to advance in this direction, with posts of such strength upon either flank.

The enemy advanced in two strong columns ; one by the great road attacked the posts of the 5th division, and drove them back upon their support on the Plateau of Barouillet. The other, coming forward by the Plateau of Bassussarry, threw out a strong line of *tirailleurs*, supported by battalions, against the light division at Arcangues ; but the main body pushed on a little way beyond the left flank of the light division, and sent forward columns to attack the right of the 5th, denoting thus an intention of penetrating between, and in rear of the two divisions. Soult knew not at how great advantage he had taken the allies : the 5th division had been separated during the last night's dismal march, the ammunition mules were not forthcoming, and when the piquets were driven in, there was hardly a round left. There was nothing to be done but to hold their ground as well as they could till more troops and ammunition should arrive. Not more than eight or ten guns could be brought into action, because of the nature of the ground, . . there being a low thick wood to the right, and close to the road ; and on the left a rugged heath, intersected with gullies and ravines. The French brought more pieces into play, and served them with more than usual vivacity ; for they knew their own great superiority of numbers, and were elated with the hope of getting to S. Jean de Luz, which was the great depôt of the allies. Sir John Hope, who was, with his staff, in the thickest of the



fight, encouraging the troops by his example, received a severe contusion on his shoulder, and a hurt on his leg ; and a ball went through his hat : . . it was believed that, at one moment, nothing but his extreme gallantry saved the troops from utter confusion. Major-General Robinson, who commanded the second brigade of this division, was severely wounded, and carried off the field. The contest still continued, ebbing and flowing, till the enemy pushed through the wood in front of Barouillet, and through a large field and orchard on its right, in such force as to drive back Campbell's Portuguese brigade, and Robinson's, which supported it ; and, penetrating thus beyond the front of the position, they were rapidly following up their success, when a Portuguese battalion on the left flank boldly moved forward on the road, and wheeled into the rear of the wood ; at the same time the 9th British regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Cameron, which was on the extreme right, faced about, and, uniting with the Portuguese, charged the French columns in their rear, . . a movement as unexpected as it was bold and well-timed. It gave the enemy a severe check at this point, and some hundred prisoners were taken. This was between two and three in the afternoon. By this time a considerable number of troops had arrived in detail ; the brigade of guards, who had been ordered from St. Jean de Luz to support the 5th division, arrived just after the enemy had been thus checked ; and Lord Wellington, hastening from the right wing where all was quiet, came to the scene of action. He was very much exposed this day, and unavoidably so, for there was no eminence from whence the whole field could be seen ; the wood intercepted the sight, and it was necessary for him to ride from point to point. The enemy, checked though they had been, persisted in the action, and it continued till night-fall ; the firing gradually

ceasing as the evening closed, and the troops, after very severe loss on both sides, remaining on the ground which they had occupied in the morning. The remainder of the left wing having been brought up from its cantonments, the first division relieved the fatigued troops; and the 7th took post in rear of the position, to support either of the defensive corps.

Meantime the attack upon the light division at Arcangues had been maintained with great animation and perseverance. The enemy were repulsed in all their efforts to dislodge these troops from their defences of the churchyard and the chateau; but they retained at night the Plateau of Bassussarry, in the immediate front of Arcangues, which joins that of Barouillet, before the mayor's house. The issue of the day had greatly disappointed Marshal Soult, whose utmost efforts had been completely defeated by a comparatively small part of the allied forces, and with great loss. He suffered a further loss during the night. There were with him the two German regiments of Frankfurt and Nassau Usingen: every possible means had been taken for concealing from their officers the state of affairs in Germany; nevertheless, they discovered that Germany had thrown off the yoke. The French government had been apprehensive of this, and, in consequence, had recently altered its conduct towards them; instead of being treated with disrespect, as men who had no government which could protect them, they now found themselves the objects of marked attention; and were newly clothed, and received pay up to the last six months, when a year and half's was due to the greater part of the French army. Marshal Soult, however, under various pretences, had long kept them in the rear. But in the action of this day they were in advance, in Villatte's division; and that General being severely wounded,

*Two German regiments escape from the French army.*

the division was for a while without any special commander. The officer in command of the Nassau regiment was a Bavarian, but had been educated in Hanover, and for some years in the Hanoverian guards. Not only had the news from Germany reached him, but means had also been found for conveying to him the orders of his sovereign; he now took advantage of the first opportunity which had offered, and proposed to the Colonel of a French regiment, that his corps, with the two Nassau battalions, and one of the Frankfort, should occupy a height a little in advance of where they then were. The advice, though proposed with a view of going over to the allies, offered some feasible advantage, and was agreed to without suspicion. As it was growing dark, and the roads were intricate, it was further proposed, that the battalions should file to their ground by different routes. The German officers were apprized of the intention, except those of the second Frankfort battalion, to which no communication could be made, its commander being badly wounded in the action. A Frankfort officer now made his way to the outposts of our 4th division, in the centre of the allies, and announced the intended defection, requiring a General officer's word of honour that they should be well received, and sent to Germany: no General being on the spot, Colonel Bradford gave his word: means were immediately taken to apprise the three battalions, and they came over in a body, 1300 men; the French not discovering their intention till just when it was too late to frustrate it. On the morrow the Colonel wrote to General Villatte, thanking him for the attentions which he had received whilst under his command; but stating that in obedience to their King's orders, his troops had quitted the service of France to return to that of their own country. Their women and their sick, who were left behind, he commended to the General's huma-



nity ; and said that his brother officers and himself freely gave up their personal baggage in performing an act prescribed by their duty. This officer seems to have united a just moral feeling to a proper sense of military honour ; and he rejoiced that he had been able to bring off those battalions, without being compelled to fire on the French, in company with whom they had served so long.

In the morning the 5th division was brought a little forward, beyond the wood, and the advanced *Dec. 11.* skirmishers were soon within forty or fifty yards of each other : the light troops drove in the enemy's piquets, and the most advanced sentries were again pushed forward to their own line. On this side, and also at Arcangues, there was some skirmishing during the forenoon, but with little advantage on either side : about noon the firing was suspended, the weather brightened, unarmed parties were sent out to cut wood for cooking, and the men received their rations. But about two there was a stir in the enemy's lines ; they were seen cutting gaps in the fences for the passage of artillery ; presently they attacked in great force, along the Bayonne road, driving in the piquets, and the hill in front of Barouillet again became the scene of contest. The soldiers who had gone in front to cut fuel ran hastily back when they heard the cry of "to arms," that they might get themselves armed and accoutred ; and the French, seeing them run toward the rear, thought they had taken panic, and set up loud cheers, as if they had now only to pursue their favourable fortune. But their whole left wing was promptly formed in perfect order. A feint attack was made upon Arcangues, to cover a serious one upon the Plateau Bassussarry. Lord Wellington's orders were, that the piquets, in case of any serious effort, should be withdrawn from the hill in front, but that the position in

front of Barouillet should be maintained : great efforts were made, and the enemy every where were repulsed, Sir John Hope, as on the yesterday, encouraging his men wherever there was most danger. During these two days he was struck three times ; and all his staff had either themselves or their horses wounded. Lord Wellington is said to have requested that he would consider of what consequence he was to the army, and not expose himself so much. When darkness closed, the two armies were in the same position which they had occupied on the preceding night.

The fifth division, which, after one day's severe exertion in the worst weather, had borne the heat of the action in the two following ones, was relieved by the first, as soon as it became so dark that the enemy could not perceive and take advantage of any change in their disposition. The night was again rainy, and in posting the sentries at some parts, it was not easy, because of the darkness, to avoid interfering with the French piquets. The weather cleared toward morning ; drums and trumpets were heard at intervals along the *Dec. 12.* enemy's line ; and at sunrise their staff officers were seen riding in all directions. Soult showed three or four divisions ; and at ten some severe skirmishing began, which continued till three, being chiefly confined to the wood and the immediate ground about the house of Barouillet. The loss was not great, but it fell chiefly on the guards : Captain Watson, the adjutant of the 3rd guards, observed in the morning that " plenty of laurel grew round that house to deck the graves of those who should fall," . . and he was one of the first. Lord Wellington, foreseeing Soult's intention, moved the 4th and 7th divisions to the rear of the light division and of the first, where they might afford support to either. But Marshal Soult, when he found how fully the allies were prepared, did

not deem it prudent to make any further effort on this side, where he had tried his fortune skilfully, bravely, and perseveringly, but without success. The skirmishing therefore ceased in the afternoon, and the enemy retired entirely within their entrenched camp that night.

The last four days had been most harassing to the troops, exposed as they had been, and continually under arms ; but the fifth day of these multiplied actions proved more murderous than any of the foregoing. During the night Soult passed a large force through Bayonne, with the intention of making a most formidable attack upon the right wing of the allies. Sir Rowland was aware of his movements, and prepared accordingly. His position was about a league from Bayonne, in the form of a crescent, extending about four miles from the Adour to the Nive. Major-General Pringle's brigade, consisting of the 28th, 34th, and 39th regiments, formed the left, stationed on a ridge of hilly ground extending from Ville-Franche toward Bayonne, and bounded on one side by the Nive, and on the other by large mill-dams in a deep hollow, which separates it from the heights of Monguerre. Major-General Byng's brigade, consisting of the 31st, 57th, and 68th, formed the right, posted also on a long ridge, in front of the village of Vieux Monguerre, which had the Adour on its right, and mill-dams in like manner on its left, separating it from the heights in the centre. Brigadier-General Ashworth's Portuguese brigade occupied the centre ridge opposite the village of St. Pierre. The ground was favourable, because it admitted of only one or two points of attack, one of which was by the main road.

It was a clear frosty morning, but the ground so wet, and the road so heavy in that deep and rich soil, that the horses were knee-deep in stiff mud and clay. Soon after eight o'clock, the allied out-posts on the great road were attacked



by *tirailleurs* in great numbers, and the French columns advanced close in the rear. Soult showed that day about four divisions; and these, drawn up in two lines and supporting columns, appeared, from the confined ground on which they acted, more numerous than they were. They advanced up the long slope in front of the centre position, their column extending a good way on either side of the road; at the same time a large body moved against the left of the centre, up the hollow way, its right resting upon the mill-dams. Sir Rowland, as soon as the enemy's intention of piercing the centre was manifest, brought Major-General Barnes's brigade forward from the heights of Petit Monguerre, and stationed it on the right of Ashworth's Portuguese. He moved also the whole of Byng's brigade, except one regiment, and the light companies of the others, to support the right of the centre, and Brigadier-General Buchan's Portuguese brigade from behind Ville-Franche, to support its left. These troops arrived just at the time when they were most needed; four guns of Lieutenant-Colonel Ross's troop, and Lieutenant-Colonel Tulloch's brigade of Portuguese artillery, were also moved up in aid of the centre, and kept up a steady but cautious fire, all possible exertions being used meantime for bringing them a supply of ammunition. The light companies which had gone forward in support of the piquets were borne back by weight of numbers upon the main line, and the French established themselves upon a height close to the position; and here the heat of the contest lay, this post being repeatedly won and lost, till Barnes's brigade, with the 92nd Highlanders, and Ashworth's Portuguese, made a final charge, and drove the enemy down. The artillery fired this day with dreadful effect, and the main road was in many places literally running with blood.

On the right a feint only was made, before which the

battalion that had been left there retired from Vieux Monguerre to the heights in its rear; but, ascertaining from thence that the enemy on this side were not in force, they re-entered the village, and made some prisoners there. But on the left centre the columns which had advanced up the hollow way made a powerful attack; and though the 71st and part of the 92nd were sent to aid the Portugueze there, the enemy, by dint of superior force, won an important part of the position in front of Ville-Franche. Two Portugueze regiments opportunely arrived. Sir William Stewart directed the one to turn the right flank of the attacking columns, while the other attacked the enemy in front, charging them with the bayonet; and this was decisive in that quarter. A hot fire of *tirailleurs* was kept up meantime upon Major-General Pringle's brigade, with a view of preventing it from aiding the centre; but that General, occupying a line at right angles to theirs, caused them considerable loss by a well-directed flanking fire.

Foreseeing such an attack on Sir Rowland, Lord Wellington had provided against it by requesting Marshal Beresford to reinforce him with the 6th division, which had crossed the Nive accordingly at daylight that morning; and he sent also for the fourth and two brigades of the third, and formed them in reserve. The expected coming of the 6th division gave Sir Rowland great facility in making his movements; but before its arrival he had completely repulsed the enemy, the troops under his immediate command being about 13,000 men, and the force by which they were attacked little, if at all, short of twice that number. The allies kept their ground; . . their purpose, therefore, was effected. Soult's troops, when beaten back, had the city and the intrenched camp in their immediate rear, and retired under cover of their guns placed in position. They remained in

great force in front of that camp, and kept up a warm cannonade upon the centre; but the officers could not induce their men again to renew attacks which they had found so destructive. Sir William Stewart then directed Major-General Byng to unite his brigade and attack the enemy upon the opposite bank of the mill-stream, in front of the height of Vieux Monguerre. Byng did this in the most gallant style, carrying the colours of the 66th himself, and planting them, under a hot fire of musketry and artillery, in their position. The third regiment crossed the mill-stream to co-operate in the attack; the brigade then drove the enemy down, and Buchan's Portuguese arrived to aid in finally repulsing them. About four o'clock the action terminated in a continued skirmishing: at night the enemy retired within their camp.

. The loss of the allies during these five days, in killed, wounded, and missing, amounted to 5029, of whom 302 were officers: nearly half the loss fell upon the Portuguese, upon whom, indeed, as much reliance was now placed as upon the British themselves. The last day was the most destructive: Generals Barnes, Le Cor, and Ashworth, and nearly the whole of the staff and aides-de-camp of Sir William Stewart, and of Generals Barnes and Byng, were wounded. The French return made their loss 1314 killed and 4600 wounded. They fought well in this long series of actions, far better than they had done in defending their position upon the Nivelle; and this can only be explained by the different feeling with which men, and especially men of the French temperament, are animated when standing on their defence, from that which excites them when they are themselves the assailants. Marshal Soult, who was never wanting in ability, never displayed more than on this occasion. The often repeated effort cost him his



best troops, and forced upon him the mortifying conviction that, brave as they were, and admirably disciplined, they were nevertheless inferior to their opponents: for all circumstances here had been in his favour; the points of attack were at his own choice, and wherever he attacked he brought into the field a greatly superior force; yet every where he had been defeated. Not

*Soult takes  
a defensive  
position.*

venturing, therefore, again to repeat a trial in which he had so often failed, though he had at this time 50,000 infantry and 6000 cavalry, he cantoned his army in a defensive position, having its right on the camp round Bayonne, its centre spread along the right of the Adour, to Port de Lanne, and its left along the right of the Bidouse, from its confluence to St. Palais, posting two divisions of cavalry on the left of that place, and a weak division, under Harispe, at St. Jean de Pied-de-Port. That General had been withdrawn from Suchet's army for this service, because, being a native of the valley of Baigorry, and having distinguished himself as a partizan in the Pyrenees, in the years 1794 and 1795, it was supposed that he might raise some irregular corps of his countrymen, and turn against the allies that system of guerrilla warfare which had proved so destructive to the invaders in Spain. Marshal Soult apprehended that Bayonne would be invested; and therefore he made Port de Lanne, which is on the Adour, eighteen miles above that city, his principal dépôt, laying down a bridge there, and protecting it by strong works; and he lined the right of the river with redoubts armed with heavy cannon. He intrenched Hastingues, and covered Peyrehorade with a *tête-de-pont*, for the defence of the Gave de Pau; and in like manner secured the passages over the Bidouse at Guiche, Bedache, and Came. He also strengthened the fortifications of St. Jean de Pied-de-Port and Navarreins,

and intrenched Dax as an entrepôt for stores and reinforcements from the interior; thus omitting no measure of precaution which a just estimate of his enemy's strength seemed to require.

The weather, by impeding for a while any advance on the part of the allies, allowed him time for this. Lord Wellington waited till it should become more favourable, having obtained possession of a large tract of country, and being in a situation from whence to resume his operations with advantage, as soon as the season might permit. Upon first entering France he had circulated among the inhabitants those general orders in which he enjoined his troops to respect their persons and property, accompanying them with a brief proclamation to the people. He had given, he said, and would enforce these positive orders for preventing those evils that might otherwise be looked for as the ordinary consequences of an invasion, which they knew was the result of their own government's invasion of Spain, and of the victories of the allied armies. He requested them to apprehend and bring before him any person who, disobeying these instructions, might offer them any injury; and, on their side, he required them to remain in their houses, and take no part in the war of which their country was now to be the scene. Great injury must inevitably be endured by the inhabitants of any country upon which that visitation falls; but none was suffered now which could be prevented by vigilant discipline, founded upon just views of policy and a strict sense of justice. On the morning after the line of the Nivelle had been forced, a peasant was brought before Lord Wellington, having been taken near the British outposts: the man's simple account of himself was, that he was going to drive his sheep to Bayonne; upon which he was told that he

*The allies  
wait in their  
cantonnments  
for better  
weather.*

might go where he pleased, and take his sheep where he pleased too. When the French saw that the peasantry were thus treated, . . . that the very few who were taken in arms were shipped off, like other prisoners, for England, . . . and that marauders were brought to summary punishment, they perceived that their invaders were as equitable as they were brave, and that the word of a British general was sacred.

The guerrilla troops, whom it would have been more difficult to restrain, were kept upon their own frontier.

*Nov. 28.* The discipline of the Portuguese was as good

as that of the English. Marshal Beresford, when he commended them in one of his orders for their excellent conduct at the line of the Nivelle, expressed his particular satisfaction with their behaviour in their quarters and towards the inhabitants in general. They had proved, he said, their superiority over the French troops in the field of battle; and they had shown, also, to the French people that they were not less superior to those troops in humanity and in their whole deportment, whereby, as well as by their discipline and courage, they did honour to their country. The Portuguese were not less gratified by another order which Marshal Beresford issued after the passage of the Nive. He had deemed it necessary, in the spring of the preceding year, to deprive certain militia regiments of their colours, till

*Marshal Beresford restores the colours of certain Portuguese regiments.*

they should have redeemed their character in the presence of the enemy; this, he said, they had had no opportunity of doing, the war having happily been removed far from their own country: but regiments raised in the same parts of Por-

*Dec. 29.* tugal, composed of their brethren and other near kinsmen, and in which, in fact, many of the very men who, in the said militias, had incurred this disgrace, were now serving, had, in the late series of



victories, demeaned themselves so gallantly, that they had re-established the character of their respective provinces; wherefore in justice he ordered that their colours should be restored. Their misconduct, he added, had proceeded not from want of courage, but from insubordination, . . and that, too, not the effect of wilful disobedience, but arising from habits of undue familiarity between the officers and the men, owing to which, the latter were not prepared to render prompt obedience when it was indispensable. He reminded the officers, therefore, how necessary it was that they should obtain the respect of their soldiers by treatment at the same time just, impartial, gentle, and firm; and observed that the provincial governors would see the necessity henceforth of recommending, for commissions in the militia, persons who were qualified by their means and by their local respectability. Marshal Beresford understood the national character. The Portuguese were in no slight degree gratified by this: they were proud of the military reputation which they had now established, and not less deservedly of that national feeling which they had manifested under every circumstance of good or evil fortune. A signal example of this feeling was given shortly afterwards by a battalion of Portuguese and Spaniards, composed of men who had been entrapped into the enemy's service before the commencement of the struggle in their own country. They formed part of the garrison of Dantzic when the allies besieged it; and, knowing that the besiegers were in alliance with Spain and Portugal, no threats or inducements could prevail upon them to bear arms in defence of the city: in consequence of this firm refusal, the French commander compelled them to work upon the fortifications; but they had their

*Correio  
Braziliense,  
t.12, p. 306.*

*Conduct of  
Spanish and  
Portuguese  
soldiers at  
Dantzic.*

reward; and when the place surrendered, they were maintained at the expense of the Russian government till they could be transported to England on their way home.

The Spanish government had shown no want of gratitude to Lord Wellington in conferring upon him honours and rewards; but while in such things they conformed to the national sentiment, their conduct sometimes manifested a want of that frank and generous confidence which ought to have been given in as full measure as it was deserved. In direct breach of the engagement made with him when he accepted the command of the Spanish armies, they had superseded Castaños, and made other changes, not only without his advice and concurrence, but contrary to his wishes, and in disregard of his remonstrances: and this might have produced the most injurious effect, if the war had not speedily been transferred to the enemy's country. Libels were circulated imputing sinister views to England, because some of its troops still remained at Cadiz and at Carthage; and the government allowed these libels to circulate without taking any means for counteracting the impression which the calumny was intended to produce. Lord Wellington withdrew the troops as soon (after their presence had ceased to be necessary there) as he could obtain the Prince Regent's orders; and, in notifying this to the British ambassador, he stated the circumstances under which those fortresses had been garrisoned at the request of the Spanish government itself; expressed his surprise that the existing government, knowing these facts, should yet have allowed such calumnies to pass uncontradicted, and requested that his letter might be published. The Regency was, indeed,

*Ill conduct  
of the Spa-  
nish govern-  
ment to-  
ward Lord  
Wellington.*

*November.  
Change of  
the Re-  
gency.*

at this time the mere instrument of the Cortes, which had displaced the late regents by a summary vote, for demurring to enforce an impolitic decree that the clergy scrupled to obey. Cardinal Bourbon, Don Pedro Agar, and Don Gabriel Ciscar were appointed in their stead to a station which possessed only a nominal authority, the Cortes, under the dictation of a party more ardent than wise, having now arrogated to itself the whole actual power.

A whimsical proof had recently occurred of the readiness with which certain Spaniards accredited any imputation, however absurd, upon the intentions of the British government. A foolish paragraph had appeared in some Irish newspaper, saying, that Lord Wellington deserved to be made King of Spain; and that some of the grandees had offered to raise him to the throne! This found its way to Spain; and the Duques of Ossuna and Frias, the Visconde de Gante, and the Marques de Villena, published forthwith a letter to inform the world, that they neither did, nor would, acknowledge any other King than Ferdinand VII.; . . that they detested and abhorred the very idea of any usurper ruling over the Spaniards; . . and that they were persuaded that the other grandees, as soon as this statement should come to their knowledge, would hasten, in like manner, to give a public testimony of their principles and their fidelity.

Parliament met early in November, under more auspicious circumstances than at any time since the baneful commencement of the French revolution.

*Proceed-  
ings in Par-  
liament.*

England, which had stood alone in the contest against the most formidable military power that had ever existed in the civilized world, was now in alliance, not with the Spaniards and Portugeze alone, but with Russia, Prussia, Austria, Sweden, Bavaria, and Holland. Buonaparte had been driven back over the Rhine; and a British army, after beating the French from the lines



of Torres Vedras to the Pyrenees, had passed that boundary and entered France. Upon this occasion some of those statesmen who had been most decided in their opposition to government acknowledged the wisdom, and rejoiced in the success of that policy which they had formerly condemned.

*Lord Grenville.* “Upon this grand question,” said Lord Grenville, “all party conflicts must be swallowed up and lost; it is the cause of no party, of no set of individuals, but of the whole nation joined in sentiment and in action to effect a great and glorious purpose. Internal tranquillity,” he said, “might be considered as the first, and external peace as the second, blessing that any power under Heaven could confer upon a people; but what we desired and expected was the real blessing of peace, not the empty name; not the shadow, but the substance. Too long did deluded Europe, by temporary and partial truces, by concession following concession, purchase from the insatiable enemy a precarious quiet, a troubled sleep, furnishing to her foe the very means of his aggression, and of her own subjugation. The time, my lords, is now arrived (and I rejoice that I have lived to see the hour) when the walls of a British parliament may again re-echo a sound formerly held sacred in this country, and upon the observance of which, I will venture to assert, depends the hope of the restoration of peace to Europe; . . I allude to the old-fashioned tenet, now almost forgotten, of a balance of power in Europe; and I offer up my thanks, with humble gratitude, to the Supreme Disposer of events, that after so long a period he has permitted me to behold my native land in such a commanding situation, as to be able again to pursue that which ought to be the only legitimate object of foreign policy, I mean, the establishment and preservation of a balance of power in Europe. Now, then, let Great Britain resume her ancient policy: let her once more

perceive that the only mode by which the independence of the great commonwealth of Europe can be secured, is not by perpetual peace (for that is the visionary dream of visionary men), but by the maintenance of this balance, by which, even in war itself, the weak will find refuge from oppression. Whatever plans may be suggested, having this in view, I shall meet with the most earnest wish to find that they are compatible with the interests of the country. I cannot be ignorant of the difficulties that may be opposed: I do, however, fervently hope, nay, I believe, that they may be surmounted. Do me not the injustice of believing that these opinions are the result merely of the exultation felt in consequence of recent and unexpected events. Undoubtedly such events are calculated to warm the heart of every individual who feels not only for the natural rights of man, but for the independence of nations; but those with whom I have been in the habit of confidential communication know my deliberate opinion, that the existence of such a confederation as has now been formed, of itself irresistibly calls upon Great Britain to employ all her energies, and devote all her exertions to the success of a common and a glorious cause. I was prepared to add an exhortation, that as the chances of war must necessarily be precarious, you would prepare yourselves to meet with firmness those disasters which human foresight could not predict, and which human wisdom could not prevent. Even now, under circumstances that might seem almost to justify the confidence of certainty, I offer that exhortation. If in the course of human events (although I see little cause to fear) any unforeseen calamity should unfortunately occur, remember the glorious cause in which you are engaged; it may for an instant damp your hopes, but let it not damp your ardour or shake your resolution. Be assured, my lords, of this, . . . (I

hope you are already assured of it,) that there is for this country no separate safety, no separate peace! There is neither safety nor peace for England, but with the safety and peace of Europe; . . as for continental Europe, it is equally true, that an indissoluble union, a firm confederation with this country can alone secure for all liberty, tranquillity, and happiness, . . can alone obtain peace, now almost beyond the memory of living man. The plain duty of this country, placing its trust in Providence, is to improve by every possible exertion the bright prospect that lies before us. With the energies of Great Britain duly applied, ultimate success may be confidently anticipated; we may now look forward to the speedy accomplishment of that great purpose for which we have already sacrificed, performed, and endured so much, . . and for which we are still ready to sacrifice, perform, and endure."

In the same spirit, Marquis Wellesley declared, that the satisfaction he felt in the events which had now changed the destinies of Europe was with him a principle and not a sentiment. "*Marquis Wellesley.* "It was not so much," he said, "because those events had raised the military reputation of this country and of our allies, that they had the highest value in his eyes, but because they were the natural result of wise and cautious measures, executed with the greatest degree of vigour; and displaying a wisdom of combination and prudence of plan which could not fail ultimately to be rewarded with the success by which they were attended. He would not dwell on former errors; but he would not hesitate to say that the glorious successes which had lately crowned our arms in Spain, and the arms of our allies in the north of Europe, were to be traced to the long train of persevering councils persisted in by the government of this country. Though those councils had not always immediately



produced the results that were expected, they were not the less the cause of what had ultimately taken place. While we were exerting ourselves in a struggle apparently hopeless, at that moment the public councils of this country were of the utmost importance to European liberty; for opportunity was thus given to the rest of Europe to re-consider their former errors, and to learn that great lesson which the example of Britain afforded them. Nothing could be more true than the last words which that great statesman, Mr. Pitt, ever delivered in public, that England had saved herself by her firmness, and other nations by her example. What a satisfactory and consoling reflection was it for us, that from this fountain the sacred waters of gladness and glory had flowed; . . . that to the persevering spirit of this country it was owing that other nations were at last animated to deeds worthy of the cause in which they were engaged, and of the example which was set them!"

Lord Liverpool rejoiced that on this great occasion a spirit of unanimity prevailed in the British parliament. "We had seen," he said, "during the pre-  
*Lord Liverpool.*  
ceding twenty years, coalitions whose size promised strength, crushed by the power of the enemy: what was it then which had given this irresistible impulse to the present? The feeling of national independence, that feeling which first arose in the Peninsula, gave the war a new character, and afforded grounds to hope not only for the deliverance of that country, but of the rest of Europe. There had before been wars of governments, but none like this between nations; and all our principles of policy and prudence must have been belied if the issue of the present confederacy had not been very different from that of any of the former ones. They had before them examples of perseverance unexampled in any other cause than that of liberty; they had seen the least military nations

of Europe become formidable, and successfully resist the best disciplined troops of France. Small as Portugal was, the establishment of the Portuguese army had been of the greatest consequence, as the foundation of the success of the allied armies in the Peninsula; and as it gave, in addition to the general national feeling, a military tone, under the influence of which the Portuguese troops have been raised to an equality with the British. He was advancing no paradox, but a truth which was felt and admitted on the continent, when he said that the success of the peninsular cause gave new life to the suffering nations of Europe."

This theme was pursued in the House of Commons with great eloquence by Mr. Charles Grant.  
*Mr. C. Grant.* "If," said he, "we had shown a dastardly spirit at the commencement of these troubles, where now would have been the deliverance of Europe? There will be no prouder page in history than that which tells of this struggle and its victorious result, . . which tells that at a time when the foundations of the world seemed to be shaken, when all former constitutions were swept away, rather as if by a sudden whirlwind than by any of the ordinary means of destruction, . . there was yet one nation, which, reposing under the shade of a happy constitution, proud of its ancient liberties and worthy to defend them, dared to measure its strength at one time against the unnatural energies of a frantic democracy, at another time against the gigantic resources of the most tremendous despotism that ever scourged the world. If, after this narration, history were obliged to add that in this struggle at last we fell, but that we fell gloriously, with our arms in our hands and our faces to the foe, even this would have been no mean praise: but, thank God, history will be called, not to lament the fall of British greatness, but to celebrate its renewed ex-

exploits and its living triumphs. . . It is to the theatre of these triumphs, it is to that soil which but lately seemed incapable of producing a single effort, that the moralist of after-ages will resort for examples when he denounces the fall of unhallowed greatness. There too will the patriot look for lessons of enthusiasm and disinterested virtue; and this is the glorious feature of the present war. I have heard it observed of America, that her conduct has dispelled those classical associations which we have been accustomed to indulge of republican virtue and republican excellence. The remark was not more eloquently than justly made. But if we are obliged to give up that class of associations, I perceive with exultation that there is another which we may now cherish with additional fondness; I mean, those associations which enforce the belief of instinctive patriotism, of unbidden enthusiasm in the cause of virtue, of the grandeur of self-devotion, of the magnanimity of great sacrifices for great objects, for honour, for independence. We must all recollect with what delight we imbibed these sentiments at the fountains of classical learning, and followed them out into action in the history of great men and illustrious states. But of late there seems to have crept into this nation a sort of spurious and barren philosophy, of which it was the object to decry these associations, to represent them as the illusions of ignorance, or frenzy, or falsehood, to curb the original play of nature, to inculcate coldness and selfishness upon system, and to substitute in the place of all that formed the delight of a higher philosophy, a spirit of lazy deliberation, conducted by apathy, and ending therefore in meanness and dishonour. It was this philosophy which taught that it is not only more prudent, but more conformable to the laws of our being, for every man in time of danger to reason before he followed the prompt-



ings of true courage ; to make it a matter of calculation whether his country be worth saving before he draws the sword in her defence ; to reduce it to a question of algebra, or a problem in geometry, whether he should resist the efforts of tyranny, or bow before the yoke ! The sleep which seemed to have spread over Europe gave too much countenance to these pernicious maxims ; but the hour has at length come which has exposed their fallacy, and rescued human nature from such calumnies. The experience of the few last years has confuted that heartless and bloodless system, the miserable abortion of a cold head and depraved imagination, which never wakened one noble thought, nor inspired one generous action. The experience of the few last years has proved that those high sentiments which we were taught to respect are not false and visionary ; but that they are founded upon whatever is deepest and purest in the human character. It has proved that true reason is never at war with just feeling ; that man is now what he was in those distant ages, . . a creature born indeed to act upon principle, but born also to act upon strong passions ; and that he never acts more nobly, more wisely, more worthily of himself, than when he acts upon the prompt persuasion of grand passions, sublimed and directed by lofty principles."

Even Mr. Whitbread felt it necessary to say, that the *Mr. Whitbread.* proud exultation which then was manifested throughout the nation was hailed by no one, in the House or in the country, with more enthusiastic feelings than by himself ; and that he gave credit to the ministry, and to him who was at the head of it, till cut off by the dreadful deed which every one deplored, " for the great and steady confidence which they had placed in the talents and genius of our great commander," . . that confidence for which Mr. Whitbread and the

party with whom he acted had so often, so confidently, and so contemptuously reproached them ! He insisted, however, that the deliverance of Europe had not been brought about by following Mr. Pitt's policy ; and that if the counsels of Mr. Fox had been listened to, the carnage of the present campaign would not have been necessary. " And," said he, " I am particularly glad to observe the explicit terms of the Prince Regent's speech, in which it is distinctly avowed that no disposition is entertained to require from France sacrifices of any description inconsistent with her honour or just pretensions as a nation. I sincerely hope this feeling pervades the whole alliance ; an alliance with which I am not inclined to quarrel, as I have been with former ones, for it is promoted and cemented by a feeling of common danger and necessity, and not purchased and raised up to oppress France. It has arisen from the keen and indignant sentiment which the grinding oppression of France herself has excited ; and it holds out a memorable lesson to the governments of Europe. France, in the course of her career since the revolution, disturbed and overthrew the ancient monarchies, upon the pretext of their tyranny and despotism ; but when those states passed under the power of France, who was to liberate them, they found themselves subjected to a despotism still more odious, to a thralldom still more insupportable. The Emperor of that country is now in a condition to which, I firmly believe, nothing but his own restless and gigantic ambition could have reduced him : I hope the alliance will profit from this. I do not pretend to know what were the terms proposed to France before the termination of the armistice ; but I sincerely hope that now, in the moment of success, the same terms will still be offered." . . At this there was a general murmur through the House. . . " I am not sur-

prised," he continued, "at hearing this murmur: perhaps I am misunderstood. What I mean to say is, and that I will maintain, that whatever terms may have been proposed to France at that time, as a basis upon which negotiations for peace might take place, I hope the same basis will now be offered, . . or else I see no conclusion to which the war can come."

Mr. Canning was not present during this debate, but he took the first opportunity that presented itself for delivering his sentiments. "If," said he, "in the present state of this country and of the world, those who, during the course of the tremendous and protracted struggle, on various occasions, called upon Parliament to pause, to retard its too rapid and too rash advance, and to draw back from the task it had unwisely undertaken to perform, . . if those persons have manfully and honourably stepped forward to join their congratulations to the joyful acclamations of the nation, and to admit the present to be the period favourable for a mighty and decided effort, how much more grateful must it be to those who, at no time during the struggle, have lifted up their voices in this place, excepting to recommend and to urge new exertions, . . to those who, when the prospects were most dreary and melancholy, insisted that there was but one course becoming the character and honour of Great Britain, . . a persevering and undaunted resistance to the overwhelming power of France! To an individual who, under the most discouraging circumstances, still maintained that the deliverance of Europe (often a derided term) was an object not only worthy of our arms, but possible to be achieved, it must be doubly welcome to come forward and vindicate his share in the national exultation. If, too, on the other hand, there have been those who, having recommended pacification when the opportunity was less favourable, are



now warranted, as undoubtedly they are, in uttering the same sentiments, in the confidence that the country will sympathize with them, it is natural for those who, under other circumstances, have discouraged the expectation of peace, and have warned the nation against precipitate overtures, now to be anxious to embrace this occasion of stating their sincere conviction and their joy (as strongly felt by them as by others) that, by the happy course of events during the last year, and by the wise policy we shall now pursue, peace may not, perhaps, be within our grasp, but is at least within our view. It is impossible to look back upon those times when the enemy vaunted, and we perhaps feared, that we should have been compelled to sue for peace, without, amid all the ebullition of joy, returning thanks to that Providence which gave us courage and heart still to bear up against accumulating calamity. Peace is safe now, because it is not dictated ; peace is safe now, for it is the fruit of exertion, the child of victory ; peace is safe now, because it will not be purchased at the expense of the interest and of the honour of the empire : it is not the ransom to buy off danger, but the fruit of the mighty means which we have employed to drive danger from our shores. I must, with heartfelt delight, congratulate my country, that, groaning as she has done at former periods under the heavy pressure of adverse war, still ‘peace was despaired of, for who could think of submission?’ Her strength, her endurance have been tried and proved by every mode of assault that the most refined system of hostility could invent, not only by open military attacks, but by low attempts to destroy her commercial prosperity : the experiment has been made, the experiment has failed ; and we are now triumphantly, but not arrogantly, to consider what measures of security should be adopted, or on what terms a peace should be concluded.

“ But has this country gained nothing by the glorious contest, even supposing peace should be far distant ? Is it nothing to Great Britain, even purchased at so large a price, that her military character has been exalted ? Is it no satisfaction . . no compensation to her . . to reflect that the splendid scenes displayed on the continent are owing to her efforts ? that the victories of Germany are to be attributed to our victories in the Peninsula ? That spark, often feeble, and sometimes so nearly extinguished as to excite despair in all hearts that were not above it, . . that spark which was lighted in Portugal, which was fed and nourished there, has at length burst into a flame that has dazzled and illuminated Europe. At the commencement of this war, our empire rested upon one majestic column, our naval power. In the prosecution of the war, a hero has raised another stupendous pillar of strength to support our monarchy, . . our military pre-eminence. It is now that we may boast not only of superiority at sea, but on shore ; the same energy and heroism exist in both the arms of Great Britain : they are rivals in strength, but inseparable in glory. Out of the calamities of war has arisen a principle of safety, that superior to all attacks, shall survive through ages, and to which our posterity shall look forward. Compare the situation of England with her condition at the renewal of the war ! Were we not then threatened by the aggressions of an enemy even upon our own shores, . . were we not then trembling for the safety and sanctity even of our homes ? Now contemplate Wellington encamped on the Bidassoa ! I know that a sickly sensibility leads some to doubt whether the advance of Lord Wellington was not rash and precipitate. I cannot enter into that refinement which induces those who affect to know much to hesitate upon this subject : I cannot look with regret upon a British army encamped upon the fertile plains of

France : I cannot believe that any new grounds for apprehension are raised by an additional excitement being afforded to the irritability of the French people : I foresee no disadvantage from entering the territories of our enemy not as the conquered but the conquerors ! I cannot regret that the Portuguese are now looking upon the walls of Bayonne ‘ that circle in those wolves ’ which would have devastated their capital, . . that the Portuguese now behold planted on the towers of Bayonne the standard which their enemy would have made to float upon the walls of Lisbon ! I cannot think it a matter of regret that the Spaniards are now recovering from the grasp of an enemy on his own shores, that diadem which was stripped from the brow of the Bourbons to be pocketed by a usurper ! I cannot think it a matter of regret that England formerly threatened with invasion is now the invader, . . that France instead of England is the scene of conflict ! I cannot think all this matter of regret ; and of those who believe that the nation or myself are blinded by our successes, I entreat that they will leave me to my delusion, and keep their philosophy to themselves.

“ Our enemy,” the accomplished orator pursued, “ who enslaved the press and made it contribute so importantly to his own purposes of ambition, endeavoured to impress upon other nations a belief that Great Britain fought only to secure her own interests, and that her views were completely selfish. That illusion is now destroyed, and the designs of this country are vindicated. We call on all the powers with whom we have been or are at war to do us justice in this respect : above all we claim it of America ! I ask her to review her own and the policy of this country. Now she can behold Buonaparte in his naked deformity, stripped of the false glory which success cast around him ; the spell of his invincibility is now



dissolved ; she can now look at him without that awe which an uninterrupted series of victories had created. Were she now to survey him as he is, what would be the result ? She would trace him by the desolation of empires, and the dismemberment of states. She would see him pursuing his course over the ruins of men and of things : slavery to the people and destruction to commerce, hostility to literature, to light, and life, were the principles upon which he acted. His object was to extinguish patriotism, and to confound allegiance ; to darken as well as to enslave ; to roll back the tide of civilization ; to barbarize as well as to desolate mankind. Then let America turn from these scenes of bloodshed and horror, and compare with them the effect of British interference ! She will see that wherever this country has exerted herself, it has been to raise the fallen and to support the falling ; to raise, not to degrade the national character ; to rouse the sentiments of patriotism which tyranny had silenced ; to enlighten, to reanimate, to liberate. Great Britain has resuscitated Spain, and re-created Portugal ; Germany is now a nation as well as a name ; and all these glorious effects have been produced by the efforts and by the example of our country. If to be the deliverers of Europe ; if to have raised our own national character, not upon the ruins of other kingdoms ; if to meet dangers without shrinking, and to possess courage rising with difficulties, be admirable, surely we may not unreasonably hope for the applause of the world. If we have founded our strength upon a rock, and possess the implicit confidence of those allies whom we have succoured when they seemed beyond relief, then I say that our exertions during the last year, and all our efforts during the war, are cheaply purchased ; if we have burdened ourselves, we have relieved others ; and we have the inward, the soul-felt, the proud satis-

faction of knowing that a selfish charge is that which, with the faintest shadow of justice, cannot be brought against us."

This speech was wormwood to Mr. Whitbread; he animadverted in reply upon what he termed the *Mr. Whitbread.* overweening self-complacency with which Mr.

Canning talked of the share we had had in giving a decisive turn to the aspect of affairs in the North; it was the conduct of this country, he asserted, which had enabled Buonaparte to proceed as he had done in his unprincipled career: Great Britain had made Buonaparte, and he had undone himself. "If there were no broad and definite outline previously laid down," he said, "and firmly adhered to, as to the demands on the part of the allies, or the concessions on that of France, which were to form the groundwork of a general peace, he would venture to predict that before long some one or other of the allies would make a separate treaty founded on its own views or interests. And if we attempted blindly to push our advantages too far, he feared we should rouse the same irresistible power in France which in 1793 had repelled the combined attacks of all Europe, which had since led on the Emperor of the French to his conquests, and which might again turn the tide of success against us."

In pursuance of these opinions, Mr. Whitbread, when a bill was brought in for allowing three-fourths of any militia regiment to volunteer for foreign service, moved to insert in the preamble to the bill, that this was for bringing the war to a speedy and happy termination, and obtaining the blessings of peace upon terms of reciprocity, honour, and security, to all the belligerent powers. What he meant by reciprocity between some of those powers he would have found it difficult to explain; . . . but the proposed inser-

*Militia allowed to volunteer for foreign service.*

tion was negatived as unnecessary, and Mr. Whitbread neither opposed the bill, nor the supplies voted for carrying into effect the engagements of this nation with its allies. Lord Holland approved of the confidence

*Lord Hol-  
land.*

*Dec. 20.*

which was thus placed in ministers. "Although," he said, "great part of the happy results of this war might be justly attributed to a powerful popular impulse, and to that infatuation on the part of the enemy, which, thank God, always attended the long abuse of power, . . yet it must be felt that a great deal of the merit is to be attributed to the conduct of the government of this country. If the sentiments of an individual," he pursued, "are of consequence enough to arrest your attention, it must be in your Lordships' recollection that I always approved of the interposition and interference of ministers in the cause of Spain. The merit of such policy appears, and ever has appeared to my judgment, quite indisputable, and must now indeed be universally admitted; for, aided by the uncommon genius of Lord Wellington, that policy has produced the most important results. It has driven the enemy from that country which he had so long and so unremittingly oppressed. It has presented a most encouraging and impressive example to Europe of what a people excited by oppression were capable of achieving. It has changed the whole character of the war, by making it a war of the people. But a still farther advantage has arisen out of this policy. A most atrocious calumny had become current in Europe, that the government of this country was always ready to distribute its subsidies with a view to embroil the nations of the continent, while it kept its own people aloof from the contest. No such impression can ever again prevail in Europe. The calumny has been effectually refuted by the policy we have pursued with respect to Spain; for there we have not only given our



money but our men; there we have given our money, not to excite the people but to enable them to act, and we have seconded their exertions by a powerful army.

“In declaring my approbation of ministers in consequence of their moderate language and conduct, that approbation is, of course, founded upon a hope and confidence, that the very different language which appears in certain publications has in no degree their sanction or countenance. Sounding a violent and barbarous war-whoop through the country, abounding in coarse, vulgar, virulent epithets, these publications complete their abominable character by excitements to assassination. Although the French ruler has rendered himself so odious by his conduct, yet it must be admitted that he is a great military commander, still at the head of a great nation; and is it fitting that the press of this country should become the means of advising the assassination of such a man, . . . nay, of exhorting to the deed? and what else can be meant by the repeated declaration, that no peace can be concluded while this individual lives? The French ruler is no doubt ambitious, inordinately ambitious; but if it were resolved that no peace should be made with France while it was under the government of an ambitious man, when, I would ask, could peace be expected? The meaning, however, of all the publications I have referred to, may be to recommend the restoration of the Bourbon family; but the attempt at such a measure would be totally inconsistent with the professed moderation and policy of ministers. That restoration might be good; but it would be preposterous to look for the success of such an object through the intervention of foreign armies; and it would be opposite to the policy and principle of ministers to engage in any such undertaking.”

Alluding then to the just remark of Lord Grenville,

that one great advantage resulting from the recent changes on the continent was, that it afforded an opportunity for restoring the balance of power, "I must be allowed," said Lord Holland, "to say, that the re-establishment and maintenance of that balance can never consist in, nor depend upon, particular divisions of territory, so much as upon the existence of a general feeling among the European states, that it is the interest of each to preserve the independence of each and all. Such is the feeling which gave birth and cement to the present confederacy; and therefore I wish that such a confederacy may continue to exist in peace as well as in war. I esteem the principle of this confederacy, because it appears solicitous to preserve the interest of all, without gratifying the peculiar interest of any one; and upon that principle I would rather leave France with such possessions as should make her feel an interest in the common object of the confederacy, than transfer from her to any other state any possessions which might be likely to withdraw that state from the general feeling which it is the interest of peace and Europe to improve and strengthen."

*Terms offered by the allies to Buona-*  
*parte.* It was well for Great Britain and for the continent that Buonaparte was not contented with such terms of peace as the allies, with a generosity which had neither the character of wisdom nor of justice, would a little before this have granted him. Even when he had been driven over the Rhine, they would, according to their own declaration, have left France more powerful than she had ever been under her kings, if he would have consented to give up Italy. Out of Germany and out of the Peninsula he had been beaten; but they would have allowed France to remain with the whole of the Netherlands, and with the Rhine for her boundary, if vain-glory and a blind confidence in

his fortune had not still demented Buonaparte. But he declared that he would not under any circumstances abandon Italy ; and they who ought not, under any circumstances, now to have negotiated with him, prepared to enter France. On his part he collected the largest force that that exhausted country could supply, to resist the impending invasion ; and as it thus became an object of great importance for him to bring to his assistance Suchet's army, and the troops who were shut up in the remaining garrisons in Valencia and Catalonia, he thought this might be effected by dictating a treaty to his prisoner, Ferdinand. Accordingly he sent the Comte de Laforest to Valençay, to negotiate with that poor Prince, saying, that under the existing circumstances of his empire and his policy, he wished at once to settle the affairs of Spain ; that England was encouraging Jacobinism and anarchy there, for the purpose of destroying the nobility and the monarchy, and erecting a republic ; that he could not but grievously feel the destruction of a neighbouring state, connected by so many maritime and commercial interests with his own ; that he desired to remove every pretext for English interference, and to re-establish those ties of friendship and good neighbourhood by which Spain and France had been so long connected ; and therefore he had sent the Comte de Laforest under a feigned name, to whom his Royal Highness might give entire credit in all that he should propose.

*Buona-  
parte treats  
with Fer-  
dinand.*

The Comte accordingly presented himself under the name of M. Dubois, in order that the negotiation might be kept secret, because, if the English were to discover, they would use every means for frustrating it. The Emperor, he represented, had done all he could in Bayonne to accommodate the differences which then existed between

*Conference  
between  
Comte de  
Laforest  
and Fer-  
dinand.*



father and son ; but the English had marred every thing ; they had introduced Jacobinism into Spain, where the land was laid waste, religion destroyed, the clergy ruined, the nobility crushed, the marine existing only in name, the colonies dismembered and in insurrection, and, in fine, everything overthrown. Those islanders desired nothing but to change the monarchy into a republic ; and yet, to deceive the people, they put the name of his Royal Highness at the head of all their public acts. Moved by these calamities, and by the lamentations of all good Spaniards, the Emperor had chosen him for this important mission, because of his long experience, for he had been more than forty years in the diplomatic career, and had resided in every court ; but, as there were so many persons who knew him, he requested that the Spanish princes on their part would contribute to keep the affair secret. Ferdinand had at this time none with whom to consult, except his brother and his uncle, who were both as inexperienced in business as himself. He replied, that so unexpected a proposition required much reflection ; he must have time for considering it, and would let him know the result. Laforest, without waiting for this, obtained an audience on the following day, and then said, that if his Majesty accepted the kingdom of Spain, which the Emperor wished to restore to him, they must concert means for getting the English out of that country. To this Ferdinand replied, that he could make no treaty, considering the circumstances in which he was placed at Valençay, and indeed could take no measures without the consent of the nation, as represented by the Regency. The old diplomatist made answer, it certainly was not the intention of the Emperor that his Majesty should do the slightest thing which might be contrary to the wish of Spain ; but in this case it would be necessary that he should find means of ascer-

taining it. Ferdinand then said that, during five years and a half, for so long he had been absent from his own country, he had known nothing more of the state of affairs than what he read in the French newspapers. Those papers, Laforest affirmed, exhibited the true state of things; and he made a speech of some length to prove what Ferdinand was not so devoid of penetration as to believe. He concluded in words to this effect: "He who is born to a kingdom has no will of his own; he must be a king, and is not like a private individual, free to choose for himself that way of life which he may think most agreeable. And where is he who, when a kingdom is offered him, would not instantly accept it? Yet, withal, if he who should be a king were to say, 'I renounce all dignity from this time, and, far from seeking honours, desire only to lead a private life;' in that case the affair becomes of a different kind. If, therefore, your Royal Highness is in this predicament, the Emperor must have recourse to other means; but if, as I cannot but believe, your Royal Highness thinks of receiving the sceptre, the indispensable preliminary must be to settle the principal bases of the negotiation upon which afterwards to treat, and for this purpose to appoint a Spaniard, one of those who are at this time in France." Ferdinand calmly replied that this required consideration. Upon this Laforest observed, that when a kingdom was to be received, there was not much to consider, reasons of state being the sole rule of conduct. But Ferdinand made answer, that he was far from agreeing with him in that maxim; it was his belief that nothing required greater consideration, and he would take time to deliberate upon it.

Ferdinand could not have acted with better judgment at this time, if he had had the ablest statesmen to advise him. In fact, the straight course was the sure one; for,

though he had been kept in complete ignorance of all recent events, the very circumstance of this proposal was proof sufficient that Buonaparte's fortune had failed, and that his motive for giving up his pretensions to Spain was that he was no longer able to support them. On the morrow, he said to the ambassador that, having maturely reflected upon what had been proposed, he must repeat that he could do nothing, and treat of nothing, in his present situation, without consulting with the nation, and of course with the Regency. "The Emperor," said he, "has placed me here; and if he chooses that I should return to Spain, he it is who must consult and treat with the Regency, because he has means of doing this, and I have not; or he must afford me means, and consent that a deputation from the Regency should come hither, and inform me concerning the state of Spain, and propose to me measures for rendering it happy: any thing which I may then conclude here with his Imperial Majesty will be valid. And it is the more necessary that such a deputation should come, because there is no person in France whom I could fitly employ in this affair." Laforest replied at some length, endeavouring to persuade him that the English and Portuguese governed Spain, and that their intention was to place the house of Braganza upon the Spanish throne, beginning with his sister, the Princess of Brazil. He also pressed Ferdinand to declare whether, when he returned to Spain, he meant to be the friend or the enemy of the Emperor? This was presuming upon the weakness of the person whom he addressed; but Ferdinand was not wanting in presence of mind on this occasion. "I esteem the Emperor highly," he replied, "but I never will do any thing that may be injurious to my people and their welfare; and upon this point I now finally declare that nothing shall make me alter my determina-



tion. If the Emperor chooses that I should return to Spain, let him treat with the Regency, and when that is done, and I am assured of it, I will sign the treaty ; but for this it will be necessary that a deputation should come here and inform me of every thing. Report this to the Emperor, and tell him, also, that this is what my conscience dictates to me."

Ferdinand expressed himself to the same effect in a letter, which on the morrow he delivered into Laforest's hands. Nov. 21. " I am still under the protection of your Imperial Majesty," he added, " and still profess the same love and respect of which you have had so many proofs. If your Majesty's system of policy, and the actual circumstances of your empire, will not allow of your conforming to this course, I shall then remain quietly and willingly at Valençay, where I have now passed five years and a half, and where I shall remain for the rest of my life, if God has so appointed it. It is painful to me, Sire, to speak in this manner to your Majesty, but conscience compels me to it. I have as much interest for the English as for the French, but, nevertheless, I must prefer the interest and happiness of my own nation to every thing. Your Imperial and Royal Majesty will see, I hope, in this nothing more than a new proof of my ingenuous sincerity, and of the affection which I bear towards you. If I should promise any thing to your Majesty, and afterwards be obliged to act in opposition to it, what would you think of me? you would say that I am inconstant, and you would despise me, and dishonour me with all Europe."

When Laforest received this letter from Ferdinand, he observed, that his Royal Highness desired nothing but what was very just ; but he asked whether he designed to treat with the Emperor before he had consulted with the Regency, or after? if after, it would occasion much

delay ; if before, when the business was once concluded with the Emperor, the Regency would instantly do whatever he thought fit. But if his intention in returning to Spain was to continue the war with France, the Emperor would choose rather to keep him in his power, and carry on the war upon its present footing. Ferdinand replied, that surely either the ambassador had not understood him, or he himself must have failed in expressing himself with sufficient clearness. " My declarations," he pursued, " amount to this, that I marry myself to neither power. If the interest of Spain requires that I should be the friend of the French, I will be so ; but if it requires that I should be the friend of the English, their friend I shall be ; and, finally, if this should not suit the Emperor, the Infantes and I will remain well pleased where we are at Valençay. In acting thus I do no otherwise than the Emperor himself would do were he in my place \*." From this resolution Ferdinand was not to be dissuaded, and Laforest accordingly returned with this reply.

*Escoiquiz, Idea Sin- cilla, &c., pp. 83. 100.*

Upon his return, Buonaparte dispatched the Duque de S. Carlos to Valençay to negotiate, on Ferdinand's part, with Laforest ; and a treaty was easily concluded to this effect, that the Emperor of the French recognized Ferdinand and his successors as Kings of Spain and of the Indies, according to the order established by the fundamental laws of Spain ; and that he recognized the integrity of the Spanish territory as it existed before the war, and would deliver up to the Spaniards such provinces and fortified places as the French still occupied in Spain : Ferdinand obliging himself, on his part, to maintain the same integrity, and that also of the adjacent isles and fortified places, and

\* The particulars of this negotiation are stated by Escoiquiz upon Ferdinand's authority, and from that king's own papers.

especially Minorca and Ceuta; and to make the English evacuate those provinces and places, the evacuation by the French and English being to be made simultaneously. The two contracting powers bound themselves to maintain the independence of their maritime rights, as had been stipulated in the treaty of Utrecht, and observed till the year 1792. All Spaniards who had adhered to King Joseph were to re-enter upon the honours, rights, and privileges which they had enjoyed, and all the property of which they might have been deprived should be restored to them; and to such as might choose to live out of Spain, ten years should be allowed for disposing of their possessions. Prisoners on both sides were to be sent home, and also the garrison of Pamplona, and the prisoners at Cadiz, Coruña, the Mediterranean islands, or any other depôt which might have been delivered to the English, . . whether they were in Spain, or had been sent to America or to England. Ferdinand bound himself to pay an annual sum of thirty millions of reales to Charles IV., his father, and, in case of his death, an annuity of two millions to the Queen, his widow. Finally, a treaty of commerce was to be formed between the two nations, and till this could be done, their commercial relations were to be placed upon the same footing as before the war of 1792.

The next step was to notify this treaty to the actual government of Spain. Accordingly Ferdinand addressed a letter to the Regency, being the first communication which he had been permitted to hold with his own country since his entrapment.

*S. Carlos  
sent to the  
Regency.*

*Dec. 8.*

“Divine Providence,” he said, “which in its inscrutable wisdom had permitted him to pass from the palace of Madrid to that of Valençay, had granted to him the blessings of health and strength, and the consolation of never having been for a moment separated from his be-



loved brother and uncle, the Infantes, Don Carlos and Don Antonio. They had experienced in that palace a noble hospitality ; their way of life had been as agreeable as it could be under such circumstances ; and he had employed his time in the manner most suitable to his new condition. The only intelligence which he had heard of his beloved Spain was what the French gazettes supplied ; these had given him some knowledge of the sacrifices which the nation had made for him ; of the magnanimous and unalterable constancy manifested by his faithful vassals, of the persevering assistance of England, the admirable conduct of its general-in-chief, Lord Wellington, and of the Spanish and allied generals who had distinguished themselves. The English ministry had publicly declared their readiness to admit propositions of peace, founded upon his restitution ; nevertheless, the miseries of his kingdom still continued. He was in this state of passive but vigilant observation, when the Emperor of the French spontaneously made proposals to him, founded upon his restitution, and the integrity and independence of his dominions, without any clause which would not be compatible with the honour and glory and interest of the Spanish nation. Being persuaded that Spain could not, after the most successful and protracted war, conclude a more advantageous peace, he had authorized the Duque de S. Carlos to negotiate in his name with the Comte de Laforest, whom the Emperor Napoleon had nominated as plenipotentiary on the part of France ; and he had now appointed the Duque to carry this treaty to the Regency, in proof of the confidence which he reposed in them, that they might ratify it in their usual manner, and send it back to him after this necessary form without loss of time. How satisfactory," he concluded, " is it for me to stop the effusion of blood, and to see the end of so many evils ! and how do I long

to return and live among a people, who have given the universe an example of the purest loyalty, and of the noblest and most generous character !”

This letter seemed to leave the Regency no power of deliberation, but simply to require that they should ratify the treaty. But in fact, Ferdinand, if he had any such wish, had no such expectation ; and he had penetration enough to see that the course of events which had compelled Buonaparte to treat with him upon such terms, must in their consequences restore him to his kingdom ; even though the Regency should, as he supposed, refuse to ‘ratify it, because of their engagement with the allied powers. He gave the Duque, therefore, secret verbal instructions to inquire into the spirit of the Regency and the Cortes ; and if he should find them loyal and well affected to his royal person, . . not, as he suspected, tainted with infidelity and Jacobinism, . . . he was then to let the Regency know, but in the greatest confidence, his royal intention that the treaty should be ratified, if it could be done without injury to the good faith which Spain owed to the allied powers, or to the public weal ; but that he was far from requiring this if it were otherwise. Should the Regency be of opinion, that without compromising these points, the treaty might be ratified, upon an understanding with England temporarily, and until his return to Spain should in consequence be effected, upon the supposition that he, without whose free approbation it could not be complete, would not ratify it when at liberty, but would declare it to have been constrained and null, and moreover as being injurious to the nation ; in that case he wished them so to ratify it, because the French could not reasonably reproach him, if, having acquired information concerning the state of Spain, which had been withheld from him in his cap-

*Secret instructions from Ferdinand.*

tivity, he should refuse to confirm it. But if the Duque should discover that the spirit of Jacobinism prevailed in the Regency and the Cortes, he was then simply to require that the treaty should be ratified; for this would not prevent the King from continuing the war *Escoiquiz,* 108-10. after his return, if the interest and good faith of the nation should so require. This intention, however, was to be kept profoundly secret, lest, through any treachery, it should be made known to the French government.

With these instructions the Duque departed, traveling under the assumed name of Ducós, that his mission might not be suspected. *Macanaz sent to Valençay.* Laforest remained at Valençay, still under a false name, and keeping out of sight, in the same part of the castle which Ferdinand and the Infantes inhabited; and before the Duque's departure, Don Pedro de Macanaz was sent thither by Buonaparte to continue the conferences with this diplomatist. However much the Regency, or rather the Cortes (for the Regency was now the mere organ of its pleasure) might be surprised when the treaty was communicated to them, they were not unpro-

*Jan. 8.* vided for such an event. The Regency accordingly expressed in reply their joy upon seeing the King's signature, and being assured of his good health, and of that of the Infantes, and of the noble sentiments which he cherished for his dear Spain. "If," they said, "they could but ill express their own satisfaction, still less could they the joy of that noble and magnanimous people who had sworn fidelity to him; nor the sacrifices which they had made, were making, and still would make, till they should see him placed upon the throne of love and justice which they had prepared for him: they must content themselves with declaring to his Majesty that he was the beloved and the desired of



the whole nation. It was their duty to put him in possession of a decree passed by the Cortes on the 1st of January, 1811; so doing, they were excused from making the slightest observation upon the treaty, in which his Majesty had the most authentic proof that the sacrifices made by the Spaniards for the recovery of his royal person had not been made in vain. And they congratulated him upon seeing that the day was now near when they should enjoy the inexpressible happiness of delivering up to him the royal authority which they had preserved for him in faithful deposit during his captivity." The decree which accompanied this letter was that by which the Cortes enacted that no treaty which the King might conclude during his restraint and captivity should be recognized by Spain.

Some delay had taken place in the Duque de S. Carlos's journey, owing to the removal of the Cortes from Cadiz to Madrid just at that time. In the interim, Buonaparte, who was now as desirous to withdraw his troops from the Peninsula as, in evil hour for himself, he had once been of introducing them there, sought to accelerate that object. He released Zayas and Palafox, who had been kept close prisoners at Vincennes, and sent them to Valençay. Escoiquiz soon followed them; and Laforest proposed that orders should be given by the Regency, immediately after the ratification, for a general suspension of hostilities, humanity requiring that all useless expenditure of blood should be avoided. The Emperor, he said, had appointed Marshal Suchet his commissioner for executing that part of the treaty which related to evacuating the fortresses; and it now depended upon the Spanish government alone to expedite this business, and effect the release of prisoners; the generals and officers should proceed by post to their own country, and the soldiers

*Zayas and  
Palafox re-  
leased.*

be delivered upon the frontier as fast as they arrived there. This being assented to by Macanaz and Escoiquiz,

*Palafox  
sent to the  
Regency.  
Dec. 23.*

on Ferdinand's part, it was determined that Palafox should be sent to communicate it to the Regency, bearing with him a duplicate of the Duque's commission, in case any accident might have happened to him upon the way; and also a letter in which Ferdinand expressed his persuasion that the Regency had by this time ratified the treaty. But Palafox had secret instructions to see the English ambassador at Madrid, express to him how grateful the King felt for the exertions of the British government in his favour, and communicate to him, in secrecy, the King's real intention in thus negotiating with Buonaparte, in order that that government, far from resenting such a proceeding, should contribute to its fulfilment. The

*Reply of  
the Spanish  
government.*

1814.  
*Jan. 28.*

Regency replied to this second communication by referring to their former reply; they added, that "an ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary had now been named, on his Majesty's part, for a congress in which the allies were about to give peace to Europe. In that congress, they said, the treaty would be concluded; and it would be ratified not by the Regency, but by his Majesty himself, in his own royal palace of Madrid, whither he would be restored to occupy, in the most absolute liberty, a throne rendered illustrious by the heroic sacrifices of the Spaniards, and by his own sublime virtues. And they expressed their satisfaction in the thought that they should soon deliver up to his Majesty the authority wherewith they were intrusted, . . . a charge of such weight that it could rest only upon the robust shoulders of a monarch who, by re-establishing the Cortes, had restored to freedom an enslaved people, and driven the ferocious monster, Despotism, from the throne of Spain."

The Spanish government would have acted thus far prudently in its communication with Ferdinand, if it had abstained from this empty language: *Measures of the Cortes.* but the *Liberales*, as the ruling party called themselves, were, some, vain of their talents, others confident in the uprightness of their intentions, and all alike ignorant of their weakness. If the abler leaders of this party had not proceeded so far as they desired and perhaps designed, they were yet conscious that they had proceeded farther than their functions warranted and than Ferdinand would sanction. They held, therefore, a secret sitting of the Cortes, and deliberated upon the measures to be taken in case the King should pass the frontiers. It was proposed, by a commission appointed to report upon this emergency, that he should not be considered as being free, nor should obedience be rendered him, until he should have sworn to the Constitution in the bosom of the Cortes; that the Generals on the frontiers should send expresses to the government with all speed, as soon as they obtained any tidings of his probable coming; that if he were accompanied by any armed force, that force should be repulsed, according to the laws of war; should it consist of Spaniards, they were to lay down their arms, and those who had been carried prisoners into France licensed to return each to his home; whatever General might have the honour of receiving the King being to supply him with a guard suitable to his royal dignity and person. No foreigner should be allowed to accompany him, not even as a domestic or servant; no Spaniard who had filled any office, received any pension, or accepted any honour from Buonaparte or from the Intruder. The Regency should be charged to fix the route by which the King should proceed to Madrid; and the President of the Regency, as soon as he arrived in Spain, should set out to meet



and accompany him with a proper retinue, and present him with a copy of the Constitution, that so his Majesty, having made himself acquainted therewith, might, upon full deliberation and with entire consent, take the oath which it prescribed. Having reached the capital, he should proceed straight to the Cortes, there to take the said oath, with all the ceremonies and solemnities enjoined: this done, thirty Members of that assembly should attend him to the palace, where the Regency should resign the government into his hands; on the same day the Cortes should prepare a decree for making known to the nation the solemn act by which, and in virtue of the oath which he should then have sworn, the King had been constitutionally placed upon the throne; and this decree should be presented to the King by a deputation, that it might be published with all due formalities. The opinion of the Council of State upon this proposition was required within four-and-twenty hours.

The Council was of opinion that the King ought not  
*Feb. 1.* to exercise any authority till he should have taken the oath before the Cortes. They thought that a deputation should be appointed to meet him, and inform him concerning the state of affairs and of public opinion, both as to the eternal and sworn hatred of Napoleon, and the observance of the Constitution. One member of the Council advised that the deputation should consist of members of the Cortes, two of whom in rotation should accompany the King in his coach till he arrived at the palace; and also that all the soldiers who had been prisoners in France should be detained upon the frontier, and all the King's attendants also, till they should have taken the oath. "It must be believed," said the Council, "that if Napoleon sends Ferdinand to Spain, it can only be for the purpose of laying a new snare for us, and making him the instrument of his iniquitous

schemes, and rendering him, perhaps, odious to a nation which now longs for his presence, . . it must be with the design of fomenting a civil war, in which he may be entrapped, seduced, and compelled to take a part; that the attention of the allies may thus be distracted, and the progress of their operations be delayed. Now, therefore, more than ever Spain stands in need of that energy which hitherto she has displayed against the common enemy; now it is that she must manifest to the King how much she has done for his sake, and how much she loves him; but at the same time how much she loves the Constitution, and abhors the tyrannical disturber of the world. And, therefore, it is now more than ever of importance that efforts should be redoubled for maintaining our armies upon a good footing, and co-operating more effectually for the destruction of that monster."

In this transaction Buonaparte acted towards Ferdinand with good faith, because he had no interest in acting otherwise; so he could extricate his garrisons he cared not now what might become of Spain. Ferdinand conducted himself with as much prudence and as little duplicity as could be expected in his situation. The Liberales miscalculated their strength; their measures implied a distrust of the King; and if he inferred from their language, that, under all its professions of respectful and affectionate loyalty, a defiance was couched there in case he should hesitate to recognise the new order of things, he was not mistaken in its purport and intent.

## CHAPTER XLVI.

PROCEEDINGS IN FRANCE. THE DUC D'ANGOULEME GOES TO LORD WELLINGTON'S ARMY. LERIDA, MEQUINENZA, AND MONZON RECOVERED BY STRATAGEM. PASSAGE OF THE ADOUR. BATTLE OF ORTHES. THE ALLIES RECEIVED AT BOURDEAUX BATTLE OF TOULOUSE. SORTIE FROM BAYONNE. RESTORATION OF FERDINAND. CONCLUSION.

BUONAPARTE had returned to France breathing vengeance. He sent before him two-and-twenty standards taken in the course of his German campaign; and he announced to his Council of State, in troubled and passionate language, the extent of his danger, and his determination of opposing and overcoming it by the most violent efforts. "Wellington," said he, "is in the south, the Russians threaten the northern frontier, Austria the south-eastern, . . yet, shame to speak it, the nation has not risen in mass to repel them! Every ally has abandoned me: the Bavarians have betrayed me! . . . Peace? no peace, till Munich is in flames! I demand of you 300,000 men; I will form a camp at Bourdeaux of 100,000, another at Lyons, a third at Metz: with the remnant of my former levies, I shall have 1,000,000 of men in arms. But it is men whom I demand, full-grown men; not these miserable striplings who choke my hospitals with sick, and my highways with their carcasses . . Give up Holland? rather let it sink into the sea! Peace, it seems, is talked of, when all around ought to re-echo with the cry of war!"

*Buonaparte's  
speech to  
his council.*



Accordingly the obsequious senate placed, in official form and phrase, 300,000 conscripts at the disposal of the minister of war; they were to be taken from the men who had been liable to the conscription in former years, as far back as 1806, with an exception however in favour of those who should have been married prior to the publication of this decree; half this number were immediately to take the field, the others to be held in reserve, and brought forward in case the eastern frontier should be invaded. Comte Dejean, who addressed the senate upon this measure, said that painful as it was thus to call upon classes who had formerly been free from the conscription, circumstances now required such a measure: by this means men would be ranged under the French eagles, who united strength with courage, and could support the fatigues of war; while the younger conscripts would have time in garrisons and in armies of reserve to acquire vigour for seconding the sentiments which inspired them. "The cry of alarm," said Regnaud de S. Jean d'Angely, "and of succour, sent forth by our sons and brethren in arms, still gloriously combating upon the banks of the Rhine, has resounded upon the Seine and the Rhone, the Doubs and the Gironde, the Moselle and the Loire, the mountains of Jura and of the Vosges, the Alps and the Pyrenees. All true Frenchmen are already prepared to meet the wants of their country, . . to meet the dangers and sacrifices which must prevent other dangers and sacrifices far more frightful, both for their extent and for the humiliation which must accompany them. If the coalesced armies could penetrate beyond the Pyrenees, the Alps, or the Rhine, then the day of peace could not shine upon France; there could be no peace till we should repulse the enemy, and drive him far from our territory. Noble sons of our dear

*November.**Proceedings of the French government.**Comte Dejean.**Regnaud de S. Jean d'Angely.*

France! generous defenders of our glorious country! you, who close the entrance of France against the English, the Russians, and their allies, you shall not be left without support in the holy and honourable struggle to which you have devoted yourselves. A little while, and numerous battalions of men, mighty in strength and in courage, will come to aid you in again seizing upon victory, and in delivering the French soil."

"Your Majesty," said Comte Lacepède, "who knows *Comte La-  
cepède.* better than any one the wants and the sentiments of your subjects, know that we desire peace. But all the nations of the continent are in greater need of it than we are; and if, notwithstanding the wishes and interest of more than 150 millions of souls, our enemies should think of presenting to us a sort of capitulation, their expectations will be deceived; the French people show by their devotement and their sacrifices that no nation ever better understood their duties toward their country, their honour, and their sovereign." To this Buonaparte made answer, . . "It is but a year since all Europe was with us; all Europe marches against us now: this is because the opinion of the world is directed by France or by England. We should have every thing to fear, were it not for the energy and the power of the nation. Posterity will say that if great and critical circumstances offered themselves, they were not superior to France and to me." His heart was hardened, or he might now have made peace upon terms which would speedily have enabled him again to disturb the world; but his spirit was unbroken; and his abilities were never at any time so signally displayed, as in making head against the dangers which were about to beset him on all sides. It was no longer possible to keep the people in ignorance of the real state of things: the press, which hitherto under his tyranny had been em-

ployed in deceiving them, was made use of now to excite them, by declaring the whole truth as respected the danger, but suppressing it upon all other points: the allies were charged with breach of faith and inordinate ambition, they were represented as all seeking their own aggrandizement; and the Emperor Napoleon as struggling alone against them, for the honour and the interests of France. He himself addressed the legislature to the same effect, . . . "Brilliant victories," said he, "have illustriated the French arms in this campaign; unexampled defections have rendered those victories useless. Every thing has turned against us. France itself would be in danger were it not for the energy and unanimity of the French. I have never been seduced by prosperity; adversity will find me superior to its attacks. Often have I given peace to nations when they had lost all. . . From part of my conquests I have erected thrones for kings who have abandoned me. I had conceived and executed great designs for the prosperity and happiness of the world. A monarch and a father, I know what peace adds to the security of thrones and of families. Negotiations have been set on foot. I hoped that the congress would by this time have met; but delays, which are not attributable to France, have deferred the moment which is called for by the wishes of the world." When Buonaparte said this, he had no hope of peace, no desire for it, no intention of making any such concessions as would render it possible.

*Buonaparte's  
speech to  
the Legislative  
Assembly.*

As yet none of the other allied armies had passed the frontier; but Lord Wellington was established in France, where, taking into consideration the necessity of fixing the bases upon which the trade with the ports of French Navarre to the south of the Adour should be regulated, he pub-

*British regulations  
for trading  
with the  
captured  
French  
ports.*



lished a proclamation, declaring that those ports were  
*Dec. 18.* open to all nations who were not at war with any  
*Dec. 31.* of the allied powers, and fixing a duty of five per  
cent. *ad valorem* upon all articles, except grain  
and salt, and stores for the use of the army. An order of  
council was also published in England, permitting British  
vessels to trade with these and such other French  
*Jan. 14.* ports as might be under the protection, or in the  
military occupation of his Majesty's arms. To this then  
were the decrees of Berlin and Milan come at last! The  
tyrant who had endeavoured to shut the ports of all Eu-  
rope against British ships and British merchandise, and  
at one time had well nigh accomplished his barbarous  
and barbarizing purpose, saw England now regulating  
the commerce of his own ports, and levying duties in  
France, . . not after his example, with blind and merci-  
less rapacity, but upon those principles of moderation  
and equity, on which her power has been raised, and by  
which her prosperity is supported. Three years had not  
elapsed since the official journal of Buonaparte's go-  
vernment had said, that instead of defending Portugal  
and Cadiz, Great Britain's efforts would soon be required  
for the defence of Gibraltar; that Spain having been  
conquered foot by foot was on the point of being entirely  
subjected; that Wellington's mode of defending Portugal  
had been by abandoning the fortresses and laying waste  
the country, and God grant, said the *Moniteur*, that he  
may one day defend England in the same manner!  
"Our continental system," said the official journalist,  
"is completed; it diminishes your receipts by crippling  
your commerce, and increases your expenses by obliging  
you to keep armies in Lisbon and Sicily. In the mean-  
time the French army, according to our fundamental  
law, lives on the country in which it is making war, and  
only costs us the pay which it would do at home."

“ The credit which sustained the colossal power of Great Britain,” said Buonaparte to his Legislative Body in the summer of 1811, “ is no more. Her allies are either lost or destroyed. She ruins all whom she would subsidize ; she exhausts her own people in useless efforts. But the struggle against this modern Carthage will now be decided on the plains of Spain ; the peace of the continent will not be disturbed ; England herself shall feel the evils which during twenty years she has inflicted on the continental nations. A clap of thunder shall put an end to the affairs of the Peninsula, seal the fate of her armies, and avenge Europe and Asia by terminating this second Punic war.” With what feelings must Buonaparte *December.* now have reflected upon these bootless boasts !

With as little satisfaction too could he reflect upon the result of that fundamental principle of his military system, by which his armies were made to live on the countries wherein they were making war. The principle of the British commander was to demand nothing from the inhabitants, and to seize nothing ; not a single ration was required from them ; they were paid on the spot for every thing which they brought, while Soult’s army drained the adjoining provinces by its requisitions, and his soldiers were rendered at once formidable and odious to their own countrymen by the insolent and lawless habits which they had acquired in the Peninsula. The passage of the Nive had put the allies in possession of a large tract of country singularly fertile ; they obtained great part of their forage from it ; and the right wing by its position on the left of the Adour, commanded the navigation of that river, and often intercepted the enemy’s supplies. In that deep soil, and in a season of continued rain, it was not possible for the army to advance, an individual indeed could with difficulty make his way any where but on the paved road ; . . it was hardly thought bad

walking if the waters were not more than knee-deep.

*Injury done by destroying the woods in this part of the Pyrenees.* One of those unforeseen effects which frequently arise when man interferes upon a large scale with the works of nature, has rendered this country liable to inundations in winter and spring, and to drought in summer. About the

middle of the seventeenth century a speculator\* undertook to supply the French government with ship timber from the Pyrenees; to effect this it was necessary for him to increase the waters of the two rivers, or, as they are there called, *Gaves* of Pau and Oleron; and by turning into them the course of numerous rivulets, he doubled the volume of the latter stream, and increased the current of the Adour so much that a 50-gun ship could cross the bar of Bayonne with less difficulty than before that time was experienced by a vessel with ten guns. He expended 300,000 crowns upon this scheme, succeeded in it, and ruined his family. But permanent evil was occasioned to the country: for when the mountains were clothed with woods, the snow which was collected there melted gradually under their shade, and fed the streams during the whole year; afterwards, when the snow was exposed to the sun and rain, the streams poured down in torrents, rendering the rivers destructive during the winter and spring, and scarcely supplying water enough in summer for navigation.

While the allies waited in their cantonments till the season should allow them to recommence their operations, telegraphic signal stations, to guard against surprise, were formed on the churches of Guethary, Arcangues, and Vieux Monguerre, and these communicated with one upon a high sand-hill, on the north side of

\* The father of Baron de Lahoutan, in whose *Voyages dans l'Amerique Septentrionale* (Amsterdam, 1709, t. i. 149.) these facts are stated: the consequences were related by M. Dufort, of the Gironde, in the Legislative Assembly, 31 Aug. 1814.



St. Jean de Luz, near the entrance from the Bayonne road : so that notice of any hostile movement might almost instantaneously be communicated to the head-quarters. Works were thrown up in front of the left, as the most assailable part of the line, at Bidaut, at Arcangues, and almost on every knoll. On such occasions it was that unavoidable injury was done to the inhabitants. If a chateau unfortunately stood where it was deemed expedient to fortify it, every part was pulled down that did not serve for the purposes of defence ; and all the noble trees around it were felled, while the owner looked on, a sad and helpless spectator of the ruin. These were cases of individual hardship ; nothing could be more honourable to the British character than the extreme care which was taken to prevent all avoidable injury, and this was acknowledged by the people with equal surprise and thankfulness. No army ever behaved better even in its own country than the British army at this time in France, and this was owing to Lord Wellington's regulations. There was another part of the British general's conduct which attracted the notice and commanded the respect of the French people ; he regularly attended divine service, with all his staff, not in the church, but on the sandy beach, the brigade of guards forming a square there. The service of Christmas-day\* was performed there, on a bright frosty day, not a breath of wind stirring, and no extraneous sound but that of a high surf break-

\* As an instance of English character, it is worth stating in a note, that an honest butcher of Slough, near Windsor, Edward Shirley by name, sent Lord Wellington, as a Christmas present, the rump and sirloin of a famous ox. Government forwarded the present, and with the next dispatches Lord Wellington's

letter of thanks arrived, and was forwarded to Slough from the secretary of state's office by a king's messenger. The letter was as follows:—

“ St. Jean de Luz, Jan. 19.

“ SIR,

“ I received the day before yesterday the sirloin and rump of beef which you were so kind as to send

ing at least half a mile from the shore, and flashing in the sunshine.

Towards the end of December the floods carried away the bridges which had been thrown over the Nive, but they were soon replaced. A detachment was sent towards Hasparren to clear the country in the rear of the right wing of the enemy's cavalry under Paris; and on new year's day a small island in the Adour, near Monguerre, was taken from the French without opposition. At this time Clausel was assembling a considerable force on the Gave de Oleron; on the third he drove in the cavalry piquets between the Joyeuse and the Bidouze, and attacked the posts of Major-General Buchan's Portugueze brigade on the former river, near La Bastide, and those of the third division in Bouloc. The enemy turned the right of the Portugueze brigade on the heights of La Costa, and established two divisions there and on La Bastide, on the Joyeuse, with the remainder of their force on the Bidouze and the Gave. The centre and right of the allies were immediately concentrated and prepared to move; Lord Wellington reconnoitred the enemy the next day, and would have attacked them on the ensuing, if the weather and the swelling of the rivulets had not occasioned a day's delay. But on the 6th the attack was made by the 3rd and 4th divisions, supported by Buchan's Portugueze brigade of General Le Cor's divi-

me; which although it did not arrive in time for the new year's day, was a most welcome present for the queen's birthday.

"I beg you to accept my best thanks for it; and to be assured that I duly appreciate the patriotic motives which induced you to avail yourself of an opportunity at the present moment of conveying to me

your sense of the manner in which I have carried into execution his Majesty's commands, and those of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent.

"I have the honour to be, sir,

"Your most obedient, humble servant,

"WELLINGTON.

"To Mr. Edward Shirley, butcher, Slough, near Windsor."

sion, and the cavalry under Major-General Fane; the enemy were dislodged without loss on our side, and the troops resumed their former positions. Mina was at this time with three battalions at Bidarray and St. Etienne de Baygorey, observing the movements of the enemy from St. Jean de Pied-de-Port. The people of the vale of Baygorey had distinguished themselves in the war of 1793 by their brave opposition to the Spanish troops; that spirit had been transmitted to the present generation, and it was called into action by their countryman Harispe, one of the most active of the French generals. They were the only peasantry who manifested any disposition to act against the allies; by their aid, with that of Paris's division, and such troops as could be spared from the garrison of St. Jean, Harispe moved against Mina, and compelled him to retire into the valley of Aldudes. Jan. 12.

These were the only military movements on this side during the month of January; and the state of affairs here was disguised as much as possible from the French people; Buonaparte persisting to the last in that system of falsehood by which he had so long flattered and deluded them. It could not, indeed, be concealed that Lord Wellington's army was wintering in France, though by what train of events it should have arrived there the French were left to guess. But it was affirmed that he had been defeated in the actions before Bayonne with the loss of 15,000 men; that he now thought of nothing more than intrenching himself within his own lines; that Clausel had assumed an attitude which alarmed him; . . . that his situation was becoming more and more critical; . . . that the misunderstanding between the Spanish and English troops increased every day; . . . that the British commander began to fear lest the part of the French

*False reports circulated by the French government.*



army which remained in the camp at Bayonne might cut off his retreat; in fine, that the allies were filled with consternation, and that while they were suffering from want of provisions, their convoys were wrecked upon the coast of the Landes department, and supplied the French with beef and clothing, and with packages of pressed hay, which were sent to Bayonne, and there served out to Marshal Soult's cavalry.

But while the *Moniteur*, in its official articles, dwelt thus upon a chance shipwreck, and attempted, in its usual strain, to deceive the French people, that part of the nation who remembered what had been the state of France before its baneful revolution regarded the progress of the British arms with secret satisfaction, because it offered a hope of the restoration of the Bourbons, and of that peace and security which could be obtained by no other means. The Bourbons themselves thought it was now time for them to take advantage of the course of events, and remind France that by putting an end to their unmerited exile she might put an end to her own multiplied calamities. The Duc d'Angoulême, therefore, with the Duc de Guiche, Comte Etienne de Damas, and Comte d'Escars, sailed from England for Passages, and proceeded to St. Jean de Luz. But as the allied powers, whether wisely or not, had as yet held out no encouragement to the hopes of this royal family, Lord Wellington could receive him with no public honours. Many of the inhabitants, however, hastened to pay their court to him; and the mayor of this little town, expressing to him a hope that the calamities which France had so long endured would soon be terminated by peace, observed, that peace could no otherwise be guaranteed than by the word of their legitimate sovereign; and requested his Royal Highness to convey to the king

*The Duc  
d'Angou-  
lême goes to  
Lord Wel-  
lington's  
army.*

an assurance of cordial allegiance from the municipality and people of that place. Deputations were also sent to him from the neighbouring communes; and, before his arrival, a circumstance had occurred which more unequivocally manifested the disposition of the people. There was an emigrant officer in the British army whose family estates were in the neighbourhood of Pau; a native of that part of the country came to St. Jean de Luz charged by the tenants of those estates to tell him how much they wished to live again under their own old laws and customs, and how happy they should be once more to pay their rents to their old master. The Duc, under the name of the Comte de Pradelles, lived with the utmost privacy, as the circumstances required; but he addressed a proclamation to the French army, and agents were not wanting to circulate it. He called upon them to rally round the *fleurs-de-lys*, which he was come, he said, to display once more in his dear country; and he guaranteed, in the name of the king, his uncle, their rank and pay to those who should join him, and rewards proportionate to their services. "Soldiers," he said, "it is the descendant of Henri IV.; . . it is the husband of a princess whose misfortunes are unequalled, but whose only wishes are for the prosperity of France; . . it is a prince who, forgetting, in imitation of your king, all his own sufferings, and mindful only of yours, throws himself now with confidence into your arms!"

A movement such as this address was intended to excite had already begun, but it was among men who had been trained in better principles than the soldiers of the revolution. An agent of Louis XVIII. had arrived at Bourdeaux, and had found in that city the Marquis de la Rochejaquelein, whom it was part of his commission to see,

*Rochejaquelein comes to the British camp.*

and say to him that the king depended upon him for La Vendée. Rochejaquelein is one of the redeeming names that appear in the black and bloody history of the French revolution. The present Marquis had succeeded to the title, the principles, and the virtues of his brother, whō, in the first Vendean war, had addressed his soldiers in these memorable words: “ *Si j’avance, suivez-moi ; si je recule, tuez-moi ; si je meurs, vengez-moi\*!* ” “ If I advance, follow me ; if I falter, kill me ; if I fall, avenge me ! ” He now went through Anjou and Touraine, and awakened that spirit which the National Convention had not been able, even by its most atrocious barbarities, to suppress. A scheme was formed for delivering Ferdinand from Valençay ; but the person who was to have headed the enterprise died at the time when it should have taken place ; and, indeed, no advantage could have been derived from it then, if it had succeeded. Rochejaquelein’s designs were suspected, and M. Lynch, the mayor of Bourdeaux, who was then at Paris, warned him, by an express that orders were given for arresting him, and bringing him dead or alive before Savary, Buonaparte’s worthy minister of police. He escaped to Bourdeaux, and while remaining there in concealment, heard that the Duc d’Angoulême was with the English army. Upon this he determined immediately to repair to him, and receive his orders ; but before he set out upon this most hazardous adventure he requested an interview with M. Lynch, who was just then returned from the capital. That magistrate, who was always a loyalist at heart, foresaw the speedy overthrow of Buonaparte, and had already given his word to the

\* After Buonaparte’s return from Elba, the Marquis put himself at the head of the Vendéans, repeated these words of his heroic brother, and died, like him, in the same cause.



Polignacs (then in confinement), that if Bourdeaux declared for the king, he would be the first to mount the white cockade; this promise he now renewed to Rochejaquelein, and charged him to assure the Duc of his devoted services, and that he would deliver to him the keys of the town. After many difficulties and dangers, the Marquis succeeded in getting on board a ship bound, with a license, to S. Sebastian's; and, escaping from a storm by which several vessels were wrecked on the coast, he landed at Passages, and hastened to St. Jean de Luz.

When the Duc heard his report of the state of feeling in La Vendée, of the general opinion which prevailed in France, and of the disposition which there was to receive him in Bourdeaux, he declared that nothing should now make him forsake that country in which he had found subjects who were still so faithful. Without delay, accompanied by the Duc de Guiche, Rochejaquelein proceeded to Lord Wellington, who was then at Garitz; he assured him that Bourdeaux would declare for the Bourbons as soon as a British force should approach it; and, as the means of effecting a powerful diversion in aid of that loyal city, he proposed that the British General should send one or two vessels and a few hundred men to land him by night upon the coast of Poitou, escort him some two leagues into the interior, and then leave him there: while they re-embarked and drew the attention of the troops, he would pursue his way alone, and raise once more that loyal race who had exerted themselves so dutifully, and suffered so severely, in the most frantic and ferocious times of the revolution. Lord Wellington listened with great interest to these representations; but he doubted whether the feelings of the people towards the royal family were what Rochejaquelein believed

*Lord Wellington refuses to send an expedition to the coast of Poitou.*

them to be ; and he did not think himself authorized to detach even a small force upon an expedition such as was proposed, when he had no instructions from his own government, and moreover when he was on the eve of great operations, . . for he was now preparing to pass the Adour.

*Mémoires  
de la Mar-  
quise de la  
Rocheja-  
quelein,  
pp.513-28.*

On the side of Catalonia, meantime, all went on favourably for the allies ; for if they were too weak to obtain any advantages for themselves, the enemy was weakened to a greater degree, in consequence of the progress of the war in other quarters. Marshal Suchet made one vigorous attempt in the beginning of December to surprise the corps at Villafranca, where the British head-quarters were established. He made a forced night march in this hope with about 15,000 men ; but timely information had been obtained. Sarsfield's division, which was stationed there, retired across the country to the left ; the British cavalry and artillery fell back about eight miles along the main road to Arbos, where there was a strong position, and whither General Mackenzie moved his division to their support ; and Suchet, having failed in his intention, retired from Villafranca on the afternoon of the same day, and returned to the Llobregat as rapidly as he had advanced. The wants of the Spanish army had now become so pressing that it was necessary to send Sarsfield's cavalry to the rear, where it might be possible for them to subsist, his infantry being sometimes upon the shortest allowance, and without any sure prospect of even that insufficient dole for more than two or three days. His troops must from sheer destitution have quitted the field had it not been for the merchants of Villa-nueva, who, at his earnest persuasion, but on their own credit, and at their own risk, supplied them with provisions from the imports which arrived at that

*Suchet fails  
in an at-  
tempt to  
surprise a  
British  
corps.*

*December.*

port. Not a murmur meantime was heard from the men; nor did they evince the slightest feeling of discontent or jealousy when they saw the Anglo-Sicilian troops, forming part of the same army, duly supplied, while they themselves were hungered. Only if the greater strength of the British soldiers appeared, when they were engaged together in the public works, a Spaniard would sometimes quietly say, "Give us your rations, and you shall see us work as well as you do."

After the Nassau battalions had passed over to Lord Wellington's camp, immediate advice had been dispatched to Sir William Clinton; and the information was with due secrecy communicated to the officer who commanded the Nassau troops in Catalonia; but this person preferring what he considered his military obligations to his national duty, delivered the papers into General Habert's hands, who had succeeded Maurice Mathieu in the command at Barcelona. The French would, perhaps, have been better pleased if he had followed the example of his better-minded countrymen; for that German feeling *The German troops in Barcelona disarmed.* which the officer had renounced existed among the men, and it was deemed necessary to disarm them all, 2400 in number, thus weakening the army of Catalonia, and bringing upon it this additional inconvenience, that the men of whose services it was deprived were to be supported as prisoners, and guarded also. This officer was mortally wounded a few weeks afterwards in a sally from Barcelona.

Suchet's force was still farther weakened by the withdrawal of 2000 of his Italian troops; he then proposed to the French government, as a measure of expediency, that they should dismantle *Troops withdrawn from Suchet's army.* the city of Barcelona, and content themselves with occupying the citadel and Fort Monjuic, whereby 5000 of the



garrison would be disposable for service ; but his advice was rejected, the possession of Barcelona being deemed necessary for the support of the army in Catalonia. About the same time two strong battalions of Spaniards were detached from the Anglo-Sicilian army, at the pressing request of General Roche, to assist him in blockading Murviedro. Tarragona had now been so far repaired as to be in a defensible state ; but such was the exhausted condition of the province that no stores of any kind could be obtained from it for the Spanish authorities.

*Failure of  
an attempt  
against the  
enemy at  
Molins del  
Rey.*

*January.*

While both armies were withheld from undertaking any important operation by the diminution of strength on both sides, and by the increasing difficulties of obtaining supplies on the part of the Anglo-Sicilians, a plan was concerted between Sir William Clinton and Manso for attacking the enemy's cantonments at Molins del Rey and the adjoining villages on the Llobregat: Sir William was to move with 8000 men upon the Barcelona road and attack them in front, while Manso should post himself upon the strong ground in the rear of Molins del Rey, close to the only road by which they could retire. Copons had assented to this project, and agreed to lend Manso and his brigade for this service, both the men and their commander being worthy of all confidence.

*Jan. 17.*

The enterprise failed, because Copons, without making any communication to the English General, instead of sending Manso, chose to go himself with a larger force, set off two hours later than the time which had been agreed upon, and finally appeared on the right flank of the enemy instead of in the rear ; meantime the force from Villafranca having arrived at the hour appointed, the French, who, if there had been the same punctuality on the other side, must have been taken by surprise, were able to effect their retreat over the Llo-

bregat by the stone bridge near Molins, which was well fortified. Upon the first alarm Suchet dispatched troops to support General Pannetier, who was in command there, and manœuvred in the hope of decoying the allies to a dangerous advance : but Sir William was too wary to incur any unwise risk, when the object of his movement had been disappointed. Had Manso been left to execute what had been concerted with him, Pannetier's division must in all likelihood have been captured.

A few days afterwards Marshal Suchet received positive orders from Paris to dispatch for Lyons with the least possible delay two-thirds of his cavalry, from 8000 to 10,000 foot, and fourscore field-pieces. He renewed his representations concerning Barcelona, saying, he should delay till the latest minute his departure from the vicinity of that city, in the hope of farther instructions ; and he advised that, as the mission of the Duque de S. Carlos had produced no good effect, Ferdinand should be sent to Barcelona, with an understanding that France put him in possession of the fortified places, in reliance upon his honour for sending the garrison home. Meantime he appointed Habert to the command of Lower Catalonia, the division of the Lower Ebro being under General Robert, who commanded in Tortosa ; that General was assured that he should soon be delivered, either by succour or by the conclusion of peace ; but at the worst, he was instructed, when his provisions should fail, which would be before the end of April, to make for Lerida, collect his troops there, and by a rapid march through the mountains proceed to Benasque, and so into France. No farther advices having reached him by the first of February, Marshal Suchet moved with the remains of his army to the neighbourhood of Gerona ; and when, in the course of another fortnight, instructions

*Farther  
drafts from  
Suchet's  
army.*

*He retires  
to Gerona.*

came to act as he had advised with regard to Barcelona, it was too late, the allies having immediately upon his removal blockaded that city.

A greater mortification awaited him. Eroles, in the month of November, when confined by a dangerous illness at Manresa, received information from one in whom he had reason to place entire confidence, that a Spanish officer, by name D. Juan de Halen, who was then one of Suchet's aides-de-camp, was desirous of being restored to the service of his country, under his protection. Eroles replied that this was not to be hoped for, unless the officer could make some signal reparation for the injury which he had done to the Spanish name; but that in waiting till this could be effected, he might give proof of his sincerity and earnest of his intentions by communicating such useful information as his situation about Suchet's person enabled him to obtain. Van Halen replied as if he felt himself wounded by being expected to act the part of a spy: there was not much difficulty in overcoming this objection; and he found means of transmitting intelligence from time to time, and, among other papers, a copy of Suchet's cipher. The more important communications were not intrusted to writing, but made orally, through the person by whom this correspondence was opened.

Juan Van Halen, as may be inferred from his name, was a Spaniard of Flemish or Brabantine descent. *Van Halen.* He was a native of the Isle of Leon, and born in 1789. After some years of active service in the navy, he was employed in the engineers; and as an officer in that corps bore a part at Madrid in the tragedy of the 2nd of May. Escaping from the capital, he joined Blake's army after the battle of Rio-seco, and was sent by him to Ferrol; when that place was surrendered, he

*One of his  
aides-de-  
camp opens  
a corre-  
spondence  
with Eroles.*



took the oath of fidelity to the Intruder, and afterwards held a commission in his body guards. He had the good fortune subsequently to be employed in other parts of Europe, and was at Paris when Buonaparte's reverses in Germany rendered it no longer doubtful that the part in which he had engaged must finally be the unsuccessful one. A friend and countryman, who had come to the same unpleasant conviction, advised him to forsake the sinking cause; but Van Halen, in his own words, "could not think of prostrating himself at the feet of the throne and of his country, unless he could bear with him the testimony of some such service as might make him worthy of being received in the arms of Spanish generosity and gratitude, not in those of indulgence, or of strict justice." So getting leave from the then expelled Intruder to solicit employment in Spain, he obtained from the Duc de Feltre an appointment upon Suchet's staff, and provided himself with credentials to Eroles, and also with a letter of recommendation to Sir Rowland Hill.

*Restauration de las Plazas, &c. p. 12.*

After carrying on a correspondence with Eroles for about two months, and arranging with him a plan for attacking some of the places which the French held on the left of the Llobregat, it was agreed that he should come over to the Spaniards and put the design in execution; and hoping both to render service to the cause in which he now embarked, and to conceal the fact of his own desertion, leaving Barcelona in the night, he led away with him from the neighbourhood of that city two squadrons of cuirassiers, to whom he produced a forged order of the Marshal's that they should follow him on a secret expedition. His intention was that Eroles should intercept them, and make them and himself prisoners: but the messenger, whom he had dispatched two days before

*He deserts from the French army.*

*Jan. 17.*

to apprise the Baron of his movements, fell in with a party of hussars belonging to the Anglo-Sicilian army, who were scouring the road to Moncada, and was detained by them; and when Van Halen came to the place appointed, and found that the scheme had failed, nothing remained for him but to provide for his own safety by escaping as soon as he could. Thus his desertion became notorious, and all the plans which had been formed upon the supposition of keeping it secret were frustrated.

But Van Halen's disposition was turned to perilous intrigues and enterprises: he now conceived a design of recovering some strong places by stratagem; and Eroles remembering the *Rovirada* by which Figueras had been surprised, and being himself of an adventurous spirit, entered readily into his views, and went with him to General Copons, whose head-quarters were then at Vich. Copons was not without difficulty induced to give his consent, and they then proceeded to Xerta, where Don Josef Sans, who commanded the force before Tortosa, had his head-quarters. This place was so strictly blockaded that it was certain no tidings of Van Halen's desertion could have reached it; and to induce a belief in other quarters that he had left Catalonia, bills upon Madrid and other places at a distance had been taken up for him. He had possessed himself not only of Suchet's cipher, but of the handwritings which it was necessary to counterfeit; and letters were now written as from the Marshal, informing General Robert the commander that the exigencies of the Emperor's affairs compelled him to withdraw all his garrisons from that side of the Llobregat; that Colonel D'Eschalard of his staff was gone to Tarrasa, there to conclude the treaty for evacuating them; and that he must be prepared to depart with his equipage and field-

*His scheme  
for recover-  
ing certain  
places.*

artillery as soon as orders to that effect should reach him. It was added, that the Emperor had been pleased to honour him with the grand-cross of the Imperial Order of the Reunion, and upon this the Marshal offered him his congratulations. An unlucky peasant was found, who undertook, in the character of a spy of Suchet's, to carry this forged dispatch into the town. So few communications, without a strong escort, escaped the vigilance of the Catalans, that whenever a single messenger was sent, the letter . . written in the smallest compass and in the fewest words . . used to be inclosed in lead, and swallowed by the bearer. Van Halen was well acquainted with all the details of such transactions. If the enemy sent a spy out from one of their fortresses, they usually made a sally, and thus brought him out unobserved, and set him on his way; but the messenger who was to make his way in, approached in the darkness, and made a certain signal with a flint and steel. The peasant, though carefully instructed upon this as upon all other points, forgot this important part of his instructions, and in consequence was wounded by the sentinel: the first part of his errand, however, was not the less performed; the dispatch was delivered to General Robert, and no suspicion being entertained of the stratagem, the man was sent to the hospital, and there carefully attended. But the answer which he should have delivered into the hands of his employers was sent by another person, and consequently not received by those who were expecting it.

Having learnt what had befallen their messenger, Eroles and Van Halen proceeded with their device. A Spanish officer was sent with a letter from Sans, saying he had just received a copy of a treaty signed at Tarrasa by the Spanish and French commanders-in-chief in Catalonia, agreeing upon an armistice of fifteen days for the evacuation of the places

*The deceit  
tried at  
Tortosa.*



named in the treaty, Tortosa being one; he inclosed a letter with D'Eschalard's signature, which it was pretended had accompanied it, and in which it was stated that the chef d'escadron, Van Halen, one of the Marshal's aides-de-camp, would speedily arrive with full instructions. The garrison were on the point of making a sally when the officer arrived: the news of the armistice spread; a free communication in consequence took place with the advanced posts of the Spaniards, and on the next morning General Robert sent out Colonel Plique to make arrangements for evacuating the place; at the same time he liberated some soldiers who had lately been surprised and made prisoners. The Colonel accordingly came at the hour appointed; Van Halen presented himself in his aide-de-camp's uniform, and the Spanish Captain Daura, as having accompanied him from the Llobregat, delivered a letter from Copons. Plique desired to be left alone with Van Halen, whose instructions he was authorized to receive, in case the Spanish commander should not permit him to enter the town. He inquired of him concerning the state of affairs which had reduced the Emperor to sacrifice these places, and Van Halen briefly related the series of reverses which rendered it necessary to withdraw from Spain 30,000 men, leaving only garrisons in Barcelona, Gerona, and Figueras. The Marshal, he said, was before Barcelona, waiting impatiently for their arrival, that he might begin his

*February.* march: his desire was that no man should be left in the hospitals if he could safely be removed; that General Robert should bring away all the artillery he could, and include the public money with his own to avoid all difficulty upon that score: for himself, he added, he must proceed with the same orders to Murviedro and Peñiscola. Plique inquired if the English assented to the armistice, and was assured that they did. He then asked

if the only favour which the Emperor had bestowed upon their garrison was that of granting the grand-cross to General Robert, the Marshal, he said, when he withdrew from Valencia, having promised to recommend several officers for promotion. Van Halen told him he had understood that two Generals of Brigade were made, M. Plique himself he believed being one, and M. Jorry, then at Murviedro, the other. The Colonel appears to have been completely deceived ; but he was instructed to invite Brigadier Sans to a repast before the town should be evacuated, and to request that he would send officers of artillery to take possession of the magazines, and that he would allow the aide-de-camp to return with him into the town, and take up his quarters there. This, Sans said, he was positively enjoined not to permit ; all he could allow was that M. Van Halen, accompanied by a Spanish officer, should present himself at the Puente de Jesus, and confer there with General Robert. When they reached the bridge, Robert did not come out, but he sent the chief of his staff, with several officers, and one company, and they renewed the request that Van Halen might enter ; this of course was refused, and in case an attempt had been made to seize him, Eroles with a body of horse was near at hand. A letter was sent in, inclosing a copy of the forged treaty, and the parties then separated. Van Halen suspected that the deceit had been discovered ; still, however, he carried it on, and wrote to Robert, saying, that as the officers had urged him to do, he should have evaded the presence of the Spanish Colonel, *It fails there.* had he not been strictly ordered by Marshal Suchet to do nothing which could tend to interrupt the good understanding during the armistice ; and being now obliged to communicate without delay his orders in Murviedro and Peñiscola, he was deprived of the honour of seeing him. General Robert answered this by a letter to Sans, regret-

ting that he had not accepted his invitation. Van Halen's letter, he said, gave him no satisfactory notion either of his proceedings or those of his government; and unless he conferred with Van Halen in the fortress, he should not observe the armistice, but renew hostilities that afternoon, and continue them till this aide-de-camp, whom he must see, returned from Murviedro.

It was known afterwards that a spy during the preceding night had entered the town, and his letters made General Robert immediately suspect the stratagem: disappointed of getting Van Halen into his hands, and of taking the Spanish officers in a counter-snare, he took the only vengeance in his power, by putting to death the wounded peasant who had brought the first forged letter. Eroles, meantime, not discouraged by this failure, lost no time in trying the same artifice elsewhere. Mequinenza had hitherto only been observed by part of one regiment; and the garrison, though reduced in number, made incursions for many leagues round, by which means they had laid in stores of provision for eighteen months, and kept the surrounding country in continual alarm. Eroles, on his way from Xerta towards Lerida, sent his adjutant, Don Antonio Mazeda, with Don José Antonio Cid, a member of the provincial deputation of Catalonia, to raise the Somatenes, and by this means cut off all communication with the place; and he dispatched before them a peasant with such another letter as that which at first had imposed upon General Robert. He halted that night a day's journey from Lerida, having in his company Don Juan Antonio Daura, who forged the signatures, Van Halen, and Lieutenant Don Eduardo Bart, who spoke French so perfectly, that he was able to personate a French officer. Here they parted company, the two latter making for Torres del Segre, a place on the river



of that name, six leagues from Mequinenza, and three from Lerida; there they remained in secret, coming out only at night to confer with Eroles, learn from him the state of affairs, and copy such papers as were required, none of which were forwarded till they had been examined by each of the party most carefully. The Baron himself proceeded to the blockading force before Lerida, and appearing there as Commandant-General of the blockade of that place, Monzon and Mequinenza, he reviewed the troops, inspected their posts, and made dispositions for straitening the blockade; meanwhile the forged orders were sent in by a trusty Feb. 9. agent to the governor, General Lamarque. Hither the spy from Mequinenza returned, bringing with him the reply of Baron Bourgeois, the governor, to Marshal Suchet, in which he acknowledged the receipt of his orders, said that he was preparing to obey, inclosed the returns of his force, the state of the military chest and the magazines, and thanked the Emperor for the grand-cross with which he had been pleased to honour him; the same messenger brought also a letter from Mazeda, saying that he had strictly blockaded the place. The reply from the governor of Lerida was in like manner brought him, and he thus obtained the exact returns which he wished, and understood also that both commandants were ready to fall into the snare.

He then set out for Mequinenza, with 300 foot and 40 horse, including a company of Mina's division, which he met upon the way, and ordered to follow him. Van Halen was instructed to join him by a different road, which he did, in sight of the fortress, Eroles having first sent in dispatches, signed in D'Eschallard's name, and sealed with the seal of the staff, informing the governor of the pretended armistice, and stating that the two aides-de-camp, Van Halen and Captain Castres,

would go round to the fortresses with the necessary orders; he accompanied this with a letter in his own name, announced the arrival of an officer from Marshal Suchet, and requested to be informed what number of officers the French Commandant would bring out to confer with this officer in his presence, that he might present himself with an equal number; coming himself, if the Commandant came, or deputing one of his chief officers, if General Bourgeois should think proper to act by delegate: in either case, his troops should be drawn out at an equal distance with those of the French from any central point which the Commander might please to name. Time and place were accordingly appointed, and Van Halen in his French uniform, and Bart as his orderly, went to the conference without an escort, and with an effrontery which prevented all suspicion. Van Halen presented a letter as from Suchet, in which the Marshal was made to say how painfully he felt the circumstances which compelled him to give orders for evacuating places wherein, at the cost of so many sacrifices, they had planted their victorious banners. But unexampled defections had forced the Emperor to this measure; and his object now was, to preserve these brave garrisons, and place them once more in the first rank of his bayonets. His aide-de-camp was charged with verbal communications. Van Halen acted his part perfectly; and having arranged everything for the march of the troops, who were to evacuate the place on the following noon, Eroles hastened with his subtle agent to Lerida, there to repeat the stratagem.

The news that Mequinenza was recovered had already spread; but none of the circumstances were known, and the better to deceive the French, it was now necessary to deceive the Spaniards also. Eroles, therefore, issued an order of the day, stating that Mequinenza was that day to be evacuated, and that Lerida and

*Success at  
Lerida;*

Monzon were to be given up by the same treaty ; and commanding the Spaniards not to molest the French during the twelve days' truce, but to treat them with that generosity which characterized the Spanish nation. He had approached the blockading force amid the rejoicings of the people, who gathered round him on his way. General Lamarque's suspicions were completely disarmed ; and when he requested that Van Halen might be allowed to enter the place and confer with him, because his own orders did not permit him to go beyond a certain distance from it, Van Halen, relying upon his courage and his strength of countenance, ventured in. The governor met him on the bridge, and they retired into an adjoining house, where, after some searching questions, he produced a dispatch received, as he said, by an emissary who had recently arrived, in which the Marshal approved of some proposals for the further security of the place, and held out a hope of succouring him in the course of a few weeks. Van Halen answered by a reference to the date of his own letter, and the recent events which had produced an alteration in the Marshal's views. The conversation turned upon the Spanish Generals, and the circumstances of the blockade ; and Van Halen took occasion to represent that Eroles seemed hurt by the General's declining to communicate with him in person, when he, in proposing such a meeting, had gone beyond the line of his instructions from General Copons. The French General, upon this, not to be outdone in courtesy, sent to offer a meeting ; and went accordingly beyond his own advanced posts with *Feb. 14.* his treacherous companion. At this interview everything was arranged, and three o'clock on the following afternoon was fixed upon as the hour for evacuating the city. Van Halen was invited to return with the General, and be his guest that night ; but he pleaded the neces-



sity of hastening to Monzon as his excuse, and thither he departed with a Spanish escort.

Monzon had been besieged by part of Mina's troops since the end of September, to the great distress of the inhabitants, who were under the guns of the fortress. The besiegers attempted to mine the rock on which it was placed. There was but one man belonging to the engineers in the place, and he was a simple miner; but, being a man of great ability, the commandant and the garrison confided in him; and the works which were executed under his direction were so skilfully devised, that they baffled all the attempts of the assailants, and they had in consequence converted the siege into a blockade. Here Van Halen had two difficulties to overcome with the Commandant: a report had reached him that there was a Spaniard at this time with Eroles who had served as aide-de-camp to Suchet; and, the place being held under the orders of the governor of Lerida, he could not surrender it, without sending to receive his instructions. The suspicion which the report ought to have excited seems to have been removed by the confidence with which Van Halen presented himself. And the second objection was easily disposed of: the false aide-de-camp, though he might reasonably judge that the real purport was to discover whether or not there was any fraud in the business, knew that Lerida had by this time been delivered up; he prevailed upon the blockading force, therefore, to let an officer pass with this commission, and required the Commandant to hold himself in readiness for marching as soon as he should return. The officer accordingly arrived before Lerida on the night after its surrender. Eroles affected anger when he heard his errand, and declared that, if there were any further delay, the treaty as it respected Monzon should be

and at

Monzon.

Suchet, 2.

n. pp. 371,  
372.

annulled, and he would march against it and reduce it to ashes. The officer, finding him in possession of Lerida, was confounded, made what excuse he could for his superiors, and faithfully promised that Monzon should be given up immediately on his arrival there; and this was done.

Monzon was at this time stored for seven months, Mequinenza for eighteen, and Lerida for two years. By the recovery of these places, 40,000 inhabitants were saved from the miseries of a siege, and 6000 Spanish troops were rendered disposable for other service. The navigation of the Ebro, the Cinca, and the Segre was restored, and the most fertile part of Catalonia delivered, Aragon secured, and a direct communication opened with Lord Wellington's army. The next business was to secure the garrisons who had been thus deceived, amounting to more than 2300 men. As soon as Eroles had taken measures for preserving order in Lerida, which, under such circumstances, required extraordinary care, he set out with two battalions of infantry and 200 horse in the rear of the French, Colonel Don Josef Carlos having gone before them with an equal force. The intention was to intercept them in the defiles of Igualada; but they made a forced march, and frustrated this part of the plan. Upon this, lest they should succeed in effecting a junction with the troops in Barcelona, part of the blockading army was sent for; and when they arrived at Martorell, they found themselves surrounded there. General Lamarque was then informed that he had been deceived by a stratagem of war; and that nothing remained for him but to lay down his arms, give up the public treasure, and to submit to fortune. Eroles expressed his personal esteem for the General, and his sorrow that the misadventure should have fallen upon

*The three  
garrisons  
made pri-  
soners.*

him; he promised that the officers should be sent to Tarragona, and receive every attention which could alleviate their imprisonment; and he observed, that the General himself could not but in his heart approve a stratagem by which so much bloodshed and misery was prevented, as must have attended the reduction of these places, whether by siege or by blockade. Lamarque upon this asked if Van Halen was a Spaniard; and Bourgeois remarked upon the answer, that in truth he had rendered a great service to his country. The former said he had been dreaming for the last five days, and hardly knew if he were yet awake.\*

Chagrined as Marshal Suchet was by the success of what, though he might justly deem it treachery in the agent, he could not but consider to be an allowable stratagem on the part of an injured, enterprising, and ever active enemy, . . it was even more mortifying for him immediately afterwards to make overtures, by order of

*Suchet dismantles  
Gerona and  
other  
places.  
Suchet,  
2, 374.*

the minister at war, to General Copons for evacuating all the places which he yet retained, Figueras only excepted; and to find the allies so confident of speedily obtaining them unconditionally that his proposals were disregarded.

In retiring from the vicinity of Barcelona he had destroyed

\* This statement is drawn up from the printed narrative by Van Halen, and from a manuscript one by Eroles. Marshal Suchet's brief account is erroneous in stating that Tortosa was the last place at which the stratagem was tried instead of the first. He says that Van Halen deserted, *monté sur un cheval dérobé, et laissant à Barcelone des dettes criardes*. (T. 2. 366.) Concerning the horse, it is not likely that in such circumstances the adventurer would be scrupulous; but as to his debts, he left a letter at Barcelona, saying, that there were

the arrears of his pay to liquidate them, being more by one-half than all that he owed amounted to.

Van Halen afterwards got into the Inquisition as a freemason and a liberal, got out of it, published his adventures in English, went to Brussels, headed the inhabitants in that insurrection the success of which they have had so much reason to repent, was suspected of treachery by the party whom he had served, thrown into prison, and after awhile released. And there the drama of his unquiet life breaks off.



his works at the bridge of Molins del Rey, and in the pass of Moncada, and at Mongat; he now found it necessary to demolish the fortified posts at Besalu, Olot, Bascara, Palamos, and other smaller places; and even to dismantle Gerona, evacuate it, and retire with the remains of his army to the neighbourhood of Figueras. Jaca, too, about the same time was compelled to surrender to a part of Mina's army.

On the Biscayan coast Santona was the only place which still remained in the enemy's power; the garrison were blockaded; but they contrived to get supplies by sea, sometimes by successful runners from the opposite side of the bight, sometimes by capturing traders that approached too near, for they had one or two armed vessels in the port; but more by means of smugglers, who ran in for the sake of a good market, and in the spirit of their illicit occupation cared not with whom they dealt. The British depôts had been removed from Bilbao and S. Sebastian's; and, notwithstanding the stormy season, the army was always abundantly supplied, except with fodder; when this failed, bruized furze was used: the horses ate it with avidity, and kept in excellent condition. The men, during this inaction, suffered more; some of the corps were very sickly; and one regiment, which lost many men by a fever, was sent into the rear, both for change of air, and that it might be removed from intercourse with the rest of the army. The rain sometimes rendered it difficult to communicate with the more distant corps: a Portuguese brigade belonging to Sir Rowland was once four days without bread or meat, a rivulet, small at other times, being so swoln as to become impassable. But in general, money was the scarcest article: dollars, which were exchanged at so low a rate after the spoils at Vittoria, sold now for eight shillings each.

*State of  
Lord Wel-  
lington's  
army.*

The disposition of the French towards the Bourbons could at this time be so little doubted, that though the allies did not yet openly support their claims, dies were made to cut out fleurs-de-lys for scarfs, to be worn on the arms of those who might be willing to declare in favour of the old loyal cause. During the weeks of inactivity which the season occasioned, preparations were made for crossing the Adour, investing Bayonne, and carrying the war into the heart of France. The snow on the lower range of the Pyrenees had visibly lessened on the 6th, and in the course of a week had wholly disappeared. On the 14th of February, Sir Rowland put the right of the army in motion, drove in the enemy's piquets on the Joyeuse river, attacked Harispe's position at Hellete, and compelled him to retire with loss towards St. Martin. That General then took up a strong position in front of Garris, on the heights of Le Montagne, where he was joined by troops from the enemy's centre, and by Paris with his division, who, having commenced their march toward the interior of France, had been recalled because of the danger in this quarter. On the same day the detachment of Mina's troops in the valley of Bastan advanced upon Baygorrey and Bidarrey, and blockaded St. Jean de Pied-de-Port, Sir Rowland having cut off the direct communication of the enemy with that fort. On the morrow, Morillo, after driving in their advanced posts, was ordered to move toward St. Palais, by a ridge parallel to that on which they had taken their position, that he might turn their left, and cut off their retreat upon that road by the bridge of St. Palais, while the second division under Sir William Stewart should attack in front. The day was far gone before the attack could be commenced, and the action lasted till after night had closed: the position, though re-

*Operations  
are re-  
newed.*

*Feb. 15.*

markably strong, was carried without much loss on the first effort; many gallant attempts were made to recover it, and as gallantly resisted; the struggle was more obstinate in the darkness than it had been while daylight lasted, and the French being encountered in all their charges with the wonted resolution of British troops, more men were bayoneted than usual in proportion to the numbers engaged. The enemy at length gave up the contest, and retired with considerable loss, leaving ten officers and about 200 men prisoners; but they reached St. Palais before Morillo could arrive, and crossed the Bidouze during the night, and destroyed the bridges. The right of the centre made a corresponding movement with the right wing on these two days, and the allied posts were this evening on the Bidouze. The bridges were repaired; Sir Rowland crossed the next day, and on the following drove the enemy across the Gave de Mouleon. They attempted to destroy the bridge at Arriverete, as if it were their intention to dispute the passage, but time was not allowed them to complete its destruction; and a ford having been discovered above the bridge, the 92nd, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Cameron, crossed there, covered by the fire of Captain Beane's troop of horse artillery, which was advantageously placed; this regiment made a gallant attack upon two battalions of French infantry in the village of Arriverete, and drove them out with much loss. The enemy retired in the night across the Gave d'Oleron. Sir Rowland's posts were established on that Gave the next day; and the French took up a position in the neighbourhood of Sauveterre, where they were reinforced. The position was very strong, and covered in front by a broad and rapid river; but it seemed now as if no position, however advantageous,



could give the French confidence; they had been driven during the last four days from a country of peculiar difficulty, where frequent rivers afforded them great opportunities for defending it; and when Marshal Soult understood with how little success it had been defended, he directed his whole attention to that side, destroyed all the bridges over the Adour, which were not protected

*Feb. 22.* by Bayonne, left that place to its own resources, and, concentrating his forces behind the Gave de Pau, fixed his head-quarters at Orthes.

*Preparations for crossing the Adour.* During these operations the left wing of the army continued to observe Bayonne, with the 4th division, also, which occupied the heights of Monguerre, communicating with the left on the Nive, and resting its right on the Adour, and thus preventing the enemy from drawing any supplies for the fortress from that side of the river. Preparations had been made for passing that river, and for throwing a bridge over it, both below Bayonne, . . enterprises so difficult, that though Soult had witnessed the passage of the Douro, he seems not to have apprehended that they would be attempted. His attention had now been withdrawn from that side by Sir Rowland's movements; the 4th division moved to the right to support that larger part of the allied army which was now assembled on the Gave d'Oleron; the 5th replaced it in the position of Monguerre, and was itself replaced by Lord Aylmer's brigade of the first, and the Portuguese under Colonel Campbell: thus making room for Freyre's Spanish division, which had been cantoned within their own frontier, and now, to the dismay of the inhabitants, re-entered France. The people lamented the departure of the English, and dreaded the arrival of the Spaniards; and knowing their vindictive spirit,

and the long provocation which it had received, they expressed their earnest hopes that some English authorities might be left for their protection.

Adour is like Gave, a name common to many rivers in the Pyrenees, both simply meaning water in some of those primeval languages, the remains of *The Adour.* which are still widely preserved in the appellations of rivers and mountains. The greater and noted streams, into which the others are received, has its sources in the county of Bigorre, under the Pics du Midi and d'Espade, two of the highest mountains in the chain; it passes by Campan, Bagnères, Montgaillard, and Tarbes, and begins to be navigable near Grenade, a small town in the little county of Marsan; having been joined by the Douze on its right below Tartas, it inclines to the southwest from its junction, passes Acqs, and then holds an almost southerly course to meet the Gave de Pau, which brings with its own waters those of the Gave d'Oleron, into which the Gave de Mauleon has been received. The Adour is then joined by the Bidouze, and lastly by the Nive. Formerly it made a turn to the northward, after that junction, at Boucaut, below Bayonne, and held for about six leagues a slow and winding way, parallel with the coast, before it entered the sea at Cape Breton, its direct course having apparently been obstructed by an accumulation of sand. But towards the latter part of the sixteenth century, Louis de Foix, whose water-works at Toledo were then among the wonders of machinery, and who built the lighthouse at the mouth of the Garonne, (the Smeaton and the Telford of his age,) opened the present channel, . . an arduous undertaking, in which he was more than once foiled. His intent was, by erecting a dam across the river at its curvature, to force it into a straighter line, and make it clear a way for itself through the sands: the river again and again

swept away his embankments, but he, with a just confidence in his own theory, persevered in the attempt; at length, on the day of St. Simeon and St. Jude, in the year 1579, such torrents poured down from the

*Pierre de Marca. Histoire de Beurn, p. 28.* Pyrenees, that Bayonne was in danger of being destroyed by an inundation; the Adour took then, with its increased weight of water, a

straight course, and the engineer was rewarded for all his anxieties by beholding the complete triumph of his art. The Bayonnese, however, ascribed the whole

*Thuanus, l. 80. T. 3. p. 619.* merit, not to him, but to the two joint Saints of the day, and appointed a commemorative

thanksgiving to be celebrated annually from that time forth upon their festival. An excellent port would now have been formed in the Adour, if the constant tendency of the sea to throw up a bar at its entrance could have been overcome. With this view the French government constructed massive stone embankments on both sides, from Boucaut to the sea; it was hoped that by thus confining the stream, its current, which at ebb tide runs about seven miles an hour, would with its own force and weight of water keep always a clear channel; but the effect was only to remove the bar somewhat farther, without lessening the difficulty or the danger of the entrance. These were so great, that the enemy at this time relied on them. They had the Sappho corvette anchored so as to flank an inundation which protected the right of their intrenched camp; they had many armed boats on the Adour, above the town, to protect the convoys of provision which came down the river, and sometimes succeeded in getting in; the mountain guns of the allies, which were the only ones that could be removed, now and then exchanged shots with these: below Bayonne they had some gun-boats in the bend of the river, by the village of Boucaut,



stationed there, as it seemed, to strengthen their intrenched camp by a flanking fire; but the only precaution that the enemy had taken to impede the passage, was that of removing the signal staff on the left bank, which marked the line for vessels to steer by, in making for the mouth of the river.

A number of Spanish *chasse-marées* had been collected at Socoa for forming a bridge; materials also were ready for a boom to protect it. The *Passage of the Adour.* naval part of the operation was under Admiral Penrose's direction, and the 21st was the day appointed for the attempt; but the weather proved unfavourable, and it was not possible for the vessels and their convoy to get out of Socoa. Sir John Hope, however, would not delay his movement, and resolved to attempt the passage without naval co-operation; the troops, it was thought, might be towed over upon rafts formed of pontoons, and carrying about 100 men each. On the evening of the 22nd, the troops were ordered to be in readiness for marching at midnight; they had with them a brigade of 18-pounders, and a rocket detachment which had arrived at Passages a few days after the passage of the Nive. There was a prejudice in the army against this weapon, which had hitherto not been used in the field; the opinion seems to have been, that if it had been an efficient means of destruction, it would sooner have been borrowed from the East Indian nations. Lord Wellington, however, was willing that they should be tried; and some experiments which were made at Fontarabia gave reason for supposing that they might be found useful on the Adour. The direction of this new arm was assigned to Sir Augustus Fraser, but the trial was to be made under all the disadvantages of inexperience; for the corps was composed of men hastily brought together, and entirely ignorant of the arm they were to use; and the rockets themselves

were equipped in five different ways, and consequently liable to as many failures. Altogether the enterprise was one of no ordinary hazard ; the entrance of the river was frequently impracticable, and always perilous ; its width where it was to be bridged was 270 yards, and the tide and the ripple were there so formidable as to preclude the use of anything smaller than decked vessels of twenty or thirty tons burthen ; the navigation from Socoa was uncertain ; and there were the corvette and the flotilla of gun-boats to assist a garrison which consisted of more than 10,000 men. Yet even those who fully understood the difficulties of the operation had nevertheless full confidence that it would succeed.

Soon after midnight the troops were in motion ; when within a short distance of Anglet, they turned by a cross-road toward the coast, marching in strict silence along the skirts of the enemy's outposts. It was a dark night, the road narrow, deep in mud, and with ditches on either side ; one of the 18-pounders was drawn too near the edge in the darkness, the side of the road gave way under its weight, and it sunk into the ditch, dragging the near horses after it. This delayed the march for some time, till, by the greatest exertions, the gun was drawn up out of the deep mud ; but no ill consequence arose from this mischance ; the enemy were not on the alert, and the troops arrived before daylight on the sand-hills which border the coast from the vicinity of Biaritz to the mouth of the Adour : the tract between these hills and the intrenched camp is almost wholly covered by the pine-wood called the Bois de Bayonne. At daybreak, two light battalions of the German legion patrolled through the wood, and dislodged the enemy's piquets, which retired from thence, and from the village of Anglet, into the intrenched camp. The first brigade of guards, under Colonel Maitland, debouched from the wood near the

place where the signal-staff, known by the name of the *Balise Orientale*, had stood, which was on a high sand-hill nearly opposite Boucaut. The ground here could not be reconnoitred till the enemy's piquets were driven in; and this of course was avoided till the last moment, that no alarm might be given. It had been supposed that the guns might be brought within 700 or 800 yards of the Sappho, and that they might sink her, lest she should be employed against the bridge; but, when they had been brought with great labour through the deep sandy ground, it was necessary to place them where they were sheltered from the guns of the intrenched camp, and this was in a situation 1500 yards from the corvette. There they were placed in battery, and the brigade was posted behind some sand-hills, close to the marsh which protected the front of the camp. Don Carlos d'España meantime made a demonstration on the heights above Anglet, to prevent the enemy from detaching any troops.

As soon as the French saw the brigade debouching from the pine-wood they commenced a cannonade against it from their gun-boats. This had been foreseen; the rocket-corps had, therefore, been divided into three parties, one of which went, with the first division, towards the mouth of the Adour, and the other two accompanied the 18-pounders to be employed against the flotilla. There were twelve boats to assist the Sappho; but when a few rockets had been discharged, the terrified sailors took to their oars, and made all speed up the river; the effect, indeed, of these weapons was most terrific; they dashed through the water like fiery serpents, and pierced the sides of the boat, burning apparently even under water with undiminished force. The guns meantime opened upon the corvette, and fired about 400 rounds at her, some toward the conclusion with hot shot. This failed to set her on fire; and when



the three-coloured flag was shot from the flag-staff, the enemy presently nailed it to the mast-head ; but after some hours the French retired from the contest, under the protection of the citadel, their captain having been killed, and 34, out of a crew of 40 men, killed or wounded, . . . sacrificed, as it should seem, in a display of courage which could be of no avail. The action had served as a spectacle for the inhabitants of Bayonne, who came out from the promenade which skirts the river, to witness, and apparently to enjoy it, . . the day being remarkably fine, and the action itself, with all its circumstances, as described by an eye-witness, more resembling some festival display than the dreadful reality of war ; the spectators, too, thought themselves at safe distance, till one poor fellow came rashly within range of the guns, and had his head carried off by a shot which passed completely through the corvette.

That vessel had not been destroyed, but the attack on it, and the other demonstrations in front of the intrenched camp, had the desired effect of occupying the enemy's whole attention ; a bend which the Adour makes on the seaward side of the town, and the pine-wood, which extended almost close to its banks, prevented them from seeing the movements of the allies on that side, and they kept little watch there, because they apprehended no danger. But meantime the whole of the first division, except the brigade of guards which accompanied the artillery that attacked the Sappho, had marched to attempt a passage near the mouth of the river. With this force there were eighteen pontoons and six small boats, forty rocketeers, and an officer with a few artillerymen, destined to spike the guns of a battery on the enemy's side of the water. The intention was, to construct six rafts, each upon three pontoons, by which, in two passages, 1200 men might be passed across before

the day should dawn ; 1200 more being ready to follow, while these held their ground, supported by twelve field-pieces from the left bank. But, owing to the difficulty of getting the pontoons on, it was found that only three of them could be brought to the water's edge before day-light ; and therefore it was deemed advisable by the officers in command to withdraw the troops behind some sand-hills, where they were quite concealed, and collect the pontoons. Some of the officers, meantime, before day broke, examined the shore, to see where would be the most favourable points for putting the rafts into the water ; the sentry on the opposite bank challenged them, but no answer was returned, and no alarm taken. Sir John Hope came to the spot at day-light, but afterwards sent orders to attempt the passage, at all hazards, when the tide would permit. A little before noon the river became passable, the tide, still running out, being nearly slack. At this time the fleet from Socoa was in sight, but at considerable distance, and with an unfavourable though not a strong wind, rather losing than gaining ground. The river at the point where the passage was to be attempted appeared to be about 200 yards wide at low water. The British made no show of men, and could only see a small piquet of the enemy's on the other side ; this piquet appeared at a loss what to do, and as soon as the first boats were carried to the water's edge on men's shoulders, they fairly ran off, without discharging a single shot, the piece of their advanced sentry having missed fire. The six boats were soon on the water, each carrying only six soldiers ; and the tide coming in soon increased the labour of the passage. A rope was passed from one side to the other, and three rafts were put together with all speed, each carrying from 50 to 60 men ; but, after two or three passages had been effected, the tide came in with such force that it

was found impracticable to get the raft either backward or forward from the middle of the current, where it remained tide-bound, the united strength of all who were on board not being sufficient to haul with any effect upon the hawser. About five o'clock they ceased working, the few seamen whom they had, and who were all Portuguese, being exhausted with fatigue. By that time 500 of the guards had been ferried across, the rocketeers having been the last, with Captain Lane of the artillery, who came out with them from England. All was at this time quiet, and apparently the day's work was done. But a little before dusk the enemy pushed down two regiments from the citadel; they came on with apparent spirit, beating the charge. Colonel Stopford posted the guards behind some low sand-hills, with their right on the river, and their left on a morass, the ground in their front being flanked by the artillery on the opposite bank; but a well-directed discharge of rockets made the French hastily retreat: the effect of this weapon was more terrible because they had never before witnessed it, and they retired with all speed into the citadel.

The troops bivouacked that night on the ground which they occupied; those who were in the wood felled trees and kindled fires. As soon as the tide served more men were passed across, the pontoons being used as row-boats, carrying fifteen men at each turn: it was bright moonlight, the weather perfectly still, and there was no enemy to offer any opposition. The wind sprung up for the flotilla during the night, and at morning it was seen, . . . about threescore vessels, including boats of all kinds, some of them near the mouth of the river, standing off and on. The Admiral was in the Porcupine frigate: he had been apprized, through the naval agent at Socoa, how anxiously the entrance of the vessels for the bridge was

*Entrance of  
the flotilla.*

*Feb. 24.*



desired. The surf had increased in proportion as the wind became favourable; and the bar, which extends from the right bank, nearly across the river, shifting with the change of wind and tide, and at all times dangerous, was at this time more than usually formidable. The agent, who set off in his boat from Socoa as soon as he received the last night's advices, had no pilot on board, and mistaking the channel where he should have entered the river, beached himself on a spit of sand; fortunate, however, in his mishap, for the boat cleared the sand by great exertion, and having been pulled, sails standing, over the spit, got into deep water. One boat, which had the principal pilot on board, and therefore was selected as the safest, led the way, and was upset, several of the crew perished, and most of those who saved themselves were dreadfully bruised. Captain O'Reilly, who had command of the flotilla, was on board, and Captain Faddy (who had charge of 50 artillerymen sent in five gun-boats), both with great difficulty escaped: a second succeeded in reaching the beach; the larger vessels then put off, to wait the chance of the next tide, it being, as the Admiral declared, scarcely possible that one in fifty could then have effected the passage. Some small boats, however, attempted it, and were swamped; what boats were on the river were sent to pick up those who were struggling for life, but without success; some who regained their own boats, and clung to them, were swept off into the sea, and only one man was saved.

Had the bar been smoother, the tide was now too low for vessels to attempt the entrance; but a pilot was landed to the south-west of it, that he might walk to the Adour, and make signals from within the bar, to guide the vessels into the safer parts, supplying thus the signal-staff which on that side had been removed, for

from the sea there appeared only one long and heavy line of surf. Meantime the troops continued to cross as they could, about 100 yards above the mouth of the river, some on rafts, some in a pontoon-boat which carried only twelve at a time; and when the tide presented least difficulty, a few cavalry by swimming. When the tide had risen sufficiently, the vessels boldly stood in, the pilot who had been landed having set up a halberd, with a handkerchief fixed to it, as a signal for directing them. The master's mate of the *Lyra* led the way; his boat was lost, and himself and the whole of the crew. Several vessels shared the same fate. One who was on the shore, close at hand, and who had been accustomed to fields of battle, declared that he had never beheld a scene so awful. The boats were so agitated as they attempted the passage, sails flapping, oars apparently useless, and all steerage lost, that it seemed as if each must inevitably be wrecked. Two vessels were stranded, but almost all their crews were by great exertion saved. A gun-brig also was driven ashore; Captain Elliot, of the *Martial* gun-brig, was swamped in his boat; his surgeon was picked up by this gun-boat, but upon her striking the ground the shock threw down a 24-pounder, which fell upon him and killed him. Three transport boats with their crews were lost; every exertion was made to save those who were struggling for life in the surf, literally within ten yards of their countrymen on shore; but though there were men with ropes tied to them on the beach, who spared no endeavour for assisting them, and who when the waves retired appeared as if they were close to them, not a soul could be saved: some who actually obtained footing on the ground were carried back by the receding surf, and swept away for ever. But the zeal and intrepidity of British seamen will overcome all obstacles that are not absolutely insu-

perable : officers and men on this occasion displayed gallantry which could not be surpassed, and skill which has seldom been equalled ; vying with each other they essayed the passage ; and happily the wind towards evening gradually died away, and about thirty vessels got in.

The passage of the troops, meantime, had been continued ; it was quite dark before the last party were ferried over, and the tide was then running out so rapidly, that the most strenuous rowing hardly prevented the boat from being drifted out to sea. The whole of General Howard's division, about 6000 in number, were then on the right bank. They bivouacked on the sand-hills where the enemy on the yester-evening had been discomfited by the rockets. On the morrow they advanced towards the citadel, their right flank resting on the Adour, the left extending to the great road leading from Bayonne to Bourdeaux. Closing in to the verge of a deep and marshy ravine, which separates the high ground about the citadel from the surrounding country, they cut off the enemy's communication with the open tract to the north of the river, and completed the investment of the fortress and its camp ; a feint attack being kept up the while on the opposite side by Lord Aylmer's brigade, the 5th division, and the Spaniards. By great exertions the bridge was finished on the following day. The point fixed upon for it was near the village of Boucaut, where the river is 270 yards wide. It consisted of six-and-twenty *chasse-marées*, anchored each at the bow and stern so as to resist both the ebbing and the flowing tide ; to many of these, as a substitute for anchors, the heavy iron guns were used which had been taken in the redoubts on the Nive. The vessels were lashed together both at bow and stern. Five cables were stretched by capstans across these vessels from

*A bridge  
carried  
over the  
Adour.*

*Feb. 25.*



shore to shore, and oaken planks were laid athwart upon these, and secured to the two outer cables, so as to form a platform strong enough to bear the passage of artillery, yet pliant enough to adapt itself to the motion of the vessels with the tide. On the right bank the cable ends were fastened to some of the heaviest iron guns which had been taken in the camp of the Nivelle; on the left they were wound round capstans, which were firmly fixed by large stakes driven into the ground; and by these the tension of the platform could be increased or lessened as the rise or fall of the river might require. A little way above the bridge a boom-chain was laid down for its protection; and above this the gun-boats were anchored, in readiness to engage those of the enemy, should any attempt be made upon the bridge by sending them down the river. The piers on both sides were wide enough for carriages of all descriptions; and that on the right bank was used for the artillery, in a part where the

*Batty's  
Campaign,  
126, 127.*

water is admitted at flood through apertures, and where a road could not have been formed without great expense of labour and of time.

This bridge was of the greatest importance, not only as affording a communication between the troops upon both banks during the blockade and intended siege of Bayonne, but also because it opened a way to the *chaussées* on the right of the river, whereby the army in its advance towards the interior could be much more easily supplied than by the bad roads in the exhausted country along the skirts of the Pyrenees, and where the Gaves and other tributary streams of the Adour were to be crossed. The inhabitants of Boucaut and of the adjacent villages had been ordered to take up arms against the allies; they had refused; and in consequence, the French troops upon leaving them committed some excesses. The contrast indeed was so great between the

treatment which they experienced from their own soldiers and from the allies, that the peasantry volunteered to repair the roads for their uninvited, but now not unwelcome visitors.

While Bayonne was thus being invested by the left wing of the army, the two divisions which had hitherto observed that place between the Adour and the Nive joined the main body ; and Lord Wellington, as soon as the troops were closed up, continuing his operations to the right, made a general advance. Marshal Beresford, who had remained since Sir Rowland's movement with the 4th and 7th divisions and with Colonel Vivian's brigade on the lower Bidouze, attacked the enemy on the 23rd in their fortified posts at Hastings and Oyergave, on the left of the Gave de Pau, and made them retire within their *tête-de-pont* at Peyrehorade. On the 24th, Sir Rowland, with the light, the 2nd, and the Portuguese divisions, under Baron Alten, Sir William Stewart, and Camp-Marshal Lecor, passed the Gave d'Oleron, by a ford near Ville-nave, without opposition. Sir Henry Clinton passed in like manner with the 6th, between Monfort and Laas ; and Sir Thomas Picton with the 3rd made demonstrations as if he would have attacked the enemy's position at the bridge of Sauveterre, upon which they blew up the bridge. Morillo at the same time drove in their posts near Navarreins, and blockaded that place, which was fortified strongly enough to require battering-artillery for its reduction. Immediately after the passage of the Oleron Gave, Sir Rowland and Sir Henry Clinton moved towards Orthes, and the great road leading from Sauveterre to that town ; and the enemy retiring from Sauveterre across the Gave de Pau in the night, destroyed the bridges upon that river, and assembled their army near Orthes on the 25th. The allies continued to advance that day, and on the following Beresford crossed the Gave de Pau below its junction with that of Oleron,

at some fords about four miles above Peyrehorade ; these were not discovered till after some unsuccessful attempts, and the current there was so rapid, that the infantry of General Walker's division could hardly support each other against it, and for some minutes there was reason to fear that the column would be carried down the stream. The Marshal then moved along the high road from Peyrehorade toward Orthes, on the enemy's right. Sir Thomas Picton had found a ford below the bridge of Berenx, where he crossed with the 3rd division, and Sir Stapleton with the cavalry as Beresford approached ; the 6th and light divisions made a flank movement to support them, and Sir Rowland occupied the heights opposite Orthes, and the high road leading to Sauveterre, on the left bank of the Gave. His corps advanced directly upon the bridge of Orthes, with the hope of forcing it ; but, being without artillery, and finding the approach defended by loop-holed houses, and by a tower strongly manned against them, they desisted from their intent.

Orthes, which before the territorial arrangement of France was revolutionized, was the capital of *Orthes.* the Senechalry of the same name, is supposed by Scaliger to have been the ancient city of Bearum, the Beneharnus of Antoninus, and the Benarnus of writers in a later age ; but this opinion seems to have been satisfactorily disproved. It stands upon the Gave de Pau, there a considerable river, and remarkable, because its accessible source is a waterfall, higher, except one in America, than any that has ever yet been measured ; it springs from a height of 1266 feet, and being twice broken on the way by projections of the precipice, falls upon a bed of perpetual snow, under which it works its passage. Orthes was the residence of the Princes of Bearn during some 200 years from the middle of the 13th century, when Gaston de Moncada built the *Chateau*

*Ramond's*  
*Tr. in the*  
*Pyrenees,*  
*p. 92.*

*P. de Mar-*  
*ca. Hist.*  
*de Bearn,*  
*L. 1. c. 6.*  
*§ 4. 14.*



*Noble* there, upon the plan of his hereditary castle in Aragon, and in a like situation, on an eminence commanding the town, and overlooking a wide circuit of country. In that castle Froissart was entertained by Gaston Phebus, the twelfth Count of Foix, and Lord of Bearn, and there he was informed concerning the affairs of Castille, Portugal, Navarre, Aragon, Gascony, and England, Gaston himself communicating to him what he knew, and telling him that the history which he had undertaken to write would be esteemed above all others, because more marvellous deeds of arms had been done in the world within the last fifty years than in three centuries preceding. There the good old chronicler was as happy as splendid hospitality, and the diligent use of favourable opportunities, could make him; the thing which he most desired being to collect information for his great work, and having at his wish there, lords, knights, and squires, ready and willing to inform him. In this castle Gaston Phebus kept his treasure, and it is said to have amounted at one time to no less a sum than three million florins, raised by taxation, which was borne cheerfully, because he maintained order in his dominions; neither English nor French, nor robber nor rover, harassed his people; and he had the reputation of being as liberal as he was just, not heralds and minstrels only, but strangers who came there having cause to praise him for his bounty. Froissart had been in many courts of kings, dukes, princes, earls, and great ladies, but never in any, he says, that so well liked him as the Castle Noble of Orthes; and he had seen many knights, kings, and princes, but none like this Count of Foix for personage, nor of so fair form, nor so well made; for in every thing he was so perfect, that he could not be praised too much, loving what ought to be beloved, and hating that which ought to be hated. Yet so accustomed were men to the

most atrocious actions, in that which was the brightest age of chivalry, that this very Gaston committed a murder in this castle as much in violation of honour and of hospitality, as of laws both human and divine; tortured innocent persons to death upon mere suspicion, and with his own hands killed his own son at the close of a frightful tragedy, of which this castle was the scene; and the faithful historian who thus extols him has related all these things! The ruins of the *Chateau Noble* are yet to be seen, and the tower in which Gaston kept his treasure was standing in the last century. Orthes ceased to be the residence of the Counts in 1460, when they removed their court to Pau; and their removal was not compensated by the short-lived university which about a century after Queen Jeanne of Navarre founded there for the Huguenots, and endowed from the church property in her dominions.

Here Marshal Soult had taken a strong position, extending about a mile in length along a range of tabular heights; his right, under Reillé, resting on them upon the high road to Dax, and occupying the village of St. Boes; the centre, under Drouet, taking the bend of a sickle, as the hill formed a cove, and being thus protected by the flanks; the left, under Clausel, resting upon the town and the heights above it, and defending the passage of the river from Sir Rowland. Villatte's and Harispe's divisions, and Paris's brigade, were formed in reserve on high ground upon the road to Sault de Navailles. "Thus," in the words of a French historian, "from 35,000 to 40,000 French troops were collected at a point as favourable, as the most skilful commander could have chosen for resisting the advance of an invading army." Lord Wellington's arrangements were, that Beresford, with the 4th and 7th divisions, and Colonel

*Battle of  
Orthes.*

*Feb. 27.*

*Beauchamp's  
Narrative  
of the In-  
vasion, 2.  
p. 52.*

Vivian's brigade of cavalry, should turn and attack the enemy's right; while Picton, with the 3rd and 6th, supported by Sir Stapleton with Lord Edward Somerset's brigade of horse, should move along the Peyrehorade road, and attack their centre and left. Baron Alten, with the light division, kept up the communication, and was in reserve between these; and Sir Rowland was to force the passage of the Gave, and turn and attack their left.

The action commenced about nine in the morning. The 4th division, under Sir Lowry Cole, carried the village of St. Boes, after an obstinate resistance. Beresford then directed his efforts against two lines of the enemy formed on the heights above it; but the troops had not room here to deploy for the attack, the only approach being along a narrow tongue of land, which had on either side a deep ravine, and was completely commanded by the enemy's guns. Sir Lowry's division led the way; 15 pieces of artillery played on them diagonally with full effect; in front they were opposed by the main line of the French infantry, and strong bodies were formed in the ravines on their flanks. Repeated attempts were made by Major-General Ross, and by Vasconcellos's Portuguese brigade, till at length that brigade was completely broken, and the remainder of the division, with a brigade of Baron Alten's that hastened to their assistance, with difficulty covered their retreat: thus, on this point, the attack totally failed.

Lord Wellington saw that it was impossible to turn this wing of the enemy by their right, without extending his line too far; he therefore ordered the immediate advance of the 3rd and 6th divisions, and the 7th, with a brigade of the light division, to support them by attacking the height which the enemy occupied at the point of junction between their right and centre. The



52nd regiment, under Colonel Colborne, led up the hill, supported closely by the other troops both on the right and left; and the artillery gained a knoll from whence it swept the whole line of the enemy's centre. It made such havoc among their reserve masses, that the French 21st hussars were provoked to a most daring movement for seizing it; they galloped round the hill, and, under a heavy fire of musquetry, charged and drove back one of the supporting battalions; then with equal courage fell upon the 42nd Highlanders, but the Highlanders received their charge firmly, and the hussars suffered so much in it, that they gave up this brave though unsuccessful attempt. Meantime the allied troops were advancing steadily, under a destructive fire: Major-General Inglis's brigade distinguished itself now, as it had done on all occasions, and made a successful charge on the enemy's left; every regiment in the 3rd division was hotly engaged, they drove the French from every height where they attempted to make a stand, and in spite of all resistance gained at length the summit of the main position. There a severe struggle ensued; on no former occasion had the enemy fought so well when opposed to British troops; it was the only action in which they came fairly to the bayonet; but the determination which brought them to that sure trial could not support them in it, and, giving up all hope now of a successful resistance, they began to retreat over the level ground in their rear in good order, by *echellons* of divisions, each successively covering the other, and supported by their cavalry, which, by a gallant charge on the 6th division, endeavoured, but in vain, to check the pursuit. The infantry rallied upon some rising ground, and attempted again to make a stand: the 9th hussars, under Colonel Vivian, made them again give way. They then formed into squares, and continued to retire still in admirable order; and, though warmly pursued, and

suffering heavily from the British guns, they took every advantage of the numerous positions which the ground afforded.

Marshal Soult, in whom nothing was that day wanting which could be required of a commander in the field, was compelled to withdraw his wings, when the centre had thus been forced, and to order a general retreat. The wings had comparatively suffered little; and this movement was as well conducted as all his former ones had been. But meantime Sir Rowland had forced the passage of the Gave above the town; and seeing the state of the action, he moved, with the 2nd division, and Major-General Fane's brigade of cavalry, for the great road to St. Sever, keeping thus upon the enemy's left, but in a direction towards a point in their rear which would have cut off their retreat on Sault de Navailles. Their movements quickened as soon as they perceived this danger; and as their march was accelerated, Sir Rowland quickened his, till the retreat became a flight; they ran, and the allies ran also, and the race continued till the French broke so completely, that no resemblance of a column was remaining. It was the lively expression of an officer there present that, "in the battle they met the charge like lions, but that the pursuit was like hare-hunting;" prisoners were literally caught by the skirts as they ran. Could the cavalry have acted sooner off the great road, the French army must have been almost destroyed. They suffered greatly where any obstacle impeded their flight; the enclosures and ditches were thickly strewn with their killed and wounded; 2000 fugitives were picked up by the infantry, and 12 pieces of cannon taken, and many more prisoners upon the only opportunity which was offered for the cavalry to charge, when the enemy had been driven from the high road by Sir Rowland. The victory, complete as it was,

might have been followed to more advantage, if Lord Wellington had not been struck on the pommel of his sword by a musquet-shot, and bruised so severely by the blow, that he was unable to cross this intersected country on horseback time enough to direct the farther movements of the divisions in pursuit: the most decisive victory would have been dearly purchased by his loss. When it became dusk, the army was halted in the neighbourhood of Sault de Navailles. The loss of the allies, in killed, wounded, and missing, was somewhat less than 2300, of whom about 600 were Portuguese; no Spaniards were engaged that day. That of the enemy was estimated by one of their own writers at from 14,000 to 16,000, very much the greater part being by desertion after the rout; for the conscripts threw down their arms, and took the opportunity of escaping from compulsory service. Foy was severely wounded, General Bechaud killed, and another General mortally wounded.

*Beau-  
champ, 2.  
p. 55.*

The main body of the French army continued its retreat during the night, and was joined at Hagetman by the garrison of Dax, and by two fresh battalions of conscripts; it then halted behind the Adour, near St. Sever, to re-organize itself: the allies followed them to St. Sever on the day after the battle, and the centre advanced in three columns with the hope of enveloping them. That which marched on the *chaussée* arrived at the appointed moment; but the flank columns could not proceed upon the unpaved roads at the pace which was required; and thus the enemy had time to move off in the direction of Agen, escaping an attack which they were in no condition to have withstood. Beresford then with the light division, and with Colonel Vivian's brigade, passed the Higher Adour, and occupied Mont de Marsan, the principal town in the

*Feb. 28.*

*March 1.*



department of the Landes, where he took a very large magazine of provisions. Here no resistance was attempted; but at Aire, where the enemy had other magazines, a corps was collected with the intention of making a stand to protect their removal. Against this place, which is on the left bank of the Adour, Sir Rowland moved upon the 2nd of March; and when his advanced guard arrived within two miles of the town, the French were discovered strongly posted on a ridge of hills, with their right upon the river, thus covering the approach. Notwithstanding the strength of the post, Sir William Stewart was ordered to attack them with the second division along the road, and Brigadier-General Da Costa's Portuguese brigade about the centre of their position. The French force consisted of two divisions; and the Portuguese, when they forced their way up and gained the summit, found, which had not been expected, an extent of flat ground on the top, and a strong body of the enemy completely formed there to resist them; the Portuguese were so broken and confused that they could regain no formation, and must have suffered accordingly, if Sir William Stewart, having beaten back the enemy on his side, had not dispatched his first brigade under Major-General Barnes to their timely support. The enemy were then in their turn thrown into confusion by a vigorous charge, nor could they after many attempts recover the ground, but were driven from all their positions, and finally from the town, where the magazines fell into the conqueror's hands. Two divisions of the French were engaged in this affair, one of them was Harispe's, which had not been at Orthes; their loss was very considerable: that of the allies amounted to 20 killed and 135 wounded; among the former was the Honourable Lieutenant-Colonel Hood, of the general staff, an officer of great merit and promise.

*The French  
driven from  
Aire.*

At this time the French were once more favoured by the weather. Heavy and continued rain fell during the beginning of the month, swelling all the rivulets so as materially to impede the progress of the allies, increasing in proportion the Adour, which was so rapid that pontoons could not be laid upon it, and rendering it more difficult to repair the numerous bridges which the enemy had destroyed in their retreat; yet till this could be done, the different parts of the army were without communication. Lord Wellington was therefore compelled to halt; and Marshal Soult, who after his defeat at Orthes had been forced by the movement of Sir Rowland's corps to retire in the direction of Bourdeaux, had leisure and opportunity to choose his course. The divisions which had been driven from Aire retreated up both banks of the Adour towards Tarbes, with a view, as Lord Wellington perceived, of being reinforced by farther detachments from Marshal Suchet's army. This direction Soult had resolved to take, because it was only from Suchet that he could look for any efficient aid; though it appears that there was not that concert and clear understanding between the two Marshals which might have been expected in men of such experience and great ability. By thus approaching the Pyrenees he left the way to Bourdeaux open to the allies; he, however, supposed that Lord Wellington would not venture to advance upon that city, but of necessity must follow his movements. In the latter conclusion he was not mistaken; but he greatly mistook the disposition of the French people, who now looked to the English as their liberators, a disposition that was increased by his own conduct, and by the licentious habits of his troops. The loss of his magazines compelled him to impose heavy requisitions, as far as his power to collect them extended, to the ruin of the inhabitants, while their

countrymen in other parts were enriched by the presence of an invading army, paying for every thing at the exorbitant prices that its own demand occasioned. His troops, therefore, in their own country were in want of every thing, and the English were abundantly supplied. The depredations and the enormities which his men committed, though not aggravated by that fiendish cruelty which had characterized the French in Portugal, were yet such that they were execrated wherever they went; and the allies, in every town and village where they entered, were welcomed as deliverers and protectors. Many instances occurred in which our sick soldiers were taken in by some hospitable family, and nursed with the greatest kindness.

*Beauchamp,*  
2. 61.  
*Batty's*  
*Narrative,*  
139.

One of the enemy's columns having been cut off from the Adour by Sir Rowland's rapid march upon Aire, retreated in disorder toward Pau, the men throwing away their arms, the better to effect their escape and facilitate their desertion. The few who reached that place were driven out by a detachment which Lord Wellington sent thither under General Fane to occupy it; and there the allies established a hospital in which the *Sœurs de la Charité* attended upon the sick and wounded soldiers, after the manner of their exemplary order. Travellers are still shown at Pau the chamber in which Henri IV. was born, and the tortoise-shell in which he slept as in a cradle. The gardens which had been his delight were remaining at the close of the 17th century; and the walks overarched with trees, the arbours, and the evergreens, though all neglected then, bore testimony still to the care with which they had formerly been dressed, and to the topiary skill which had been displayed there. Bearn, of which Pau was the capital in former times, was one of the most favoured parts of France, and

*The allies*  
*enter Pau.*



indeed of the world, before the French revolution cut up the well-being of a whole generation by the roots; for the division of property, and the industry and manners of the people had combined there with all fortunate circumstances of soil, surface, and climate, to render the inhabitants contented and happy.

When the news of the battle of Orthes reached St.

*Deputies arrive from Bourdeaux.* Jean de Luz, two deputies arrived at the same time from Toulouse, to assure the Duc d'Angoulême that the inhabitants of that city eagerly

desired the restoration of the Bourbons. The Duc upon this repaired to Lord Wellington's head-quarters at St. Sever; Rochejaquelein followed him, and they were joined there by M. Bontemps Dubarry, who came from Bourdeaux, charged by the better part of the citizens to invite the Duc, and to assure Lord Wellington that a British force would be received there as friends. Lord Wellington no longer hesitated; and as soon as Freyre's Spanish corps, which had been stationed in reserve near Irun, could be brought up, and every disposable body was closed to the right, he dispatched Marshal Beresford

*The Duc d'Angoulême proceeds thither with Marshal Beresford.*

with three divisions toward that important city, to drive out its inconsiderable garrison, and give the inhabitants an opportunity of declaring for the exiled family if such were their wish, and they chose to venture upon a measure which might be so injurious to themselves, if Buonaparte should accept of the peace that still was offered him. Lord Wellington still doubted of this, even after he had determined upon making the trial; and Rochejaquelein, when he went to receive the Duc's last order, before he set off with the advanced guard, found that the Duc himself seemed to entertain the same discouraging opinion. Upon this he requested permission to precede the English by six-and-thirty hours, and declared that if

Bourdeaux did not declare itself, his head should be responsible for the failure. "You are certain then of your grounds," the Duc rejoined. "As certain," replied Rochejaquelein, "as one can be of any earthly thing!" The Duc then expressed his full confidence in him, and bade him go.

*Mémoires  
de la Mar-  
quise de la  
Rochejaque-  
lein, p. 529.*

The sandy tract which extends from Bayonne to Bourdeaux is well known by the name of the Landes; so called, it has been supposed, because all other ground in the adjacent country had its proper appellation of field, meadow, marsh, wood, or other such terms according to its produce and uses; but this region was mere land and nothing else; it is a vast plain, perfectly level, in some parts covered with pine forests, in others only a wide waste of sand, where the trees are so thinly scattered in the sea-like circle, that in hot and hazy weather they have the appearance of ships at sea. The peasant stalks over the loose sand upon high stilts, which are found as useful here as racquets for the snow in Canada. Uncultivated, however, and thinly peopled as this extensive tract is, the pine forests yield a considerable revenue; the trees are regularly tapped for turpentine, pitch is extracted from them, and candles made from resin are in common use. While Marshal Beresford advanced without opposition over this remarkable country, Rochejaquelein having proceeded with the light troops as far as Langon, made his way to the house of one of his confederates at Preignac; and from thence was safely conducted, though the avenues were then watched by detachments of soldiers and of *gendarmérie*, into Bourdeaux. He found that the secret council of the royalists there, contrary alike to his wishes and expectations, had just dispatched a messenger to Marshal Beresford, requesting him to delay his movement, that they might have more

*The Landes.*

*Gallia  
Christiana,  
T. 1. Gloss.*

*March 10.*

time for preparing the people, and bringing the royalists from the country round to the support of those in the town. This was at ten on the night of the 10th; his representations how impolitic it was to allow the timid time for considering the danger, and how desirable that at this crisis Bourdeaux should declare itself for their legitimate king by a spontaneous movement, inspired them with a braver spirit: and four of their confederates were then successively sent off to meet the Duc d'Angoulême and the English, and entreat them to expedite their march.

The battle of Orthes had already struck fear into those persons from whom the royalists had most to apprehend; and no sooner was it known that a British force was advancing towards Bourdeaux, than the principal persons there who were in Buonaparte's service thought it hopeless to resist. The senator M. Cornudet, who was Commissioner Extraordinary in this department, ordered all the civil and ecclesiastical authorities to be dissolved, and every person in the employ of government to leave the city. He gave directions for destroying two frigates which were upon the stocks; and when it was rumoured that this would be opposed by the people, he set fire to them himself; and, taking with him the public chests, and as much gunpowder and saltpetre as he could remove in haste from the public stores, he withdrew. General Lhuillier, who had the military command, could not collect more than 2000 soldiers; he, therefore, withdrew also. But the Archbishop, as well as the Mayor, M. Lynch, remained and prepared to receive the Duc d'Angoulême as the nephew of their lawful King, and the English as his allies. Instead of finding any force to resist him on the way, or any disposition for resistance, Marshal Beresford was met by royalists from all parts of Medoc and Guienne, who came in crowds to welcome the Duc. Long

*The Buona-  
partists  
withdraw  
from Bour-  
deaux.*



accustomed to adversity, the Duc himself was not elated by this fair appearance of returning fortune; he knew that, whatever might be the wishes of the allied sovereigns, they did not yet consider it their policy to espouse the cause of the Bourbons, and he requested the people not to endanger themselves by a hasty declaration; but notwithstanding this expressed desire, the cry of "*Vive le Roi!*" was raised in the little town of Bazan March 1. when he entered it. Early on the morning of the 12th, the local authorities of Bourdeaux assembled at the Hotel de Ville. The English hussars The Duc enters, and the white flag is hoisted there. were beginning to enter, when Rochejaquelein rode with all speed to meet Marshal Beresford, and requested him to withdraw them, that the royalists might declare themselves before he entered: of course this was instantly done. The municipality went out to meet him; the royal guard which had secretly been formed were instructed to assemble upon the road with arms concealed, and their officers followed in the magistrates' train. As soon as Beresford arrived at the bridge of La Maye, he sent Colonel Vivian to the Mayor, saying that he hoped to enter the city as a friend and an ally. The Mayor met the Marshal without the gates, and addressed him to this effect, that if he were about to enter Bourdeaux as a conqueror, he might possess himself of the keys, which there were no means of defending; but if he came in the name of the King of France and of his ally, the King of England, they should then be joyfully presented to him. Marshal Beresford replied, that his orders were to occupy the city and to protect it; that he hoped his message had been satisfactory, and that the city which he was about to enter was the city of an ally inhabited by the subjects of Louis XVIII. M. Lynch, upon this, exclaimed, "*Vive le Roi!*" cast away his scarf, and put on the white

cockade. At the same moment the white flag was displayed from the steeple of St. Michael's: those who were prepared with white cockades mounted them, those who were not supplied their place with paper; and when, about an hour afterwards, the Duc de Guiche arrived and announced the near arrival of Monseigneur the Duc d'Angoulême, Bourdeaux had never before witnessed so general or so generous a joy as was then manifested. Crowds pressed round him, if they might but touch his clothes or his horse; some cried, "He is of our blood; he was born a Frenchman, and feels like a Frenchman!" numbers fell on their knees and blessed him, and blessed God that they had lived to see this day; mothers pointed him out to their children and said, "Now we shall no longer lose all our sons in the war!"

It was nearly two hours before the Duc could make his way through the multitude to the cathedral. There the Archbishop at the head of the clergy awaited him at the great door, and *Te Deum* was performed there amid the acclamations of the populace. M. Lynch issued a proclamation in a strain well pitched to support the feeling which had thus strongly been excited. "Inhabitants of Bourdeaux," said he, "happy circumstances have called upon the paternal magistrate of your city to become the interpreter of your long suppressed wishes and the organ of your interests, by welcoming in your name the nephew of Louis XVI., whose presence has converted into allies an irritated nation bearing the character of enemies till they reached your gates. It is not to subjugate our country that the English, and the Spaniards, and the Portugeze appear where they now are: they are come with united forces into the south of France actuated by the same feelings as the nations of the north, to destroy the scourge of Europe, and supply his place by a monarch who will be the father of his people. The

hands of the Bourbons are undefiled with French blood ; the testament of Louis XVI. is their guide, and they renounce all thoughts of resentment : they proclaim that clemency and tolerance are the leading features of their conduct ; and, in deploring the terrible ravages of that tyranny which licentiousness introduced, they forget the errors caused by the illusions of liberty. No more tyranny ! no more war ! no more conscription ! no more vexatious taxes ! are the concise and consoling expressions addressed to you by a Prince who has the daughter of Louis XVI. for his consort. I am proud that you are the first who have set an example to France. Every thing tends to assure us that our misfortunes are about to terminate, and that national rivalry will cease with them. It seems to have been decreed by Providence that the great commander, who so well deserves to be entitled the Liberator of Nations, should attach his glorious name to this glorious epoch, this memorable consummation of all my wishes. Fellow-citizens, such are the hopes and motives which have supported me at this trying period, and directed my conduct, and determined me, if necessary, to sacrifice my life for you. God is my witness, that I have no object in view but the good of my country. Long live the King !”

The Royalists, by whom this most important movement was prepared and directed, were none of those time-servers who take advantage of all changes to forward their own fortunes, and whose professed principles are always found to be in perfect accord with their immediate interest. When Rochejaquelein and the Bordelais set life and fortune thus upon the die, the Bourbons were wholly disregarded by the Allied Powers ; those powers were still negotiating with Buonaparte, . . still willing, and, as it seemed, desirous to conclude a peace with him which

*Failure of  
the negotia-  
tions at  
Chatillon.*



should have left him the recognized Emperor of France. He, too, giving proof of greater military genius than could justly be inferred from his most brilliant career of success, had made head against their invading armies with an inferior force; and obtained advantages which raised the hopes of his admirers, and confirmed his overweening confidence in his own resources and strength of character. He flattered himself at this time, and endeavoured to persuade the French people, that the allies considered the scheme of invasion hopeless, that they were about to withdraw from the French territory, and to dissolve their ill-compacted league. The former conduct of those powers afforded some ground for such expectation; but they had profited by experience, and while the negotiations for peace were

still pending at Chatillon, concluded a treaty  
*Mar. 1.* among themselves which might have wakened Buonaparte from his delusion. By this treaty, Austria, Russia, Prussia, and Great Britain, formed a league offensive and defensive for twenty years, each binding itself not to treat separately with the enemy, and each to keep on foot an army of 150,000 men, exclusive of garrisons, England reserving an option to subsidize other troops in place of her own, and agreeing to supply five millions sterling, to be divided among the other powers for maintaining the war. Each of these contracting powers was fully supported in this energetic policy by the spirit of its people. But Buonaparte continued to act as if he had still only to deal with sovereigns whom he might cajole, and statesmen whom

he might intimidate or corrupt; and in this  
*Mar. 15.* temper he sent his *ultimatum* to the congress, demanding for himself the whole line of the Rhine, great part of that of the Waal, and the fortress of Nimeguen; Italy, including Venice, for his son-in-law

Eugene Beauharnois ; indemnities for that prince as having been Grand Duke of Frankfort, for Jerome on the score of his kingdom of Westphalia, for Louis as Grand Duke of Berg, . . and for Joseph the Intruder, not indeed in compensation for Spain, but for Naples, . . from whence Buonaparte himself had moved him to Madrid ! Such demands were at once rejected, and the congress was dissolved.

This was subsequent to the declaration of Bourdeaux in favour of the Bourbons ; and when the news of that declaration was known in England, some apprehensions were felt for its immediate consequences to the persons who were principally concerned. What mercy they might expect if Buonaparte should maintain himself upon the throne was plainly indicated in a proclamation addressed at this time by Marshal Soult to his troops ; it was directed against the British General as well as the Royalists, and in the spirit of one who had served the tyrant in his schemes of iniquitous ambition, without scruple and without remorse. “Soldiers,” said he, in this remarkable address, “there will be no repose for us till this hostile army shall be annihilated, or till it shall have evacuated the territory of the Emperor. It does not suspect the dangers which surround, nor the perils which await it ; but time will teach this army, and the General who commands it, that our territory is not invaded with impunity, and that French honour is not with impunity insulted. The British General has had the audacity to incite you and your countrymen to revolt and sedition ! He has dared insult the national honour : he has had the baseness to excite the French to break their oaths, and to be guilty of perjury ! Yet a few days and those who have been capable of believing in the sincerity and delicacy of the English will learn to their cost that the

*Marshal  
Soult's pro-  
clamation.*

English have no other object in this war than to destroy France by its own instrumentality, and reduce the French to servitude like the Portuguese, the Sicilians, and all the other people who have groaned under their yoke. Let these deluded Frenchmen look back upon the past ; they will see the English at the head of every conspiracy, of the overthrow of all principles, of the destruction of all establishments, whether of greatness or of industry, for the sake of gratifying their inordinate ambition and their insatiable avarice. Is there a single point on the surface of the globe where they have not either by fraud or violence brought about the ruin of the manufactories which rivalled or surpassed their own ? Soldiers, let us devote to shame and general execration every Frenchman who shall have favoured the projects of the enemy ; there is no longer any bond between them and us ! Our motto is Honour and Fidelity. Our duty is marked out : implacable hatred to traitors and to the enemies of the French name : interminable war to those who would divide in order to destroy us ; as well as to the wretches who would desert the imperial eagles for any other standard ! Let us have always in our minds fifteen ages of glory, and the innumerable triumphs which have rendered our country illustrious ! Let us contemplate the prodigious efforts of our great Emperor, and his signal victories which will eternize the French name ! Let us be worthy of him, and that we may bequeath to our posterity without a stain the inheritance which we have received from our fathers !”

This proclamation was more in accord with the moral than with the military reputation which Marshal Soult had established for himself. It ill became him as a great General to pour out coarse and angry invectives against his adversary ; but the rancour with which he



reviled and calumniated the English, the threat of interminable war to them, and of implacable hatred to the French loyalists, these were in the spirit of his councils and his conduct. For he had proved himself by his impassibility not less than by his talents, worthy of the confidence which Buonaparte placed in him . . and of the service in which he had been employed. But his exhortation to the French soldiers that they should be worthy of their Emperor was superfluous: Buonaparte's soldiers had long been worthy of him! To this Jaffa had borne witness: Madrid and Porto, Ucles and Taragona were witnesses; the wrongs, the sufferings, and the curses of all Europe testified it; and the confederated nations, in whom the insolence and the excesses of those soldiers had roused a feeling which no ordinary war could have excited, and who were now moving from the Tagus and the Elbe, the Danube and the Moskwa against the general oppressor, . . the common enemy, . . the individual who, when he might have conferred greater benefits upon Europe than ever sovereign before him, in ancient or modern times, had deliberately chosen the evil part, and employed his mighty power to bring about the worst ends by the most flagitious means.

But if some fears were entertained in England for the loyalists at Bourdeaux who had not waited to declare their loyalty till the danger would have been in delaying the declaration, a generous sympathy also was manifested. The militia availed themselves of the act which allowed them to volunteer for foreign service. The example was set by the Marquis of Buckingham and Sir Watkin Williams Wynn, and they sailed as soon as possible with 4000 men for the Gironde. Contrary winds impeded their passage: meantime Buonaparte had ordered a division under General

*Admiral  
Penrose  
enters the  
Gironde.*

Decaen to march against it by Perigueux, and Lhuillier collected what force he could to the north of the city. But Buonaparte and his Generals had now no force at their disposal strong enough to put down the spirit that had shown itself; the rich raised companies of cavalry, the artisans formed a volunteer guard for the Duc; and Lord Wellington was now so well acquainted with the disposition of the French people, that without any fears for Bourdeaux, he recalled Marshal Beresford with two divisions, thinking that Lord Dalhousie with 5000 men would secure it from any attempt that could be made against it. Admiral Penrose had hastened thither with

*March 27.* the Egmont, the Andromache, and Belle Poule frigates, and some smaller vessels, and entered the Gironde without sustaining any loss from the fire of the forts and batteries at its mouth. There was more danger from the difficulty of the navigation, but this also was surmounted by the skill and the exertion of British seamen. The enemy had the Regulus line-of-battle-ship, three brigs of war, and some *chasse-marées* lying in the river, and the squadron chased them as high as the shoal of Talmont, where the French passed up through the narrow channel to the north, which had been buoyed for the purpose, and then took shelter under the strong batteries on each side of Talmont bay, the British squadron anchoring outside the shoal. Fort de Blaye still prevented the navigation of the Garonne; the mayor of that place would willingly have hoisted the white flag, but though he found means of letting the Duc know his own sentiments, he could not persuade the garrison to take that part. While the Admiral prepared to act against it, Lord Dalhousie, taking Rochejaquelein for his guide, crossed the Garonne, and pushed the enemy's parties under General Lhuillier, beyond the Dordogne; *April 14.* he then crossed that river at St. Andre de

Cubzac, with a view to the attack of the fort, but learning that Lhuillier with 300 cavalry and 1200 foot had retired by Etauliers, he moved on that point, intending to turn back again upon Blaye if that General continued his retreat. Lhuillier however drew out his corps in a large open common near Etauliers, and occupied some woods in front of it: the woods were soon cleared; the enemy's horse and foot gave way and retired through the town, leaving scattered parties to shift for themselves; some 300 prisoners were taken, including about 30 officers, great numbers dispersed in the woods, and the conscripts took the desired opportunity of escaping. On the preceding day a detachment under Captain Coode, of the Porcupine, took or destroyed a numerous flotilla, which had been equipped in haste, and *March.* which, before the arrival of the British squadron, had threatened the coast of Medoc, and Bourdeaux itself. Among the prizes was a splendid barge designed for the Emperor when he visited that city, with his name on the stern, and his golden eagle on the prow; this the sailors humbly requested might be presented with their duty to the Prince Regent. Another corps of 600 seamen and marines, under Captain Harris of the Belle Poule, landed, marched more than fifty miles in six-and-thirty hours, reduced and dismantled five forts, destroyed 47 pieces of cannon and 17 mortars, and re-embarked without any loss. The Regulus and the smaller vessels which had sought protection with it, were attacked and burnt, and by the 9th of April the river was cleared as high up as Blaye. General Merle held out in that fortress till the 16th; when the news that had arrived induced the Admiral to agree to an armistice with him, and the Gironde was then opened from its mouth to Bourdeaux.



*Proceed-  
ings at  
Valançay.*

Meantime another restoration, which once might have been deemed as little likely as that of the Bourbons in France, had taken place. When Ferdinand and his counsellors at Valançay found that neither San Carlos nor Palafox returned from their mission, they represented to Laforest that the best mode of removing all difficulties would be for the Emperor to let Ferdinand depart unconditionally, relying upon his honour to fulfil the treaty, if the obstacles to it should not be insurmountable. Suchet had given advice to the same effect, seeing that at that time, when there was no longer a hope of retaining any hold on Spain, it was of great consequence to withdraw from thence the garrisons, and that they could be extricated only by this means. If Ferdinand were honourable enough to restore them to their country upon being put in possession of the places which they occupied, the great and only advantage which was now desired would be obtained ; if he should refuse to do this, or be unable to effect it, doubtful as it was what his authority might be, nothing would be lost, nor ever risked by the experiment. This the French government saw ; and they were not without hope that the presence of Ferdinand in his own country might lead to a civil war, which would have the effect of at least embarrassing the English, and probably of impeding their operations in Gascony.

Ferdinand and his counsellors might have escaped from any imputation of bad faith in this transaction, if they had not themselves claimed credit for acting with duplicity. When they said the fulfilment of the treaty might be relied on, if there were no insurmountable obstacles, they well supposed that such obstacles existed in their relations to the allied powers ; “ but,” says the Canon Escoiquiz, “ not knowing this of a certainty, we had a

right, when treating with so perfidious a person, to put it in doubt; and by this just dissimulation to obtain the object of our wishes, which was the King's liberty. Skillfully to deceive with truth a man so false was not an evil deed, but an excellent one; and this was our maxim\*." They represented farther that an unconditional liberation was of all things most likely to conciliate Ferdinand's entire good-will; that it would moreover make the allied powers believe Buonaparte to be sincere in his desire of peace, and which was of more consequence, gratify the French nation, who had always indignantly regarded the war with Spain; that if Ferdinand should find it impossible to confirm the peace with France, it was not his interest that France should be dismembered, and to prevent any such danger he would only carry on an illusive war, merely to save appearances; that even if it were his desire to carry it on with vigour, he must of necessity be less able to do this than the Regency, because of the changes which his arrival in Spain could not but produce; finally, that his farther detention would occasion the Emperor a great and useless expense, and must also be a matter of some anxiety, when it was so possible that he might be delivered by the arms of the allies. Buonaparte, indeed, seems at one time to have been sensible either of the reproach which he had brought upon himself by his treachery toward Ferdinand, or of the likelihood that some successful plan might be formed for his escape; and it was once his intention to have shipped him off for Mexico, or for any other part of the Spanish colonies which he might have preferred, with Charles IV. and the

\* *Bien suponíamos que lo habría, por las relaciones con las Potencias aliadas; pero no sabiéndolo de cierto, teníamos derecho, tratando con hombre tan perfido, para ponerlo en duda y conseguir con este justo dissimulo*

*el fin de nuestros deseos que era la libertad del Rey. Engañar mañosamente con la verdad á un hombre tan falso, era una obra no mala sino excelente: tal era nuestro máxima.* Idea Sencilla, 114.

Queen, the Infantes, his brothers, the Queen of Etruria, and as many other members of the family as he could collect, and to have given them large possessions there ; but upon discovering that none of those colonies were at his disposal, as he had hoped them to be, and considering moreover that Ferdinand might easily from thence find his way to Spain, and there protest against the validity of his renunciation, he abandoned this project. At present, willing to be rid of him, knowing that his presence now could do him no hurt any where, desiring to get his soldiers out of Spain, which he had no hope of effecting by any other means, and perhaps also having a hope that Ferdinand's return might create new troubles in that country, he readily assented to the proposal ; and Laforest was instructed by the first post after the receipt of his dispatch to inform Ferdinand and the Infantes, that they were at liberty to depart unconditionally, and that orders had been given for forwarding to them the necessary passports.

Ferdinand had endured captivity as contentedly as if his patience had been the effect of philosophy or of religion. Nothing, however, could have rejoiced him more than this reply ; and, as if believing that his return would be not less a matter of joy to the Regency, he determined that as soon as the passports came, Zayas should precede him by three or four days, and travel with all speed to notify his approach, that preparations might be made for receiving him. This happiness was but of six hours' duration ; for on the evening of the same day, San Carlos arrived with the refusal of the treaty. To conceal this was impossible, the utmost publicity having been given to it by the Spanish press ; and as it was likely to irritate Buonaparte, whose violent temper was well known to his ministers, Laforest proposed that San Carlos himself

*Idea Sen-  
cilla, 78.*

*Ferdinand  
is set at  
liberty.*



should be the first bearer of the intelligence, and present with it such representations as might tend to appease him, and if possible avert his displeasure. The Duque accordingly, who had come post from Madrid, set off without delay, and at the same speed for Paris. Buonaparte was then with the army in the neighbourhood of Troyes; the ministers at Paris had withheld the passports till they should receive fresh instructions, and not allowing the Duque to proceed, sent him back to Valençay. Laforest, however, was of opinion that he should repair to the Emperor's quarters: San Carlos again departed; failing to find, and perhaps not being able to follow him in the rapidity of his movements, he communicated his business by letter: the course which Laforest recommended coincided with the advice given by Suchet, in whom Buonaparte had great confidence, and the result was that orders were sent to Paris for forwarding the passports without delay. They reached Valençay on the night of March 7; San Carlos arrived on the 9th; Zayas set out for Madrid the next day. He bore a dispatch to the Regency, wherein Ferdinand said that their letter, which he had now received by Palafox, had filled his soul with satisfaction: he saw in it how anxiously the nation wished for his return, which he desired not less ardently, that he might devote all his powers to the good of his beloved subjects, to whom he was so greatly indebted on so many accounts. Then, after notifying his speedy departure, he said that the re-establishment of the Cortes, concerning which the Regency had informed him, and the other measures for the good of the realm which had been adopted during his absence, deserved his approbation, because they were in conformity with his own royal intentions. On the following Sunday, March 13, Ferdinand and the Infantes com-  
*Idea Sencillos*, 113, 119.

Marshal Suchet received them in that city. His instructions from the minister at war were, that he should send Ferdinand to Barcelona, and cause all the places which the French still possessed in Spain to be delivered up, taking, however, securities and precautions for the return of the garrisons to their own country. Hence the Marshal concluded that there was not such entire confidence placed in this prince as might otherwise have been inferred from the manner of his liberation. Both parties, however, were desirous of smoothing all difficulties, which may always best be done by fair dealing; and this was now the interest of both. San Carlos gave Suchet a full account of the temper of the Cortes, and their determination to control the King, or to resist him, if he should be found refractory; and he expressed his belief that the Generals, whether they were influenced by their fear or their opinions, would not acknowledge his authority until they received orders from Madrid. Ferdinand's desire was to proceed without delay, and not to enter Barcelona, but go on to Valencia; and he promised to expedite as much as he could the deliverance of the garrisons in exchange for the places which they occupied. The Marshal frankly stated the difficulty wherein he was placed by his instructions, these being to conduct the King to Barcelona, and take securities for the deliverance of the garrisons; he had written to Paris, he said, for farther explanations, and till these should arrive, it was agreed that the Infante, Don Carlos, should remain at Perpignan, and that the King should pass the frontier without delay. Accordingly, on the 22nd, Ferdinand re-entered his own country. The rain had so swoln the streams, that he was detained two days at Figueras; during this delay, the Marshal addressed a note to him, requesting that the treatment of the French prisoners

*Arrangement with  
M. Suchet.*

might be improved, and pressing for the deliverance of the garrisons. An assurance was given that there should be an immediate alteration in the condition of the prisoners, and a promise was given respecting the garrisons, to which Ferdinand affixed his signature. This answer was returned from Figueras, where he was still in the hands of the French; but, that it might appear more evidently his own free act and deed, he dated it from Gerona. Upon receiving this, Suchet immediately dispatched orders for letting the Infante, Don Carlos, proceed from Perpignan; thus he conferred an obligation, by releasing a hostage whom it would have been useless to detain; all questions concerning the fortresses and garrisons being, as by a tacit understanding, waived on both sides, there being a third party, without whose consent the garrison of Barcelona could not be dismissed; for Sir H. Clinton was then with the Anglo-Sicilian army blockading that city. A little before this time, instructions had been received by that General to embark one portion of his troops, including the Calabrians, for the coast of Italy, there to be employed in an expedition under Lord William Bentinck; and with the remainder to march, by way of Zaragoza and Pamplona, into France, there to reinforce Lord Wellington. Sir Henry took upon himself the responsibility of not obeying these instructions: and his conduct in so doing was fully approved by Lord Wellington; for, if that army had been withdrawn, the Spaniards in Catalonia could not have prevented Suchet from collecting and bringing off the whole of his remaining garrisons.

*Suchet, 2.*  
375-8.

As soon as the waters permitted, Ferdinand proceeded towards Gerona. General Copons had been apprized of his coming. Marshal Suchet escorted him to the Fluvia.



The French troops were drawn up in a semicircle on one side of the river, the Spaniards on the other ; and, having crossed it amid salutes of artillery, and the joyful sound of martial music, and the acclamations of the surrounding inhabitants, who had flocked thither from all sides, Ferdinand found himself then indeed free, . . in his own country, among his own people, and a King. There was no difficulty about his reception ; his retinue consisted only of Spaniards, among whom there were none to whom any exception could be taken, if Copons had been disposed to offer it. The General delivered into his hands the Regency's letter, and the documents which accompanied it ; and when Ferdinand came the same day to Gerona, he acknowledged them in a letter to the Regency announcing his arrival, saying that he should make himself acquainted with the contents of their papers ; meantime he assured them that his greatest wish was to give them proofs of his satisfaction, and of his lively desire to do every thing which might conduce to the happiness of his subjects. It was a comfort indeed for him, he said, to see himself in his own country, in the midst of a nation and an army to whom he was beholden for a fidelity as constant as it was generous.

The Cortes had regulated Ferdinand's route ; and as it was understood that he would proceed by the line prescribed for him, which was straight by way of Valencia, the Governors of Barcelona, Tortosa, and Murviedro, received instructions to commit no hostilities when he should pass. But Ferdinand was in no haste to proceed ; he needed time for consideration, and for such rest as the critical position in which he now found himself would allow : he halted, therefore, a few days at Gerona. On the 30th, he passed through the

*March 24.*

*Ferdinand  
writes from  
Gerona to  
the Re-  
gency.*

*Ferdinand  
goes to Za-  
ragoza.*

blockading army in front of Barcelona, the enemy firing a salute, the allies receiving him with all honours, and the people with every possible manifestation of joy. It was believed that he was proceeding to Valencia; but, altering his intention on the way, he made for Zaragoza, meaning to remain there till he should have determined how to act.

This restoration Buonaparte regarded at this time with indifference; but there was nothing which he dreaded so much as the progress of that feeling which had manifested itself at Bourdeaux; for peace, upon some terms, he thought himself always sure of obtaining, as long as the allies forbore to take up the cause of the Bourbons. Soult saw how likely it was that this feeling should spread from the Gironde to the Loire, and had resolved upon carrying the war back toward the Pyrenees, more with the view of occupying the English force at a distance from those parts in which he knew that the existing tyranny was borne with most impatience, than for the sake of the succours which he could draw from Catalonia. Not being acquainted with the success of Marshal Beresford's movement upon Bourdeaux, he expected thus to frustrate it, and that Lord Wellington would find it necessary to recall all the detachments which he had sent in that direction. He had, indeed, written to the Minister at War, saying he did not think the British General would dare to weaken himself by sending a force against that city. With this intention, he resumed the offensive; and, having sent most of his encumbrances to Toulouse, moved by Lembege to Conchez and Viella, on the right flank of the allies, drove in Sir Rowland's piquets, and made a demonstration as if intending to attack him with his whole force. Sir Rowland,

*Soult resumes the offensive.*

*Suchet, t. 2.  
Pièces  
Justif.  
pp. 530-2.  
March 13.*

upon this, took a position behind the Gros Lees, extending from Aire to Garlin, on the road to Pau. *He retreats upon Tarbes.* Lord Wellington quickly moved two divisions to his support, and prepared to concentrate the army in the neighbourhood of Aire. Marshal Soult did not then feel himself strong enough to venture upon an attack, and not finding his situation secure, retired in the night toward Lembege, keeping his advanced posts toward Conchez; and on the 15th, he halted his main body in position near Burosse, covered by a strong rear-guard at Mascarras; but, on the approach of a single brigade, they retired upon Vic Bigorre, not offering to maintain their ground, though in a country peculiarly defensible. The various detachments which Lord Wellington had sent out, and the reserves of cavalry and artillery from Spain, did not join him till the 17th. On the morrow the army marched; the right by Conchez, the centre by Castelnau, the left by Plaisance; *Colonel Jones's Account, 2. 262.* and Sir Rowland drove in the enemy's outposts upon Lembege. The French retired in the night, but held a strong rear-guard in front of Vic Bigorre, posted in the vineyards that encircle that town, and extend for several miles around it. There they made a stand, with a show of resolution which was not supported; for Sir Thomas Picton, with the 3rd division and Major-General Bock's Portuguese brigade, attacked them there, dislodged, and drove them through the vineyards and through the town. The allied army then assembled at Vic Bigorre and Rabastens, and the enemy retired during the night upon Tarbes.

Buonaparte had rested in this city on his way to Bayonne in 1808, when the treachery which *Further retreat to Toulouse.* he had plotted for the usurpation of Spain was about to be consummated: a monument had



been erected here in commemoration of this imperial visit; and now that journey had in consequence brought thither a victorious enemy's army. So different, too, were the feelings of the inhabitants toward him from what they had been, that when Soult sent General Maransin thither before him to raise a levy *en masse* throughout the department, they refused to take arms. Here, on the morning of the 20th, the French were found, having the advanced posts of their left in the town, their right upon the heights near the windmill of Oleac, and their centre and left retired, the latter upon the heights near Angor. The allies marched in two columns from Vic Bigorre and Rabastens; and Lord Wellington directed Sir Henry Clinton, with the 6th division, to turn and attack their right, through the village of Dour, while Sir Rowland attacked the town by the high road. Sir Henry's movement was completely successful: Baron Alten, also, with the light division, drove the enemy from the heights above Orleix: and when Sir Rowland had moved through the town and disposed his columns for the attack, they retired in all directions. The troops ascended the position which had been thus relinquished, thinking to pursue their advantage; but having gained the summit, they unexpectedly discovered a large portion of Soult's army, formed on a parallel height of great strength, and the body which had retreated before them, about 15,000 in number, ascending to join their comrades. This new position could not be attacked without incurring severe loss; and to preserve the advantages which had been obtained, it was necessary that the corps from Rabastens should move further forward. But before this arrangement could be completed, the evening closed, and Marshal Soult, once more taking advantage of night to cover his movements, retired toward Toulouse. There are two roads from Tarbes to that city, by S. Gaudens,

and by Auch ; Soult retreated by the first, but having collected his troops at St. Gaudens, crossed the country from thence to Auch. He had previously sent off all his remaining encumbrances ; and marching with all possible celerity, that he might profit at Toulouse by the time which he gained upon his pursuers, and destroying the bridges as he went, he entered that city on the 24th, having suffered no other loss during the pursuit than that of some prisoners, taken by General Fane in an attack upon his rear-guard at St. Gaudens on the 22nd.

Once more Lord Wellington's operations were impeded by heavy and continued rains ; he had to carry with him a pontoon train, as well as most of his supplies ; and it was not till three days after the French army had entered Toulouse, that the allies halted on the left of the Garonne, opposite that city.

*Passage of  
the Ga-  
ronne.*

*March 27.* On the following day, Lord Wellington ordered a bridge to be laid at Portet, a village immediately below the junction of the Ariège, and above the city. The current was so rapid, that the sheer line could not without much difficulty be stretched across ; and when this was effected the distance was found to be twenty-six yards more than the pontoons would cover. It was desirable to obtain a passage above the city ; for in that case Soult must either abandon Toulouse, or lose the hope of being joined by Suchet, now, though late in his movements, on the march to join him ; . . . a tardiness not imputable to that skilful commander, but to the unwillingness with which Buonaparte consented to give up any object of his ambition. Three days after the failure of the first attempt, a place was found near Roques, where the river was not too wide, and the spot in other respects favourable ; here, therefore, the pontoons were laid down, and Sir

*March 31.*

Rowland's corps crossed, and seized the bridge over the Ariège at Cintegabelle ; but after an anxious

trial of some hours, it was ascertained that from thence to Toulouse there was no way passable for an army ; and that till finer weather should have hardened the roads, it would be impracticable to direct an attack from the upper side of the town. The corps therefore re-passed the Garonne ; and it then became Lord Wellington's object to bridge the river below the city, and attack Soult in front before he should be reinforced. A favourable bend in the stream was discovered about two miles above Grenade, at a point where the Garonne skirts the main road : here some flanking batteries were established before daybreak on the 4th ; but *April 4th.* owing to some accidental delay, it was five o'clock before the first pontoon was brought to the water's edge. A few of the enemy's cavalry were patrolling on the right bank, and their whole army was within a short march : the patrols retired, and it was expected every moment that some attempt would be made to oppose the passage. Marshal Soult, indeed, had assured *Suchet, Pièces Justif. p. 536.* Suchet that whenever the passage should be effected, he would march and give the allies battle, whatever might be the disproportion of his force ; but of this he thought more wisely when the time came, and his whole attention was now engaged in strengthening a position so advantageous in itself, that with the labour and skill now employed in fortifying it, he thought he might there safely defy even such an enemy as Lord Wellington. The river at this point was 127 yards wide, and exceedingly rapid ; the bridge however was finished in four hours ; and just before it was completed the day became beautifully fine. The right bank is some fifty feet high, the other considerably lower ; and on that side there was a plain of open wood, after a rise of about twelve feet. A few men had previously been sent over in small boats, and posted in this wood. The cavalry



passed in single files, the infantry by threes, the bands playing "British Grenadiers," and the "Downfall of Paris," . . not knowing that at that time Paris had indeed fallen, and the allied sovereigns were in possession of it. Unopposed as the passage was, it had the appearance rather of some festival display, than of an actual military operation; the people from the neighbouring villages had by this time collected to behold it, . . with so little fear or dislike were the allies regarded by the inhabitants; and when the horse artillery crossed, the peasants volunteered their aid, and pulled the guns up the bank with all possible alacrity.

The more concerned spectators were not without fear for the bridge; it had been made fast by four stays to trees on either side, but the strength of the current was such that it was soon forced into the shape of a bow. Marshal Beresford passed with three divisions of infantry and some cavalry; but when Freyre's Spaniards and the light division should have followed, the river had increased so much in height and strength, that it was necessary to take up the platform. During the night, it rose two feet; the rain had also recommenced; and on the morrow the centre pontoon was removed, as a measure of precaution, and at length the whole were taken up. The army was thus divided, the main body being still on the left bank, and Soult, if he had thought proper, might have attacked either flank; but he had suffered severely for such an attempt in the battles before Bayonne, when he was more confident and in greater strength.

The extent of Toulouse is disproportionately large  
*Toulouse.* with respect to its population, being in length  
from north to south about two miles, and a mile  
and quarter in breadth from east to west; while the  
inhabitants were computed at not more than 60,000.

It has little commerce, though most favourably situated for inland communication : but it flourished as a provincial capital : formerly it was second only to Paris in size. The houses, and even the cathedral, are built of brick, which is very unusual in France : the latter edifice, therefore, though remarkable for its magnitude, is neither beautiful nor grand ; for a structure composed of such mean materials can produce no impression of grandeur, unless it be like the pyramids in size. That cathedral boasted of possessing the bodies of no fewer than seven Apostles, one of them being a duplicate of Santiago. The Dorade church derived its name from a gilt image of Notre Dame, the reputed work of St. Luke, who is better known in Roman Catholic countries as an artist in this line, or as a painter, than by his Gospel. The Dominicans exhibited a less doubtful relic in their church, the body of St. Thomas Aquinas, authenticated by himself in ghostly person, and brought to that city, after numerous adventures, with 10,000 lighted tapers, and 150,000 people in procession. Devout or curious persons were formerly indulged by a sight of the head, which had been fitted to a half-body of silver ; upon opening a plate at the top, the real skull was to be seen, and, under circumstances of special favour, kissed by adoring lips. Few places in France afford more subject for reflective thought. It was the capital of a great Gothic kingdom, till the last of its kings was overthrown by Clovis. The pulpit is still preserved there from which St. Bernard preached the crusade. Poetry flourished there in those ages when it stood most in need of patronage and culture ; and the city, under its own Counts, was then the seat of religious liberty as well as of literature. Its Floral Games may still remind us of the Gay Science of the Troubadours ; but the freedom of opinion and the truths of religion for which Toulouse

made so heroic and so virtuous a stand were succeeded there, as in the Catholic Netherlands, by that victorious bigotry of the deepest die which eats into the soul ; and, down to the revolution, a festival was yearly observed there in commemoration of the destruction of the Albigenes. That name must ever bring with it painful reflections to an Englishman's mind, when he remembers the history of a papal crusade under an English leader : and, looking to much later times, never were blind superstition and legal iniquity seen in such accursed combination as here, in the case of Calas ; never, in human history, was a judicial murder accomplished with circumstances of such peculiar barbarity and injustice, . . . circumstances so monstrous, that they could not be believed, if it were possible to deny or doubt them.

Marshal Soult had retreated upon Toulouse less for the sake of the abundant supplies which it afforded *Soult's position there.* him, than because of the singular advantages that its situation offered as a defensible position. The canal of Brienne (so called after the Cardinal Archbishop of that name), and which is broad enough for several barges to lie on it abreast, connects the Garonne with the great canal of Languedoc about two miles from the town, the navigation of the river being impeded in that part of its course by a weir for the use of the corn-mills. The whole western side is protected by the river ; on the east and north the canal covers it ; and on the south, the only part which was not covered by the river, could be approached only by roads impassable for artillery, and was therefore so secure, that Soult, who omitted no means of defence, deemed it wholly unnecessary to erect any works on that side. There were formerly three bridges over the Garonne : the single one which is left connects the city with the Fauxbourg St. Cyprien ; and the enemy had fortified



that suburb with strong field-works in front of the old walls. The walls were high, thick enough for defence in old times, and flanked by towers. The communication across the canal was covered by *têtes-de-pont*, defended by various buildings which had now been fortified for that purpose, and by artillery from the walls. East of the city is a range of bold heights extending along the space between the canal and the river Ers; over these heights all the roads from the eastward pass, and here Marshal Soult had taken his position, having fortified the summit with five redoubts, with various lines of intrenchment to support them, and to connect the flanks of the ground with the defences of the town. The left and centre being the points which he considered most assailable, were thus strengthened; toward the right, where the line approached the Ers, the river itself was sufficient defence. He flattered himself that his determination to defend Toulouse had astounded Lord Wellington, because four days elapsed after the passage of the river, and the allies had undertaken nothing. But the bad weather, he said, might have occasioned this delay; and expecting an attack, not without an ominous feeling of its result, he wrote to Marshal Suchet, saying that, in case of being compelled to retire, he should draw nearer to him, and that it would be for the advantage of both, if Suchet would make a diversion by the shortest line upon the Upper Garonne.

Formidable as this position was, it was necessary to attack the enemy there; Lord Wellington had no alternative, the roads from Ariège being impracticable for artillery, and even for horse. On the 8th the stream had subsided enough for the pontoons to be again laid down; the head-quarters then, and General Freyre with the Spanish corps and the Portuguese artillery, crossed the Garonne, and immediately moved forward to the

neighbourhood of the town. Colonel Vivian, with the 18th hussars, had here an opportunity of attacking some cavalry, which, though superior in number, they drove through the village of Croix d'Aurade, taking about 100 prisoners, and pursuing them so closely, that they had not time to destroy the bridge over the Ers, the only one which had been left standing, and by which it was necessary to pass in order to attack the position; Colonel Vivian was severely wounded in this charge. That attack was designed for the following day; but Sir Rowland's corps was on the left of the Garonne, in front of the suburb St. Cyprien; the pontoon bridge was too far off for that ready communication which might be required during the action; orders were therefore given for moving it a league higher up, near Ausonne. Some unexpected difficulties occurred in laying it; it was not completed till after mid-day, and the attack was, therefore, deferred till the following morning, being Easter Sunday: long will that Easter be remembered at Toulouse.

Lord Wellington's arrangements were that Marshal Beresford, who was on the right of the Ers with  
*April 10.* the 4th and 6th divisions, should cross that river  
*Battle of* at the bridge of Croix d'Aurade, gain possession  
*Toulouse.* of the village of Montblanc, and march up the left of the Ers to turn the enemy's right, while the Spaniards supported by the British cavalry should attack their front. Sir Stapleton was to follow the Marshal's movements with Lord Edward Somerset's brigade of hussars; and Vivian's brigade, now under Colonel Arentschild, was to observe the enemy's cavalry on both banks of the Ers, beyond the left of the allies. On the lower part of the canal, Picton and Baron Alten, with the 3rd and light divisions, and the brigade of German cavalry, were to threaten the *tête-de-pont*, and so draw the enemy's atten-

tion to that quarter; and Sir Rowland was to do the same on the side of St. Cyprien.

The business of this dreadful day commenced about seven o'clock, when Sir Thomas Picton drove in the French piquets in front of Pont Jumeau, at the point where the Canal de Brienne joins that of Languedoc; the action became warm here, and the enemy retiring, set fire to a fine large chateau, in the cypress avenues of which they had sought in vain to cover themselves. To the left of this division the light division extended nearly to the road to Alby, by which road Freyre's army advanced, in two columns, and formed in front of Croix d'Aurade, near a hill on which Lieutenant-Colonel Arentschild's Portuguese guns, protected by General Ponsonby's brigade of cavalry, were advantageously placed to cover their movements. Marshal Beresford, with the 4th and 6th divisions, under Sir Lowry Cole and Sir Henry Clinton, advanced also by the Alby road, turned off to their left at Croix d'Aurade, toward the village of Montblanc, carried the village, and proceeded up the left bank of the Ers, in three open columns, along the foot of the heights, over difficult ground, which was much intersected with deep ditches and hollow roads. Upon their march they were exposed to a heavy cannonade from all the guns of the enemy's works; and those guns throughout the day were served with great spirit and correctness, Toulouse having been an artillery school since the Revolution. Beresford's artillery was left at Montblanc because of the badness of the roads; it was posted there on some low ground, in front of the village, and kept up a fire upon the works on the heights of Pujade. The Spaniards advanced in good order to assault these works, which formed the left of the enemy's position, and which Clausel and Villatte occupied with their divisions, having a brigade of cavalry in their front.



They advanced across the valley with great bravery under a most severe fire: a brigade of their own troops, and one of British heavy dragoons, had been formed in reserve in the rear, and Gardiner's troop of artillery was brought up to their left to answer the enemy's. At first they drove before them a brigade of French, but as they approached the intrenchment, a heavy fire of grape was poured upon them with full effect, and to escape it they pushed forward with inconsiderate speed, . . the nimblest outrunning their comrades, in such disorder that before the first line arrived at a hollow road some fifty yards in front of the intrenchment, it was completely broken. The reserve, as if deterred rather than instructed by this error, fell into the opposite fault, and came on so slowly as not to be near enough for supporting them, when the French advanced against them vigorously, and drove them down the hill, and in spite of the utmost exertions of Freyre and the superior officers, were on the point of seizing the bridge over the Ers, in which, if they had succeeded, Beresford's troops would have been isolated. But the 1st Portuguese *Caçadores*, forming part of Baron Alten's light division, moved opportunely to their left, and advancing through the flying Spaniards, rallied them, and caused the enemy to halt in their pursuit: a squadron of British dragoons, who were still more in their rear, turned others, by striking them with the flat side of their swords; and Lord Wellington himself, the moment he saw them give way, galloped to the spot, and by his personal exertions rallied about a company of them, near the cypress trees on the Alby road. They suffered greatly in their flight, and the consequences might have been worse if the enemy had followed up the advantage with spirit. The great exertions of General Freyre, and of the staff officers, Mendizabal and Barcena among others, formed them again sooner than might have

been expected after such a failure, and they were again placed in position, from which they afterwards moved to their left in support of the 6th division; but they were not again brought into serious action.

This was not the only time at which the circumstances of the day turned in favour of the enemy. Picton saw that a great advantage might be gained at this moment by pushing across the canal, while the enemy were engaged so far in front; and thinking to profit by the opportunity, having driven them within their *tête-de-pont* at Pont Jumeau, he attempted, contrary to his instructions, to carry it. It was not till the assailants were on the counterscarp that they discovered the formidable nature of the works, which had been regularly formed, and with the greatest possible care; an assault, indeed, was impracticable; they were exposed to a heavy fire of musketry in front, and to a numerous artillery in their flank, and nothing but a speedy retreat could have saved them from destruction. Lieutenant-Colonel Forbes was killed here, and Major-General Brisbane wounded.

Meantime Beresford was more successful. The 4th and 6th divisions moved on till they came opposite to the points of attack assigned them; there they halted, and formed in three lines. Sir Lowry advanced against the extreme right of the enemy's line, where General Leseur guarded the heights of Montaudran with one brigade, having General Berton's cavalry in his front, on the road to Bordes: and Sir Henry moved up, in front, to attack the redoubts on Mount Calvinet, which were occupied by Harispe's division, now considerably reinforced with the troops whom the repulse of the Spaniards had rendered disposable for this service. The face of the heights was irregular and steep, yet the 6th division steadily ascended under a severe fire of artillery, to which at every step they were exposed. A body of cavalry

made many serious attacks on their right flank when they had gained the summit: the 79th formed into a square, received the charge, and totally routed them; and the troops drove back everything that opposed them, carried with the bayonet the principal redoubt on the right, and established themselves on the crest of the position. Sir Lowry on his part, though menaced by Berton's cavalry on his left, and opposed by infantry in front, made his way successfully up, and having driven the enemy from the heights beyond the right of the intrenchment, took up ground on the left of Sir Henry Clinton, just before noon.

Two divisions of the allies were thus formed on the heights; but their artillery which had been left at Mont-blanc was not yet brought up, and the enemy meantime moved in force toward the points which were now threatened. The whole face of the hill is intersected with deep hollow roads; and the soil is a stiff heavy clay, in which at this time horses could with difficulty move out of a walk: the French, therefore, had laid planks from one of their works to another, on which their artillery could rapidly be moved wherever it was most needed. During the interval which elapsed before Beresford's guns arrived, they had time to effect this removal from their left, on the heights of Pujade, to those of Calvinet; and General Taupin's division was moved to the same point from the Fauxbourg S. Cyprien, (where Reille commanded with Maransin under him) when it was perceived that no serious attack was intended against that suburb. The roofs and steeples of Toulouse were at this time covered with spectators, who, whatever their hopes and fears might be for the issue of the battle, execrated Marshal Soult for bringing the war thus to their own doors, and exposing a populous city to its horrors. About one, Beresford was.

*Précis Historique,*  
*P. 2. p. 61.*

*Ib. p. 47.*



joined by his artillery ; and the 4th and 6th divisions advanced steadily in line against the redoubts on the heights of Calvinet. Soult thought he could overpower Sir Henry's division by a vigorous attack both in front and flank, before Sir Lowry's could come up to its support ; with this view the French pushed forward beyond their works to meet the assailants, Clausel and Taupin against the front of the 6th division, Leseur's brigade and Berton's cavalry against its flank. They could receive no support from the fire of their intrenchments in this advance ; it became, therefore, a trial of courage ; and the brave movement was as bravely met : Sir Henry Clinton, instead of waiting to receive the attack, pushed forward and met it with the bayonet ; and his charge was a most determined and successful one. General Taupin was killed. The French were not only broken but routed ; and General Pack's brigade carried the two principal redoubts and fortified houses in the enemy's centre. They made a desperate effort from the canal to recover these redoubts ; and a Scotch battalion, which was placed in the interior of one, was nearly exhausted in defending it, when a brigade came in good time to their assistance, charged the French, and drove them down the hill. The enemy then formed their two routed divisions and General Rouget's brigade in a line from the heights of Pujade to Pont des Demoiselles, a bridge over the canal on the Montaudran road ; from thence they made a second attempt in great force to recover that redoubt, which they looked upon as the key of the position ; and the English, seeing them approach, planted their colours on the parapet in defiance. The French soldiers never throughout the whole war displayed more courage, nor more of that intelligence, which is their peculiar praise, than on this day ; and in no part of the action did they behave better than in this attack, where they knew that

they had support at hand, and, if need were, a sure retreat. To that need they were driven by men who exceeded them in cool and patient courage, a courage depending less upon excitement than upon constitution; and after many and strenuous efforts they were finally repulsed with great loss.

The victorious division continued its movement along the ridge; and the Spaniards, brought into a serviceable position, though not into action, made a corresponding movement upon the front. The enemy did not wait to be assaulted in their remaining works: they withdrew from them gradually, and removed their artillery by the hollow road across the bridge over the canal. By four o'clock the action was at an end; and the allies, having accomplished the object of the day, were with their artillery formed on the hills, looking down on the city; the French occupying in strength an intermediate rising ground. Sir Rowland on his side had done all that was assigned him; he had driven the enemy from their exterior works in the suburb, and made them retire within the ancient wall. This had had the intended effect of distracting them, and keeping one of their divisions employed.

The loss in this severe action was very great; that of the British being in killed and wounded 2124, of the Portuguese 607, of the Spaniards 1983, in all above 4700\*. The brunt of the action fell on the 6th division, which had 13 officers killed and 88 wounded. General Pack was wounded, but remained in the field. Lieutenant-Colonel Coghlan was killed; Mendizabal and Espalata wounded. The loss of the enemy was not known;

\* French exaggeration has seldom been carried farther than in the accounts of this action. One account makes the loss of the allies 21,000 in killed, and nearly 15,000 wounded!

and the author of the *Précis Historique de la Bataille* takes credit to himself for moderation and candour in reducing the number of the slain to 17,000.—P. 3. pp. 32—37.

but from the circumstances of their position they are believed to have suffered less than the allies: their dead lay in full view of the city, and they asked leave on the following day to bury them. General Lamorandiere was killed. Generals Harispe, Baurot, and S. Hilaire were wounded and made prisoners. Only one gun was taken in the position; the rest of the enemy withdrew in time. Soult's force had consisted of not less than 36,000 men, that of Lord Wellington's was numerically little greater.

At night every post of the French was withdrawn within their intrenched line behind the canal.

The only remaining bridge over the Ers was in possession of the allies, and the road from that *Soult retires from Toulouse.* over the Garonne was guarded by Sir Rowland: Toulouse was thus closed on three sides, and preparations were made for completing the investment. There was a want of ammunition, so much had been expended in the action; the reserve therefore was ordered up from Aire and Orthes; and shot were collected from the field of battle, the men searching for them at a fixed price. The inhabitants had now the miseries of a blockade before them, or the fear of having their lines forced, and the city at the mercy of an enemy's army. Above all, they dreaded the rockets, which it was falsely reported would be discharged against the town; but so far was Lord Wellington from entertaining any such purpose, that though some heavy guns were fired from the ramparts, not a shot was directed against the city in return. It was said that Marshal Soult hesitated what part to take; whether to hold Toulouse, in the likelihood of obtaining some great advantage by bringing his forces out in a mass against any part of a line widely extended, and occupied by a force little more numerous than his own; or, retiring toward Carcassonne, to effect a junction with Suchet.



General d'Armagnac is said to have advised this course, in consideration of the inhabitants, and they blessed him for it ; for Soult, whom they hated, and whom they openly accused of extortion and rapacity, followed the advice : a considerable body of his troops left the city on the night after the battle, leaving their wounded, 1600 in number, much of their artillery, and stores of all descriptions in large quantities.

The allies entered Toulouse not as conquerors, but The allies enter. as friends and deliverers, amid cries of "*Vivent les Anglois !*" "*Vive le Roi !*" "*Vivent nos libérateurs !*" It was known officially at this time that the allied armies were in possession of Paris ; and, though it was uncertain what measures might be taken with respect to the government of France, the wishes of the people were loudly declared, and the white flag hoisted. That same evening Colonel Cooke arrived from Paris to inform Lord Wellington that the allied Sovereigns had declared they would enter into no fresh negotiations with Buonaparte, because of his bad faith ; that the Senate had passed resolutions declaring he had forfeited all right to the crown, and absolving the soldiers and the nation from their oaths of allegiance ; finally, that he had submitted to their decree, and was permitted to retire to Elba, with the independent sovereignty of that island. Colonel St. Simon accompanied the British officer, charged with the same communication from the Provisional Government to Marshals Soult and Suchet. It was in the theatre that this news was published, for the theatre was not closed that night : the dead were lying all around the walls ; the hospitals and many of the houses were filled with wounded, all of whom were not yet brought in : the inhabitants themselves had been, by the mercy of Providence, spared from the horrors of an assault, of a blockade which would speedily have

caused famine, and from the evils of fire and sword which they had apprehended; and it was the theatre at Toulouse that was opened, not the churches! . . . But the play was altered, and Richard Cœur de Lion was represented, for the sake of its applicable passages and songs. Nothing could exceed the cheering at these passages, except the bursts of applause with which Lord Wellington was received and greeted whenever he moved: only those who know the French character, said one who was present, could imagine the excessive joy of the people; they shouted and wept, and shouted again. In the midst of this exultation, an unusual tumult announced something new; and a person in black, attended by many candles, and having a paper in his hand, appeared in one of the side boxes, struggling for room, and endeavouring to obtain a hearing. Many minutes elapsed before even the eagerness of their own expectation could still that vociferous audience sufficiently for the magistrate to make himself heard; nor was anything then audible except that he announced the abdication of Buonaparte, and the proclamation of Louis XVIII.

*Louis  
XVIII.  
proclaimed.*

Here it might have been hoped that the bloody account of this long war had closed; even this last bloodshed might have been spared if, through some great treachery or inexcusable neglect, there had not been either delay in sending off tidings of the cessation of hostilities, or in impeding them upon the road; for the courier, who was dispatched on the first of the month, ought to have arrived a week before the battle; indeed suspicions were expressed in the *Moniteur* that orders and dispatches had been intercepted, with the view of giving Marshal Soult an opportunity of retrieving the reputation of the French armies by fighting in a position which he thought inexpugnable.

*Sally of the  
French  
from Ba-  
yonne.*

Colonels Cooke and S. Simon had passed through Bourdeaux, and advice was dispatched from thence to Sir John Hope before Bayonne, while they proceeded to Toulouse. As this advice was not official, Sir John did not think proper to notify it officially to General Thouvenot, till he should receive orders from Lord Wellington; but he caused it to be communicated to the French officers at their advanced piquets, in the hope and expectation that it might prevent any hostilities in the mean time. The intimation seems to have produced a very different effect. On the night of the 13th, two deserters came from the town, and gave information that the garrison were to make a sortie in great strength early on the morrow. The first division, upon this, was ordered to arms at three in the morning; and in a few *April 14.* minutes afterward a feint attack was made upon the outposts in front of Anglet. But it soon appeared that the chief effort would be on the right of the Adour. Parties from the citadel crept up the hill on which the piquets were stationed, took them almost by surprise, and instantly two columns rushed forward with loud cheers, and by their numbers broke through the line of piquets between St. Etienne and St. Bernard; another strong column advancing at the same time against the former village. The line of outposts through this village, and along the heights towards Boucaut, was marked by a road worn in some places to a deep hollow way, and in others bounded by high garden-walls, so that it was not easy to get out of it, except where gaps at long intervals had been broken down for the passage of the troops. The piquets, therefore, were cut off from their supports; and, fighting with desperate animosity on both sides, heaps of slain were found here, both French and English, mostly killed with the bayonet. Sir John Hope, hastening with his staff, in the early part



of the attack, to St. Etienne, entered this road, as the shortest way, not aware that great part of it was in the enemy's possession, and that the piquets of the right flank had fallen back when the line of outposts had been pierced. As soon as he discovered this, he endeavoured to retire; but having been in front himself, with his aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Moore, and Captain Herries of the Quarter-Master-General's department, they were consequently the last in retiring; and before they could get out of this hollow way, the French came up within a few yards, and began firing. Sir John's horse was struck with three balls, and falling dead, brought his rider to the ground. Captain Herries and Lieutenant Moore dismounted to assist him, for his foot was under the dead horse; but the first of these officers was instantly brought down himself severely wounded, and the latter had his right arm shattered; the General was also wounded in the arm; and the French coming immediately up, made them all three prisoners. As they were carrying them to Bayonne, Sir John received a second and severe wound in the foot, from a ball which was supposed to come from his own piquets. Major-General Hay was in command of the outposts for the night; and having just given directions that the church of St. Etienne should be defended till the last, he was killed shortly after the attack commenced. The enemy, having here a great superiority of numbers, got into the village towards the left, and obtained possession of the whole, except one house, which Captain Foster of the 38th occupied with a piquet, and bravely maintained, though the greater part of his men were killed or wounded, till a brigade of the German Legion retook the village.

It had been supposed that the French would make it their main object to destroy the bridge, which would

*Sir J. Hope  
taken  
prisoner.*

have been the only reasonable or justifiable object of such a sortie in that state of the siege, when neither stores nor artillery were on the ground, nor the works commenced. To guard against this, Lord Saltoun had intrenched the convent of St. Bernard, and with great ability converted it into a respectable little fortress; and Colonel Maitland now formed the first brigade of Guards on the heights above it, to charge the enemy in flank, should he advance toward the bridge. But, though their gun-boats came down the river, and opened a heavy flanking cannonade, no attempt was made on the bridge by water; and it was soon perceived that they had as little intention of attacking it by land, their efforts being wholly directed against the centre of the countervallation opposite to the citadel. Major-General Howard now directed Maitland to support the right flank, and Major-General Stopford, with the 2nd brigade of guards, to co-operate in recovering the ground between that flank and St. Etienne; that officer was soon after wounded, and the command of the brigade fell to General Guise.

The night was very dark; but the French from time to time sent up blue lights from the citadel, *The French repulsed.* obtaining light enough thereby to direct their guns, of which nearly 70 were constantly firing to support their attack. Some of their shells and fire-balls fell upon the depôt of fascines, and several houses also were set on fire by the same means. These partial illuminations made the darkness deeper in those places to which the light did not extend; and the guards when they approached the French line could distinguish it only by the fire of musketry from behind the hedges and walls. They were directed to lie down and wait till orders could be communicated to the Coldstream guards, under Lieutenant-Colonel Woodford, who were to charge simultaneously for recovering the old position in the hollow road. Mean-

while they kept close to the ground, for the eminence on which they were was so exposed to the citadel, that had they stood up for a few minutes they must have been nearly destroyed : but when the signal was given they rose and rushed forward ; the Coldstream charged on the opposite flank at the same moment, and the contest on this part of the line was decided by this well-combined attack : the French ran with all speed lest their retreat should be intercepted ; and they suffered from a most destructive fire which both battalions poured upon them as they retired over the glacis of the citadel. When also they were driven out of St. Etienne by the German Legion, a field-piece was brought to bear on their columns, and thirteen rounds of grape and canister were fired at them with dreadful effect as they retreated down the great road into St. Esprit. The moon rose toward the close of the action ; and, as day broke, French and English were seen lying on all sides, killed or wounded, and so intermixed, that there seemed to have been no distinct line belonging to either party. The loss was severe on both sides : on the part of the allies 143 were killed, 452 wounded, and 231 made prisoners ; the loss of the French amounted to 913, of whom only twenty were prisoners.

During the short truce which took place on the outposts when the engagement was over, the British officers expressed their regret that so many brave men should thus uselessly have been sacrificed ; and they were justly disgusted at the heartless levity with which the French officers affected to treat the affair, saying it had been nothing more than a *petite promenade militaire* ! Under all circumstances it seemed indeed to have been planned less in a military spirit than with a feeling of bitter enmity ; made as it was when the French had reason to know that the war was at an end, . . and when, if it had



been otherwise, no object but that of the immediate slaughter could be effected, there being no works to be destroyed, no cannon to be spiked; and when whatever loss might have been inflicted could not have been so great as to prevent or delay the operations of the siege. Major-General Colville, on whom the command devolved, landed his guns, and made preparations upon a scale which, if hostilities had been renewed, would, in all human probability, in the course of a very few weeks have added Bayonne to the British conquests. But no new conquest, no farther victories were needed for the honour of the British name. The reputation of the English soldiers had not been higher in the days of the Black Prince, nor that of a British commander in the days of Marlborough.

Colonels Cooke and S. Simon made no tarriance in Toulouse, but hastened on to inform Marshal Soult of Buonaparte's deposition, and the consequent termination of the war. The Marshal discovered no willingness to acquiesce in the new order of things; the information, he said, came to him without any character of authenticity, nevertheless, inasmuch as Lord Wellington seemed persuaded of its truth, he proposed an armistice, that he might have time to receive from the Emperor's government official advices, which might direct him how to act. When Colonel Cooke returned to Toulouse with this reply, Lord Wellington dispatched a second letter to Marshal Soult, saying, it appeared to him that Colonel Simon had been sent to the French Marshal by the Provisional Government of France, just as Colonel Cooke had been to him by the British minister who was with the King of Prussia, both bearers of official intelligence; nor could the truth of that intelligence be doubted, nor did it require proof. Without requiring his Excellency to come to a decision,

*Batty's  
Campaign,  
158, 165.*

*Suchet and  
Soult ac-  
knowledge  
the new go-  
vernment.*

whatever that might be, he himself, he added, must not depart from the line of conduct which the allied sovereigns had pursued in their negotiations at Paris ; but were he to consent to an armistice before his Excellency should have followed the example of his companions in arms, and declared his adhesion to the Provisional Government, he should be sacrificing the interest not only of the allies, but of France itself, whom it concerned so much to be saved from a civil war. Meantime Colonel S. Simon proceeded to Marshal Suchet, whom he found at Narbonne with about 12,000 men, all whom he could bring out of Spain. His last act in Catalonia had been to demolish the fortifications of Rosas ; Denia and Morella had capitulated ; he left garrisons blockaded in Figueras, Hostalric, Barcelona, Tortosa, Murviedro, and Peñiscola, in which latter place the governor with his staff, and many others, perished by the explosion of a magazine. Marshal Suchet was far from approving the latter movements of Marshal Soult, and from his own dispatches had been led to believe that he could surely have maintained himself at Toulouse. Upon Colonel S. Simon's arrival, he assembled his superior officers, laid the information before them, and with their unanimous consent sent in the adhesion of the army of Aragon and Catalonia. Soult had now no choice ; the allies were moving against him ready to have acted if he had hesitated longer ; yielding an unwilling consent, he then *April 19.* acknowledged the Provisional Government, and a convention for the suspension of hostilities was arranged.

Thus was the war concluded, happily for all parties, even for the French, whom nothing but such a series of defeats could have delivered from the tyranny which their former victories had brought upon themselves. It was by the national spirit which had first shown itself in the Peninsula, by the persevering efforts of Great Britain

in the peninsular war, the courage of her troops, and the skill of her great commander, that Buonaparte's fortune had been checked at its height, and successfully resisted; till other governments were encouraged, and other nations roused by the example; and that power, the most formidable which had ever been known in the civilized world, was then beaten down. The independence of Spain and Portugal had been triumphantly vindicated and secured; and if the civil liberties of both countries were not restored, and firmly established upon a sure foundation, the cause is to be found, not in any foreign influence exercised ill, nor in the perverse disposition, nor malignant designs of any individual or set of men, but in old evils which time had rendered inveterate, for which there is no sudden cure, and which when it is attempted to remove them by the knife and the cautery, must ever be rendered worse.

Ferdinand had returned from captivity with the belief in which he had been trained up, that by right of birth, and by the laws and customs of his country, he was an absolute King; and in this the great majority of the nation entirely agreed with him. But he had been accustomed to yield to circumstances which he could not control, feeling in himself neither the wish nor the strength to struggle against them; and had the general opinion been in favour of the new constitution, he would have submitted to it, as he had to his detention at Valençay, if with no better will, with the same apparent contentment, and the same convenient insensibility. Certain it is that he had no intention of overthrowing it when he arrived at Zaragoza: . . . "there are many parts of it," said he, "which I do not approve; but if any opposition on my part were likely to cause the shedding of one drop of Spanish blood, I would swear to it immediately." He soon found that this was

*Disposition  
of Ferdi-  
nand on his  
return.*



not the national wish; that the people cared for the constitution as little as they understood it, that they execrated the *Liberales*, and hated the Cortes for their sake. That assembly, indeed, had acted toward all classes with such strange impolicy as to offend or injure all. The nobles, though the constitution gave them not that weight in the political scale, without which there can be no well-balanced monarchy, might nevertheless have submitted to it without repugnance, because they possessed no authority as an order under the old government: but their property had been attacked; and a sweeping decree had abolished those feudal rights and customs from which a large portion of their hereditary revenues was derived. The clergy might have acquiesced in the suppression of the Inquisition, if they had not been required to proclaim the triumph of the *Liberales*, . . a triumph whereby nothing was gained for toleration, death being still the punishment for any one who should dare dissent from the Roman Catholic faith. The monasteries might have been quietly reduced, as Pombal had begun to reduce them, without wrong to the existing communities, and without offence to the feelings or prejudices of the nation, simply by forbidding the admittance of new members: by suppressing them the Cortes not only made the monks and friars their enemies, but the people also, among whom the revenues of the former were expended, and over whom the latter exercised far greater influence than either the gospel or the laws. This measure, indeed, would have been impolitic, even if the whole expected profit to the treasury had accrued from it; but as a measure of finance it was worse than a failure. Purchasers could not be found for church property thus confiscated, in a country where the people revolted at this species of sacrilege; the estates, therefore, were

*Impolitic  
measures of  
the Cortes.*

administered for the government; and what with the excuses and opportunities which were afforded for mal-administration and speculation, it was generally found that the costs of management consumed the whole proceeds; whereas a regular impost might always have been levied upon the former possessors. The necessity of raising money to support the war was the plea for this suppression; yet the pay of the armies was always greatly in arrear; and it has been seen how much they suffered for want of proper clothing and of sufficient food: such evils are always imputed to the government under which they exist; and as the Cortes had, in fact, assumed the government, the Cortes were as unpopular with the soldiers as with the great body of the people. Nothing but the army could support them if the King should refuse to take upon himself the yoke which they had prepared for him; yet such was the infatuation of the *Liberales*, that one of their most influential members said the liberties of the country could never be safe if there were even four paid soldiers and a corporal in it; and another described the army as composed of privileged mercenaries and hired assassins.

Yet this party courted popularity; and while they declaimed in the hall of the Cortes fancied that they enjoyed it. The galleries were filled with their admirers; and they had active partizans who could at any time raise tumult enough out of doors to carry violent measures by intimidation. The *Serviles*, as they contemptuously called those who disapproved the new constitution, either wholly or in any of its parts, were kept silent, some by prudence, others by this system of terror.

*Feb. 3.* One deputy ventured to say that Ferdinand, as soon as he arrived, ought to be acknowledged as being born to all the rights and privileges of an absolute King, and that the constitution ought therefore to

be annulled. The indignation of the *Liberales* burst forth at this, and of the galleries also, for the persons who attended there had always a potential voice; the president thought it prudent to close the doors, lest the liberal mob should be brought in to take summary vengeance upon the indiscreet member: a vote for expelling him was passed, and orders given for commencing a process against him, upon a law passed in the preceding summer, by which any person who should affirm, *Aug. 18,* either by word of mouth or by writing, that *1813.* the constitution ought not to be observed, was to be punished with perpetual banishment, and the deprivation of all offices, pay, and honours. Another law had been passed, on the same day, declaring, that whoever should conspire to establish any other religion in Spain than the Catholic-Apostolic-Roman religion, or to make the Spanish nation cease to profess it, should be prosecuted as a traitor, and suffer death, the established law concerning offences against the faith remaining in full force. It was only by thus consenting to the persecution of religious opinions that the *Liberales* could make the *Serviles* concur in a law which gave them authority to persecute for political ones!

“Happy,” said a journalist who spoke the sentiments of the ruling party, “happy will be the day when Ferdinand, having been restored to his faithful subjects, may be thus addressed: Here is your throne, preserved by the loyalty of your subjects; here is your crown, repurchased for you by the blood of Spaniards; here is your sceptre, which Spanish constancy replaces in your hands; here is your royal robe, purpled with the blood of thousands who have fallen that you might wear it! Peruse our history; inform yourself of all that the Spaniards have done for you, and never forget that to the Spanish people you owe everything. Never forget that



you are come to be the chief of a nation, the monarch of subjects who have abolished the vestiges of despotism! It is the law which orders; . . the King is the executive magistrate. . . But, that such a day of jubilee may arrive, King Ferdinand must return absolutely free, neither influenced by the tyrant of France, nor by Spaniards who are ignorant of the state of Spain, or who regard our institutions with dislike." This was written before the overthrow of Buonaparte, and before Ferdinand's enlargement, and perhaps before the *Liberales* themselves apprehended the consequence in which their own rashness must inevitably involve them. Indifferent spectators saw clearly that either the constitution must be modified, or that the King would make himself absolute again: and even now, if the *Liberales* had not been possessed with an overweening opinion of their own strength, such a modification might have been effected as would have given the Spaniards all the liberty which they were willing to receive, and, indeed, all the political freedom which those who had the sincerest wish for their improvement and their prosperity could have desired for them. But when the last communication from Valençay was read in the Cortes, conciliatory as it was intended to be, and satisfactory as it ought to have been deemed, one member took a sudden exception to the word *subjects*: "We are not subjects!" he exclaimed. And another member, expressing his assent to the absurd exception, said, that the Spanish people were subjects of the law alone; but that the use of a word which he erroneously represented as being peculiar to the ancient despotism was accounted for by Ferdinand's long imprisonment, and his consequent ignorance of the new political phraseology of Spain! Meantime the most preposterous projects were started by those who saw that such language and such opinions were likely to occasion

a struggle, and who saw no farther. Some were for assembling an army to defend the Cortes against the King; others were for setting him aside, and appointing his brother, the Infante Don Carlos, to reign in his stead: and it is said that there was a party in the Cortes who dreamed of offering the crown to Lord Wellington!

Some of the Guerrilla chiefs are said at this time to have tendered their services to the Cortes; and this is rendered probable by their subsequent conduct. The Cortes is supposed to have reckoned, also, upon Lacy's attachment to the constitution; but the enthusiasm with which Ferdinand was received by the troops might have shown them how little they could expect from any declarations of the military in their favour. When it was expected that he would proceed from Barcelona to Valencia, Elio, with the double purpose of rendering most honour to the King and affording most gratification to the soldiers, proposed a truce to General Robert, in order that the troops employed in the blockade of Tortosa might join their comrades, who were assembled at Amposta, to receive him on his way. When Ferdinand *April.* apprized them that he had changed his route, he assigned as a reason his desire of viewing the ruins of Zaragoza, and showing a mark of respect to that faithful city. But the season of festivity at Valencia was rather prolonged than retarded by this deviation; for the Infante Don Antonio proceeded immediately thither, and his arrival kept the inhabitants in a jubilant state till the King himself arrived. Ferdinand may have intended to gain time by this delay for making himself acquainted with the real state of public opinion; but the visit was probably suggested by Palafox, without any such view: he knew that it would be creditable to the King's feelings, and honourable to the Zaragozans; and what could be so gratifying to himself as to return under such circum-

stances to Zaragoza, where, with a devoted heroism which had never been surpassed, he had performed his duty to the uttermost, and won for himself a glorious name not to be stained by calumny, and not to be obscured by lapse of ages, while any remembrance of these times shall endure.

After tarrying some twelve days at Zaragoza, Ferdinand set out for Valencia. On the way he was met by his uncle, Cardinal Bourbon, whom, as President of the Regency, the Cortes had sent to meet the King, but with a strict injunction that he was not to kiss the King's hand, because they deemed any such mark of homage inconsistent with their dignity. Ferdinand had been apprized of this; and, as a first and easy trial of his strength, when the Cardinal accosted him, he presented his hand, and commanded him to kiss it. The old prelate, who had weakly promised to obey the orders of the Cortes, which in his heart he disapproved, obeyed the King with better will than grace, after he had shown a wish to avoid the ceremony; but Ferdinand, having thus humbled him, turned his back upon him in displeasure, and presently deprived him of his archbishopric.

The objection to the word subjects might have been imputed to the folly of the individuals who started and supported it; . . but this refusal of a ceremony which was as old as the monarchy itself, was the act of the Cortes as a body, and might well be considered as one more proof that they, who had so proposterously assumed the title of Majesty for themselves, were resolved to leave the sovereign little but his bare title. But Ferdinand had seen the disposition of the people at Zaragoza; he had seen that all classes heartily united in reprobating the measures of the Cortes, and that the re-establishment of the Inquisition was one of the blessings which

*Cardinal  
Bourbon's  
reception  
by Ferdi-  
nand.*



they expected from his return The disposition of the army was distinctly declared by Elio, who met *Elio meets him at Jaquesa, on the frontiers of Aragon the King. April 15.* and Valencia, and addressed him in the name of the second army, that army, he said, which had shed most blood, and made most sacrifices for the deliverance of their country and their King. "Your Majesty," said he, "arrived in a happy hour to occupy the throne of your fathers; and the God of Hosts, who by such strange and wonderful ways has brought your Majesty hither to restore the monarchy of the Spains, which Nature has given you, may He give you all the strength of mind and body that are required for governing it worthily: then, Sire, you will not forget the armies which have deserved so well, those armies who, having moistened with their blood the land which they have delivered, find themselves at this day in want, neglected, and what is worse, outraged; but they trust that you, Sire, will do them justice!" Elio then offered to resign his General's staff; and upon Ferdinand's declining to receive it, and saying it was well placed in his hand, the General, with ready adulation, said, "Take it, Sire, . . let your Majesty grasp it but for a moment, and in that moment it will acquire new worth, new strength!" The King took the staff accordingly, and instantly returned it. Elio then requested permission to kiss his royal hand, and in a short but studied speech, which concluded this ominous scene, he pledged himself that 40,000 strong right arms should be as they had been in the worst of times, the support of his throne.

Ferdinand entered Valencia on the following evening, drawn into the city as he had been into every place upon the road by the joyous people who yoked themselves to his carriage, and who testified by every possible expression of word and deed their *Ferdinand enters Valencia.*

desire of taking the old yoke upon themselves and upon their children. An English traveller, who had the good fortune to be present on this memorable day, describes their enthusiasm as bordering upon madness; he had seen before the King's deliverance the extreme unpopularity of the Cortes throughout Spain, but the feeling which was now manifested surprised him by its intensity and its eagerness, and by the sudden conversion of those who but a few days before professed fidelity to the new constitution; those very persons were now ready to shed their blood in Ferdinand's cause, that he might be restored, they said, to the full enjoyment of all the rights which his fathers had possessed. "Long live the Absolute King!" was the cry, "and down with the Constitution!"

On the morrow the King went on foot to the cathedral, to be present at a thanksgiving service for his restoration. The streets were lined with soldiers; the colours of the crown regiment were lowered as he passed, so as to be spread before him, that he might see they were stained with blood; and Elio, who had prepared this scene, said, "I have detained you for a sight worthy of you! The stains which you see upon this flag are of the blood of the officer who now holds it, and who, when covered with wounds, saved it from the enemy at Castalla. The crown which this blood has dyed seems to say that the blood which the loyal Spanish army has shed is that which has recovered for you your crown; and the blood which remains in all the Spanish armies they are ready to shed for securing you upon the throne in the plenitude of those rights which Nature has made your portion!" Ferdinand could not have performed his part better at that moment if he had studied it; he stooped and kissed the flag, and announced to the standard-bearer, who had before received no promotion

*April 17.*

for his services, that he was now promoted. In the afternoon, after the officers had been presented and had kissed hands, Elio, in their name and presence, renewed for the army under his command the oath which the whole loyal Spanish nation had taken in the year 1808, when Ferdinand was acknowledged King: the constitution was not mentioned in his address, nor the Cortes; "this oath," said he, "they renew by me as their organ upon your royal hand (and he knelt and kissed the hand at this part of his speech), and they promise your Majesty that at the price of their blood they will preserve the throne for you with all those rights to which the heroic Spanish nation at that time swore." Turning then to the officers, he asked whether these were the sentiments which animated them? He was answered by a general acclamation of assent: many of them burst into tears in the strength of their emotion, and some cries were heard of death to those who did not hold such sentiments, and would not maintain them! The time came when General Elio paid with his own life's blood for this and other services to the absolute cause.

*The officers  
swear fidelity  
to him.*

He was indeed an evil counsellor now, acting honestly and bravely, but upon an erring judgment. Unhappily there never was a time in which wise counsel was more needed; for if the blind, unreflecting, generous loyalty of the nation had been rightly estimated, so as to call forth a generous but thoughtful feeling in return, it would be rash and presumptuous to say that things might have been settled upon a sure foundation, but certainly much evil might have been averted, much wickedness might have been prevented, and blood, and tears, and misery, might have been spared. General Whittingham, who commanded the cavalry and artillery in Aragon when the King arrived at Zaragoza, and who



accompanied him by his express orders to Valencia, was asked in that city his opinion whether the King should swear to the constitution or not? He replied, that the constitution was too democratic to be in accord either with the habits and opinions of the Spanish people, or with the laws and customs of the Spanish monarchy; it must be modified therefore in many parts, or there could be no hope of its duration. Yet one of its articles forbade the slightest alteration during the space of eight years; and thus the King, if he swore to it, must either deprive himself of all possibility of amending it during that time, or be guilty of predetermined perjury. He delivered it therefore as his opinion, that the King under these circumstances could not swear to the constitution as it then existed; but, he added, that the Cortes had deserved well both of the King and of the country; that the King, unaccompanied by a single soldier, should in person dissolve the Cortes, should thank them for the service they had rendered the state, and say that it would gratify him to see them re-elected by their constituents as members of the Cortes which he was about to summon.

The British ambassador, Sir Henry Wellesley, had gone to Valencia to meet the King, and the advice which he gave was to the same effect, that he should modify the constitution, but not annul it. This indeed was the opinion which any Englishman who regarded the situation of Spain with a sincere wish for the peace and prosperity and improvement of a great and noble nation would then have formed; for this was the straightforward course which at that golden opportunity it behoved the King to take. But there were few Spaniards who saw this, few who were in a state of sufficient equanimity to see it: inflamed by strong passions, or settled in strong prepos-

sessions which no force of reason, no lessons of experience could shake, a small minority were bent upon violent change, a much more powerful and now more active party were resolved to resist all alteration, even such as was most needed ; while the great majority of the people, looking back upon the tranquillity they had enjoyed before the war as to a golden age, desired nothing but to return to their old habits and their old pursuits, and relapse into their former state of happy indifference to all political affairs. The care of the nation they were for leaving to the government, the care of religion to the Holy Office, and the care of their individual consciences to the priest, as implicitly as they relied on Providence for the due return of the seasons ; and it was with these, who were the great body of his subjects, that Ferdinand, who would have been just such a subject himself, was in perfect sympathy. It is often seen that circumstances awaken dormant genius, and bring latent qualities into strong action : but no circumstances can raise an ordinary man to the level of extraordinary times, no circumstances can give strength to a weak mind ; nor can anything but the special grace of God call forth in the heart a virtue which is not innate in it.

The Cortes at this time repeated their solicitations that the King would proceed to Madrid, and establish the happiness of Spain ; but they made a show of military preparations to support their own authority ; and they took upon themselves, with singular indiscretion, to regulate the establishment of his household. But every day now diminished their numbers as well as their strength ; and more than seventy of the mem-  
*Memorial  
of the  
Serviles.*  
bers sent a deputation to Valencia to present a memorial, in which they protested against the measures of the Cortes as having been carried by force and intimidation, and professed for themselves, and for the provinces

which they represented, fidelity to their ancient laws and institutions. Beyond all doubt they spoke the sense of the provinces. In most of the large towns, the *Stone of the Constitution removed.* *Plaza Mayor*, or Great Square, had been new named *Plaza de la Constitucion*, and a stone with these words engraven on it erected there ; at Valencia this was removed one night, and in the morning what is absurdly called a provisional stone of wood, was set up in its place, with the words *Real Plaza de Fernando VII.* : this was publicly done ; and the provisional stone was first borne under Ferdinand's window with military honours, in a long procession formed by the populace, with officers intermixed, carrying drawn swords, and bearing the royal flag. A stanza, composed\* and printed for the occasion, was soon affixed to it, denouncing, in a ferocious spirit, vengeance upon any one who should profane it, and upon the liberal party.

The news of Buonaparte's deposition, and the consequent termination of hostilities, reached Ferdinand during his tarriance at Valencia. Any perplexity which he might have felt (if he could be supposed to have felt any) concerning the treaty of Valençay was thus removed, and there was nothing to withdraw his attention from the immediate object of resuming his absolute authority, and suppressing what he now regarded as a mere revolutionary faction. He was delayed a week by indisposition, which confined him to his apartment. The first thing he did, when he was sufficiently recovered to leave the house, was to visit all the nunneries, that the nuns might

\* Piedra immortal, que en gloria de Fernando  
 Hoy el brazo del justo aqui coloca,  
 En ti se estrelle el enemigo bando,  
 Qual se estrella la nave en dura roca :  
 Y si algun vil ideas abrigando  
 Contra el Rey, te profana ó te provoca,  
 Que muera ; y que á cenizas reducido  
 Sirva de exemplo al liberal partido.



not be disappointed in their ardent desire of seeing him; and in these visits part of two days was employed much to the increase of his popularity, this being at the same time an evidence, it was thought, of good-nature, and of devout respect to the superstition of the country. When these visits were concluded, he attended an evening *Te Deum* in the cathedral, performed by the light of 20,000 tapers; after which he and the Infantes adored a chalice of legendary reputation which is venerated there. Hitherto there had been no avowal of the course which he intended to pursue; but on this day a declaration appeared, signed by the King and by Macanaz, as Secretary of State, with special powers for this peculiar occasion. In this memorable paper, Ferdinand, speaking in his own person, began by briefly touching upon his accession to the throne, and his imprisonment, at the commencement of which he had issued, he said, as well as he could, while surrounded by force, a decree addressed to the Council of Castille, or, in defect of it, to any other chancellery or audience that might be at liberty, requiring them to convoke a Cortes which should employ itself solely on the immediate business of taking measures and raising supplies for the defence of the kingdom, and remain permanent for other emergencies. This decree had arrived too late; and when the Cortes of 1810 was assembled, the states of the nobility and clergy were not summoned to it, although the Central Junta had so directed; and the members, after taking the oaths, "whereby," said he, "they bound themselves to preserve to me, as their sovereign, all my dominions, on the very day of their installation, and for a commencement of their proceedings, despoiled me of the sovereignty which they had just before acknowledged, attributing it nominally to the nation, for the purpose of appropriating

*Breve Relación de los sucesos en Valencia.*

*Ferdinand's declaration. May 4.*

it to themselves, and then dictating what laws they pleased. Thus, without authority from province, place, or junta, and without the knowledge of those which were said to be represented by substitute members, they imposed upon the nation the yoke of a new constitution, wherein almost the whole form of the old constitution of the monarchy was changed; and, copying the revolutionary and democratical principles of the French constitution of 1791, they sanctioned . . . not the fundamental laws of a moderate monarchy, . . . but those of a popular government, with a chief or magistrate, their mere delegated executor, and not a King, although they gave him that name to deceive and seduce the unwary. They carried these laws by means of the threats and violence of those persons with whom the galleries of the Cortes were filled; giving thus the colour of the general will to what was in fact only the work of a faction. With the same want of liberty, the constitution was signed and sworn to; and it was notorious to all what had been the treatment of the respectable Bishop of Orense, and the punishment with which others had been threatened who refused to sign and swear to it."

He proceeded then to say in what manner revolutionary principles had been diffused in journals, some of which were edited by members of the Cortes; that king, and tyrant, and despot had been used as synonymous terms; that the army and navy and other establishments which used to be called royal, had been re-named national, in order to flatter the people, who, nevertheless, in spite of these arts, retained by their native loyalty the good feelings which always formed their character. "Of all this," he continued, "since I happily re-entered the kingdom, I have been acquiring faithful information, partly by my own observation, and partly from the public papers, in which, up to this day, representations of my

coming and of my character are circulated, so false and infamous in themselves, that even with regard to any other individual they would be heavy offences, worthy of severe exposure and punishment. Such unexpected circumstances have filled my heart with bitterness, which has only been tempered by demonstrations of affection from all those who hoped for my arrival, that my presence might put an end to these evils, and to the oppression in which those were held who preserved the remembrance of my person, and desired the true happiness of their country. True and loyal Spaniards, I promise and vow to you that you shall not be deceived in your noble hopes! Your sovereign wishes to be so for your sake; and in this he places his glory, . . in being the sovereign of an heroic nation, who by immortal deeds have gained the admiration of all, and preserved their liberty and their honour. I abhor and detest despotism: the intelligence and cultivation of the nations of Europe do not suffer it now; neither in Spain have its Kings ever been despots, nor have its good laws and constitution authorized it, though by misfortune there may have been from time to time there, as every where, and in every thing human, abuses which no possible constitution can entirely preclude; and these were not the faults of the constitution, but of individuals, and the effects of melancholy but very rare circumstances which gave occasion to them. Yet to prevent them as far as may be by human foresight, preserving the honour of the royal dignity and its rights (for rights it has) and those which belong to the people, which are equally inviolable, I will consult with the *procuradores* of Spain and of the Indies, and in a Cortes, legitimately assembled, composed of both, as soon as they can be brought together, (order having been restored, and the good usages in



which the nation has lived, and which with its accord the Kings, my august predecessors, have established,) every thing that can conduce to the good of my kingdom shall be firmly and legitimately established, that my subjects may live prosperously and happily under a religion and a government closely united in an indissoluble tie, wherein and wherein alone consists the temporal happiness of a King and a kingdom bearing for excellence the title of Catholic. Immediate preparations shall be made for assembling these Cortes. Liberty and security, individual and royal, shall be firmly secured by means of laws, which, guaranteeing public tranquillity and order, shall leave to all that wholesome liberty, the undisturbed enjoyment of which distinguishes a moderate government from an arbitrary and despotic one. This just liberty all, likewise, shall enjoy to communicate their ideas and thoughts through the press, that is, within those limits which sound reason prescribes to all, that it degenerate not into licentiousness; for the respect which is due to religion and to government, and that which men ought mutually to observe towards each other, can under no civilized government be reasonably permitted to be violated with impunity. All suspicion, also, of any waste of the public revenues shall cease; those which shall be assigned for the expenses required for the honour of my royal person and family, and that of the nation which I have the glory to govern being separated from the revenues, which, with consent of the kingdom, may be assigned for the maintenance of the state in all the branches of its administration. And the laws which shall hereafter serve as a rule of action for my subjects shall be established in concert with the Cortes; so that these bases may serve as an authentic declaration of my royal intentions in the government

with which I am about to be charged, and will represent to all, not a despot or a tyrant, but a King and a father of his subjects."

He went on to say, that having heard complaints from all parts against the constitution, and against the measures of the Cortes, . . considering also the mischiefs which had sprung therefrom, and would increase if he should sanction that constitution with his consent, . . acting, moreover, in conformity to the decided and general demonstration of the wishes of his people, wishes which were just in themselves and well founded, he declared that he would not swear to the Cortes, but that he annulled it, and abrogated all such of its acts as derogated from the rights and prerogatives of his sovereignty established by that constitution and those laws under which the nation had so long lived. And he declared all persons guilty of high treason who should attempt to support them, and to excite discontent and disturbance in his dominions, whether by writing, word, or deed. The administration was to go on under the present system till the old one could be restored; and the political and administrative branches till the future Cortes should have determined upon the permanent order of this part of the government. But from the day on which this his decree should be published and communicated to the President of the Cortes, the sittings of that Cortes should cease; all their papers should be delivered to the officers charged with the execution of this decree, and deposited in the house of the *Ayuntamiento* of Madrid, and the room in which they were deposited be locked and sealed up; and whoever should obstruct the execution of the decree, should be deemed guilty of high treason, and punished with death. All proceedings pending for any infraction of the constitution were to cease; and all persons imprisoned for such

infraction to be set at liberty forthwith. "Such," the King concluded, "is my will, because the welfare and happiness of the nation require it."

By another decree of the same date, Ferdinand conferred upon the capital, in testimony of his esteem and gratitude, and in earnest of some more signal favour, the privilege of adding to its appellation of the "right noble, loyal, and imperial town of Madrid," that of "heroic" also; and upon its *Ayuntamiento* the title of "excellency." In this decree, also, he ordered a hundred doubloons to be distributed in each of the parishes of Madrid, on the day when he should make his entrance; and he regretted that circumstances did not allow him to give greater proofs of his natural bounty.

On the following day he departed for Madrid. Such were the multitudes who came from far and near to obtain a sight of their King, that

*Ferdinand  
sets out for  
Madrid.*

*May 5.*

one continued concourse of people lined the whole way from Valencia. Every village devised some means of displaying its loyalty; some by erecting triumphal arches, such as their abilities could afford; others by strewing the road with branches and flowers for miles together. The Cortes, as he approached, could no longer dream of resistance; the decree which abrogated their constitution and put an end to their authority was posted in the streets of Madrid, countersigned by General Eguia, as Captain-General of New Castille, and Political and Military Governor of the Province, now by the King appointed; and deputations from its Audience and its *Ayuntamiento* went to meet him at Aranjuez, where he halted two days, and where the rejoicing of the inhabitants, and the illuminations which they exhibited, and the confluence of visitors, contrasted strangely with the devastation that the French had committed there; for they had stripped the gardens of every



thing which could be carried away, and had destroyed or mutilated the statues and the fountains.

Such members of the Cortes as were marked for the King's displeasure were arrested on the night before his arrival by General Eguia. On the 13th Eguia went out with the grandees in procession, habited in the ancient costume, to meet him. The Majorcan division lined the Prado, from the Puerta de Atocha, at which he entered, and the Calle de Alcalá to the Puerta del Sol, . . not to overawe the people (for a corporal and four soldiers might have repressed any discontent that appeared that day), but to increase the pomp and splendour of the festival. In the highest part of the Calle de Alcalá, . . and no scene could be better suited to such a pageant, . . a triumphal arch had been erected, as imposing in appearance as if it had been of durable materials. The balconies were hung with silk of various colours, fringed with gold and silver; and Ferdinand made his entrance amid the salute of cannon, and the sound of bells from all the churches, and the shouts and acclamations of an innumerable multitude rising above all. Their invaders had been totally defeated and expelled; their strong places were recovered; their national independence had been gloriously vindicated and established; the tyrant who had deceived, and outraged, and insulted them, had been beaten from his throne; the Intruder whom he had set over them had been hunted out of their land; their King, . . their legitimate, their popular, their beloved King was restored! Greater joy could not have been expressed, greater happiness could not have been felt, if that King had been in all respects deserving of the generous enthusiasm which was that day manifested for his sake.

*He enters  
Madrid.  
May 12.*

*Subsequent  
conduct of  
the people  
and of the  
govern-  
ment.*

If Ferdinand had now performed the promises which were distinctly made in his declaration, he might have averted much, if not all, of the subsequent danger which he incurred, and the just reproaches which will be attached to his name in history. It ought not to be said that in making those promises he had no intention of fulfilling them; for though he scrupled at no dissimulation when under duress, they were voluntary in this case, and the temper of the nation, then unequivocally declared, was such, that no purpose was to be gained by it. Ferdinand was a person of narrow mind, and his heart seems to have been incapable of generous feeling; but he was not a wicked man, nor would he have been a bad King if he had met with wise ministers, and had ruled over an enlightened people. On the two important subjects of civil and religious freedom he and the great body of the nation were in perfect sympathy, . . . both, upon both subjects, imbued with error to the core; and the popular feeling in both cases outran his. The word Liberty (*Libertad*) appeared in large bronze letters over the entrance of the Hall of the Cortes in Madrid. The people of their own impulse hurried thither to remove it; they set up ladders, forced out letter by letter from the stone, and as each was thrown into the street the spectators renewed their shouts of exultation. They collected as many of the journals of the Cortes, and of the papers and pamphlets of the *Liberales*, as could be got together; formed a procession in which the religious fraternities, and the clergy regular and secular, took the lead; piled up these papers in one of the public squares, and sacrificed them there as a political *auto-da-fé*, after which high mass was performed and *Te Deum* sung, as a thanksgiving for their triumph. The Stone of the Con-

stitution, as it was called, was everywhere removed, and replaced as it had been at Valencia. The people at Seville deposed all the existing authorities, elected others in their stead to all the offices which had existed under the old system, and then required those authorities to re-establish the Inquisition. In re-establishing that accursed tribunal by a formal act of government, in suppressing the freedom of the press, which had been abused to its own destruction, and in continuing to govern not merely as an absolute monarch, but as a despotic one, Ferdinand undoubtedly complied with the wishes of the Spanish nation. He did these things conformably to his own misguided conscience and weak judgment, as well as to his inclinations; and for so doing he was, by the voice of the people, a patriotic and popular King. In all this he cannot justly be charged with anything worse than error of judgment; fearfully injurious indeed in its consequences, but in the individual to be pitied as well as pardoned. But, in his treatment of the more conspicuous persons among the *Liberales*, whom he condemned to strict and long imprisonment, many of them for life, he brought upon himself an indelible reproach, and incurred the guilt of individual sin. Quintana, who, more than any other person, contributed by his eloquent writings to excite and sustain the national spirit, and awaken the sympathy of other nations, was one of the victims thus sentenced, and his life is said to have been not the only one which was shortened by severe confinement.

But the peninsular war concludes with the return of Ferdinand to Madrid; and its history may best be concluded with the return to his own country of the General by whom it was brought to this triumphant termination. A dukedom was conferred upon Lord Wellington, £300,000 were voted by Parliament

*Lord Wellington returns to England.*



for the purchase of an estate suitable to the dignity, and such an additional grant of income as made up the annual amount of his parliamentary allowances to £17,000.

*He takes his seat in the House of Lords.* He had not been in England since he was raised to the peerage; and thus it happened, that when he was introduced into the House of Lords to

*June 28.* take his seat, his patents of creation as Baron, Earl, Marquis, and Duke were all to be read on the same day. No ceremony of honour was omitted on this occasion: the Duchess his wife, and his mother, the Countess of Mornington, were present to behold it, being seated below the throne. After the oaths had been administered, and he had taken his seat, the Lord Chancellor

*The Lord Chancellor's speech.* Eldon addressed him for the purpose of conveying the thanks of the House, which had been voted to him on the preceding evening, for the

twelfth time. In performing this duty, Lord Eldon said, he could not refrain from calling the attention of his Grace, and of the noble Lords present, to a circumstance singular in the history of that House, . . . that upon his introduction he had gone through every dignity of the peerage in this country which it was in the power of the crown to bestow. These dignities had been conferred upon him for eminent and distinguished services; and he would not have the presumption to attempt to state the nature of those services, nor to recapitulate those brilliant acts which had given immortality to the name of Wellington, and placed this empire on a height of military renown of which there was no example in its history. He could not better discharge the duty which had devolved upon him than by recurring to the terms in which that House had so often expressed their sense of the energy, the unremitting exertions, the ardour, and the ability with which the noble Duke had conducted the arduous campaigns of the Peninsula, . . . exertions

and ability which finally enabled him to place the allied armies in the heart of France, fighting their way there through the blaze of victory. The glorious result of his victories had been to achieve the peace and security of his country; while, by his example, he had animated the rest of Europe, and enabled her governments to restore their ancient order. The Lord Chancellor then expressed his own satisfaction in being the instrument of informing the Duke that the House unanimously voted their thanks for his eminent and unremitted services, and their congratulations upon his return to his country.

The House of Commons in voting their thanks had voted also that a committee of the House should wait upon his Grace to communicate the same, and to offer him their congratulations on his return. The Duke in reply signified that he was desirous of expressing to the House his answer in person. He was admitted in consequence the following day; a chair was set for him toward the middle of the House: he came in making his obeisances, the whole House rising upon his entrance. The Speaker having informed him that there was a chair in which he might repose himself, the Duke sat down, covered for some time, the serjeant standing on his right hand with the mace grounded, and the House resumed their seats. The Duke then rose and uncovered, and addressed the Speaker thus: "I was anxious to be permitted to attend this House in order to return my thanks in person for the honour they have done me in deputing a committee of members to congratulate me on my return to this country; and this after the House had animated my exertions by their applause upon every occasion which appeared to merit their approbation; and after they had filled up the measure of their

*The House of Commons congratulate him on his return.*

*July 1.  
He returns thanks to the House.*

favours by conferring upon me, at the recommendation of the Prince Regent, the noblest gift that any subject had ever received.

“ I hope it will not be deemed presumptuous in me to take this opportunity of expressing my admiration of the great efforts made by this House and by the country, at a moment of unexampled pressure and difficulty, in order to support the great scale of operation by which the contest was brought to so fortunate a termination.

“ By the wise policy of Parliament the government was enabled to give the necessary support to the operations which were carried on under my direction ; and I was encouraged by the confidence reposed in me by his Majesty’s ministers and by the Commander-in-chief, by the gracious favour of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent, and by the reliance which I had on the support of my gallant friends the general officers of the army, and on the bravery of the officers and troops, to carry on the operations in such a manner as to acquire for me those marks of the approbation of this House, for which I have now the honour to make my humble acknowledgments. Sir, it is impossible for me to express the gratitude which I feel ; I can only assure the House that I shall always be ready to serve his Majesty in any capacity in which my services can be deemed useful, with the same zeal for my country which has already acquired for me the approbation of this House.”

Mr. Abbot, the Speaker, who had sat covered during this speech, then stood up uncovered, and replied to his Grace in these words : “ My Lord, since last I had the honour of addressing you from this place, a series of eventful years has elapsed, but none without some mark and note of your rising glory.

“ The military triumphs which your valour has achieved upon the banks of the Douro and the Tagus,

*The  
Speaker's  
speech.*



of the Ebro and the Garonne, have called forth the spontaneous shouts of admiring nations. Those triumphs it is needless at this day to recount. Their names have been written by your conquering sword in the annals of Europe, and we shall hand them down with exultation to our children's children.

“It is not, however, the grandeur of military success which has alone fixed our admiration, or commanded our applause; it has been that generous and lofty spirit which inspired your troops with unbounded confidence, and taught them to know that the day of battle was always a day of victory; that moral courage and enduring fortitude which, in perilous times, when gloom and doubt had beset ordinary minds, stood nevertheless unshaken; and that ascendancy of character which, uniting the energies of jealous and rival nations, enabled you to wield at will the fates and fortunes of mighty empires.

“For the repeated thanks and grants bestowed upon you by this House, in gratitude for your many and eminent services, you have thought fit this day to offer us your acknowledgments: but this nation well knows that it is still largely your debtor; it owes to you the proud satisfaction, that amidst the constellation of great and illustrious warriors who have recently visited our country, we could present to them a leader of our own, to whom all, by common acclamation, conceded the pre-eminence. And when the will of Heaven, and the common destinies of our nature, shall have swept away the present generation, you will have left your great name and example as an imperishable monument, exciting others to like deeds of glory, and serving at once to adorn, defend, and perpetuate the existence of this country amongst the ruling nations of the earth.”

With these honours was the Duke of Wellington received, and such honours were never more fully de-

served. Since the peace of Utrecht, in which the interests of Europe were sacrificed by that party-spirit which is the reproach of England, our military reputation had declined. The American war contributed to lower us in the estimation of our neighbours; for though the courage of our men was never found wanting in the day of trial, the circumstances of that contest were such that, after the first season for vigorous measures was gone by, success became morally impossible. This was not taken into the account. The war ended to our loss; and the disgrace which should exclusively have attached to our councils affected our arms also. When the Duke of York was made commander-in-chief, our military establishments were in a wretched state; boys held commissions literally before they were out of leading-strings; there was not a single institution in Great Britain wherein tactics were taught; and it was in France that young Arthur Wellesley learned the elements of war! The Duke of York soon began a silent and efficient reform; abuse after abuse was removed, defect after defect supplied; but these improvements were known only to persons connected with the army; and its military character suffered materially in the revolutionary war from causes which are neither imputable to the commander, nor to the soldiers under him: for then also, as in the American war, they were placed in circumstances which rendered success impossible. The evil, however, was done. The enemy insulted us; the continental nations were persuaded that we were not a military people; and we, contenting ourselves with our acknowledged maritime supremacy, were but too ready to assent to an opinion which in its consequences must have operated as a death-sentence upon national honour, national power, and national independence. It is not too much to say that our army would have sunk into contempt, if the expedition

to Egypt had not thrown some splendour over the close of a most ill-fated and ill-conducted war. But the effect which that expedition produced upon public feeling soon passed away ; and the French convinced themselves that our success had been owing to the incapacity of their commander, the disputes among their generals, and the universal desire of their troops to escape from Egypt, . . any cause rather than the true one. A second war broke out ; and while the enemy obtained the most signal victories, we had only the solitary battle of Maida to boast, which was upon so small a scale, and so nugatory in its consequences, that the continent never heard of it, though our disgrace at Buenos Ayres was known everywhere.

Meantime the French had persuaded Europe as well as themselves that Buonaparte was the greatest military genius of ancient or of modern times ; that his generals were all consummate masters in the art of war ; and that his troops were, in every respect, the best in the world. This opinion was more than ever prevalent when Sir Arthur Wellesley took the command in Portugal in 1809, and began a career which, when all circumstances are considered, may truly be said to be unparalleled in military history. He entered upon that career at a time when the military reputation and the military power of France were at their greatest height ; when a belief that it was impossible to resist the commanding genius and inexhaustible resources of Buonaparte had been inculcated in this country with pestilent activity, and had deeply tainted the public mind. Daily and weekly, monthly and quarterly, this poison was administered with the most mischievous perseverance in newspapers, magazines, and reviews. Never was there an opinion more injurious, more fatal to the honour, interest, safety, independence, and existence of the country ; yet was it



propagated by writers who were then held in the highest estimation, and they enforced it with a zeal which arrayed their passions, and seemed to array their wishes, as well as their intellect, on the enemy's side ; and with a confidence which boldly affirmed that nothing but folly or madness could presume to doubt their predictions. Suicidal as the belief was, it was the creed of that party in the state to which these writers had attached themselves ; and no effort was omitted on their part for deadening the hopes, thwarting the exertions, disgusting the allies, and encouraging the enemies of their country. Our government was not influenced by such advisers ; but it was long before its exertions were commensurate with the occasion ; and during four years Lord Wellington was crippled by the inadequacy of his means. Yet, even when thus crippled, he contended successfully against the undivided power of France. Every operation of the British army under his command tended to give the troops and the nation fresh confidence in their general, and to impress upon the enemy a proper sense of the British character. Wherever he met the French he defeated them ; whenever he found it necessary to retire for want of numbers, or of food, or of co-operation in the Spaniards, it was in such order, and so leisurely, as neither to raise the hopes of the enemy, nor abate those of his army, or of his allies. After the battle of Talavera, and the series of provoking misconduct by which the effects of that victory were frustrated, he distinctly perceived the course which the enemy would pursue, and, anticipating all their temporary advantages (which yet he omitted no occasion of opposing and impeding), he saw and determined how and where the vital struggle must be made. The foresight of a general was never more admirably displayed ; and if there be one place in the Peninsula more appropriate than another for

a monument to that leader whose trophies are found throughout the whole, it is in the lines of Torres Vedras that a monument to Lord Wellington should be erected. When he took his stand there, Lisbon was not the only stake of that awful contest: the fate of Europe was in suspense; and they who, like Homer, could see the balance in the hand of Jupiter, might then have perceived that the fortunes of France were found wanting in the scale. There the spell which bound the nations was broken; the plans of the tyrant were baffled, his utmost exertions when he had no other foe and no other object were defied; his armies were beaten; and Europe, taking heart when she beheld the deliverance of Portugal, began to make a movement for her own, . . . for that spirit by which alone her deliverance could be effected was excited. Foresight and enterprise, meantime, with our commander went hand in hand; he never advanced, but so as to be sure of his retreat; and never retreated, but in such an attitude as to impose upon a superior enemy. He never gave an opportunity, and never lost one. His movements were so rapid as to deceive and astonish the French, who prided themselves upon their own celerity. He foiled general after general, defeated army after army, captured fortress after fortress; and, raising the military character of Great Britain to its old standard in the days of Marlborough, made the superiority of the British soldier over the Frenchman as incontestable as that of the British seaman.

The spirit of the country rose with its successes. England once more felt her strength, and remembered the part which she had borne, and the rank which she had asserted in the days of her Edwards and her Henrys. Buonaparte had bestowed upon France the name of the Sacred Territory, boasting, as one of the benefits conferred upon her by his government, that France alone

remained inviolable when every other part of the continent was visited by the calamities of war. That boast was no longer to hold good! Our victories in the Peninsula prepared the deliverance of Europe, and Lord Wellington led the way into France. A large portion of his army consisted of Portugueze and Spaniards, who had every imaginable reason to hate the people among whom they went as conquerors; they had seen the most infernal cruelties perpetrated in their own country by the French soldiers; and it might have been supposed, prone as their national character was to revenge, that they would eagerly seize the opportunity for vengeance. But such was Lord Wellington's influence over the men whom he conducted to victory, that not an outrage, not an excess, not an insult was committed; and the French, who had made war like savages in every country which they had invaded, experienced all the courtesies and humanities of generous warfare when they were invaded themselves. In Gascony, as well as in Portugal and Spain, the Duke of Wellington's name was blessed by the people. Seldom indeed has it fallen to any conqueror to look back upon his career with such feelings! The marshal's staff, the dukedom, the honours and rewards which his Prince and his country so munificently and properly bestowed, were neither the only nor the most valuable recompense of his labours. There was something more precious than these, more to be desired than the high and enduring fame which he had secured by his military achievements, . . . the satisfaction of thinking to what end those achievements had been directed; . . . that they were for the deliverance of two most injured and grievously oppressed nations; . . . for the safety, honour, and welfare of his own country; . . . and for the general interests of Europe and of the civilized world. His campaigns were sanctified by the cause; . . . they were sullied by no cruelties, no crimes;



the chariot-wheels of his triumphs have been followed by no curses; . . his laurels are entwined with the amarantths of righteousness, and upon his death-bed he might remember his victories among his good works.

This is the great and inappreciable glory of England in this portion of its history, that its war in the Peninsula was in as strict conformity with the highest principles of justice as with sound state policy. No views of aggrandizement were entertained either at its commencement or during its course, or at its termination; conquests were not looked for, commercial privileges were not required. It was a defensive, a necessary, a retributive war; engaged in as the best means of obtaining security for ourselves, but having also for its immediate object "to loose the bands of wickedness," and to break the yoke of oppression, and "to let the oppressed go free." And this great deliverance was brought about by England, with God's blessing on a righteous cause. If France has not since that happy event continued to rest under a mild and constitutional monarchy, . . if Spain has relapsed into the abuses of an absolute one, . . if the Portuguese have not supported that character which they recovered during the contest, . . it has been because in all these instances there were national errors which retained their old possession, and national sins which were not repented of. But the fruits of this war will not be lost upon posterity: for in its course it has been seen that the most formidable military power which ever existed in the civilized world was overthrown by resolute perseverance in a just cause; it has been seen also that national independence depends upon national spirit, but that even that spirit in its highest and heroic degree may fail . . if wisdom to direct it be wanting. It has been seen what guilt and infamy men, who might otherwise have left an honourable name, entailed upon

themselves, because, hoping to effect a just end by iniquitous means, they consented to a wicked usurpation, and upheld it by a system of merciless tyranny, sinning against their country and their own souls: this was seen in the Spanish ministers of the Intruder; and the Spanish reformers, more lamentably for Spain, but more excusably for themselves, have shown the danger of attempting to carry crude theories of government into practice; and hurrying on precipitate changes, from the consequences of which men too surely look to despotism for protection or for deliverance. These lessons have never been more memorably exemplified than in the Peninsular War; and for her own peculiar lesson, England, it may be hoped, has learnt to have ever from thenceforth a just reliance, under Providence, upon her resources and her strength; . . . under Providence, I say, for if that support be disregarded, all other will be found to fail.

My task is ended here: and if in the course of this long and faithful history, it should seem that I have anywhere ceased to bear the ways of Providence in mind, or to have admitted a feeling, or given utterance to a thought inconsistent with glory to God in the highest, and good-will towards men, let the benevolent reader impute it to that inadvertence or inaccuracy of expression from which no diligence, however watchful, can always be secure; and as such let him forgive what, if I were conscious of it, I should not easily forgive in myself.

*Keswick, 26th March, 1832.*

*Laus Deo.*

# LIST OF PUBLICATIONS

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History of the War in the Peninsula and in the South of France, from the year 1807 to the year 1814. By W. F. P. Napier, C.B. Lieutenant-Colonel, H.P. forty-third regiment. Vols. I. and II., 1828, 1829.

All that part of the present history relating to the events of which General Foy has treated, or to which the histories of Lord Londonderry and Colonel Napier have as yet extended, was printed before either of those works appeared.

THE END.

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